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Abstract 
Researchers have been investigating the clinical judgement and decision-making of 
nurses for several decades now. However, prior to the research described in this thesis, 
Registered Psychiatric Nurses (RPNs) working in the Irish Republic had not been the 
subject of a comprehensive study looking specifically at their clinical judgement and 
decision-making. As this is the first study conducted in this area, it takes an exploratory 
descriptive approach. 
With a comprehensive review of the literature and pilot study (n=7) as its basis, a novel 
mixed methods study was designed. Simulated cases presented in an audio-visual 
format were used to collect in-vivo and retrospective data in the form of narratives from 
participants (n=40) across the Irish Republic. The sample comprises RPNs across all 
levels of experience working in several sites, representing the full range of Irish mental 
health services. The data were analysed using comparative keyword analysis and 
conversation analysis informed discursive analysis. 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis reveals participants’ judgement and decision-
making to be routinised and habitual, hinging on reference to typicality grounded 
mainly in psychiatric diagnoses. The role of participants can be seen to represent the 
paternalism of the social order of which it is part. Participants express confidence and 
certainty in their judgement and decision-making, even where paraverbal and other 
discursive evidence points towards situations characterised by uncertainty.  
The study’s findings are of particular interest given the direction envisaged for the 
profession of psychiatric nursing by leading academics, health service providers and 
professional and statutory bodies. The findings of this study suggest that if psychiatric 
nursing in the Irish Republic is to proceed towards more person-centred, autonomous 
practice with a stronger therapeutic focus, dramatic restructuring of psychiatric nurses’ 
roles will be required. In conclusion, the thesis discusses this situation with reference to 
the challenges made evident by the study, along with the viable options available to 
address them. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This study explores the clinical judgement and decision-making of registered 
psychiatric nurses (RPNs) working in the Irish Republic. It is part of an 
interdisciplinary, collaborative, Health Research Board funded “Integrated Programme 
of Research to Maximise the Effectiveness of Clinical Nursing Resources” - the first 
study to consider nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making in the Irish Republic. 
This programme of research is foundational, with no body of judgement and decision-
making research from an Irish context to build on.  
As part of a foundational programme of research, this study is exploratory and 
descriptive. Exploratory descriptive studies are often used to investigate areas about 
which little is known in a specific context. They have proved useful in nursing, 
psychiatric nursing and mental health generally (Koopowitz et al 2003, Newton et al 
2007, Gleeson & Higgins 2009).  
The exploratory nature of this study lies in two main features. As with exploratory 
studies generally (Pridemore 2006), it is the first study of its kind in the Irish Republic. 
Given this, it does not seek to test any hypotheses (Nunkoosing 2005, Tachibana 2005). 
Instead it seeks to give a general overview of psychiatric nurses’ clinical judgement and 
decision-making in an Irish context in order to serve the development of policy, practice 
and education in psychiatric nursing, as well as informing future research studies.  
1.1.1 Stylistic Issues 
Researchers often write in the first person (Porter 2000), as I have done throughout this 
thesis. This is in order to lend as much reflexivity (Porter 2000) as possible to my 
description of the study. Reflexivity is that process whereby the researcher 
acknowledges and considers the pros and cons of any personal stake holding, subjective 
opinions and/or values with regard to the research and its subject matter. Writing 
reflexively has positive implications for trustworthiness and credibility of research 
findings (Hall & Callery 2001), and this aspect is discussed in relation to the study 
design and methodology in Chapter Three. 
Throughout the thesis I refer to “psychiatric nursing”. I am aware of the various 
opinions on what terms should be used to refer to nurses working in the field of mental 
health. As this debate is not the focus of this study I have deferred to the term used by 
the statutory body that governs nursing in the Irish republic, An Bord Altranais. 
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Various terms are used to refer to people who avail of the services of psychiatrists, 
nurses and other mental health professionals. Where people are resident in hospitals I do 
not differentiate them from the general populace resident in hospitals, and simply refer 
to them as “patients”. Where people are availing of community based services I have 
avoided terms such as “client”, “consumer” etc., that differentiate individuals from the 
general populace (Barker 2004), simply referring to “people”. Where syntax demands it 
I use the phrase “service-user”. This is out of grammatical and syntactical necessity, and 
is not intended as an ideologically loaded term.  
1.2 Clinical Background & Context 
The background and context for this study is essentially that of the work of psychiatric 
nurses within the adult mental health services in the Irish republic. In their “Vision for 
Change” mental health policy document, the Department of Health and Children 
(DoHC 2006) deals in some detail with the work of psychiatric nurses, who make up the 
majority of mental heatlth services staff. The latest figures available show that there are 
9,796 registered psychiatric nurses working in the Irish Republic (An Bord Altranais 
2008a), about 10% of whom are located in community-based services (DoHC 2006).  
The policy describes the roles that are envisioned as being undertaken by psychiatric 
nurses as part of proposed changes in service provision. This involves the psychiatric 
nursing role becoming more specialised. This scope for specialist practice is not seen as 
applying only to the nursing role, but also to the roles of other team members. 
The Mental Health Commission (2005) is keen to have the voices of service-users heard 
with regard to the improvement of the quality of mental health services. One of the 
issues that arose in their consultation with key stakeholders around care provision was 
the need for nurses to be more integrated members of the mental health team. The 
Mental Health Commission (2005) has reported that mental health service providers see 
a need to have mental health care integrated more closely with primary care, with 
greater psychiatric nursing involvement with the primary care team. They cite the 
example of making psychiatric nurse consultations available as a matter of course in GP 
surgeries and accident and emergency departments. 
As part of the broader profession of nursing, psychiatric nursing in Ireland has also been 
influenced by wider changes that affect all branches of nursing. The general thrust of 
these changes has been to increase the autonomy and responsibility of the nursing role. 
The most significant area of change has been that of nurse prescribing, (An Bord 
Altranais 2008b).  
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Rooted in the custodial asylum system of addressing mental health problems, Irish 
psychiatric nursing has undergone many changes over recent decades (Nolan & 
Sheridan 2001). What has been described above is the direction that the profession 
should now take, as proposed by two of the major stakeholders and powers in Irish 
healthcare provision (Mental Health Commission 2005, DoHC 2006). I have taken this 
into account for this study, with the intention of providing evidence that will be useful 
in charting the future direction that the profession needs to take in order to best serve the 
public. 
1.3 Theoretical Background & Context 
In this Chapter I set out the broad conceptual background to human judgement and 
decision-making. In Chapter Two I examine the clinical application of these ideas as 
discussed in nursing research and academic writing. Together, these chapters are 
intended to provide the reader with a comprehensive introduction to the main concepts 
and issues being explored in this study.  
To those coming to the topic for the first time, the terminology used in the judgement 
and decision-making literature can be confusing. Buckingham & Adams (2000a, 2000b) 
see this situation as stemming from the proliferation in the nursing literature of theories 
on clinical judgement and decision-making. Indeed Dowding & Thompson (2003) have 
commented that the complex nature of judgement and decision-making is bound to be 
reflected in an equally, if not more complicated theoretical background.  
Like the medical literature, the nursing literature on judgement and decision-making has 
drawn for the most part from psychology. However, this should not be to the exclusion 
of other perspectives and disciplinary approaches to the topic. Therefore, in this study I 
have used a more sociologically oriented perspective to understand nurses’ judgement 
and decision-making in context. 
To this end, this chapter gives a broad account of coverage of the topic of human 
judgement and decision-making in the philosophical and social sciences literature as 
well as in the psychological and nursing literature. These disciplines have seen the 
discussion of various approaches and concepts relating to human judgement and 
decision-making, and I have aimed to capture this here. My intention is not to be 
exhaustive or comprehensive, but to consider each area within the context of its 
relevance to nursing.  
A caveat for any reader of “judgment” and “decision-making” literature is that these 
two terms are ascribed varied meanings throughout the literature. This applies not only 
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within disciplines as well as across them, but within publications. For the sake of 
clarity, in this thesis I do not use a plethora of terms. Instead I limit myself where 
possible to the use of the terms “judgement” and “decision-making” with specific 
reference to two distinct phenomena. In order to understand what is meant by these 
terms, it is necessary to fully discuss what they have come to represent across different 
disciplines. 
1.3.1 Human Judgement & Decision-Making 
It is difficult to frame singular definitions that cover the application of concepts in 
human judgement and decision-making across the social sciences (Packard 1962). 
Psychology is primarily concerned with the cognitive processes of judgement and 
decision-making. This involves consideration of the rationality and/or accuracy of 
judgements and/or decisions in order to assess if they are “sound” or “good” (Connolly 
et al 2000, p2).  
A prerequisite for this is the recognition and explanation of what constitutes being 
‘good’ or ‘sound’ with regard to judgement and decision-making in the area being 
studied. This is often beyond the scope of any one discipline, and therefore psychology, 
philosophy sociology, organisational and business studies are very much relevant to 
nursing judgement and decision-making. With psychology’s focus on cognitive aspects 
of human judgement and decision-making, the social sciences more generally provide 
the necessary examination of the contexts in which humans make judgements and 
decisions.  
This broad perspective is helpful in accounting for influences external to the cognitive 
faculties of the judge or decision-maker. Philosophy in particular can add to the 
discussion on what constitutes “good” or “sound” judgement, as well as serving to pull 
all strands together in a meaningful way. The contexts that need to be considered in this 
regard range from wider society down to immediate work group and environment.  
This is particularly important in nursing, where clinical practice involves a more 
intimate degree of social contact than many of the other disciplines that feature 
prominently in judgement and decision-making research (e.g., agricultural science, 
meteorology, or air traffic control). Yet philosophical or sociological perspectives tend 
not to be incorporated into the design or discussion of nursing research on clinical 
judgement and decision-making. With this in mind, I consider the contribution of 
psychology to the study of human judgement and decision-making, before discussing 
approaches from across the social sciences generally. 
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1.3.1.1 Human Judgement & Decision-Making in Psychology 
The psychological literature around judgement and decision-making has been 
dominated by discussion around the benefits of analytic versus intuitive judgement 
since the early 1950s. Meehl (1954) favoured analytic over intuitive judgement and 
decision-making, and Holt (1958) was one of his first critics in this regard. Holt (1958) 
argued that judgement, because of its very nature, must be to a large degree intuitive.  
Although Meehl’s work over the years did not deny this, his contributions did move the 
study of judgement and decision-making towards a more analytic focus (Kleinmuntz 
2000). This focus tends towards examining the accuracy of judgements and decisions 
rather than focusing on rationality per se (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995, Grove & Lloyd 
2006). In differentiating between accuracy and rationality, Hammond (2000b) explains 
that accuracy implies actual empirical precision with regard to the outcome of a 
judgement or decision. This may or may not be achieved in the case of a rational 
process of making a decision or judgement. Even though the process of arriving at a 
certain judgement or decision may be perfectly rational, this is no guarantee of its 
accuracy.  
Advances in computer science from the 1960s on influenced shift away from the 
dominance of Freudian and behaviourist perspectives towards a focus on human 
information processing (Connolly et al 2000). Technology enabled the use of 
mathematics in research in a way that had not previously been possible. Psychological 
research of judgement and decision-making began to draw heavily on statistical analysis 
and mathematics – with a new emphasis on experimental study, judgement analysis and 
decision analysis (Connolly et al 2000). 
Decision analysis involves a four-step process that requires the decision-maker to first 
identify the inherent relationships between the probabilities, available options and 
prospective outcomes of a situation (Narayan et al 2003). This involves a priori 
decomposition of the process (Raiffa 1970), using a top-down expectation for how the 
decision should be made. In contrast, judgement analysis involves a ‘bottom-up’, a 
posteriori decomposition of the judgement process.  
In judgement analysis, an a priori analysis of the judgement process is possible using a 
gold standard for the outcome of the judgement. For both judgement and decision 
analysis, it is necessary to be able to reduce a “sound” or “good” judgement to 
mathematical terms (Connolly et al 2000, p3). Whist the two approaches themselves do 
not offer a way to determine what is meant by “good” or “sound” in the first instance, 
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they are highly effective at examining judgements and decisions once ‘soundness’ or 
‘goodness’ has been attributed numerical value.  
Informal decision analysis is a more qualitative approach to decision analysis that offers 
a way to determine what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘sound’ judgement or decision. 
Although it does not involve arithmetic to the same extent, it is based on the same 
concepts as formal decision analysis insofar as it quantifies outcomes, options, and 
probabilities. Informal decision analysis is used where the purpose of decision analysis 
requires less rigour from a statistical perspective, e.g., for patient decision aids (Owens 
et al 1987, Blank et al 2006).  
With informal decision analysis, the aim is to ascertain a patient’s preferred treatment 
as opposed to the best treatment in terms of likelihood of positive outcome (Deadman et 
al 2001). Informal decision analysis is more qualitative as it serves more qualitative 
ends, such as increasing patient responsibility and building the clinician-patient 
relationship through shared decision-making. For this reason, informal decision analysis 
is more suited to clinical practice, whilst formal decision and judgement analysis 
approaches are more useful for research purposes. 
The empirical focus of formal decision analysis and judgement analysis has been seen 
as particularly useful in researching the role of human intuition in judgement and 
decision-making. Kahneman (2003a, p697) defines intuition as “thoughts and 
preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection”. Since the early 
1970s the focus of psychological research has shifted from the usefulness of intuition 
(Hadamard 1945) towards examining the tendency for error in intuition (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1974, Kahneman & Tversky 1982).  
Several theoretical concepts, such as stereotyping (Wittenbrink et al 1998, Wegener et 
al 2006), heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman 1973) and pattern recognition (Deutsch et al 
1994, Rosenfeld & Weschler 2000) have been developed as a result of research and 
conceptual work around the role of intuition in human judgement and decision-making. 
Heuristics is the term used to describe the cognitive process by which individuals use 
probability-like judgements to arrive at a subjective likelihood estimate on which 
subsequent judgements are based (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Goldstein & Gigerenzer 
2002). The use of heuristics has been shown to reduce task complexity, simplifying the 
judgement process. This occurs by replacing intricate analytic processes involving the 
assessment of probability and prediction of values with simple heuristic rules - although 
not without widening the scope for error (Tversky & Kahneman 2000). 
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Pattern recognition is defined by El-Deredy (1997, p99) as “the ability to identify and 
interpret meaningful regularities in noisy or complex environments”. This involves four 
distinct cognitive processes: acquiring information, recognising salient features, 
detecting similarities between patterns, and subsequent evaluation of the situation 
(Rosenfled & Weschler 2000). This process is not deliberate and analytic, but rapid and 
intuitive. 
Social psychology has seen the study of stereotyping grow considerably over the last 
two decades (Wegener et al 2006). Gaertner & McLoughlin (1983, p23) describe a 
stereotype as “in part, a collection of associations that link the target group to a set of 
descriptive characteristics”. Research has focused either on stereotyping as automatic or 
stereotyping as a controlled behaviour (Wegener et al 2006) - with the greater focus on 
the automatic nature of stereotyping (Perdue & Gurtman 1990, Fazio et al 1995, Banaji 
& Hardin 1996, Dovidio et al 1997). 
Subjective expected utility theory (SEU) has proved useful in examining the rationality 
of judgements and decisions. This approach accounts for the beliefs and values of a 
rational person making a decision, calculating different possible outcomes and 
identifying the optimal choice for the individual in the given situation (Shaban 2005a). 
SEU is one of a range of theories based on the expectancy values element of Bayesian 
theory (Edwards 1954, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995).  
Savage (1954) developed SEU from the expected utility theory of van Neumann & 
Morgenstern (1947). Expected utility theory aims to give a mathematical explanation of 
a person’s decisions based on their rational use of a rule-based approach to maximise 
the expected utility, or benefit, from a decision. In doing this it uses a probability-
weighted average to account for what might be ‘expected’. SEU differs from this in that 
instead of basing maximum expected utility on probability-weighted averages it uses the 
person’s own subjective expected utility.  
From the 1960s onwards, psychologists studying human judgement and decision 
making became interested in developing descriptive theoretical explanations and models 
of human information processing (Neisser 1967, Newell & Simon 1972). The study of 
human information processing considers the roles played by our limited or ‘bounded’ 
rationality, short-term memory and an infinite long-term memory store. Information 
processing theory has been one of the most influential approaches to studying and 
explaining how nurses make clinical judgements and decisions (Thompson & Dowding 
2009c).  
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Consideration of the hypothetico-deductive process is another popular, similar approach 
that has proved useful in this regard. Studying this process involves gaining insight into 
how individuals selectively generate several hypotheses in relation to a specific task or 
situation (induction) (Elstein et al 1978). Having thought about various potential 
outcomes, the individual then rules out one or more of these hypotheses (deduction) 
(Cacioppo & Tassinary 1990).  
Whilst these approaches are considered mainly with the cognitive processing involved 
in judgement and decision-making, some researchers have sought to account for the 
attention paid by individuals to the ecological aspects of judgement tasks. This involves 
identifying relevant ecological factors and trying to account for their complexity and 
variability. This is achieved by representing them numerically for the purposes of 
statistical and algebraic modelling (Brunswik 1952).  
The most popular approach in this regard is that of social judgement theory (Hammond 
et al 1975). It involves the application of models such as the lens model to judgement 
tasks in order to account for the role played by social factors (Hammond et al 1975, 
Hammond 1978, Cooksey 1996). Social judgement theory has been successfully applied 
to nursing (Dowding 2002) and medicine (Wigton 1996).  
One of the most useful developments of social judgement theory has been Hammond’s 
(1988, 1996a) non-traditional cognitive continuum theory (Connolly & Beach 2000). 
This has proved particularly useful in modelling and exploring the relationship between 
intuitive and analytic approaches in judgement and decision-making (Offredy et al 
2008, Beckstead 2009). In doing this, cognitive continuum theory places the cognitive 
processes of analytic and intuitive judgement at either end of a spectrum, each seen as 
more suited to certain situations than to others.  
Cognitive continuum theory also places types of judgement tasks along a continuum of 
six categories, ranging from well-structured to ill-defined tasks (Hammond 1978). Well-
structured tasks stand in contrast to ill-defined tasks in terms of the amount and 
relevance of information available and complexity of the task at hand. Also considered 
are the potential for accuracy and pressure due to time constraints inherent in a task 
(Hamm 1988). In this way, cognitive continuum theory seeks to account for both the 
ecological and cognitive elements involved in the process. 
At the analytic end of the continuum Hammond uses scientific experimentation as an 
example of the type of task in which analytic thinking predominates, whereas at the 
other end of the continuum quasi-rational intuition is dominant (Hammond 1978). The 
more intuitive processes described in the cognitive continuum might lend towards 
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acceptable outcomes for certain non-complex task types. Their use, however, leads to 
less favourable outcomes for those tasks which require what Coler (2003) has referred 
to as a more predictive, or analytic, approach.  
As might be expected, approaches in psychology to human judgement and decision-
making are concerned mainly with the cognitive processes involved. However, there is 
also a concern for the ecological elements, e.g., task features, time pressure, and so on. 
These, along with aspects of cognitive processing, can be represented numerically for 
the purposes of quantitative research and modelling.  
As demonstrated in this section, the theories, models and frameworks produced by this 
type of enquiry form the basis for exploring the cognitive and immediate ecological 
factors involved in human judgement and decision-making. To account for the more 
qualitative aspects of human judgement and decision-making, such as what is ‘good’ or 
‘sound’, changing individual preferences, and wider social influences, it helps to look 
beyond what psychology has to offer. Of particular help in this regard are the 
contributions of philosophers, sociologists and other social scientists and commentators. 
1.3.1.2 Human Judgement and Decision Making: Beyond Psychology 
In its focus on individual judgement and decision-making, psychology differs from 
approaches that are concerned with the wider social context. For the most part these 
involve consideration of the societal and organisational contexts in which people make 
judgements and decisions. These raise issues such as role, semiosis and the sharing of 
objectives.  
The nature of inquiry into these aspects of judgement and decision-making differs from 
that of psychology in that psychologists are interested primarily in the individual. Social 
scientists considering the wider interactional context of judgement and decision-making 
are interested in individuals as part of work groups, institutions and society as a whole. 
Their research differs from psychology in that this wider social context is its main 
focus. 
Consideration of shared objectives is a key element in social theories that look at 
decision-making from the perspective of the group or organisation as opposed to the 
individual (Bourgeois 1980). The degree to which objectives are shared by a work 
group is vital to the fulfilment of a decision task, and will itself hinge on the degree to 
which the group has shared understanding of both the means and the ends (Simon 
1957). This shared understanding is often enshrined in a clearly stated, mutually 
accepted, and socially valorised form, e.g., an organisational strategy.  
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Given this, any consideration of judgement and decision-making from a wider social 
perspective must first deal with how meaning is made (semiosis). This involves looking 
at individuals’ understanding of roles and routine social practices in relation to 
judgement and decision-making. This reveals the complexities, in both theoretical and 
practical terms, of the wider social aspects of human judgement and decision-making.  
For example, researchers seeking to understand judgement and decision-making 
processes may find that participants are simply following a pattern of behaviour without 
consciously choosing a course of action. Theoretical concepts explaining such situations 
are vital to understanding instances of human judgement and decision-making, 
particularly where individuals simply cannot explain why they decided to take a 
particular course of action. There is overlap here with the psychological concept of 
intuition, and awareness is needed at this point that social and psychological theories 
often consider the same phenomena from different viewpoints. 
From sociological perspective, oft-repeated activities that become patterned over time 
so that they are carried out without any apparent deliberation in judgement or decision-
making are explained by the concept of habitualisation (Berger & Luckmann 1967). The 
application of this concept can be useful in considering routinised practices, especially 
where there is difficulty in explaining the apparent opacity as regards any intelligible 
process. What a psychologist sees as a lack of conscious decision-making predicated on 
cue-based judgement, a sociologist may view as habitual, routinised behaviour. 
Despite seeming, on these grounds, to characterise low-skilled work, habitualisation is 
essential to highly specialised work (Berger & Luckmann 1967). The routinisation of 
certain activities permits attentiveness to more highly skilled tasks that are more 
demanding. Habitualisation is, therefore, one of the necessary prerequisites for the 
emergence of specialised roles (Berger & Luckmann 1967).  
Understanding the development of roles and related judgement and decision-making 
requires an awareness of the meaningfulness associated with these roles and the work 
that they involve. Meaning is a fundamental concept in sociology, and has been seen by 
structuralists and symbolic interactionists as forming the very basis for society 
(Rochberg-Halton 1982). This is borne out in the extent to which meanings are formed 
(semiosis) and shared within and between groups. This has significant bearing on the 
discussion of judgement and decision-making in the sociological literature.  
Peirce (1895/1998) offered the classic definition of semiosis as a triadic process 
involving an object, a sign representing that object, and an interpretant who finds 
meaning in that sign. The relevance of this concept for judgement and decision-making 
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is apparent in its relationship to the interpretation of cues as signs. Such interpretation is 
considered in empirical terms in social psychology approaches such as the lens model 
(Brunswik 1952, Cooksey 1996). 
Whilst such approaches consider individuals’ interpretation of cues from a quantitative 
perspective, semiosis also takes into account the qualitative interpretation of cues. 
Making sense of how individuals find and share meaning is what the study of semiosis 
is primarily concerned with. Modern definitions of semiosis may vary, but almost 
invariably draw on Peirce (1895/1998), particularly in terms of the need for an 
interpretant in the process (Sebeok 2001).  
Vital to understanding the place of semiosis in the analysis of judgement and decision-
making is Peirce’s (1895/1998) contention that an object cannot be studied in isolation 
from its being mediated to the interpretant by means of a signal. This is because the 
mediation of the object cannot be studied in isolation either (Glassman & Kang 2007). 
Therefore, it is important not to artificially separate the mediatory function from the 
sign, let alone the overall process of semiosis.  
Although all three elements of the triad of semiosis must be given due consideration, the 
object does remain the least accessible element of the triad (Glassman & Kang 2007). A 
major implication of this is the need to account for the social situation of judgment and 
decision-making, as well as accounting for the effect of the intrusion of the researcher 
into its naturalistic setting. This needs to be addressed in terms of study methodology, 
reflexivity and the need to account for the role of the researcher.  
This in itself must be addressed within the wider context of semiosis as human activity 
(Glassman & Kang 2007). This principle applies both to the semiosis being engaged in 
by the participant and the semiosis being engaged in by the researcher studying that 
participant’s activity. The importance of not focusing solely on the mediation of a sign 
when studying semiosis is of particular relevance to the study of the semiosis that 
occurs when individuals attempt to arrive at a judgement or decision as a group 
(Glassman & Kang 2007).  
This is because the meaning attributed to the sign may have neither correspondence 
between, nor stability for, all the interpretants involved. This sharing of meaning has 
been given much consideration in the sociological and related literature around group 
judgement and decision-making. In doing this, the social sciences literature uses a 
diversity of terms.  
These include ‘shared meaning’, ‘shared understanding’ and ‘shared beliefs’. Insofar as 
they have common meaning, these terms are used interchangeably in this study as they 
 13 
have been in the literature. This concept of shared meaning draws to some extent of 
Habermas’s description of shared comprehension as an important part of the consensus 
that exists within and between lifeworlds (Habermas 1992/1996). More specifically, 
shared meaning is seen as the starting point for communicative action.  The degree to 
which people in any given social context have shared meanings will depend on their 
belief systems and also on prevailing knowledge structures (Shakespeare 1998, Repert 
et al 2002).  
In terms of applicability to judgement and decision-making, the wider social science 
literature views shared meaning as part of the culture of organisations (Smircich 1983, 
Kunda 1992). With Habermas (1992/1996), the business/management research literature 
on organisational decision-making views shared meaning/understanding in the context 
of consensus (Bazzoli et al 1998, Boster et al 1983, Phillips & Bana e Costa 2007). 
Whereas some commentators equate shared understanding with consensus (Wooldridge 
& Floyd 1989, Bowman & Ambrosini 1997), others see it as only one component of this 
complex social phenomenon (Noble 1999).  
In the healthcare literature around organisational decision-making, the concept of shared 
understanding appears in relation to consensus as well as in terms of the shared 
understanding of roles (Cott 1998) and decisions regarding resource allocation (Heritage 
et al 2001). It is also an important element in the exploration of shared decision-making 
between health professionals and those who avail of their services. This is especially 
true in the context of patient-centred communication (Epstein et al 2005, Johansson et al 
2005, Wirtz et al 2006, Halpern 2007). 
Individuals tend not to share their own conceptualisations of phenomena and processes 
ad-lib, but in a specific social context in which they are engaged with others in an 
activity (Shakespeare 1998, Lam 2004). It is within this context that the hegemony 
proposed by Gramsci (1971) can be seen to operate (Brandist 1996). Where the social 
actors involved in an activity share social homogeneity they are likely to develop a 
broadly homogenous view of their situation (Midthassle 2006).  
However, where this social homogeneity is not a feature of the group, discrete views 
may develop that hinder smooth operation of the work group (Vallaster 2005). Given 
this social context, communication between individuals involved in such activity is seen 
not only as vital to the development of shared understanding (White 2002), but also of 
accommodating diversity that might otherwise fuel antagonism (Vielhaber Hermon 
1996, Vallaster 2005). Where the area of the activity is characterised by ambiguity, this 
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communication needs not only to be frequent, but structured (Jacobs & Heracleous 
2006).  
As with habitualisation and intuition, and semiosis and the interpretation of cues, the 
conceptualisation of shared understanding in sociological literature has a distinct 
parallel in the psychological literature. The building of consensus has direct relation to 
Hammond’s (1988, 1996a) inclusion of peer-aided judgement in his cognitive 
continuum. Also, the structuring of communication and other elements of judgement 
and decision-making to avoid ambiguity and dissension finds a parallel in Hammond’s 
consideration of system-aided judgement as part of the cognitive continuum. 
The aims of this study involve the social context of nurses’ judgement and decision-
making as well as the cognitive processes involved. An approach is needed, therefore, 
that brings together the wider social perspectives on human judgement and decision-
making with a psychology of judgement and decision-making that also considers its 
social aspects. This is in distinction to the more traditional laboratory-based approaches 
of cognitive psychology research which are concerned with the cogntitive processes of 
the individual in isolation, to the exclusion of the influence of other individuals on 
participants. 
The work of Mead (1934) is essential to understanding the philosophical basis for the 
role of language in the formation of shared meaning in terms of social homogeneity and 
heterogeneity. Mead (1934) saw language as the basis for the management of difference 
between self and others within and without one’s social group. Mead’s work is seminal 
in terms of the pragmatist school of thought that formed the basis for the symbolic 
interactionist approach to sociology (Rochberg-Halton 1982), and so his work is also 
essential to understanding the role played by shared meaning in social action.  
Because they draw on modes of cultural expression, individual narratives speak not only 
of an individual’s subjective reality (Berger & Luckmann 1967). Narratives also 
represent the social group and culture from which they are speaking. This again links 
back to Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony, as certain discourses tend to be 
dominant (Mogensen 1997). 
Ethnographic methodologies examine narratives to explore shared cultural 
understandings and their influence on social action (Bruner 1986a). This is both in 
terms of how the shared cultural understandings evident in narrative influence social 
action and the role played by social action in constructing shared understanding (Bruner 
1986b). This is seen as a dialectical interaction between experience and narrative.  
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Wider sociological theory has not focused solely on the transmission of shared beliefs 
within groups, but on broader issues such as the extent to which beliefs are shared 
across groups (Hollis 1982). These beliefs are shared not just because they have been 
transmitted between groups, but because of their basis in a human rationality that 
transcends social groups. These shared beliefs are seen as underpinning transcultural 
“rules of coherent judgement” (Hollis 1982, p74).  
From a psychological perspective, this is explained in terms of epistemic rationality 
underpinning instrumental rationality – or beliefs underpinning actions (Thomspon & 
Dowding 2009c). Whilst psychology considers how the individual relates the abstract 
and theoretical to the practical, from a sociological perspective the same phenomenon is 
considered from a group, institutional or societal perspective. The consideration of 
influence of preferences and values (Thompson & Dowding 2009c) is instrumental to 
both these perspectives. 
This concept is an important addition from sociological theory, which I believe can 
complement the domninant perspective of social psychologists in judgement and 
decision-making in business and organisational research. It lends to this area the 
consideration that judgement/decision rules that are shared within a work group may not 
be peculiar to that work group. Instead they may stem from a wider set of societal 
norms and values that influence judgement and decision-making and other cognitive 
activity.  
As discussed above, the application of a mix of social psychology and sociological 
theory in business organisation research has shown the role played by shared meaning 
in organisational decision-making. However, sociological research has found that 
collective action does not necessarily rely on such explicitly shared understanding 
(Bender 2003). In light of interpretive sociological theory, it is apparent that in the 
absence of explicitly shared meaning, individuals assume that meanings are shared with 
their peers.  
This explains how social action can occur without being contingent on explicit 
expression of shared meaning. Shared understanding, therefore, is not seen as an end in 
itself, but is a function of the cohesiveness of work groups (Fine 2006). The implication 
of this for the researcher is to realise that an objective analysis of individuals’ shared 
understandings based on empirical data is not always possible, and is perhaps not what 
the researcher should pursue in any case (Midthassel 2006).  
Instead, acknowledgement of the limited extent to which shared understanding can be 
accessed should be acknowledged and reflected in what the researcher seeks and claims 
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to study. For this reason research in this area can often focus on very specific elements 
of narrative and semiosis, for example, shared metaphors (Jacobs & Heracleous 2006). 
In my discussion of the psychological background of judgement and decision-making 
research I considered the extent to which psychology can help determine what 
constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘sound’ judgement or decision. Here, the same issue arises again, 
with the attribution of a judgement or decision as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ being linked to the 
outcome and consequences for the wider social group. This is not to the exclusion of the 
rationality of the individual judgement or decision-making process, but rather accounts 
for some of the external forces influencing it (Packard 1962).  
What is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ will inevitably differ across various contexts. This is because 
such attribution will depend on the value systems of the individual and the group within 
which they are working. To further consider this issue it is necessary to turn to the 
philosophical literature around judgement and decision-making. 
1.3.1.3 Philosophy & Human Judgement and Decision Making 
Consideration of the philosophical literature around human judgement and decision-
making is necessary to inform this study on issues such as the normative basis for 
judgement and decision-making, particularly in terms of its rationality. Philosophers 
exploring human knowledge see the exploration of judgement as fundamental to their 
enquiries, as it is viewed as one of the oldest and most basic elements of rational 
thought in humans (Polanyi 1962). For this reason, the philosophical literature on 
judgement and decision making is broad in its scope, addressing topics that range from 
technical application to consideration of moral judgements.  
However, this study is concerned with the clinical application of judgement and 
decision-making theory, and my review of the philosophical literature will reflect this 
focus. I will consider such issues as the person-centredness of these processes and 
associated issues of moral agency. Ultimately this involves addressing the issue of what 
makes someone a ‘good’ judge or decision-maker. 
Philosophical writing on human judgement can be traced back as far as Aristotle 
(Thomson 1953), and key figures in the development of modern philosophy, such as 
Kant, dealt with human judgement as a cornerstone of the cognitive faculties (Korner 
1955). A discussion of this literature is essential not only because it constitutes the 
oldest body of academic discourse around human judgement and decision-making, but 
also because it addresses issues that underpin the different perspectives from which 
psychological and social science research and commentary approach the topic. 
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Aristotle’s development of the thought of Plato to frame the concepts of techne, or 
technical skill, and phronesis, or practical knowledge (Dunne 1993) is fundamental to 
the philosophical treatment of judgment and decision-making, especially in terms of the 
types of knowledge and reasoning used. Dunne (1993, p10) has described the traditional 
understanding of the concept of phronesis as a form of practical knowledge that is 
“nontechnical but not, however, nonrational”. The idea of techne is strongly linked to 
craft or making, being the technical ability to make or craft something. 
As well as these two ideas, philosophers examining human judgement and decision-
making have drawn on Aristotle’s concepts of the spoudias (“the person of sound 
disposition and outlook” (Dunne 1993, p36)) and phronimos (“the man of practical 
wisdom” (Rhodes 1991, p322)). According to Dunne (1993, p10), it is not just because 
they are seminal that these concepts remain relevant, but because they have “since 
hardly been surpassed” as organising principles. This can be seen in the application of 
these principles throughout the philosophical literature around work roles, often without 
attributing them to Aristotle or naming them “techne”, “phronesis”, “phronimos” or 
“spoudias”.  
For the most part, this literature has centred on holistic theories regarding education 
(Lakes 2000). Of particular relevance for my study is its application to vocational 
education (of, e.g., nurses or teachers). Vocational education involves the engagement 
of individuals who seek to develop themselves in preparation for assuming a vocational 
role in order to serve the public good.  
The motivation to become a certain type of person in order to serve the public good is 
no longer seen as intrinsic to the success of those who engage in vocational education 
(Dunne 1993). This stands in contrast to the original idea of vocational education as 
shaping the spoudias or phronimas. The judgement of such a professional was seen to 
be characterised more by a striving for qualitative goodness within a principles-based 
framework, than quantitative achievement per se.  
Free of such values, research can identify the characteristics of the murderer whose 
judgement and decision-making is sound insofar as the practice of murder without 
detection is concerned. However, in the Aristotelian-based vocational paradigm a 
murderer could never be considered a good judge of anything, as his homicide is not a 
desirable end however skilled the means (Rhodes 1991). This is not to say that the place 
of values in the Aristotelian paradigm preclude its forming the basis for consideration of 
the process of making accurate judgements and decisions.  
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Indeed, it was from an Aristotelian standpoint that Newman (1870/1985) viewed 
capacity for judgement as a personal quality of the experienced expert, to the extent that 
he saw expert personal judgement as superior to technical judgements derived from 
scientific method. In arriving at both moral and intellectual judgements, Newman 
(1870/1985) took a dichotomous view, proposing that thinking based on practical 
experience was to be preferred to logical reasoning. This preference for personal 
intuitive reasoning over rule-based deduction was not novel, having been characteristic 
of the earlier work around the nature of judgement by philosophers such as Ramus and 
De Tracy (Flower & Murphey 1977).  
The tendency towards the intuitive in judgement is very much Aristotelian, although it 
could be viewed as being at odds with modern rationalism (Dunne 1993) and stands 
contrary to evidence-based paradigms such as cognitive continuum theory (Hammond 
1988, 1996a, Standing 2008, Beckstead 2009, Braude 2009). Nevertheless, philosophers 
writing in early modernity on judgement worked from the common foundation of the 
Aristotelian concept of intuitive judgement. Reid’s development, in the late 18th 
century, of the this standpoint did not so much describe human judgement as intuitive as 
attribute the capacity to judge to human intuition (Flower & Murphey 1977).  
In developing his constructional theory of perception, Reid characterised human 
perception as essentially judgemental in nature, leaving no room for talk of feelings or 
sensations that cannot be accounted for in terms of cognitive structures. He saw this 
cognitive perception as being instantaneous, innate and not inferential (Flower & 
Murphey 1977). Writing in the mid-19th century, Bowen concurred with Reid’s model 
of intuition as judgement, but differed from Reid insofar as he did not draw a great deal 
of distinction between conceptualisation and judgement (Bowen 1864/2007).  
Whereas Reid saw concepts, or conceptions, as categories that were derived from 
judgement, Bowen suggested that one could equally view judgements as elements of 
concepts or concepts as elements of judgement (Flower & Murphey 1977). This lack of 
distinction made Bowens’ epistemology problematic, insofar as he suggested that 
concepts were arbitrary mental products that were only verifiable by way of 
discernment in the form of intuitive judgement – itself an arbitrary process (Flower & 
Murphey 1977). However, Aristotle’s view of intuition was not that it should replace 
deductive reasoning with arbitrary judgement, but that it was a necessary supplement to 
the deductive process (Dunne 1993).  
The intuitive nature of critical judgement implied by phronesis is also discussed by 
Collingwood (1938). He viewed critical judgement as a tacit part of the artist’s work, 
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rather than as detached evaluation in line with certain external standards. Like 
Aristotle’s phronimos or spoudias, Collingwood (1938) posits that the judge must 
possess an inherent ability to engage in this process.   
The judgement process is conceptualised by Collingwood (1938) as an integral to 
artistic endeavour, rather than the subject of afterthought. This can be related to the idea 
of the phronimos or spoudaios pursuing their vocation as opposed to merely engaging in 
technical work. The philosophical writings of Arendt (1958), who makes clear 
distinctions between labour, making and action also point towards a kind of vocational 
intuitiveness. Arendt’s (1958) use the term ‘action’ is akin to Aristotle’s phronesis.  
Gadamer (1960/1975) adopted the Aristotelian notion of judgement as virtuous in 
nature and essential to phronesis. In this paradigm, judgement does not occur in 
isolation, but is communicated to others in a beneficial way. In teleological terms, 
Gadamer (1960/1975) has found this value-based conceptualisation to offer a truer 
representation of human judgement than that offered by modern positivism.  
What appears to underpin this stance is the Aristotelian concept of value-based 
judgement (gnomē) combined with scepticism about the objectivity claimed by 
positivism. This scepticism relates in particular to positivism’s purported ability to 
distinguish objective thought from subjective thinker. As Dunne (1993, p289) puts it, 
“theoretical reason, as a ruler of action, first founders on the rock of character”.  
The teleological also underpinned the thinking of Kant (1790/1978) around judgement. 
Kant’s (1790/1978, p18) definition of judgment as “the faculty of thinking the particular 
as being contained in the universal” influenced later philosophers such as Smith (Flower 
& Murphey 1977). Analytic judgements, according to Kant, serve to clarify meaning, 
whereas synthetic judgments are inferential (Kant 1787/2003).  
As a rationalist, Kant (1790/1978) proposed that judgement constituted personal 
analysis or synthesis. This stood in contrast to the propositional nature of judgement 
posited by empiricist philosophers such as Hume (Korner 1955), Ramus (Graves 1912) 
and Agricola (Howell 1961). Kant’s conceptualisation of judgement views it very much 
in the personal context, and so is more akin to a psychological approach than the 
empiricists’ impersonal propositional logic of judgement (Flew 1979). However, the 
fact that Kant proposed judgement as personal analysis or synthesis from a rationalist 
perspective as opposed to that of empiricism means that in terms of method the 
empiricist view is closer to the perspective of modern psychology.  
Whereas philosophy was once the main source of academic writing on the nature of 
human judgement and decision-making, the development of the field of psychology 
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over the last two centuries has provided a basis for the study of human judgement that is 
more grounded in scientific method. This shift from a Kantian rationalist to an 
empiricist consideration of human judgement and decision-making, however, does not 
negate the contribution of philosophy. There are epistemological, ontological and moral 
issues around the study of human judgement that cannot be dealt with by appealing 
solely to empiricist research.  
Although such research is the standard approach to ascertaining the accuracy and 
efficacy of judgements and decisions, a more qualitative approach is better suited to the 
question of whether judgements and decisions are ‘good’ or ‘sound’. This is because the 
inquiry may also need to ask what is ‘good’ or ‘sound’ in the specific context of a 
nurse’s practice. In light of this, nurses’ judgements and decisions are best explored 
initially using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods that can accommodate the 
concept of the nurse as a phronimos or spoudaios, as opposed to merely a research 
subject engaging in technical work. With this in mind, I will now move on to consider 
the aims and objectives of this study. 
I set out the aim and objectives of the study at this point, rather than at the end of 
Chapter Two, due to the exploratory nature of the study. The preceding overview of the 
general literature has given a preliminary overview that provides sufficient information 
to determine the aims and objectives of the study. Because of the exploratory and 
descriptive nature of the study these aims and objectives are relatively broad. For this 
reason that the literature reviewed in Chapter Two will help address and refine the 
study’s aims and objectives, as opposed to actually generating them. 
1.4 Study Aim & Objectives 
The literature considered in this chapter points towards the importance of studying the 
cognitive processes involved in the clinical judgement and decision-making of nurses in 
their social context. To this end, I have set out to explore the social and cognitive 
aspects of the clinical judgement and decision-making of Registered Psychiatric Nurses 
(RPNs) working in the Irish Republic. I achieved this by conducting an exploratory 
descriptive study, which is described in detail in the ensuing chapters. 
This study has employed a mixed methods analysis of RPNs’ retrospective and in-vivo 
accounts of their judgement and decision making with reference to simulated cases and 
cases drawn from clinical practice. The relationship between participants’ cognitive 
processes and the social settings in which they work is complex. An approach involving 
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both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis aims to address this 
complexity.  
I discuss this matter further in Chapter Three of this thesis. In concluding this chapter, 
and by way of introduction to the study, I present the study’s overall aims: 
• To explore the judgement and decision-making of RPNs working in the Irish 
Republic, in terms of both the cognitive processes involved and their social context.  
• To consider and apply the findings to psychiatric nursing practice and education, as 
well as to policy issues and future research in this area. This applies primarily to the 
Irish context from which the data were generated and, where valid, to psychiatric 
nursing generally. 
To this end the study comprises the following objectives: 
1. To give a comprehensive account of clinical judgement and decision-making in 
nursing, in particular as it applies to psychiatric nursing  
2. To understand how and why RPNs make clinical judgements and decisions  
3. To gain as much insight as possible on the cognitive processes and social context of 
the clinical judgement and decision-making of RPNs.  
4. Having fulfilled the aims and objectives above, to make applications to psychiatric 
nursing in the Irish republic, with particular reference to its future development. 
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Chapter Two – Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this review is to provide a survey of the literature on clinical judgement and 
decision-making in psychiatric nursing. This is in order to inform the fulfilment of the 
research aims and objectives introduced in Chapter One. The objectives that this chapter 
sets out to meet in order to fulfil this purpose are: 
1. To provide a critical synthesis, around prevalent themes, of the research findings 
found in the literature on clinical judgement and decision-making in psychiatric 
nursing and nursing generally. 
2. To provide an overview of conceptual work on clinical judgement and decision-
making as related to psychiatric nursing and nursing generally. 
3. To identify common themes and disparate findings. 
In reviewing the nursing research literature I set out to ensure inclusion of as much of the 
available relevant literature as possible. In 2004, systematic searching of the literature was 
begin using several databases of academic publications. This ensured that articles from 
non-nursing and non-healthcare sources were included in the search, as would both 
research and conceptual papers.  
The search terms used were “nurse” OR “nursing” AND “decision” OR “judgement” OR 
“judgment”. These were derived from those used by Dowding & Thompson (2003) in their 
review of the literature. Although as with Dowding & Thompson (2003), the search was 
limited to the English language, it was not limited to papers reporting research findings 
and/or methodology. This was because the review seeks to incorporate conceptual as well 
as research publications.  
Also, whilst the focus of the review by Dowding & Thompson (2003) looked at the quality 
of nursing judgement and decision-making in practice, this review has a broader remit, 
seeking to give a comprehensive overview of clinical judgement and decision-making as it 
applies to psychiatric nursing. A great deal of overlap was found between the results of 
these database searches. On “SWETSwise”, the database’s automatic search of 17,401,914 
articles yielded 225 relevant articles. A search of the SpringerLink research database 
resulted in “no articles which satisfy the search criteria”, whilst searches of the PsycInfo 
and PsycArticles databases yielded 778 and 14 relevant articles respectively.  
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The PubMed database yielded 15,451 articles, very few of which were relevant. Those that 
were relevant had already been found using the SWETSwise, SpringerLink, PsycInfo and 
PsycArticles databases. Indeed there was considerable overlap between all of the database 
search results.  
After consulting senior researchers in the field, it was decided to also employ snowball 
sampling (Robson 1995) based on updated literature searches for the remaining duration of 
the study. This was because it was advised that many papers relevant to judgement and 
decision-making have titles and/or keywords that might not easily be found using a few key 
terms. Hallstrom & Elander (2005) have also employed this strategy in their review on 
decision-making in paediatric care.  
Certain articles were not the primary focus of the literature review on the grounds that it is 
concerned mainly with the clinical practice of registered psychiatric nurses. These fell into 
one or more of the following categories: 
• Articles primarily about the decision making of undergraduate student nurses, nurse 
educators and/or clinical supervisors.  
• Articles about non-clinical decision-making (e.g., decision to quit job, human 
resource management decision making etc.) 
• Articles where decision making was not the main topic of research or discussion, 
but mentioned as marginal to the main topic or focus of research 
• Articles that described studies testing the efficacy of generic decision-support tools 
which did not focus on the clinical judgements and decisions of nurses per se 
• Articles that were neither research nor conceptual pieces, e.g., editorials, book 
reviews etc. 
Publications that did not meet the above criteria are occasionally mentioned in this chapter, 
but do not make up the bulk of its content. This has been done insofar as they assist by 
providing necessary background, clarification or elaboration on the topics covered in the 
primary literature reviewed. Many research papers focus on a particular type of nursing, but 
with the purpose of examining topics that apply to nursing generally. An example of this is 
the paper by Corcoran-Perry et al (1999) on line of reasoning. Although Corcoran-Perry et 
al (1999) have looked at this phenomenon in the context of coronary care nurses, its 
findings have implications for nurses generally that cannot be ignored in a review such as 
this.  
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It is also the case that many authors discuss clinical judgement and decision-making in 
nursing generally. The matters covered by generic papers referred to in this review have as 
much relevance for psychiatric nursing as they do for general nursing. Indeed, the dearth of 
specific literature on psychiatric nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making is such 
that other authors writing on the topic have had to go to the general literature for 
background (e.g., Cook et al 2001). By way of example, in Crook’s (2001) focused review 
of the literature on the topic of expert psychiatric nurses’ decision-making only four out of 
31 papers used are on psychiatric nursing. 
2.2 Background  
As with other disciplines, many researchers investigating clinical judgement and decision-
making in nursing tend not to distinguish between judgement and decision. An example of 
this is Bucknall (2003, p312), who writes, “For the purposes of this article, judgement and 
decision-making are synonymous”. In contrast to this broad use of the terms, some writers 
use them more specifically.  
For example, Thompson (1999, p1222) uses the term “decision-making” to refer to 
“decisions taken by nurses relating directly to issues of nursing diagnosis or intervention in 
clinical settings”. This, Thompson states (1999, p1222), “represents the operational face of 
nursing”. Like Shaban (2005a), he views the term “Clinical decision making” as 
encapsulating “clinical judgement … clinical inference … clinical reasoning … and 
diagnostic reasoning” (Thompson 1999, p1222). 
Dowding & Thompson (2003) outline the importance of differentiating between a 
judgement and a decision, recognising that each represents a distinct cognitive process. In 
their 2002 textbook Thompson & Dowding (2002) paraphrase Dowie (1993) to define a 
judgement as “the assessment of alternatives” (Thompson & Dowding 2002, p15) and a 
decision as “a choice between two alternatives” (Thompson & Dowding 2002, p14). 
However, Dowie’s (1993) original definition, which leaves out the word ‘two’ to simply 
describe decision-making as a choice between alternatives is perhaps more salient with 
regard to the realities of clinical nursing practice.  
Concepts and definitions forged in the medical and psychological literature have informed 
academic and research literature in nursing from the outset (Kelly 1964, Hammond et al 
1967, Grier 1976). Dewey’s writings from the 1930s onwards and Elstein’s work in the 
1970s on medical decision-making had a strong influence on the conceptualistaion of 
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clinical judgement in nursing (Coler 2003). However, use of knowledge from other 
disciplines is not limited to knowledge from the professions represented in 
multidisciplinary healthcare.  
For example, in taking into account how different types of judgement are used in clinical 
practice, Coler (2003) has drawn on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Mark L. 
Johnson. In doing this Coler (2003) has equated Kant’s ‘reflective judgement’ with clinical 
or observational judgement, and his ‘determinate judgement’ with predictive or actuarial 
judgement. Predictive judgement and observational judgement are both addressed within 
the Judgement Axis of the ICNP (ICN 2002).  
Coler (2003, p16) argues that the combination in practice of the more clinically-grounded 
observational type of judgement with what she describes as the more “actuarial” form of 
predictive judgement has been facilitated and made more visible in practice through the use 
of information technology and the standardised approach to nursing terminology. Coler 
(2003) goes on to describe predictive judgement as quantitative in nature, and observational 
judgement as relying more so on the clinician’s intuition. This illustrates, as did my 
consideration of psychological, social and philosophical theory in Chapter One, how the 
approach to nursing judgement as intuitive/analytic is not unique to nursing but is grounded 
in wider thinking around human judgement and decision-making. 
The perceived intuitive/analytic dichotomy is also apparent in Rashotte & Carnavale’s 
(2004) conceptualisation of both perspectives as well as in work by others such as Lamond 
& Thompson (2000), Taylor (2003), Salantera et al (2003) and Thompson et al (2004). 
Indeed, debate around the dichotomous model of analytic versus intuitive judgement has 
permeated the nursing literature over the last couple of decades (Benner & Wrubel 1982, 
Carnevali & Thomas 1993, Ubel & Loewenstein 1997). As such it constitutes the 
overarching theme in clinical judgement and decision-making (Rashotte & Carnavale 
2004). 
2.3 Intuition, Analytic Thinking & Cognitive Continuum Theory 
There is no universally accepted definition of intuition in the nursing literature (Thompson 
& Dowding 2002, Shaban 2005a). Much of the nursing literature around intuition tends to 
be ambiguous (Lamond & Thompson 2000). This ambiguity lies in the lack of clarity as to 
whether reference is being made to intuition as a form of knowledge (Rew & Barron 1987) 
or intuition as a way of using knowledge (Ritter 2003).By way of clarity for the reader, 
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reference to intuition in this study is to what Kahneman (2003a, p697) describes as 
“thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection”.  
There has been a tendency toward a dichotomous approach in terms of the usefulness of 
intuition and analytic thinking in judgement and decision-making (Taylor 2003, Nyatanga 
& de Vocht 2008). Thompson (1999) suggests that this is indicative of a wider tension in 
the nursing literature between intuitive humanism and systematic positivism.  
In Chapter One I noted the roots of this tension in the writing of philosophers on judgement 
and decision-making over the last couple of centuries. Here, and throughout this work, I 
will seek to apply their ideas to understanding intuition in nursing. At this point it is 
important to note that those grounded in systematic positivism place greater emphasis on 
the features of the task involved, whereas those coming from the perspective of intuitive 
humanism tend to view the individual making the judgement or decision as being at the 
heart of the matter (Thompson 1999).  
Taking a critical standpoint on these two viewpoints, authors such as Easen & Wilcockson 
(1996) have questioned the validity of taking a dichotomous perspective. As with any 
dichotomy concerning the application of theory to practice, resolution of the underpinning 
philosophical issues can be pursued in a non-dualistic manner (Dunne 1993). Authors such 
as Bunge (1983) and Gould (1996) have offered such a dialectical synthesis in their 
epistemological models of the humanistic use of positivist knowledge.  
This approach is evident in the description by Rashotte & Carnavale (2004, p169) of a 
clinician’s development of proficiency in judgement and decision-making as a “sequential 
learning process” that involves reflective practice, transformative learning and experiential 
learning. It is also evident in the popularity in the nursing literature of reflective practice 
(Taylor 2003). Schon’s (1987) work on reflective practice has been seen as especially 
relevant in helping nurses account for intuitive elements of clinical judgement and decision-
making (Carr 2004).  
However, due to the opacity of intuition, nurses find it difficult to reflectively articulate its 
use (Nyatanga & de Vocht 2008). For this reason, Taylor (2003) has questioned the 
contribution of reflective practice to improving decision-making in clinical practice. There 
is similar concern from a research perspective about the extent to which intuitive clinical 
judgements can be analysed (Thompson & Dowding 2002).  
Research on intuitive judgement in nursing tends towards techniques that are limited by 
hindsight bias, such as critical incident analysis (Lamond & Thompson 2000). This 
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provides particular difficulties for the promotion of evidence-based practice (Lamond & 
Thompson 2000, Taylor 2003, Paley 2006). These points need to be addressed in any study 
of nursing judgement and decision-making, and I intend to do this more fully in Chapter 
Three, where I discuss the methodology of this study. 
Notwithstanding prescriptive philosophical or values-based perspectives on intuition, 
researchers have described its centrality in nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making 
(Andersson et al 2006), particularly in psychiatry (Welsh & Lyons 2001). Taking into 
account the tension between descriptions of intuition as a concrete and valid phenomenon 
and evidence of its opacity (Harbison 2001), I will now consider how researchers have 
approached intuition in nursing.  
2.3.1 Nursing Research on Intuition & Analytic Thinking in Clincal 
Judgement & Decision-Making 
The idea of combined application of intuitive and analytic approaches in nursing (Smith 
1988, Grobe et al 1991, Easen & Wicockson 1996, Ritter 2003) is not novel and reflects a 
similar view in the psychological literature (Nisbett et al 1983). Benner (1984, Benner et al 
1992) has drawn on the work of Dreyfus (1972) in an attempt to accommodate both 
perspectives –ultimately valuing intuition as central to expertise (Benner & Wrubel 1982, 
Benner et al 1996, Benner et al 1999).  
This perspective is shared by others such as Gerrity (1987), Rew & Barron (1987), 
Schraeder & Fischer (1987), Young (1987) and Kosowski & Roberts (2003). However, 
intuition is not a reliable basis for the most accurate judgements and effective decisions 
(Kleinmuntz 2000). Buckingham & Adams (2000a) attribute the relatively low professional 
status of nursing to its association with intuitive judgement and decision-making.  
2.3.1.1 Pattern Recognition 
Since the publication of the seminal work of Tversky & Kahneman (1971), psychological 
concepts have provided the basis for the exploration of nurses’ reliance on intuition. Benner 
& Tanner (1987) and Ritter (2003), for example, described the use of pattern recognition in 
nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making. The psychological concept of pattern 
recognition is to be differentiated from the term as it is used in the wider nursing research 
and philosophy literature. In nursing research and philosophical writing, pattern recognition 
is an “emancipatory process” that relates to “the process of expanding consciousness” 
(Newman 1994). Although both uses of the term describe pattern identification, in the 
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wider nursing literature it occurs in the context of Newman’s (1997) writings on nursing 
and health - which is distinct from its meaning in cognitive psychology.  
In line with Hammond’s (1988, 1996a) view of intuitive judgement, researchers in nursing 
have described pattern recognition as appropriate for non-complex cases where patterns can 
easily be recognized by the clinician (Offredy 1998) and where a quick decision is required 
(Easen & Wilcockson 1996). However, Cioffi & Markham (1997) and Cioffi (2000) have 
found that nurses use pattern recognition for complex judgement tasks, in particular where 
there is increased uncertainty. Pattern recognition has been described by Benner & Tanner 
(1987) as working alongside skilled know-how as a distinct element of expert intuitive 
clinical judgement and decision-making.  
The ability to rapidly recognise a typical scenario or type of person (Patel & Groen 1986) is 
a key feature of expertise, especially where there is time pressure and increased uncertainty 
(Klein 1998). According to Benner (1984), nurses begin to develop their ability to use 
pattern recognition in their first six months of practice as registered nurses, combining 
domain-specific knowledge from their pre-registration education with experiential 
knowledge that they are beginning to consolidate as novice practitioners (Benner 1984). 
Perhaps influenced by the seminal work of Benner (1984), some nursing researchers use the 
concept of pattern recognition as fully representative of nursing intuition (Iliffe et al 2006, 
Ruth-Sahd & Tisdell 2007). In accounting for and explaining nurses’ use of intuition, 
nursing researchers sometimes combine this concept with heuristics, in particular the 
recognition heuristic (Simmons et al 2003). 
2.3.1.2 Heuristics 
The concept of heuristics has been useful in accounting for how nurses use intuition to 
respond to uncertainty (Gilovich & Griffin 2002). Research on heuristics stems from 
attempts to understand more about both the rationality and accuracy of judgements and 
decisions (Hammond 2000b). The use of heuristic strategies by nurses tends to be 
considered in terms of task intereaction (Ciofi 2002). This involves the study of judgement 
and decision-making where there is significant uncertainty (Orasanu & Connolly 1993).  
Anchoring is a heuristic strategy involving ‘anchoring’ on an initial estimate which is 
adjusted as relevant data become available (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Individuals tend 
not to move too far away from their initial ‘anchored’ position, increasing the scope for 
error. Ciofi (2001) has described how nurses form anchor points based on experience and 
knowledge, making adjustments based on subsequent knowledge and learning.  
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The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky 1973, 1996, Tversky & Kahneman 
1974), describes how individuals make predictive judgements based on the extent to which 
they can see the outcome represented in the raw data under consideration. Much of the 
research work demonstrating its use is based on algebraic or statistical reasoning (Cahan & 
Snapiri 2008). This poses difficulties to its application to a qualitatively-based 
consideration of the complexities of the social situatedness of judgement and decision-
making in nursing. 
The recognition heuristic is an alternative perspective on the cognitive processes which the 
representative heuristic attempts to explain (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002). It represents an 
attempt to broaden the scope of study to account for ecological validity by using multiple 
values as opposed to single value prediction rules. Much of the research on the recognition 
heuristic has also been limited to algebraic and statistical modelling based on quantitative 
data (Cahan & Snapiri 2008). Where qualitative data has been collected on in nursing and 
midwifery studies looking at use of the representative or recognition heuristic, analysis has 
been in terms of base rates, statistics and percentages with a view to measuring accuracy 
(Cioffi & Markham 1997, Cytryn et al 2009). 
Using the availability heuristic a person bases their assessment of the probability, frequency 
or causation of an event on the degree to which occurrences of such an event are readily 
available in their memory (Ciofi 2001). With no regard for statistical probability, they 
assume that because they remember it to have been so, that it is so (Thompson 2002). As 
with representativeness, experience - in particular range of experience - is an important 
factor in its use.  
Also important is the recency of the events and their saliency and vividness (Ciofi 2002). A 
nurse working in an accident and emergency department is more likely to use the 
availability heuristic in a case of myocardial infarction than is a nurse working in a mother 
and baby clinic, as s/he will have seen more myocardial infarctions, more recently and can 
therefore recall these with more vividness and saliency. Buckingham & Adams (2000b) 
view both the representativeness and availability heuristics as describing, to a degree, the 
process of classification which they see as central to judgement and decision-making and 
proffer their own unifying framework as offering a clearer representation of the process. 
Although she does not refer to the literature around heuristics, Delaney (2006) describes 
how nurses working in psychiatric inpatient units for children and adolescents draw on 
prior knowledge in interpreting cues. She uses staff interpretation of a child’s behaviour to 
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show how the nurse interprets this behaviour. Interpretation, she argues, will depend on 
what the nurse has already witnessed in such cases in terms of antecedents to and 
consequences of the behaviour. She also describes how the nurse draws on their knowledge 
of how children’s cognition, emotions and behaviour interact in interpreting cues in such 
scenarios (Delaney 2006). 
2.3.1.3 Stereotyping 
Nursing researchers often refer to the representativeness or recognition heuristic in 
explaining nurses’ matching of cues from presenting cases to similar cases they have 
previously encountered (Cioffi & Markham 1997). Sterotyping is one of several 
explanations of this aspect of cognitive functioning (Wittenbrink et al 1998). Most studies 
of stereotyping in nursing focus on undergraduate nurse education and tend to view 
stereotyping as socially and morally undesirable, rather than as a value-free cognitive 
function that facilitates the development of expertise (Page & Thorn 2004, Dearing & 
Steadman 2008, Grady et al 2008). 
Where commentators focus on nursing practice or wider mental health care, a 
predominantly social rather than cognitive perspective is taken (Burr & Chapman 1998, 
Foster & Oneyeukwu 2003, Ladwig et al 2006). Without much critical discussion on 
stereotyping as a basic and universal aspect of human cognitive functioning, its negative 
social implications form the basis for research and comment (Clarke 1998, Evans 2002). 
This is in contrast to the psychological literature discussed in Section 1.3.1, where a more 
detached and objective outlook by researchers has permitted investigation into the presence 
of stereotyping and how it works. 
Unlike most researchers in the nursing literature, Rogers & Kashima (1998) have taken a 
critical look at stereotyping in mental health care. Although they do see stereotyping as 
undesirable, they engage in a critical discussion of the cognitive processes involved. Given 
the ability of individuals to actively resist stereotyping, Rogers & Kashima (1998) see a 
need for raised awareness of its negative aspects.  
2.3.1.4 Intuition, Analytic Thinking & Cognitive Continuum Theory 
Many nursing commentators view intuition as practical knowledge that is “nontechnical but 
not, however, nonrational” (Dunne 1993, p10). From a psychological perspective it is clear 
that intuition is inherently “nonrational”. To consider the implications of this for nursing, I 
now consider how intuition works alongside more rational approaches to clinical judgement 
and decision-making. I will draw in particular on cognitive continuum theory (Hammond 
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1988, 1996a), as well as the nursing literature on analytic thinking in judgement and 
decision-making.  
Many commentators in the nursing literature, including Thompson (1999), Harbison 
(2001), Lauri & Salantera (2002), Thompson et al (2004), Cader et al (2005), Offredy et al 
(2008) and Beckstead (2009) have looked to cognitive continuum theory to explain the 
combination of analytic and intuitive approaches in nursing. Standing (2008) has adapted 
cognitive continuum theory for nursing by including reflective practice, patient-aided 
judgement, research and its critical appraisal, the use of tacit-explicit knowledge along a 
continuum and the use of ethical codes of practice. She sees the application of these 
strategies by nurses as fitting within an adapted nine-point format of the cognitive 
continuum for use in education and practice. It remains for its theoretical structure to be 
tested by research. 
As adaptive practitioners, nurses combine intuition, peer-aided judgement and system 
aided-judgement depending on task type (Beckstead 2009). Of particular importance in this 
regard are the level of ambiguity and the complexity of the task structure (Hamm 1988). 
Cognitive continuum theory views structural task complexity in terms of the amount of 
information required and the number of ‘steps’ involved in the process of reaching a 
decision. Task ambiguity considers factors such as familiarity, observable outcomes and 
availability of cognitive organizing principles such as clinical practice guidelines (Rycroft-
Malone 2002). The presentation of a task contributes to complexity in terms of time frame 
for completion and the amenability of the task to ‘decomposition’ – that is, its being broken 
down into component parts.  
As intuitive judgement, widens the scope for error and makes for less transparent 
judgement and decision-makin, Lamond & Thompson (2000) favour leaning towards the 
more analytic approaches of peer-aided and system-aided judgement. Narayan & Corcoran-
Perry (1997), Luker et al (1998), Harbison (2001), Lauri & Salantera (2002) and Beckstead 
(2009) concur. In the context of cognitive continuum theory, intuition is characterised by 
speed, opacity, focus on ‘at hand’ data, lack of apparent rationality and propensity for error 
involved in such judgements and decisions. Hammond (1978) placed medical decision-
making towards this end of the cognitive continuum, specifically describing it as quasi-
rational. Hamm (1988) has also described medical decision making as fitting into the quasi-
rational category, seeing it as representing peer-aided judgement.  
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Nursing researchers (Offredy et al 2008) see nurses operating in this category also. Whilst 
this may be seen as acceptable in situations where it represents the optimal approach, 
Lamond & Thompson (2000) contend that greater focus on analytic judgement processes in 
nursing would serve the dual purpose of promoting more incisive research into the clinical 
judgement and decision-making of nurses whilst at the same time promoting evidence-
based practice. Thompson et al (2004, p70) explicitly equate intuitive decision-making with 
non-evidence based reasoning and rational decision-making with a less intuitive approach, 
thereby concluding that a non-intuitive approach lends towards “better decision 
performance”.  
Furthermore, Dowding & Thompson (2002) see the more analytic end of the cognitive 
continuum as representing the direction in which not only nurses, but also healthcare 
professionals in general, should lean. However, some see this as a dichotomous outlook, 
characteristic of the tendency to herald positivist knowledge as a panacea, whilst failing to 
satisfactorily tackle the very real issues of uncertainty and ambiguity that face nurses in 
everyday practice (Braude 2009, Taylor 2003). A non-dichotomous approach that strives to 
address the analytic-intuitive dualism as a construct of human reasoning, rather than an 
over-arching reality, is seen as truer to the philosophical underpinnings of judgement and 
decision-making theory.  
A resolution of this dichotomy, therefore, is perhaps better achieved through strategies 
drawing on a broader philosophical basis, such as dialectical synthesis, than by approaches 
that seek to unilaterally promote one aspect of the dichotomy over the other. However, it is 
also important to be cognisant of the need for a truly dialectical resolution of this 
dichotomy, and not a mere reversal of ostensible superiority of the one epistemological 
standpoint over another. There are those who would replace claims for the pre-eminence of 
positivist evidence as a basis for practice with an order governed by reflective practice 
and/or other humanist approaches (Taylor 2003).  
Therefore, in arriving at a truly dialectical resolution of the perceived intuitive/analytic 
dichotomy, it is imperative that commentators realise that they do not of necessity stand on 
neutral ground themselves (Hamilton & Hirszowicz 1987). Bearing this in mind, 
commentators engaging in appraisals of either standpoint should give due recognition of 
their own prejudices. Indeed, this is what I have set out to achieve by using a reflexive style 
(Porter 2000) in writing this thesis. 
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2.4 Methodological perspectives & approaches to judgement and 
decision-making research in nursing  
Since the seminal work of Meehl (1954) was first published, psychologists have focused on 
researching the accuracy of judgements (Ashton 2000, Cooksey 1996a). However, over the 
latter half of the 20th century psychologists became just as interested in the rationality of the 
process involved in making judgements and decisions (Kleinmuntz 2000). This has been 
reflected in developments over the years in research on clinical judgement and decision 
making in nursing.  
Early nursing judgement and decision-making studies, such as that by Aspinall (1979), 
tended to focus on accuracy in decision-making, and researchers did not tend initially 
towards descriptive approaches. In the last decade there was a shift to investigating the 
process of judgement and decision-making as well as accuracy and outcomes (Bakalis & 
Watson 2005). However, research on accuracy and effectiveness in nursing judgement and 
decision-making remains paramount (Buckingham & Adams 2000a, Cioffi 2002, and 
Dowding & Thomspon 2003).  
Despite interest in rationality, researchers remain concerned with the accuracy of nurses’ 
clinical judgement and decision-making – particularly in the context of evidence-based 
practice (Hancock & Easen 2005, Currey & Botti 2006, Goransson et al 2006, Paley 2006, 
Pritchard 2006, Thompson et al 2006). This is because the benefits of being able to 
accurately measure the impact of clinical nursing decisions on patient outcomes are 
considerable (Dowding & Thompson 2003). However, measures of judgement accuracy 
used in nursing research tend to be too simple to accurately capture the complex process 
involved and tend to be open to systematic errors.  
In light of this, Dowding & Thompson (2003) contend, nurse researchers should attempt to 
account for the uncertainty that characterises clinical judgement in nursing (Thompson 
2002), whilst also attempting to precisely measure the accuracy of these judgements. There 
are challenges in this regard, however, such as the difficulty of determing what constitutes a 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ judgement or decision (Rhodes 1991, Connolly 2000). Where there is 
consensus that a certain judgement or decision is ‘right’, there is the added problem of 
accounting for ineffectiveness due to indeterminable factors (Dowding & Thompson 2003).  
Therefore, my own study takes a descriptive approach, which is seen by Thompson (1999) 
as particularly suited to the needs of nursing. This represents the first step in determining 
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what might constitute ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in terms of psychiatric nursing judgements and 
decisions in the Irish context. Further research, it is envisaged, could develop the findings 
to measure accuracy and effectiveness of these judgements and decisions.  
As it stands, there is uncertainty regarding exactly what, for the most part, constitutes 
“accuracy” in Irish psychiatric nursing diagnosis and intervention decisions. This is hardly 
surprising given the lack of agreement on international standards for nursing diagnoses 
(Thompson 1999). In the context of the wider nursing research agenda, I view my own 
descriptive study as complementary and enabling (as opposed to an alternative to) the 
investigation of the accuracy of nurses’ diagnostic reasoning. 
In Chapter Three I outline my study design in detail. For the remainder of this section I will 
consider other approaches that have proved useful in researching nurses’ clinical judgement 
and decision-making. Several of these approaches have the potential to build on evidence 
from my study in order to ascertain the effeciveness and accuracy of psychiatric nurses’ 
clinical judgement and decision-making. 
Dowding & Thompson (2003) view subjective expected utility (SEU) theory as offering 
one of the best approaches for dealing with the uncertainty that characterises clinical 
judgement and decision-making in nursing. This is because it offers a method by which 
large numbers of judgements, decisions and their outcomes can be examined. Whilst 
Shaban (2005a) agrees that subjective expected utility theory offers an ideal approach to 
clinical judgement and decision-making, this approach has not been popular in nursing 
research (Dowding & Thompson 2003).  
Social judgement theory is also useful for measuring accuracy in clinical judgement 
(Dowding 2002, Dowding & Thompson 2003). Social judgement theory views the 
judgement process in terms of the social reality of a situation, which makes it highly 
applicable to clinical judgement (Hammond 1955, Wigton 1996). Another benefit is its 
approach of examining achievement (in terms of accuracy) and concord (in terms of 
consistency) (Dhami & Harries 2001), the results of which can be used to inform quality 
improvement of the types of judgement studied (Hammond et al 1975).  
Decision analysis theory can also be applied to studying accuracy in clinical judgement and 
decision making. It has military and economic origins in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
and has been used by nurses and other healthcare professionals since the mid 1970s 
(Narayan et al 2003). Like SEU, decision analysis theory, is based on Bayesian theory 
(Kleinmuntz 2000).  
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As well as approaches such as judgement analysis and decision analysis, nursing research 
has also drawn on concepts regarding human information processing (Corcoran 1986a, 
1986b, Tanner 1987, Tanner et al 1987, Jones 1988, White et al 1992, Carnevali & Thomas 
1993, Taylor 1997, Offredy 1998, Ritter 2003). From the perspective of information 
processing theory, judgement and decision making is a hypothetico-deductive process, 
focusing in particular at the interaction between the individual and the task at hand 
(Corcoran-Perry et al 1999). Of interest to researchers coming from this perspective is how 
individuals collate data, generate and evaluate hypotheses, and interpret cues. 
Application of information processing theory to research on nurses’ clinical judgement and 
decision-making was based on earlier research on medical judgement and decision-making 
(Elstein et al 1978). This involved study of the intricate cognitive processes involved in the 
clinician’s recall and weighing-up of various clinical possibilities when they made 
diagnostic judgements and decided on, or modified interventions (Carnevali & Thomas 
1993, Thompson & Dowding 2002). Mahner & Bunge (1997) view this hypothetico-
deductive perspective as the most appropriate approach for clinical decision-making.  
In the United States, information processing theory and the hypothetico-deductive approach 
generally form the main theoretical underpinning for the education of nurse practitioners in 
clinical judgement and decision-making and are also used extensively by those researching 
medical problem solving (Ritter 2003). They are used, for example, to explore clinicians’ 
proneness to confirmation bias, which occurs if one hypothesis is concentrated on by the 
clinician to the detriment of other hypotheses (Buckingham & Adams 2000b). Researchers 
have also considered clinicians’ tendency towards anchoring bias, whereby they tend 
towards their original hypothesis despite evidence to the contrary (Harbison 2001, 
Thompson 2002, Hamilton 2004). However, some commentators have argued that the 
concepts regarding human information processing that underpin the hypothetico-deductive 
model do not allow for a complete account of what really occurs when a nurse makes a 
judgement or decision in the clinical setting (Lauri & Salantera 1995, Szaflarski 1997, 
Thompson 1999). 
Caution needs to be exercised in attempting to resolve issues around uncertainty in clinical 
judgement and decision-making using approaches grounded solely in positivism. A major 
limitation is the often tenuous nature of links between interventions and outcomes in 
nursing (Narayan et al 2003). Also, the ‘best’ possible decision needs to weigh the 
influence of societal values, rights and duties, which is not always possible in quantitative 
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research studies that focus on a singular aspect of the process (Braude 2009, Wang & 
Mentes 2009).  
One solution is to attempt to “balance realism and manageability” (Narayan et al 2003, 
p240). Whilst focused statistical analysis of nurses’ judgement and decision-making is 
especially useful in particular situations characterised by uncertainty and/or complexity, it 
cannot be applied universally to clinical judgement and decision-making in nursing 
Dowding & Thompson 2002). This echoes what Rashotte & Carnavale (2004) have written 
with regard to scientific realism.  
Rashotte & Carnavale (2004) have considered how empirically measurable aspects of 
clinical judgement and decision-making are affected by organic and social realities of 
human experience that are more difficult to account for. This is particularly the case when 
professionals are engaging in shared decision-making with service-users and/or their 
significant others (Narayan et al 2003, Ryland 2005).  
Having considered the various approaches to research on clinical judgement and decision-
making in nursing, I am mindful of the work of Buckingham & Adams (2000b) in 
presenting a unifying framework for theories underpinning clinical judgement and decision-
making in nursing. Although such frameworks can be useful, not every model of judgement 
and decision-making is applicable to individual clinical contexts and practice roles (Offredy 
1998), with some being suited to certain settings more so than others (Harbison 1991). I am 
convinced that what is required in this study is a methodology that draws on those 
perspectives and approaches that are best suited not only to the aims and objectives of the 
study, but to accommodating the diversity of settings and roles in which study participants 
practice.  
Before considering how best to do this in Chapter Three, I take a closer look at the focus of 
nursing research. In reviewing the literature I noticed that studies tended to look either at 
the processes through which nurses arrived at judgements and decisions, or else at the types 
of knowledge that they used to inform this process. I have divided my further consideration 
of the literature into two sections accordingly. 
 37 
2.5 Researching the process of clinical judgement & decision-
making in nursing 
2.5.1 Knowledge informing the process 
As with Dowding & Thompson (2003), Crow et al (1995) see a clinical judgement in 
nursing as essentially comprising the nurse’s assessment of a service-user’s condition. 
Researchers & commentators have considered the types of knowledge that inform this 
assessment, as well as the clinical decisions that follow on from it. Domain-specific 
knowledge is integral to the clinical judgement and decision-making of healthcare 
professionals (Boshuizen & Schmidt 1992, Rashotte & Carnevale 2004).  
In nursing assessment involves the identification of particular problems, states or 
conditions e.g., that someone is dehydrated. This identification or recognition aspect of 
judgement is seen as ‘diagnostic’ is not exclusive to the healthcare. The meteorological 
judgements made by weather forecasters, for example, are also diagnostic insofar as they 
represent the judgement as to whether or not a certain weather phenomenon is present 
(Swets 2000).  
Because of this similarity, Crow et al (1995) have seen a danger in confusing the medical 
diagnostic role with the type of diagnostic reasoning that occurs as part of the nursing role. 
Crow et al (1995) do not argue that the cognitive processes used by nurses to make 
diagnostic judgements differ from those of doctors. Rather, their concern is that nurse and 
physician roles in clinical judgement could be wrongly interpreted due to their both being 
described using similar terminology. However, not all judgements made by nurses are 
diagnostic. Gerdtz & Bucknall (1999), for example, have cited the example of prioritization 
of already-diagnosed patients in triage.  
Writing about nurses’ judgements regarding the behaviours of inpatients in child and 
adolescent psychiatric units, Delaney (2006, p172) describes the judgment process as an 
“assessment” that leads to a “diagnostic picture”. Psychologists see diagnostic clinical 
assessment as involving two distinct cognitive components (Krueger et al 2006).  These 
involve identifying a distinct clinical condition on one hand and judging its severity on the 
other. 
These two aspects of nursing judgement are apparent in the work of organisations that are 
interested in making the work of nurses more visible by formulating standardised 
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representations of practice. For example, the International Council of Nurses (ICN) (2002, 
p75) has defined a nursing judgement as “a clinical opinion, an estimate, or determination 
of professional nursing practice regarding the state of a nursing phenomenon, including the 
relative quality of the intensity or degree of the manifestation of the nursing phenomenon”. 
Also, the ICN’s latest version of its International Classification of Nursing Practice 
includes as one of its seven axes a Judgement Axis dedicated to the classification of clinical 
judgement in nursing (ICN 2005).  
Whilst the North American Nursing Diagnosis Association (NANDA) defines nursing 
diagnosis in terms of clinical judgement, its definition is not as descriptive of the 
components of clinical judgement as is that of the ICN. NANDA (1999) defines nursing 
diagnosis as constituting a “clinical judgement about individual, family or community 
responses to actual or potential health problems/life processes”. The definition appears to 
be less concerned with unpacking “judgement” itself and more concerned with the types of 
phenomena that nursing judgements focus on.  
Rashotte & Carnevale (2004) distinguish between diagnostic and interventional decision-
making. In doing this they have paid particular attention to clinicians’ use of empirical 
knowledge, with particular reference to Bunge’s (1983) concept of scientific realism. This 
approach grounds the clinician’s use of positivistic empiricism firmly in the biological and 
social context of being human. 
What this might entail can be seen in Carnavale’s (2001, p13) statement in an earlier work 
that the use of empirical knowledge “… is not so much about ‘learning what is right or 
true’ but is a process of ‘getting it progressively less wrong’”. This involves the clinician 
coming to each new clinical judgement or decision armed with an experiential practice-
based understanding of empirical knowledge that has been developed over previous 
encounters with similar situations. This accretion of knowledge about an individual is a 
crucial source of information for nurses in arriving at a judgement or making a decision 
regarding that person’s care (Crow et al 1995). O’Neill et al (2005, p71) found 
practitioners’ use of such “pre-encounter data” (the term they use to describe such prior 
knowledge used with reference to a general knowledge base) to be fundamental to their 
judgement and decision-making.  
It has been suggested that the more knowledge a nurse has, the more cues they will 
recognise and therefore use in their judgement and decision-making (Moore 1996, Jones 
1988, Evans 2005). The nature and volume of cues that are involved in a judgement or 
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decision contribute to its complexity. This type of complexity can be said to characterise 
clinical judgement and decision-making of nurses (Corcoran 1986b, Hammond 1988, 
Carnevali & Thomas 1993, Cioffi & Markham 1997, Cioffi 2001).  
Many researchers have used observation to look at how nurses use cues to arrive at 
judgements and make decisions amid the complexities of ‘real-life’ clinical settings (King 
& Macleod Clark 2002, Hedberg & Larsson 2003, McCarthy 2003b, Arslanian-Engoren 
2004, Carr 2004, Manias et al 2004a, O’Neill et al 2005, Delaney 2006). Where real-life 
setting were not accessible, researchers attempted to simulate these using case studies and 
vignettes (Salantera 2003). Examining nurses’ assessment of inpatients in child and 
adolescent psychiatric units, Delaney (2006) described how intervention choice differs 
according to differences in how cues are interpreted by nurses.  
Carr (2004) and O’Neill et al (2005) have commented on factors affecting nurses’ use of 
cues in decision-making, whilst Manias et al (2004a), Hedberg & Larsson (2003) and King 
& Macleod Clark (2002) have looked at the nature of those cues. For the most part, nurses 
used mainly biomedical cues – which might be expected given the general healthcare 
settings in which their studies took place. Indeed Manias et al (2004a) found that the more 
medically specialised the area, the more specialised the biomedical cues which are used.  
Of importance to these researchers was the way in which cues were presented, interpreted 
(perceptually or objectively), organised cognitively and weighted by the nurses making the 
judgement and/or decision (Hammond 1988). In this regard, Lusk & Hammond’s (1991) 
differentiation between primary and secondary cues is helpful in explaining complexity in 
clinical judgement and decision-making in nursing. Primary cues are those directly 
discernable by the observer, either from data provided or by direct observation, e.g., a 
person’s facial expression, volume and pitch of speech or hand gestures. Secondary cues, 
meanwhile, are inferred from combined primary cues, so that a nurse might infer from the 
primary cues of an individual’s furrowed brow, glaring eyes, loud, rapid speech and 
clenched, raised fists a secondary cue that tells him/her that the person is experiencing 
anger. 
Sociological ideas concerning semiosis (Peirce 1895/1998) are complementary to this 
cognitive psychological concept of cue recognition. In recognising cues, the nurse is 
involved in the triadic process of semiosis. As the interpretant, the nurse is drawing on 
experiential and domain-specific knowledge to attempt to identify and judge the 
characteristics of the object that is represented by certain signs or cues. 
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In Chapter One I have already noted the common ground that is covered by sociological 
thinking around semiosis and social psychological perspectives, e.g., the lens model 
(Brunswik 1952, Cooksey 1996). The main difference in the application of the two to 
nursing judgement and decision-making is that research and thinking around semiosis is a 
predominantly qualitative affair, whilst psychological research of cue recognition takes the 
form of mathematical and statistical analysis and modelling. As they differ in the 
perspectives they take on judgement and decision-making, these concepts can serve to 
complement each other in giving a more rounded appreciation of the processes involved. 
2.5.2 The process of making a judgment or decision 
Having discussed the types of knowledge that nurses use in their clinical judgement and 
decision-making, and the way in which this knowledge is used to interpret cues/signs, I 
now move on to consider the nursing literature on the cognitive and social processes 
involved. In doing this, I have considered the literature under the headings of the main 
themes to which the studies have related. These themes reflect the focus in nursing research 
on the investigation of how ecological factors such as organisational structure, the care 
environment and interdisciplinary relationships impact on clinical judgement and decision-
making. Also apparent is interest in the influence of individual factors such as experience 
and expertise.  
2.5.2.1 Experience, Expertise and Clinical Judgement & Decision-Making 
Research has shown that novice nurses are not as adept at decision-making as their more 
experienced colleagues (Corcoran 1986b, Bucknall & Thomas 1996, Schutzenhoffer & 
Musser 1996, Tabek et al 1997, Thomas 1997, King & Macleod Clark 2002, Myers & 
Nikoletti 2003, Hoffman et al 2009), although this has been questioned by some (Hoffman 
et al 2004). For those grounded in what Thompson (1999, p1223) refers to as the “intuitive-
humanist” paradigm (Benner 1984, Benner et al 1996), the apparent benefits of experience 
are explained in terms of an inextricable link between effective intuitive judgement and 
decision-making and expertise. However, when considering the seminal work of Benner on 
nursing expertise and experience, particularly when contrasting her theory to the work of 
others, it has to be remembered that like Darbyshire (1994), Benner (1984) contends that 
experience measured in years of practice does not in itself constitute expertise.  
Although Benner’s ‘Novice to Expert’ model (1984) does use years of experience to grade 
nurses as novices or experts, Benner does not use the term ‘experience’ solely to denote the 
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number of years a nurse has spent in clinical practice. Instead she uses it as a descriptor for 
a dynamic process of allowing one’s knowledge and work to be changed by the new 
situations met in clinical practice.  
Each new situation ideally helps the nurse to enhance their ability to approach clinical 
situations in a less fragmented manner. This enables them to distinguish relevant data from 
irrelevant data and make a judgement or decision without a great deal of conscious 
cognitive effort, e.g., spending time weighing up alternatives (Benner & Tanner 1987, 
Easen & Wilcockson 1996, Benner et al 1999). This is similar to how researchers such as 
Brykczynski (1989) and White et al (1992) have conceptualised expertise as a result of their 
research with nurse practitioners.  
White et al (1989) found that expertise was a matter of knowing which cues to pay attention 
to more so than being skilled at formulating hypotheses. Brykczynski (1989) also found 
expertise to involve context-specific pattern recognition. However, experience alone might 
not be adequate in honing this skill, and Flynn & Sinclair (2005) view the refining one’s 
expertise as involving formal further education in addition to the clinical experience 
discussed by Benner. 
Whilst novice nurses may not be highly proficient at decision-making, there is no guarantee 
that given time they will eventually become expert decision-makers by merit of the 
clocking up of years of practice alone (Hoffman et al 2004, Thompson 2006). Psychologists 
studying judgement and decision-making in areas other than nursing often determine 
expertise in terms of the empirical accuracy of judgement and decisions made by 
participants as opposed to their level of experience (Swets 2000). Having said this, it is 
important that experience is not totally discounted as a factor in building up expertise, 
particularly in light of studies which have linked the two.  
In their study, Corcoran-Perry et al (1999) used indicators of expertise besides experience. 
These involved nurses having been published in their area of expertise, having made 
presentations in that area, or being regarded as ‘expert’ by three or more colleagues. 
However, even with the use of these indicators, Corcoran-Perry et al (1999, p50) desisted 
from using the ‘expert’ and ‘novice’ labels in their work, using “experienced and new, 
rather than expert and novice”.  
It can be inferred from the literature that whilst a nurse might not gain enough experience in 
their first year of practice to reach ‘expert’ level, neither does having five or more years of 
practice automatically confer this level of proficiency on a nurse. However, some 
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researchers (e.g., Ferrario 2004) do use this criterion to describe their samples. Without 
rating proficiency at clinical decision-making, Corcoran-Perry et al (1999) found that there 
were more similarities than there were differences between the clinical judgement and 
decision-making of novice nurses and experienced nurses with some degree of expertise.  
Lauri & Salantera (2002) have found that the link between clinical experience and expert 
decision-making differs from setting to setting, whilst Corcoran (1986c) has described 
clinical decision-making as varying widely between clinical nurse experts. In line with a 
previous study (Lauri & Salantera 1998), it was found that there was no correlation 
between years of experience and the type of decision-making engaged in by nurses working 
in intensive care settings, with the same being true for nurses working in public health 
(Lauri & Salantera 2002). However, Lauri & Salantera (2002, p97) did find a link between 
experience and the type of decision-making approaches used by nurses working in what 
they termed “long- and short- term care”. It is unclear precisely what type of care settings 
are indicated by these rather vague descriptors, although they are clearly differentiated in 
the paper from the public health, psychiatric and intensive care settings.  
In designing their novice clinical reasoning model (NCRM) O’Neill et al (2005) viewed the 
lack of novice expertise at decision-making as being further compounded by the more 
deliberate, less intuitive and subsequently slower cognitive processing of the novice nurse. 
In addition to their NCRM, the authors’ more general clinical decision making model 
(CDMM) did not (by their own admission) take into account the variety of nurses’ 
educational backgrounds and care settings. These factors have been recognised as important 
to the study of nurses’ clinical decision-making by Hoffman et al (2004). In addition to this, 
neither model accounted for accommodation of the range of clinical decisions across the 
many specialist areas in which nurses work.  
Notwithstanding this, O’Neill et al (2005) have made a significant contribution in 
proposing a model for the distinctive clinical judgement and decision-making of novice 
nurses and have linked this directly to a general model that accounts for more experienced 
nurses. Also, addressing the challenges presented to novice nurses as clinical decision-
makers, O’Neill et al (2004, 2005, 2006) have offered a prototype system to provide 
evidence-based clinical information to support novice nurses in their decision-making. 
Such decision support systems tend to be relied upon more so by novices than by expert 
nurses (Benner 1984, Flynn & Sinclair 2005). 
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However, what is apparent from the literature generally is that experience cannot be held up 
on its own as an indicator of expertise. What constitutes expertise and contributes to its 
development will vary across settings and roles. Apart from empirical performance 
indicators around accuracy, indicators of expertise apart from experience can be qualitative 
in nature, being socially and culturally embedded.  
Essentially the attribution of expertise in nursing judgement and decision-making is as 
complex as clinical judgement and decision-making itself. Ironically, study design has 
often involved researchers making judgements themselves, or relying on the judgements of 
others, as to the expertise of participants. Apart from accuracy in performance where 
appropriate, the measurement and attribution of expertise in the different clinical roles and 
settings of nursing practice requires recognition of the fact that data on all of the relevant 
factors will always be available and/or measurable. In addition to this, the environment and 
socio-cultural context in which expertise is developed and attributed require careful 
consideration in their own right. 
2.5.2.2 Environmental elements influencing nursing judgement & decision-making 
The influence of the specific clinical context and environment in which nurses make 
judgements and decisions is a topic that has received notable attention in the nursing 
literature (Crow et al 1995). Researchers have tended to either focus on a singular type of 
clinical setting (Bucknall 2003, Carr 2004), or to examine differences in nurses’ judgement 
and decision-making across various clinical settings (Bucknall & Thomas 1995, Lauri & 
Salantera 2002 Hedberg & Larsson 2004, Bakalis & Watson 2005). This research into 
differences across clinical settings is particularly important in light of the links made by 
some nursing theorists and researchers between environment-specific tasks and the 
knowledge and cognitive processes peculiar to those tasks (and therefore environments) 
(Corcoran-Perry et al 1999, Thompson et al 2004, 2006). This reflects a similar focus in the 
psychological literature, which has drawn in particular on cognitive continuum theory (e.g., 
Dunwoody et al 2000). 
Lauri & Salantera (1995, 1998, 2002) have studied the clinical decision-making process 
across different types of nursing internationally. They found that different approaches to 
decision-making are used in different clinical situations because decision-making is 
essentially a task centred process in which the approach adopted by the clinician depends 
on the type of task at hand. For data collection, Lauri & Salantera (2002) used a 56-item 
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instrument based on cognitive continuum theory (Hammond 1996b) and Dreyfus’s (1972, 
1986) writings on intuition on which Benner (1984) based her work. 
Statistical analysis of data collected from nurses (n=1,460) working in Finland, Norway, 
Northern Ireland, Switzerland, the U.S.A. and Canada demonstrated their use of four 
approaches to decision-making: intuitive (26% of respondents), intuitive-analytical, 
analytical-intuitive (combined – 60% of respondents), and analytical (14% of respondents). 
However, with 60% of respondents falling into the intuitive-analytical and analytical-
intuitive categories combined, Lauri & Salantera (2002) do not give a breakdown of how 
many nurses were represented by either of these two models individually. Lauri & 
Salantera (2002) found that nurses could be shown to use different models in different 
countries, across different care settings and also at different stages in the decision-making 
process – although sometimes there were similarities in the approach taken by nurses.  
Generally, nurses working in long-term care settings tended more towards analytical 
decision-making whilst those in acute settings were more inclined to be intuitive in their 
approach. Across the sample intuitive decision-making tended to be used at the data 
collection stage whilst analytical decision-making predominated at the data processing and 
problem identification stage. Decision-making differed not only across settings but was also 
different internationally within the same type of clinical setting.  
For example, whilst Finnish public health nurses tended towards the use of analytical 
decision-making, Canadian public health nurses were mainly intuitive in their decision-
making. Drawing on an earlier study (Lauri et al 1997), Lauri & Salantera (2002) attribute 
this result to the differences between national health services and subsequently between 
professional role and the types of tasks engaged in by nurses. However, this was not always 
the case. The decision-making of intensive care nurses, for example, was found to be 
mainly intuitive at the implementation, monitoring and evaluation stage in Finland, 
Switzerland, Northern Ireland, the U.S.A. and Canada.  
One point where this study is unclear is in the types of settings involved. Whereas it is clear 
what is meant by “psychiatric care” and “intensive care”, it is not made clear exactly what 
types of settings are incorporated within the categories of “health care” and “long- and 
short term care” (Lauri & Salantera 2002, p97). Whilst the reader might initially interpret 
“long- and short term care” as applying to the two aforementioned clearly defined 
categories, this is not borne out in the discussion of the results, whereby it appears that data 
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was collected from “long- and short term care” settings as distinct from the two more 
clearly labelled settings (Lauri & Salantera 2002, p97).  
It is apparent that “health care” is the label given to the setting populated by “public health 
nurses”, as the latter appears in the discussion of results whilst the former does not (Lauri & 
Salantera 2002, p97). The overall picture given by the results of this study by Lauri & 
Salantera (2002) is that decision-making is a complex process which sees nurses differ in 
their approach according to the environment in which they are operating and the demands 
of the task at hand. Whilst this instrument enables researchers to uncover evidence of the 
nature of the decision-making of individuals in this regard, one would have to go beyond 
the use of the instrument (as did Lauri & Salantera (2002)) to find evidence of the specific 
influences on such shifts in approach.  
In investigating the importance of the clinical environment as an influence on the clinical 
judgement and decision-making of nurses Carr (2004), like O’Neill et al (2005), was 
informed by information processing theory. Carr (2004) has pointed out that it is imperative 
to bear in mind that there is a great deal more variance between hospital and community 
practice settings than might be first apparent, and that knowledge gleaned about the 
decision making process in one setting cannot be assumed to apply to the other (Carr 2004). 
Community nursing, according to Carr’s (2004, p853) model of clinical reasoning, takes 
place in settings which generate a high “signal: noise ratio” which makes it more difficult 
for nurses to clearly detect signals or cues.  
Based in the United Kingdom, Carr’s (2004, p852) study employed hermeneutic 
phenomenology and involved four focus groups (n=45), non-participant observation with 
follow-on interviewing (n=5), tape recorded interviews (n=18) and four tape-recorded 
participant group (n= “3 to 5”) reviews of transcripts. Carr (2004) used an information 
processing type organising framework to explain how nurses recognised and acted on cues 
according to the environment in which they were working. Because of her interpretive 
approach, Carr (2004) views her study as having been more sensitive to the ethical and 
aesthetic elements of clinical judgement and decision-making. 
Carr (2004) found that community-based care settings confer a more heterogeneous, less 
defined role on nurses, to the extent that they described themselves as negotiating this role. 
Like the high “signal : noise” ratio, this situation was found not to be conducive to clarity 
and certainty. It also placed demands on nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making 
that might not be experienced in hospital settings.  
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Cook et al (2001) also examined nurses’ decision-making in community settings. They 
found that the nature of community-based psychiatry meant that organisational 
cohesiveness was essential to the efficient functioning of the multidisciplinary team. The 
many different agencies, professions and locations involved in such care has the potential to 
thwart attempts at effective group-decision making involving all members of the team 
unless efforts are made to ensure that organisational structure accounts for such multiplicity 
(Cook et al 2001). 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that whilst nurses can be said broadly to engage in a 
mix of intuitive and analytic approaches to judgement and decision-making, this will differ 
across clinical settings. This is because different settings vary in terms of the structure, 
complexity and nature of clinical tasks and challenges that they present. Consequently they 
also differ in how nurses’ work is structured, particularly in terms of their role.  
In the context of psychiatric nursing in Ireland, this issue is further complicated by the 
rotation of nurses around settings. The majority of participants in this study work 
alternately in community and inpatient settings, being rotated from one to another after 
several weeks or months. Given this, it is difficult in this study to begin to discern links 
between approaches to clinical judgement and decision-making and specific clinical 
settings and roles. 
Nurses’ roles are inextricably linked to their clinical context and care setting. For this 
reason I move on next to consider what the nursing research literature reveals about how 
the clinical role of a nurse impacts on their judgement and decision-making. Fundamental 
to this is the consideration of nursing roles vis-à-vis those of other members of the 
multidisciplinary team. 
2.5.2.3 Interdisciplinary elements influencing nursing judgement and decision-making 
Studies have shown that relationships between the members of the different professions 
involved in the delivery of multidisciplinary healthcare impact on their clinical judgement 
and decision-making (Huckabay & Jagla 1979, Harris 1984, Bourbonnias & Baumann 
1985, Foxall et al 1991, McKeron 1991, Stern et al 1991, Jenks 1993, Bucknall & Thomas 
1995, Baggs et al 1997, Cott 1997, Bucknall 2003, Coombs 2003). The impact of these 
relationships is compounded by the fact that the level at which nurses have the autonomy 
and authority to make decisions impacts on their position and status within the 
multidisciplinary team, and vice versa (Bucknall & Thomas 1997, Bakalis & Watson 
2005). Colombo (1997) and Cook et al (2001) have argued that the cohesiveness of 
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multidisciplinary teamwork in clinical judgement and decision-making is most important in 
mental health services. Buckingham & Adams (2000a) see research on clinical judgement 
and decision-making in nursing as vital in helping to improve the standing of nurses as 
multidisciplinary team members.  
Bucknall (2003, p315) found that handovers and medical rounds afforded both medical and 
nursing staff the opportunity to share information in relation to clinical decision-making. 
During these interactions, informal “checks” were made in the context of a professional 
hierarchy of experience and level of appointment. Also, Bucknall (2003) found that the 
absence of medical staff increased the onus on nurses to contingency plan with regard to 
clinical decision-making.  
This was because nurses would be unable to consult medical team members, although there 
was reported to be a degree of shared clinical decision-making between nurses and junior 
doctors. However, this collaboration would only take place after the nurses and junior 
doctors had built up a relationship of trust and mutual respect over time (Bucknall 2003). 
Where this did not occur, the absence of shared decision-making resulted in 
interdisciplinary disharmony.  
In line with this, Hopkinson et al (1998) found poor interdisciplinary relationships to be a 
source of stress for psychiatric nurses. Bucknall (2003) found that the process of decision-
making was also shared between nurses and other health professionals such as pharmacists 
and physiotherapists insofar as a mutual sharing of information regarding patients enabled 
all involved to engage in more effective decision-making (Bucknall 2003). In both inpatient 
and community psychiatric nursing this is true particularly with regard to risk assessment 
for aggression and violence, where the nurse tends to be the focal point for 
multidisciplinary team information sharing (Doyle & Dolan 2002). 
Carr (2004) describes the community nurses in her study as engaging in collaborative, 
triadic decision-making which involved nurses, service-users and their carers. Triadic 
decision-making involving a nurse, service-user and significant other was also examined by 
Dalton (2003, p23), who expanded on Kim’s (1983, 1987) theoretical model by adding the 
“family caregiver” to the nurse/service-user dyad. The main thrust of Dalton’s (2003) 
theory is to describe individual and organisational factors that influence triadic decision-
making. Each participant brings unique role expectations, personality traits, knowledge and 
attitudes to the process.  
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The context in which the triadic decision-making takes place is characterised by the 
structure of the healthcare organisation involved (Dalton 2003). This includes the system of 
care delivery used, its processes and the degree to which decision-making is routinised. 
However, it remains for Dalton’s (2003) theory to be tested by further research. 
Crow et al (1995) have contended that the processes engaged in by nurses and doctors in 
clinical judgement and decision-making are distinct from each other. Buckingham & 
Adams (2000a, 2000b) and Rashotte & Carnavale (2004) point out that this distinction is 
not very marked. Buckingham & Adams (2000a, 2000b) note the main similarity being the 
application of a process of classification in both nursing and medical judgement and 
decision-making.  
Furthermore, Rashotte & Carnavale (2004) have suggested that the basis of the decision-
making of both professions is based on contextual use of positivistic empiricism. Coombs 
& Ersser (2004) concur with this insofar as they found that both doctors and nurses use 
biomedical knowledge to inform their decision-making. However, this scientific knowledge 
is applied firmly within the context of hierarchical dominance of the medical role.  
As also found by Colombo et al (2003), the medical staff participating in the study by 
Coombs & Ersser (2004) tended not to place a high value on the experiential knowledge 
drawn on by nurses as useful for decision-making. Nurses in the same study placed a high 
value on scientific medical knowledge. This reflects the higher regard that society in 
general holds for the construct of quantitative medical knowledge over that of qualitative 
nursing knowledge (Davies 1995).  
Henneman et al (1995) have identified the need for experiential knowledge to be 
recognised and used by multidisciplinary teams in a way that promotes successful 
interdisciplinary collaboration. This is a view shared by Rashotte & Carnavale (2004), who 
suggest that medicine tends not to recognise the value of constructivist approaches to 
knowledge, such as reflective practice, to the same degree as do other professions. DiGiulio 
& Crow (1997) contend that this contrast is due to the medical preference for empirical, 
theoretical knowledge because of the doctor’s reductionist role in reaching a correct 
diagnosis, compared to the nurse’s role of responding to patient needs.  
Whilst Thompson (1999) argues that the qualitative, even somewhat ineffable nature of 
intuitive experiential nursing knowledge could make it difficult to share in the context of 
collaborative interdisciplinary decision-making, he does see a solution to this problem in 
cognitive continuum theory. The benefit of this theory, he argues, is that it considers the use 
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of personal knowledge in the context of social hierarchies (Hamm 1988). This accounts for 
the acceptance of intuitive knowledge within a multidisciplinary team where it is used in 
combination with analytical methods and by those with acknowledged expertise.  
Colombo et al (2003) found that service-users’ sick role and elevated status of the medical 
profession leads to the dominance of the medical model as the main influence controlling 
shared decision-making in community psychiatry. They concluded that a more equitable 
arrangement for the delivery of community mental health is needed if nurses and service-
users are to be enabled to make valuable contributions to the shared decision-making 
process.Coombs & Ersser (2004) found that some areas of nursing knowledge are valued 
by medical staff, in particular the knowledge gained through interaction with service-users’ 
families. Doctors and nurses were found to vary in their views of the importance to their 
decision-making of less scientific knowledge areas, such as ethical knowing, with nurses 
giving more priority to ethical knowledge in their decision-making. The richest source of 
knowledge to inform clinical judgement and decision-making for nurses identified by 
Coombs & Ersser (2004), however, was that gained through continuous involvement in 
patient care.  
Kikuchi & Simmons (1999) and Rashotte & Carnavale (2004) view such practical 
knowledge as being the desirable bedfellow of scientific knowledge in the clinical setting. 
This is because they view biomedical knowledge as sometimes failing to establish certain 
truth. Where certain truths are established, they are seen as difficult to apply to a complex 
clinical situation. Here the concurrent utilisation of inductive reasoning can at least help the 
clinician work towards ascertaining probable truth.  
Mrayyan (2004) and Coombs & Ersser (2004) have found that despite the distinct role that 
nursing knowledge has to play to decision-making, and the acknowledgement of this fact 
by doctors and nurses alike, medical knowledge (and therefore medical decision-making) is 
seen as superior when it comes to important decisions about patient care. Even where 
nursing knowledge has a unique contribution to make, it is subsumed within a medical 
framework. This is because nurses have not been empowered to make clinical judgements 
and decisions to the same extent that their medical colleagues have Coombs & Ersser 
(2004).  
Nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making is embedded in their traditional role as 
lesser partners in care provision alongside other members of the multidisciplinary team - 
doctors in particular (Fulton 1997, Cassidy 2004). However, the profile of the nursing input 
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to care provision is being raised in Ireland with moves being made, for example, towards 
nurse prescribing (An Bord Altranais 2000b). In the U.K. official policy has also been 
moving towards enhancing the autonomous role of the nurse in healthcare provision 
(Department of Health 2002).  
One rationale for this is the impact that greater autonomy can have on patient outcomes 
(Curley 2002, Luyt et al 2002). There is no universal agreement as to exactly what 
autonomy for nurses in practice entails (Keenan 1998). However, there is general 
agreement that an improved understanding of the role that level of autonomy plays in 
nurses’ clinical judgement decision-making could help inform the advancement of the 
nursing profession (Wade 1999, Buckingham & Adams 2000a).  
Cook et al (2001), for example, found that community-based psychiatric nurses 
experienced greater autonomy when they worked in a multidisciplinary team which 
operated cohesively. This was particularly in terms of cohesiveness in communication, 
organisational structure and collegial support. This enabled nurses to deliver care that was 
more user-centred. 
The role of psychiatric nurses is very much determined by the setting in which they work as 
well as their place in the hierarchy of the work team. These factors all influence how they 
make clinical judgements and decisions. This is not least because they determine the very 
judgements and decisions that they are mandated to make. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In concluding this review of the literature it is essential to reconsider it in the context of the 
study’s aims, first discussed in Chapter One: 
1. To explore the judgement and decision-making of RPNs working in the Irish 
Republic, in terms of both the cognitive processes involved and their social context.  
2. To consider and apply the findings to psychiatric nursing practice and education, as 
well as to policy issues and future research in this area. This applies primarily to the 
Irish context from which the data were generated and, where valid, to psychiatric 
nursing generally. 
The review outlines the wide variation of themes, approaches and opinions that prevail in 
the literature. The concept of an intuitive-analytic spectrum of clinical judgement and 
decision-making is a dominant theme, but there is also a pervasive concern with issues such 
as the nursing role and the social context of nurses’ judgement and decision-making. This 
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mix of social and cognitive elements is apparent only when a wide ranging review of the 
literature is undertaken.  
Specific research questions require a focus on one or other of these elements. However, an 
approach that focuses on the social over the cognitive or cognitive over the social aspects 
would, for an exploratory study, obscure a large part of the picture. This can be seen in 
approaches taken by other researchers. 
Buckingham & Adams (2000b), for example, have seen the consideration of intuition as an 
integral part of how they have explored more socially situated issues such as professional 
role and attribution of expertise. Such an integrated approach makes possible the study of 
the influence and interplay of both the social and cognitive elements. At the same time it 
permits exploration of nurses’ clinical judgements and decisions in terms of the dominant 
theme of the intuitive/analytic spectrum.  
To date research has shown that nurses do tend towards intuitive approaches in their 
clinical judgement and decision-making. Some accept this as an inevitable and unavoidable 
characteristic of nursing as the art of caring. Others urge a move towards a more evidence-
based, actuarial approach.  
It is important, as the philosophical literature points out, to maintain a balance of these two 
perspectives. This is what I intend to do in my own study. I do this by considering both 
positions as indicative of the wider, sometimes dichotomous, debate regarding the 
fundamental nature of nursing as art and/or science.  
A keen awareness of the wider philosophical discussion should underpin any study of 
nursing judgement and decision-making, and the literature discussed in these first two 
chapters has provided that background. This wider discussion is relevant not only to 
nursing practice, but also to the choice of research methodology for investigating practice. 
In light of this, I deliberately aim towards a non-dichotomous, eclectic approach to this 
study. 
From the review of the literature, it is apparent that many researchers were successful in 
their application to nursing of the empirical approach used by psychologists researching 
judgement and decision-making. This was particularly the case where nurses made 
judgements and decisions that involved data that were consistently measurable in 
quantitative terms. Despite the complex nature of psychiatric nursing, there are phenomena 
that can validly be reduced to purely mathematical terms in order to be studied using 
judgement or decision analysis.  
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These methods could be used to examine discrete psychiatric nursing phenomena. 
However, they would not be appropriate as a means of broadly exploring the judgement 
and decision-making of psychiatric nurses. As such, this study needs to take account of the 
socio-cultural context of psychiatric nurses’ work, - in particular how the ‘goodness’ or 
‘soundness’ of judgements and decisions are determined in that context. 
I believe that these issues are best addressed by a study that incorporates qualitative 
investigation of nurses’ perceptions of their decision-making (Manias et al 2004a, 2004b). I 
also believe that there is a need to ground such an inquiry by combining it, where possible, 
with an actuarial approach. My review of the literature suggests that consideration of the 
combined cognitive and social factors involved in nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-
making requires a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods.  
I am confident that with an appropriate research methodology that a reasonable attempt to 
address these issues can be made. This does not affect the overall aims of the study, but it 
does involve refining of the study objectives. The literature reviewed in the first two 
chapters addresses the first objective: 
I. To give a comprehensive account of clinical judgement and decision-making in 
nursing, in particular as it applies to psychiatric nursing 
From my discussion of the research processes involved in the study of nurses’ clinical 
judgement and decision-making, the second objective can be refined as follows: 
II. To understand, through a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, how and why RPNs make their clinical judgements and decisions  
From my discussion of the nature of nursing judgement and decision-making, in particular 
how it is best understood, the third objective can be refined thus: 
III. To gain as much insight as possible on the cognitive processes and social context 
of the clinical judgement and decision-making of RPNs, in particular analysing 
the interplay between the external social and internal cognitive elements involved. 
The fourth objective remains unchanged:  
IV. Having fulfilled the aims and objectives above, to make applications to 
psychiatric nursing in the Irish republic, with particular reference to its future 
development. 
In summary, the revised aims and objectives in light of the review of the nursing literature 
are:  
AIMS 
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1. To explore the judgement and decision-making of RPNs working in the Irish 
Republic, in terms of both the cognitive processes involved and their social context.  
2. To consider and apply the findings to psychiatric nursing practice and education, as 
well as to policy issues and future research in this area. This applies primarily to the 
Irish context from which the data were generated and, where valid, to psychiatric 
nursing generally. 
OBJECTIVES 
I. To give a comprehensive account of clinical judgement and decision-making in 
nursing, in particular as it applies to psychiatric nursing 
II. To understand, through a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, how and why RPNs make their clinical judgements and decisions  
III. To gain as much insight as possible on the cognitive processes and social context 
of the clinical judgement and decision-making of RPNs, in particular analysing 
the interplay between the external social and internal cognitive elements involved. 
IV. Having fulfilled the aims and objectives above, to make applications to 
psychiatric nursing in the Irish republic, with particular reference to its future 
development. 
Successful fulfilment of these objectives requires a methodology capable of yielding data 
and enabling analysis that considers more than the intuitive/analytic nature of nursing 
judgement and decision-making in its social context. It must also enable the study of those 
aspects of clinical judgement and decision-making that the literature has identified as 
important, i.e., role, expertise, interdisciplinary work etc. I believe that this can be achieved 
with the right combination of research methods. In Chapter Three I discuss how I have set 
out to achieve this. 
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Chapter Three – Methodology & Piloting 
3.1 Introduction 
In my conclusion of Chapter Two, I broached the epistemological and ontological issues 
pertaining to research on nursing judgement and decision-making. In this chapter I further 
elaborate on my point made there, that a study design grounded solely in either positivism 
or postpositivism is not adequate to address the aims and objectives of this study (e.g., 
Brykczynski 1989, Bryans 2000, Bryans & McIntosh 2000, Sainio et al 2001, Fredelius et 
al 2002, Coombs 2003, Fonteyn et al 2003, Hellzen 2004, Offredy & Meerabeau 2005, 
Hastie & Penington 2000). This is not because being grounded in a single approach is 
defective – indeed it would have the benefit of lending clarity and focus to the research. 
Notwithstanding this, the types of issues that can be raised by the data in an exploratory 
descriptive study such as this one (Koopowitz et al 2003) require analysis that considers the 
meaning and significance of participants’ practices. A singularly quantitative approach 
cannot achieve this (Banister et al 1994, Abma 2001). Therefore, this study’s qualitative 
approach seeks to accommodate and engage with concepts such as the nurse as phronimos 
or spoudaios (Dunne 1993).  
However, it is not solely on conceptual bases such as these that my choice of a 
predominantly qualitative methodology rests. Willingness to use qualitative research 
methods broadens the potential for a study to incorporate diverse approaches that are 
required to address the issues at hand. This is true not only for exploratory studies - in 
research on consensus building (see pp20-21), for example, qualitative research is the 
standard approach (Bowman & Ambrosini 1997).  
Edwards & Potter (1992a) view qualitative research methods that examine the use of 
language as vital to widening the perspectives that research can offer in areas, such as 
cognitive psychology, that have traditionally been dominated by quantitative approaches. 
This does not rule out the use of quantitative research methods or imply the general 
superiority of qualitative methods (Silverman 1993). Indeed, the focus of this study is such 
that a broad, inclusive perspective on methodology is required. 
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3.2 Choice of Method: The need for a dual perspective & methods 
triangulation 
The aim of this study, as stated in Chapter One, was to examine the judgement and 
decision-making of RPNs working in Ireland. In doing this I intended to explore the 
judgement and decision-making as involving social and cognitive processes involved. This 
dual cognitive-social perspective has been a feature of psychology and sociology literature 
throughout the 20th century (Trotter 1919/2005, Sherif 1936, Festinger 1950, Moscovici 
1985, Bandura 1986), and so is a well established theme in psychological research in areas 
such as personal identity (Wortham 2001), attitudes, attribution and problem solving 
(Edwards & Potter 1992a, Potter 1996, Potter & Wetherell 1987, Hogan 2002).  
This approach to nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making as happening “in social 
contexts as well as in individual minds” (Hogan 2002, p345) follows on from the work of 
Blackburn (1972). Here, it was noted that researchers risk uncovering only partial evidence 
due to the limitation of their research to the methods of a singular discipline. For a topic as 
complex as human judgement and decision-making, this point is all the more pertinent 
(Juslin et al 2000). 
Denzin (1989) has also recommended that researchers move beyond the limitations of 
confining themselves to a single research method, advocating the use of whatever 
applicable theoretical approaches are needed to answer the research question. Such a 
combination of approaches can also address the shortcomings in terms of validity and 
potential bias that are inherent in using a single method (Cook & Campbell 1979, Creswell 
& Plano Clark 2006). By studying phenomena from several viewpoints, the researcher can 
decrease the likelihood of the type of subjectivity that is inherent where one perspective is 
dominant (Hanson 2006). 
In nursing research this usually involves the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Cowman 1993) to deal with complex, socially situated topics (Twinn 2002, 
Power 2004). In this study my aim is to use methods triangulation to expand on and 
validate quantitative results using qualitative data analysis (Creswell & Plano Clark 2006, 
Plano Clark & Creswell 2007).  I have done this using a concurrent triangulation design, 
whereby data collection and subsequent qualitative and quantitative data analysis occur 
within the same time frame and are given equal weight.  
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Normally this involves the concurrent collection of two sets of data, one qualitative and the 
other quantitative (Creswell et al 2003). However, in this study the same data set is 
analysed using two distinct methods of analysis. Quantitative data analysis (comparative 
keyword analysis) of the data set is used to inform qualitative analysis of the same data set 
using conversation analysis-informed discursive analysis.  
Discursive analysis is informed by conversation-analytic principles and methods, which are 
grounded in ethnomethodology. Comparative keyword analysis is a novel quantitative 
method of data analysis with its origins in the mixing of sociological and linguistic research 
paradigms (Seale 2006, Seale et al 2006). The data were collected using think aloud 
protocols & critical incident interviews due to their proven track record in answering 
similar research questions in psychological research. This also applies to my choice of 
discursive analysis as a method of analysis.   
My use of methods from different research traditions presents challenges involving 
underpinning philosophies, and issues of ontology and epistemology (Risjord et al 2001, 
Sale et al 2002). Notwithstanding this, nursing research has traditionally resolved such 
problems through the application of across-methods triangulation as part of the study 
design. The researcher has the onus to do this in a way that adequately addresses the 
relevant philosophical, epistemological, ontological and methodological challenges.   
My philosophical grounding in conducting this study is one of pragmatism. Characteristic 
of this perspective is that my choice of methods is solution-focused, pluralistic, concerned 
with outcome and addressing a problem grounded in the “real world” of clinical practice 
(Creswell & Plano Clark 2006, p22). My contention is that triangulation is justified as it 
represents the best solution within a study of this size and duration to the problems 
presented by the study’s aims and objectives. 
Grounded in pragmatism, I conceptually I view the research process from a social 
constructionist perspective. This does conflict with the essentialist view that underpins 
much of cognitive psychology (Gelman 2003). This approach would require me to analyse 
the data with a view of fitting the study findings into existing models and theories, which 
would pose problems given that this is not a cognitive psychology research study.  
My pragmatist perspective enables me not only to do this (and in Chapters Six I do discuss 
the findings with reference to these) but also to recognise that the socially-situated, 
“practice-oriented” nature of the data (Creswell & Plano Clark 2006, p22). This is 
particularly appropriate given that my approaches to data collection and analysis are not 
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methods of choice in cognitive psychology, where quantitative methods are almost 
exclusively preferred. This study design to this study was not my initial plan, but 
constitutes a solution-focused approach to the research question, borne out of necessity in 
the context of solving several problems. 
3.3 Research Design 
The exploratory nature of this study (Newton et al 2007) requires richly descriptive data 
(Nunkoosing 2005). Live observation of practice was considered, but the ethical and 
logistical problems around access to participants as they worked with vulnerable 
individuals proved insurmountable in a study of this size and duration. Also, direct 
observation is not seen as the most effective way to collect information on ‘invisible’ 
phenomena such as the cognitive aspects of human judgement and decision making 
(Schulter et al 2008). A combined ‘think aloud’ and retrospective interviewing approach 
was used as the best available way to yield the data required (Cioffi & Markham 1997). 
3.3.1 The ‘Think Aloud’ Research Design & Critical Interviews 
The think aloud approach involves the recording of concurrent verbalisation (Ericsson & 
Simon 1993) - in-vivo recording of participant verbalisations while they are involved in an 
activity such as problem solving (van Somneren et al 1994). This approach is considered 
more reliable than retrospective interviewing alone, particularly in terms of accuracy and 
validity (Fonteyn 1993). It is also the standard method for attempting to access cognitive 
processes in-vivo (Ericsson & Simon 1993, Fonteyn et al 1993, Crutcher 1994, Van Den 
Haak et al 2003, Cokely & Kelley 2009).  
Nursing researchers have used the think aloud approach to study clinical judgement and 
decision-making (Narayan & Corcoran Perry 1997, Corcoran Perry et al 1999, Azzarelo 
2003, Simmons et al 2003, Offredy & Meerebeau 2005, Offredy et al 2008). However, data 
yielded by the think aloud approach may not represent the normative practice of 
participants. Therefore, Ericsson & Simon (1993) recommend supplementary retrospective 
interviewing.  
I decided on this approach given its successful use by nursing and midwifery researchers 
(Cioffi & Markham 1997, Corcoran-Perry et al 1999, Ritter (2003). Retrospective 
interviews were conducted using the Judgement & Decision-Making Performance in 
Practice (JDM PiP) schedule (MacNeela et al 2005 – see Appendix A), which provided a 
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basis for engaging participants in the critical incident technique of retrospective 
interviewing (Flanagan 1954). 
This technique has been used extensively in nursing research (Keating 2002), particularly 
around clinical judgement and decision making (Benner 1984, Webb & Shakespeare 2008). 
It is preferable to structured question-answer format interview (Abma 2001). Although a 
structured format was used by interviewers, this was in an informal, conversational manner 
that yielded co-authored naturalistic narratives (Och & Capps 1996, Gaeth & Shanteau 
2000). 
Participants were asked to give an account of a recent case similar to the one that they had 
just encountered using the think aloud approach. In this way, the JDM PiP schedule 
(MacNeela et al 2005 – see Appendix A) used critical incident technique to provide 
information around the normative practice of the participant (Abma 2001) in enough detail 
to obtain data of the depth and richness required in a descriptive study (Fratilis & Sionis 
2006). Critical incident technique is commonly used in this way in clinical judgement and 
decision-making studies (Farnan et al 2008). 
An advantage of critical incident technique is that it involves not only participant recall of 
events, but critical reflection also (Perry 1997, Keatinge 2002). In this study, the ‘critical’ 
element of critical incident technique sought to supply a rich meta-narrative by engaging 
participants in a conversational manner. This expanded on the most relevant aspects of the 
recalled incidents (Abma 2001). 
Critical incident technique tends not to instigate critical discussion of social phenomena 
such as role and interpersonal interaction (Byrne 2001). However, these aspects could be 
addressed due to the JDM PiP’s coverage of both social and cognitive aspects of judgement 
and decision-making. In doing this, the five steps of the technique were followed (Flanagan 
1954).  
First, the original educational format of the JDM PiP was revised and piloted in broad 
discussion of social and cognitive aspects of recalled incidents. Secondly, the JDM PiP 
sought participant recall of events similar to those engaged with in in-vivo data collection. 
Thirdly, the JDM PiP enabled probing around aspects of participant recall and reflection on 
events relevant to the study aims (Schulter et al 2008).  
Sound data analysis is the fourth principle of critical incident technique. Problems around 
objectivity in critical incident technique were acknowledged by Flanagan (1954) and since 
then there has been considerable discussion of this in the literature. Flanagan’s (1954) fifth 
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principle is the discussion and dissemination of study findings. Chapter Six discusses the 
findings of this research report, whilst Chapter Seven addresses dissemination.  
Whilst the collection of in-vivo and retrospective data enables an enriched perspective on 
participant judgement and decision-making, the question remains of precisely what these 
data represent. Such data are not an open window into the minds of participants (Schegloff 
1989). This has implications for the collection and analysis of data that need to be dealt 
with before engaing in discussion of the validity and reliability of the think aloud approach. 
3.3.2 Verbal Data and the Problem of a Naïve View of Language 
As well as considering what verbal data can reveal about cognitive processes, they need to 
be considered in terms of the interactive activity from which they are derived (Potter 1996, 
Edwards 1997, Taylor 2001). Whilst verbal data do offer the clearest available view on the 
cognitive formation and processing of information (Schegloff 1989), this view is limited 
(Edwards & Potter 1992a). Insofar as they are conversational, verbal data offer deeper 
insight into social organisation than into cognitive processes (Sacks 1992). 
The limitations of verbal data do not preclude them from from offering some degree of 
insight into cognitive processes. Austin (1962) and Wittgenstein (1953) have made a clear 
case for linking how we know with how we use language (Potter 2001). Pursuing this link 
in research requires analysis to focus not solely on narrative content, but also on its 
linguistic and paralinguistic features (Misler 1986).  
Whilst necessitating a departure from the standard protocol analysis approach to think 
aloud data, this enables a deeper focus on the link between language and knowledge. Whilst 
somewhat precarious in its novelty, such a departure does offer the benefit of insight into 
phenomena such as the expression of inference by participants, and the establishment of 
mutual understanding as efforts at sense-making (Heritage 1984, Taylor 2001). This 
approach is rooted in ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967), an area that has been drawn 
successfully in the study of cognitive and affective phenomena (Edwards & Potter 1992a, 
Edwards 1997).  
Taken at face value, language can be interpreted as conveying bona fide information 
(Dekker 2002). This leads to analysis that seeks to simply uncover the machinations of 
participants’ minds, as opposed to the more realistic aim of reaching a better understanding 
of links between discourse and cognition (Edwards & Potter 1992a, Billig 1997). This, 
arguably more scientific approach, is underpinned by an understanding of language use as 
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contextually constitutive rather than as a transparent reflection of actual phenomena (Taylor 
2001). Therefore, in this study I view participants’ language as a resource that they use in 
response to certain contingencies within the complex web of social practices in which it is 
necessarily embedded. 
Essentially, the perspective taken in this study is that verbal data cannot be taken to 
represent participants’ telling of ‘true’ versions of events (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984, Abma 
2001, Nunkoosing 2005). Instead I have attempted to understand what participants have 
communicated in terms of the meaning they attribute to events (Wertsch 1990). This stands 
in contradistinction to any attempt to simply presuming that the data represent an objective 
perspective on the actuality of those events.  
Any sense of actuality is put at a further remove by the fact that participants’ are 
reconstructing events from memory (Edwards & Potter 1992b). Aware of problems with 
recall themselves, participants indicate this by way of “metacognitive disclaimers” 
(Edwards & Potter 1992a, p194). Participants can also lack awareness that the story that 
they are relating is not an authentic account of events, and may even contradict themselves 
(West 1990). 
However, whilst best not interpreted at face value, participant talk is referential and 
therefore permits some degree of knowledge to be yielded from its analysis (Taylor 2001). 
This knowledge allows us to begin to understand how participants make judgements and 
decisions by first understanding how they represent them discursively. The alternative to 
this approach is to deny the usefulness of language in exploring human judgement and 
decision-making, which would be a total departure from the approach that researchers in 
human judgement and decision-making have taken to date.  
Instead, I have strived to take an informed, healthily sceptical and balanced view of what 
verbal data can reveal. In doing this I have avoided adopting a naïve view of participant 
narrative as a precise discursive representation of actual cognitive events. However, 
overcoming a naïve view of the nature of language and verbal data does replace simple 
problems with more complex ones (Fairclough 1992). Chief among these is the need for 
analysis to be shown to account for participant reactivity (Gaertner & McLoughlin 1983, 
Haskell 2009), which poses still further problems for claims that the data validly reflect 
participants’ cognitive processes (Halliday 1978).  
Verbal data can be said to represent what the participant chooses to share with the 
researcher within the social context of being a participant in a research study (Charmaz 
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1995, Rowbotham 2004, Nunkoosing 2005). This is relatively unproblematic if researcher-
participant interaction is the focus of the research study, but poses significant challenges if 
a study seeks to uncover actual cognitive and/or social processes. It is vital therefore that 
data collection and analysis permit incisive exploration of the data, taking meta-narrative 
into account (Gilbert 1980, Hammersley & Atkinson 1985, Horton-Salway 2001), and 
shedding any “simplistic notions of true original events” being represented by the data 
(Gilbert & Mulkay 1984, Edwards & Potter 1992a, p187).  
3.3.3 Validity and reliability of the think aloud approach 
The value of conclusions from think aloud studies rely on “the validity of the think-aloud 
method, and on the reliability of the coding process” Skaner et al (2005, p3). Much of the 
commentary on the validity and reliability of the think aloud method focuses on the 
production of data that are representative of the cognitive processes that are normative for 
the task in which the participant is engaged. Although Ericsson & Simon (1993) contend 
that think aloud data are fairly representative of participant’s normative problem solving, 
they point out that ancillary thoughts and information are also in play.  
Lane & Schooler (2004) have suggested that methods such as the think aloud approach can 
be biased in favour of the detection of cognitive processes that are more easily verbalised. 
This is a limitation of think aloud method that needs to be taken into account by choosing a 
method of analysis that seeks to look beyond what is apparent in participant verbalisation. I 
address this issue in detail in the section on data analysis (see p.80), as I am concerned 
primarily in this section with data collection. 
Like Reicks et al (2003), van Somneren et al (1994, p33) found that cognition appears to be 
slower during use of the think aloud method, as participants slow down the process in order 
“to synchronize it with verbalization”. Failure to do this, they report, could result in 
participants’ verbalisations not keeping abreast with their thought processes, resulting in 
incomplete reporting. Van Den Haak et al (2003), however, have reported finding no 
evidence for this. Nevertheless, this is an issue of which the researcher needs to be aware, 
and one which I will also address in my discussion on data analysis (see p.80). 
Although it is an in-vivo method of data collection, the think aloud method differs from 
observation insofar as participants are engaged in a staged task. This increases participant 
mindfulness of how they are using their working memory, which can lead to incomplete 
reporting and possible disruption of the entire process (van Somneren et al 1994). Where 
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this occurs, participants complain of not being able to keep abreast with the process and 
there can be prolonged silences in verbalisation. 
Everyday social communication differs significantly from think aloud monologues 
(Ericsson & Simon 1993). Social verbalisation between the researcher and participant 
during data collection can result in the verbalisation taking on a social hue as well as 
introducing bias (Reicks et al 2003, Hansen 2005). Therefore the researcher is generally not 
visible to the participant during data collection.  
However, Hansen (2005, p518) notes the importance of the participant being “made aware 
that it is a social situation of some kind in which they are participating”. Therefore, the use 
of cues involving controlled social interaction that is an integral and standardised part of the 
task at hand differs from the social chit-chat that is seen as undesirable by Hansen (2005). It 
might also prove essential in lending a more natural social hue to the task that is important 
in terms of ecological validity (Gaeth & Shanteau 2000). This is all the more relevant in 
light of the fact that Lamond et al (1996) found that verbal information was the most 
common source of information used by nurses in making clinical decisions. Compared to 
social verbalisation, concurrent verbalisation can lack coherence, be disjointed, and may 
not be wholly representative of the actual thought processes used in performing the task 
(Ericsson & Simon 1993). Notwithstanding this, “the urge towards coherence and 
completeness” should be avoided, with the researcher seeking to capture nothing more or 
less than participant expression as it occurs.  
There is no reason why data yielded by the think aloud method cannot to be related to its 
social context as much as to purported cognitive processes. However, due to the nature of 
the work of psychiatric nurses, it would not be possible to collect think aloud data from 
them as they engage in their everyday work. Not only would this be ethically questionable, 
but logistically impractical. Therefore, it was necessary to use simulated cases to facilitate 
the collection of think aloud data. 
3.4 The Use of Simulated Cases in Research 
Simulated cases are used in research across many disciplines (Stewart 2001, Patomella et al 
2004), including nursing (Hughes & Huby 2002). They are particularly useful for collecting 
comparable data from large numbers of participants in standardised and controlled 
situations (Gould et al 2001, Hughes & Huby 2002, Gilbert 2004). Simulated cases are 
especially useful in research on judgement and decision-making in health and social 
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sciences (Reich et al 1998, Gilbert & Troitzsch 1999), particularly in nursing (Grobe et al 
1991, Colombo et al 2003, Ferrario 2004, Dowding et al 2009). In nursing research (Cioffi 
& Markham 1997, Corcoran-Perry et al 1999, Aitken 2003, Ritter 2003), as in other areas 
of research (Fredilius et al 2002, Laing & Kamhi 2002, Reicks et al 2003, Van Den Haak et 
al 2003), simulated cases have often been used for think aloud data collection.  
Researchers using simulated cases have tried various approaches to ensure that 
environmental elements are controlled and accounted for and that cases are presented with 
both realism and ecological validity. This has included the use of audio and visual aids, 
such as the presentation of cases in videotaped format (Cohen & Strayer 1996, Bryans 
2000, McKinstry 2000, Chau et al 2001, Gilbert 2004) or computer simulation (Payne et al 
1990, Salantera et al 2003, Carter et al 2004, Connelly & Bair 2004). Computer simulation 
has the added benefit of allowing interaction, going some way towards recreating the 
dynamism of a situation (Buchanan 2003).  
In order to increase this sense of dynamism, some researchers (Dresselhaus et al 2000, Van 
Walsum et al 2004) have used live actors to present simulated clinical cases. Whilst this is 
ideal in using case simulation for educative purposes (Nunn 2004), it may lead to 
inconsistencies and therefore lack of comparability across case presentations to individual 
participants in a research study. Cioffi et al (2005) note, however, that there is not a great 
deal of evidence – positive or negative – regarding the use of live actors in comparison to 
other methods of case presentation. 
3.4.1 The challenges and limitations of using simulated cases in 
research 
Simulated cases can be used in conjunction with many different types of data collection in 
qualitative, quantitative or mutli-method research (Stake 2000). The biggest challenge in 
developing and using such cases in research is the need to ensure that they are as realistic as 
possible in content (Gould et al 2001, Hughes & Huby 2002) and have an ecologically 
valid presentation format (Lamond et al 1996, Gerdtz & Bucknall 2001, Kneebone et al 
2003, Salantera et al 2003). With regard to content, the gold standard is to use actual cases 
from clinical practice (Lamond et al 1996).  
This presents participant with situations that are close to clinical actuality, but in which 
controls can be applied (Bryans & MacIntosh 2000). The added benefit is that the 
researcher has access to case types and scenarios that might not be available in the settings 
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to which s/he has access for the duration of the study (Peabody et al 2004, Yin 2003). 
Furthermore, these case types can be augmented in ways that would not be achievable in 
actual clinical practice, such as altering case complexity (Cioffi & Markham 1997, Stake 
2000, Cytryn et al 2009). This permits exploration of situations that could not ethically or 
safely be explored in the observation of clinical practice (Howard et al 2003). The main 
challenge in devising case simulations for research is to present realistic and believable 
cases that incorporate the phenomena and variables in which the researcher is interested 
(Hughes & Huby 2002).  
3.5 Pilot Testing of Data Collection Methods 
Pilot testing in this study was conducted for the purpose of testing the proposed data 
collection approach. In my conclusion to Chapter Two, I noted that data collection methods 
in nursing judgement and decision-making studies should produce data which can speak to 
both the main cognitive and social issues in nursing judgement and decision-making. For 
this reason I tested the data collection methods which I devised prior to using them for the 
main study. 
Seven psychiatric nurses participated. Two of these were university lecturers who are 
currently clinically active, two were mental health nurses undertaking a post graduate 
diploma in their nursing specialty whilst the remaining two were undertaking a post-
registration degree course in nursing. The table on the following page gives a breakdown of 
participants’ relevant demographic details along with the time taken in going through the 
stages of data collection. In the case of Participant F it is worth noting that English was not 
the participant’s first language. English was the first language of all study participants in 
the main study, but this was not by purposeful design. 
Table 3.1 
Participant  Experience Education  T.A. Time JDM Pip Time 
A Male 10 + Masters 5 minutes 14 m 50sec 
B Male 10 + Masters 9 minutes 12m 10sec 
C Female 10+ Certificate 10m 22sec 12m 32sec 
D Female 5-9 Degree 10m 46sec n/a* 
E Female 5-9 Degree 8 minutes n/a* 
F Male 0-4 Certificate 18m 19sec 14m 35sec 
G Female 10+ Certificate 6m 40sec 7 minutes 
* - JDM PiP Interview not completed due to participant time constraints 
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3.5.1 Think Aloud Data Collection 
A pilot case was devised to test the think aloud data collection protocol (see “Pilot Case” in 
Appendix B). This case involved a man who was referred to a day centre in the mental 
health services. His referral posed difficulties across several areas ranging from its non-
adherence to standard procedures of referral to the suitability of day centre vis-à-vis the 
man’s needs. 
A ‘warm-up’ case in the form of a set of nursing notes for a different fictional case was 
presented to all participants. They reported finding this useful in helping them to get used to 
verbalising their thoughts in-vivo. However, all participants had to be initially prompted to 
think aloud for the pilot case proper. It seemed that this often distracted them from reading 
the case study documents as they would, when prompted to think aloud, read the notes 
either verbatim or in paraphrase. Participant A was instructed to think aloud during the 
video sequence. On review of the film of Participant A’s pilot it was apparent that this had 
distracted his attentiveness to the cues being presented therein and it was decided that other 
participants would not be asked to think aloud for the video sequence.  
Reading of the case material ranged from reading the notes verbatim without comment to a 
paraphrasing of salient information with critical comments. Comments ranged from making 
inferences from the information to querying the veracity of the information therein. 
Inferences and deductions made ranged from noting that the service-user was not likely to 
be aggressive to making general statements about the person’s condition, e.g., “there is a 
lapse of concentration and exhaustion”.  
Participants’ treatment of the notes fell into two approaches. They either read them from 
beginning to end and commenting as they went, gradually building up a picture of the case, 
or else sifting through the notes for specific pieces of information. Some who had engaged 
in the former approach initially revisited parts of the notes for further information.  
Using both approaches, participants expressed formulations regarding the individual’s usual 
behaviour. These were based on collected evidence of behavioural patterns from the video 
clips and case documentation, e.g., situations in which the person was aggressive or similar 
presentations in the past to the current scenario. None of these aforementioned approaches 
had any particular correlation to the participants’ level of education or experience.  
In terms of the presentation of the individual’s past history in the case notes, participants’ 
made reference to it in establishing a baseline of the person’s usual status to compare his 
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current presentation against, e.g, “he was doing well”. There was evidence also of 
participants quickly expressing initial impressions, e.g., the person having a UTI or his 
daughters being overprotective. These initial impressions were either discarded or 
developed, and the final judgments made are set out in Table 3.2 overleaf.  
In two instances participants misread or misinterpreted documentation. Participant 3 
misread an entry in the daily notes that was clearly interpreted by other participants. Where 
the entry noted that the service-user had had a cup thrown at him, Participant C read this as 
saying that the cup had been thrown by the service-user himself. Participant D, meanwhile, 
remarked that the referral policy was of no use and that a discharge policy would have been 
of more use. They had interpreted the referral policy as covering referral out of the service 
only as opposed to between parts of the service. 
It was apparent that participants were for the most part perusing the documentation for the 
sake of the data collection and might not have done this in a more naturalistic setting. One 
participant, for example, having viewed the video and read the referral letter, held up the 
nursing notes and asked the researcher “will I just go through this?” It was also clear that 
most participants read the documentation critically, i.e., they did not take the information 
presented as ‘true’ and often doubted its veracity. This ties in with the findings of Crawford 
et al (1995) who have noted that most nursing documentation is, to some degree, fictional. 
After reading through all of the case material all participants gave a summary of the case as 
they saw it and their judgement regarding the case. Participants were told they would be 
asked for their judgment regarding the case having “thought aloud” about it, but all 
volunteered this information, although with some clarity had to be sought about aspects of 
the judgment, e.g, they may give alternatives and have to be asked which alternative they 
would decide on. Some participants made judgments beyond the scope of the scenario and 
task set for them, e.g., noting that the person’s medication should be reviewed.  
Whereas all participants but one used the nursing notes and all used the referral letter, use 
of the referral policy was mixed. Participant G used it to critique the referral letter insofar 
as it did not fulfil the criteria set in the policy. Participant B did use it to check to see if the 
referral contravened the policy, but noted that it was “no good to me” in this regard – that is 
the person could not be said to have been referred contrary to policy.  
During the think aloud process participants made reference to similar cases or types of 
cases that they had encountered. For example, one participant made reference to what 
happens “when people get older”, whilst another interpreted the referral of the service-user 
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as indicating that the admission unit “must have been in need of a bed”. Ideal cases were 
also a source of reference, with participants also noting what “should have” happened, 
whilst also admitting that scenarios like that presented “can happen”.  
All participants, except for Participant C, avoided eye contact with the researcher during 
think aloud data collection. All participants asked the researcher for clarification of a point 
of information in the documentation at least once during think aloud data collection. Of 
special note was Participant F, who did not have English as a first language.  
Participant F read slowly and deliberately through the notes, commenting after each 
segment. Most often these comments did not relate to the scenario at hand but concerned 
other elements of the person’s overall case, e.g., “Mr Feehy’s sleeping pattern has been 
fluctuating and will need to be reviewed by the doctor to ensure that his sleeping pattern is 
stabilised”. Also of note was Participant F, who, having viewed the video remarked “well 
without looking at any of that [the case documentation] straight off … that man appears to 
be very, very unwell” and said that they would need to “talk to the person and to the 
family” and at this point made their judgement on the case. They then went through the 
referral letter and referral policy, thinking aloud, but not the nursing notes. They did not, 
however, change their initial opinion. Participant judgements are outlined in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2 
Participant Judgement 
A Hold on to person & get more information before deciding what to do 
B Hold on to person & get more information before deciding what to do 
C Have patient reviewed by doctor attached to community services with a view 
to perhaps having them referred back to the admission unit 
D Get more information from referring unit staff and then have person assessed 
medically with a view to either accepting them and giving them a walking 
aid or having them referred to A&E.  
E Not fit for day centre, refer on to his own GP 
F Refer him back to the admission unit as he is still mentally unwell 
G Hold on to person & get more information before deciding what to do 
3.5.2 JDM PiP Interview 
All participants were able to easily relate experiences of cases similar to the one presented. 
Some participants referred back to the case notes and compared details of the current case 
to past cases they had come across. With regard to the case type represented, all 
participants saw this as relating to inappropriate referral. The JDM PiP interview schedule 
(MacNeela et al 2005 – See Appendix A) also enabled participants to talk about the sources 
of information used in making judgements and decisions and the way in which this 
information was processed (intuitively in the main). Observation, experience and prior 
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knowledge were consistently cited as important in judgment and decision-making across 
interviews. Prior knowledge related both to certain categories of service-user and individual 
service-users. Information sources used were consistently referred to as being observed 
cues and information garnered from talking to service-users and their families. 
The JDM PiP was useful also in revealing participants’ use of primary cues and secondary 
cues. Taking Participant C as an example, the primary cues of “voice”, “tone”, 
“demeanour”, “shouting” and “lingo” were combined to lead to a judgment that a person 
was “volatile”. This was a main factor in deciding on the person’s being unsuitable for a 
particular care setting.  
In the case of Participant F, for whom English was not their first language, it was 
noteworthy that the JDM PiP enabled the deconstruction of a concept that otherwise might 
have remained obscure. The participant remarked that a patient dealt with in the past was 
“mentally lazy”. The JDM PiP interview enabled this condition to be elaborated on and it 
was apparent that the person in question lacked motivation. Unlike the think aloud element 
of data collection, Participant F was able to engage relatively fluently with the JDM PiP, 
although this did take more time then with other participants. 
3.5.3 Summary Report on Data Collection Piloting 
The most apparent conclusion from the piloting data collection is the phenomenon of 
participant performance, particularly with regard to the think aloud process. Participants 
were nervous initially about being recorded, and being reassured that no-one except the 
researcher would have access to the tape was important to them. Once recording began, 
however, participants had no qualms about verbalising freely ‘on the record’.  
With regard to think aloud data collection, it was apparent that it is vital for the researcher 
to remain out of view of the participant in order to minimise opportunities for unnecessary 
participant-researcher interaction. However, some degree of interaction is unavoidable for 
reminding participants to think aloud and for clarifying details (Gaeth & Shanteau 2000). 
Otherwise, participants engaged with the case documentation in such a way as to produce 
audible, usable data.  
The JDM PiP (MacNeela et al 2005 – see Appendix A) was particularly effective in 
generating participant narrative regarding their approach to clinical judgment and decision-
making in general. Participants seemed more at ease with this element of the data collection 
than with the think aloud protocol. Information regarding their approach to judgment and 
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decision-making, types of information used, and the sources of this information were all 
readily forthcoming.  
Most importantly, as can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 set out above, these data collection 
methods are successful in terms of accessing participants’ judgements and decisions in 
simulated practice. It is also apparent that they yield data which can shed light on both 
cognitive and social aspects of participant judgement and decision-making. This would 
appear to be due to a combination of realistic cases and the ability of the data collection 
methods to produce rich narratives on both in-vivo and recalled participant judgement and 
decision-making.  
3.6 Main Study Data Collection & Analysis 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this descriptive and exploratory study (Koopowitz et al 2003) is to examine the 
judgement and decision-making of registered psychiatric nurses working in Ireland, in 
terms of its relationship to its social context. As direct observation of participants’ practice 
was not possible, the collection of think aloud data with retrospective interviews provided 
the best type of data for this purpose. This data was analysed using comparative keyword 
analysis and conversation analysis-informed discourse analysis. The comparative keyword 
analysis of the data forms the basis for the conversation analysis informed discourse 
analysis of the data by identifying the characteristic aspects of the data.  
3.6.2 Sample 
Thompson (1999) recommends that researchers investigating clinical judgement and 
decision-making enhance their contextual understanding of the phenomena involved before 
engaging in the research. This understanding should inform an approach to sampling that is 
systematic and nonprobalistic, with the aim of having a sample that will yield the richest, 
most robust data about the phenomena in a particular context or across certain contexts 
(Mays & Pope 1996). This approach is known as theoretical sampling (Thompson 1999), 
and involves examining the literature around the topic of research, and the research aim and 
then identifying themes within that literature.  
Two of the most prominent themes that pervade not only the nursing literature on 
judgement and decision-making but also the wider psychological literature are those of 
 70 
experience/expertise and how judgement and decision-making differs across different 
environmental settings. Therefore, it was decided to derive a sample from different sites 
across the Irish Republic that would include nurses with different levels of experience 
working across both inpatient and community psychiatric services. The population 
represented in this sample is RPNs working in Ireland.  
Flanagan (1954) has recommended that at least 50 incidents be collected in any study using 
critical incident technique. With each of the 40 participants discussing four cases, over 150 
incidents are represented in the data. This is in light of the fact that a brief form of critical 
incident technique was used for data collection, which is bound to yield shorter narratives 
than standard length critical incident interviews. 
The sample (n=40) from which the data were collected is outlined in Appendix C. All 
participants were Registered Psychiatric Nurses. Although it was not a critierion of 
exclusion or inclusion, English is the first language of all participants.  
The sample was taken from both community and inpatient services at five sites around the 
country and across three levels of experience (0-5 years, 6-9 years, 10 years plus). 
Allocation of staff varies widely between and within Irish mental health services. In some 
areas staff work in the same clinical setting over years, whereas in others they are rotated 
on a regular (e.g., annual or six-weekly) or irregular (which may involve anything from 
being arbitrarily moved after spending years in a setting to being rotated on a daily basis to 
meet the staffing needs of a service). The mode of rotation (or relative permanence in 
location) varies so much within the sample that the “community” and “inpatient” 
descriptors can serve only to indicate the location of participants at the time of data 
collection. In terms of sample size, the in-depth nature of the analysis of the transcripts 
using conversation analysis informed discourse analysis (Wooffit 2005) means that forty 
participants constituted a sample of adequate size (see Table 3.3 below). 
 
Table 3.3 
 Community* Inpatient* 
0-5yrs experience 5 9 
6-9yrs experience 2 5 
10+yrs experience 8 6 
Missing Data 4 1 
Total 19 21 
* Denotes where participant was working at time of data colletion. Most participants are regulary rotated between settings 
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Access to individual sites was negotiated according to the relevant procedures and 
protocols of each site. In order to preserve the anonymity of participants, I have withheld 
the identity of the sites from which the sample was selected. The relatively small size and 
non-uniform nature of Irish mental health services are such that a detailed description of the 
sites beyond identifying them as “in-patient” and “community” would easily enable their 
identification. 
Informed consent was sought from potential participants by distributing and collecting 
information sheets and consent forms (see Appendix D). This gave me the opportunity to 
meet face-to-face with potential participants in order to discuss the study and answer 
questions. In addition to this, I gave my work telephone number and e-mail address to 
participants so that they could withdraw their consent at any time.   
3.6.3 Ethical considerations 
In order to gain approval by the Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee for this 
study several issues had to be addressed. Firstly, there was a risk that potential participants 
might have misinterpreted the motivation for studying their clinical judgement and 
decision-making. This is understandable as participants are making themselves somewhat 
vulnerable in allowing their personal narratives to be recorded (Cutcliffe & Ramcharan 
2002).  
Once collected, data become the intellectual property of the researcher to interpret and 
represent as s/he wills (Nunkoosing 2005). For this reason I made it very clear to 
participants (See Information Sheet, Appendix D) that no value judgements would be made 
about their clinical judgement and decision-making. It was made clear to participants that 
the rationale of the study is to explore the social and cognitive processes involved in their 
judgements and decisions rather than measuring them against some gold standard.  
Participants were made aware that they could withdraw from the study at any point, 
including the time during which their voice was being recorded for data collection purposes 
as well as after they have been recorded. They were also made aware that if they did decide 
to withdraw from the study during or after the collection of this data, that any recording of 
them or notes/data concerning them would be destroyed. Digital audio recordings of the 
participants will be listened to only by professional transcribers and are stored securely at 
the School of Nursing, DCU.  
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These recordings will be destroyed when the study ends, although the transcripts will be 
retained. At no point in data collection has it been necessary to record or hold data on 
participants’ addresses or dates of birth. For the purposes of data recording and analysis 
participants are identified only using an anonymous coding system.  
This means that the participants will in no way be identifiable from the transcripts. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, the nature of Irish mental health services is 
such that I had to take care that details given in the discussion of the findings did not enable 
identification of sites and individuals. For this reason I have deliberately avoided mention 
in the discussion of the findings of any grades (e.g., Clinical Nurse Specialist) or specialist 
services that might identify a site or individual.  
It was stressed to the Research Ethics Committee that the rationale behind this study in the 
first instance is that there is a lack of knowledge about the clinical judgement and decision-
making of RPNs in Ireland generally. Therefore any potential risks are outweighed by the 
benefits to healthcare delivery and ultimately its end users.  
3.6.4 Development of cases used for data collection 
The cases used for data collection were derived from actual clinical data. These were 
collected as part of the programme of research of which this study is part. Full details of 
these cases provided in Appendix B, and I will give only a brief overview of them here. 
The anonymity of the case subjects was assured by changing several demographic details of 
their presentation, excluding or changing any potential identifying features and adding 
fictional features. For the sake of ecological validity, the language used to describe the case 
in the clinical documentation was preserved, insofar as anonymity allowed, in the case 
presentations.  
Nurses make clinical judgements and decisions using verbal and written information, what 
they observe and their prior knowledge (Corcoran-Perry & Graces 1990, Lamond et al 
1996, McCaughan et al 2005). To meet this challenge, case scenarios were devised that 
could be presented in an audio visual format as well as drawing on paper-based 
information. The DVD that accompanies this thesis contains the audiovisual scenarios as 
viewed by participants. The scenario for each case, as per the DVD menu, is indicated in 
the outlines given in Section 3.6.4.1 below. Case design for the main study was informed 
by the pilot study as well as by expert panel review. The following sections give an 
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overview of both in terms of implications for case design and presentation for the main 
study data collection.  
 
3.6.4.1 Expert Panel Reviews 
All cases were reviewed by expert panels of psychiatric nurses, both academics and nurse 
working in clinical practice. Panel members’ clinical backgrounds are given in Appendix 
Xa. The community-based cases were reviewed by nurses with a community mental health 
background, whilst nurses with a background in inpatient mental health settings reviewed 
the inpatient cases. 
The panels were given the draft case documentation and film clips in advance of panel 
review meetings which lasted roughly an hour. At these meetings panel members gave their 
individual and collaborative evaluations of the cases in terms of the following criteria 
which I had given them along with the case documentation and film clips: 
• The clinical plausibility of the particular case situation 
• The degree to which the case materials provided relevant and plausible information 
• The relevance of the task around which the case was focused 
• The degree of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in the case presentations 
Case One (Karen) focuses on a woman in her thirties, resident in a psychiatric rehabilitation 
hostel with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. In the presented scenario (Scenario 1) 
she is experiencing distress due to difficulties in her relationship with her sister. In this 
context she expresses verbal aggression towards a student nurse who has been despatched 
to encourage Karen to tidy her room. 
With regard to this case, the community-based expert panel felt that the cases’ focus on 
family involvement was representative of the type of situations that pose challenges for 
psychiatric nurses working with hostel residents. One panel member noted that, “It seems 
like a straightforward case, but there is a lot of complexity to it”. The panel agreed that the 
complexity of the case was such that there were a number of legitimate ways in which 
participants could respond to the scenario.  
Unlike Case Four (Patricia) the panel felt that the description of Karen’s schizophrenia was 
fairly typical and would not constitute a challenge to participants given that most people 
resident in hostels carry that diagnosis. The challenge instead lay in participants lack 
personal prior knowledge of Karen in the context of her hostile presentation. In clinical 
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practice hostel-based nurses would be quite familiar with residents, so this lack of 
knowledge would add to the difficulty of the case.  
However, the information provided on Karen’s relationship with her sister, they felt, 
provided sufficient background for participants to make a relatively well-informed, if 
difficult decision. The panel felt that eight years was a long time for Karen to have lived in 
a ‘rehabilitation’ hotel, but when it was pointed out that the case was derived from an actual 
clinical case, they conceded that it is often the case that people can end up living in 
‘rehabilitation’ hostels for up to a decade or even longer. 
Case Two (Noel) involves a man in his twenties who has been admitted to an acute 
inpatient psychiatric unit having spent several nights sleeping rough after being evicted by 
his partner. The presenting scenario (Scenario 2) presents him as anxious, low in mood and 
exhibiting the signs and symptoms of an undiagnosed serious respiratory tract infection. 
Other significant features of the case include the fact that he has only recently been 
discharged fro the unit and has a history of selling his prescribed medication to others. 
The inpatient psychiatric nursing expert panel felt that although Noel was not so 
psychologically unwell as to merit admission to an acute inpatient unit, even given his poor 
physical condition and his “chaotic” social situation. They felt that some indication of 
suicidal ideation or death wish would be required to warrant his admission as part of a 
wider crisis intervention, and this feature was added to the case presentation. Although 
Noel’s social situation was identified as the main source of his problems, the panel felt that 
his deteriorating physical health was the element that was of greater urgency and that the 
mix of the two would make the case sufficiently challenging for participants. The panel 
also felt that more detail could be given regarding Noel’s family background and social 
situation, and this was provided in the revised case history. 
Case Three (John) features a man in his forties who has been experiencing difficulty in 
coping with the death of his wife from cancer. His subsequent dependence on alcohol has 
lead to serious financial and social difficulties, including the loss of his job and driving 
licence. His admission to the acute inpatient psychiatric unit was precipitated by intentional 
self-poisoning and the presenting scenarios (Scenarios 3a, 3b & 3c) involve the participant 
in ascertaining John’s readiness for a weekend pass out of the unit. Participants were 
advised that the scenarios occur consecutively in the morning (3a), afternoon (3b) and 
evening (3c) of the same day. 
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The inpatient expert panel felt that the video clips successfully gave the impression that 
John’s mood and general mental state did not improve throughout the day. They also were 
of the opinion that the case details were sufficiently complex to give participants plenty of 
information to interpret and base a decision on. They felt that the case presented a challenge 
in terms of participants’ lack of personal knowledge of John, and the cases plausible mix of 
positive (e.g., John’s good level of social support) and negative (e.g., his expression of 
hopelessness) features.  
The panel felt that the video clip presented cues that, in the absence of further information 
and a chance to engage with John, could legitimately be interpreted in a variety ways. For 
example John’s exclamation that he is “not fucking alright”, could be seen in terms of over-
reaction, frustration or hostility. They also felt that this cue might overshadow other cues in 
the case presentation and that participants might anchor their judgements on it. 
Case Four (Patricia) is the only case where the person involved is not seen in the 
accompanying video clip. This was based on the findings of another study in this 
programme of research that demonstrated that RPNs spend a great deal of time making 
judgements and decisions regarding the management and organisation of care in situations 
that do not involve interaction on a one-to-one basis with indiviuals and their significant 
others (Scott et al 2006). The review meeting of the multidisciplinary team that is presented 
in this case scenario (Scenario 4), where Patricia’s non-attendance at the clinic is discussed 
is typical of this kind of work.  
Although the panel of community-based nurses saw the “personality disorder” descriptor 
for Patricia as a “hot label”, they felt that nurses were unlikely to make their judgements 
based on this diagnostic label but on a more holistic assessment of the case. The panel also 
agreed that the case notes were worded in a manner that reflected the reality of psychiatric 
nursing documentation in clinical practice. They were of the opinion that the case presented 
a challenge in that it presented a scenario whereby the ongoing strategy taken by the team 
towards the case management was patently not working and a new direction was needed. 
It was felt that the case’s referral from the multidisciplinary team presented a greater 
challenge than the alternative of referral from a GP. This was because GP referrals are 
relatively straightforward in comparison to multidisciplinary team referrals. This is because 
both Irish mental health community services and community mental health nurses’ work 
structures are complex and provide plenty of scope for system-based error. 
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The panel felt that missing data, and Patricia’s atypical presentation – most notably in the 
early morning wakening cue (usually associated with depression and not personality 
disorder) would make the case sufficiently complex and challenging for participants. They 
commented that because the case did not “fit with a script” that it should force participants 
to engage with it in a critical manner. 
Overall, the expert panels felt that the cases did contain the full range of information 
needed to fully inform the clinical judgements and decisions that would be sought from 
participants. However, it was explained that this was an integral part of the purposeful 
design of the cases, in order to introduce a tangible degree of objective uncertainty. It was 
felt that the cases would pose participants with a challenge and, given the specific changes 
to be made, were at the same time realistic. 
Both panels also felt that the presentation of the cases was ecologically valid and that the 
scenarios were plausible. The common features identified by the panels that made all of the 
cases sufficiently challenging and complex were; the lack of prior personal knowledge of 
the individuals involved, missing data that nurses might expect to find in case 
presentations, and the presence of atypical features. These had all been deliberately 
included in the case design for the purpose of ensuring a sufficient degree of complexity. 
3.6.4.2 Implications of Pilot Study for Case Design & Presentation 
In the pilot study it was noted that participants were somewhat vague in expressing their 
judgement on the case and that some clarity had to be sought from participants about 
aspects of the judgment that they had made. Also, some participants gave details of 
judgments that were outside the scope of the scenario and task that they were given. For 
this reason it was decided to improve the clarity of case presentation in the main study, 
primarily by giving the request to participants for specific judgements and decisions in 
relation to each case in written as well as verbal form.  
Clarity with regard to the case documentation given to participants was also an issue in the 
pilot study. Whilst missing data and ambiguity was a deliberate element of case design at 
all levels of this study, in the pilot study there was ambiguity around case details that was 
not planned. Therefore it was decided to increase the clarity of information provided and to 
specifically ask the expert panels, as detailed in the previous section, for feedback in 
relation to this element of the case design and presentation. 
The film clip for the pilot study data collection presented a case that unfolded over time, 
with gaps of several hours between one scenario and the next. However, in the film clip, 
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these scenes followed each other in direct succession and the sense of passing time was not 
explicitly discerned by all participants. It was decided, therefore, that the film clip for Case 
Three (John) in the main study data collection would be broken up into three distinct 
scenarios and participants verbally notified as to how much time had elapsed between 
scenarios. 
3.6.5 Data collection 
Data were collected using digital audio recording devices from participants in a suitable 
setting in their work place as part of their working day. Participants worked through all four 
simulated cases and associated retrospective interviews in a single sitting where possible. 
The order of presentation of cases to participants was randomised. 
For the think aloud data collection, participants were allowed two viewings of the video 
clip, with data collection occurring during the second viewing. This was due to the finding 
of the pilot study that verbal expression during the initial viewing distracted participants 
from paying attention to the cues presented in the video clips. Recording of this verbal data 
continued to include the participants’ perusal of the case documentation immediately 
following their second viewing of the video clip.  
As in the pilot study, continuous prompting of participants to ‘think aloud’ was often 
needed. Data recording was ended after the participant had made their full case formulation 
in response to the researcher prompts and/or clarifications and it was checked that they had 
said all that they had wanted to say in relation to the case. Due to the work-based collection 
of data, however, there were some interruptions. 
Where necessary and/or requested, the researcher gave correction or clarification regarding 
participants’ reading of the case documentation. Apart from this there was no 
communication with participants during think aloud data collection and the researcher sat 
outside of their field of vision. Although it was not the result of a deliberate exclusion 
policy in the sample selection, all participants had English as their first language. 
As with the pilot study, participants had no major difficulties in recalling and relating 
experiences of cases in the retrospective interviews. The JDM PiP interview schedule 
(MacNeela et al 2005 – See Appendix A) proved useful in this regard. It was of particular 
use in facilitating the discussion of the potential for error in practice, which was not a 
naturally occurring feature of participant discourse. 
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Overall, as with the pilot study, participants yielded data in both the think aloud and 
retrospective interview data collection that proved amenable to analysis. This analysis is 
described in depth in the following two chapters. In these chapters I demonstrate the extent 
to which the data could be analysed in order to meet the study aim of enabling insight into 
the cognitive and social aspects of participant judgement and decision-making.  
3.6.6 Data analysis 
The conceptual and philosophical basis of data analysis in this study does not view 
language as being able to offer a completely clear view on cognition (Schegloff 1989). 
Notwithstanding this, verbal data offer the clearest view achievable in the context of this 
exploratory descriptive study (Koopowitz et al 2003). Achieving the clearest insights from 
verbal data requires analysis that acknowledges the social context of the cognitive 
processes involved, as well as the methods of data collection and the analysis itself 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1995).  
This results in an approach to data analysis which, though sceptical regarding what we truly 
can know about human judgement and decision-making, strives to uncover all that can be 
uncovered by contextually appropriate use of the most incisive methods available. What 
verbal data does enable the researcher to look at most clearly in the context of this study is 
human judgement and decision-making as a process that, although essentially cognitive, is 
most clearly visible in interpersonal interaction (Potter 1996, Edwards 1997). This is not to 
deny the ability to detect any underlying cognitive process, but only to posit that language 
offers at best a limited view (Edwards & Potter 1992a) into these processes as things-in-
themselves (Van Cleve 1999).  
The choice of research methods for this study has been determined by the exploratory and 
descriptive nature of the study (Newton et al 2007) and the complexity of its topic. 
Exploratory study of a complex topic requires an approach that looks broadly at the content 
of the data in an effort to focus on the features that are significant in terms of answering the 
research question (Gleeson & Higgins 2009). To this end I have looked towards corpus 
linguistics and in particular towards comparative keyword analysis. 
Having identified the features that characterise the study data using comparative keyword 
analysis, there is a need to analyse their meaning in relation to the research topic and the 
social context of the data. In my discussion of the value of verbal data, I have drawn to a 
large extent on the work of Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (Potter & Edwards 1990, 
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Edwards & Potter 1992a, 1992b, Potter 1996, Edwards 1997). I have chosen their 
discursive psychology approach to discourse analysis as the most applicable of the many 
available options (Wetherell et al 2001).  
In order to minimise the influence of my own preconceptions, I have used the principles of 
conversation analysis to add to the robustness of my analysis of the data, in what Wooffitt 
(2005) refers to as a conversation analysis-informed approach. This considerably boosts the 
rigour of the evidence derived from the data (Seale & Silverman 1997), as a main principle 
of the conversation analytic approach is that the interpretation of data must draw on the 
data itself as opposed to solely on the researcher’s insights (Sacks et al 1974, Hutchby & 
Wooffitt 1998). This involves scrutinising the data in great detail, taking into account the 
data in their entirety, including para-verbal features and silences (ten Have 1999). I see my 
identity as ‘the researcher’ as pivotal to giving an account of this study (Taylor 2001), and 
have therefore approached the description of this study in a reflexive manner throughout.  
The schematic diagram in Figure 3.1 overleaf illustrates the process of analysis which is 
described in overview in the ensuing sections, as well as indicating the chapters of this 
thesis in which they are discussed in detail. 
Figure 3.1 The process of analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.6.1 Comparative Keyword Analysis 
In nursing research, initial analysis of qualitative data often involves some form of 
inductive thematic analysis that relies on the researcher’s insights following several careful 
readings of the data (Polit & Beck 2004). In order to limit the impact of my own subjective 
interpretation of the data, I have used a novel quantitative data analysis method known as 
comparative keyword analysis for initial analysis of the data (Seale 2006). This method has 
been designed to contribute to qualitative data analysis, including discourse analytic 
approaches.  
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Comparative keyword analysis involves the use of computer software (such as ‘Wordsmith 
Tools’) to run a quantitative analysis of a text or groups of texts in order to identify key 
words and combinations of words that characterise the text(s) (Seale 2006). This yields a 
quantitative analysis of the relative frequencies of key words and phrases in the data on 
which to base qualitative analysis. This is preferable to the researcher relying wholly on 
his/her intuitive reading the texts to uncover themes, which could result in the researcher 
reading themes ‘into’ the text(s) or failing to uncover significant themes in the text(s) 
(Alonso et al 2002).  
Comparative keyword analysis does, however, allow for researcher interpretation of results. 
This is because the intention is not to entirely rid analysis of the researcher’s interpretation 
of the text(s), but to make a clearer and more transparent account possible, reducing the less 
desirable subjective elements of such interpretation. It is the stated aim of comparative 
keyword analysis to enable researchers to lend greater objectivity and rigour to qualitative 
data analysis (Seale 2006). 
Seale (2006) suggests that researchers using conversation analysis use comparative 
keyword analysis to identify portions of texts that best warrant the full and detailed 
application of the conversation analysis method. Seale (2006) also recommends the use of a 
reference corpus against which to compare individual texts or groups of texts. In 
researching interaction on breast cancer message boards, Seale (2006) and Seale et al 
(2006) used this comparative approach to discover that women’s contributions had 
significantly more reference to self and relationship than those of men.  
This was concluded based on analysis of personal pronoun use as well as of words 
indicative of relationship. Seale (2006) points out that it is vital that the researcher does not 
rely wholly on the frequency analysis in this regard, and the contextual occurrence of words 
and phrases must be checked before confirming their function. For the comparative 
keyword analysis, I used the ‘Wordsmith Tools’ software programme recommended by 
Seale (2006).  
I then applied coding to the data. Comparative keyword analysis differs from most 
qualitative data analysis methods in that coding refers to specific word/phrase groupings 
rather then portions of the text. Here my subjective discernment was required, and I 
explicitly account for this in my discussion of the data. An example of such discernment is 
where Seale (2006) omitted references to support stockings from coding intended to 
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indicate interpersonal support. This discernment is based on the analysis of keywords-in-
context and collocation (Seale et al 2006).  
The analysis keywords-in-context involves the use of the concordance function of the 
software being employed to display a listing of all sentences in which keywords occur. 
Collocation refers to the occurrence of a word as part of a phrase, and it is this to which the 
analysis of keywords-in-context looks to confirm the function and meaning of key words 
and phrases. Once identified, these portions of the text can be further explored using a 
conversation analysis informed discursive analysis in order to better gauge the social and 
cognitive work that is being done at these points in the interactive process.  
3.6.6.2 Discursive Analysis 
Like Gilbert & Mulkay (1984), Edwards & Potter (1992a) contend that where research aims 
to shed light on cognitive processes, successful analysis of data needs to take account of 
social and discursive elements. This involves approaching the data from a combined 
cognitive psychology / discourse analysis perspective in order to extract greater veracity 
from the data than simply approaching it with the assumption of face veridicality that has 
been characteristic of many cognitive studies (Edwards & Potter 1992a). Discourse analysis 
recognises that a participant, in relating information to a researcher, is not merely providing 
data (Shotter 1989).  
Instead they are engaged cognitively and socially in a dynamic (with the researcher) 
discursive reconstruction of events (Edwards & Potter 1992b). Accounting for this co-
authoring (Ochs & Capps 1996) of participants’ narratives adds rigour to the analysis 
(Nunkoosing 2005, Fratilis & Sionis 2006). Within social (and in particular discursive) 
psychology, discursive analysis has been developed by Potter & Wetherell (1987) 
(influenced by the work of Sacks, Schegloff, and especially by Gilbert & Mulkay 1984) as 
a critical approach to qualitative data analysis.  
This form of analysis, although often referred to as discourse analysis, is distinct from the 
Foucauldian forms of discourse analysis (Stevenson 2004, Buus 2005) developed in 
sociology (Wooffit 2005). For the purpose of clarity I will use the term ‘discursive 
analysis’ (Seymour-Smith et al 2002) to distinguish the method that I have used from the 
more widely applied forms of discourse analysis with their roots in the sociological 
research tradition. With a firm basis in ethnomethodology and social constructionist 
thinking (Edwards & Midleton 1986), discursive analysis looks at conversational 
interaction mainly in terms of its functions.  
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Discursive analysis brings a social perspective to phenomena that are usually viewed from 
a purely cognitive perspective (Edwards & Midleton 1986). It achieves this through 
examining the discursive practices by which they are represented. In doing so, it often 
comes up against and is informed by important socially-situated influences and issues that 
are overlooked when a mainly cognitive approach is taken (Potter & Wetherell 1987).  
This does carry certain implications and assumptions. As has been discussed throughout 
this chapter so far, the conceptualisation of language that has generally informed research 
into cognition could be seen as somewhat naïve, insofar as the speech of participants is 
thought to reliably represent their cognitive processes (Potter & Edwards 1990). Therefore, 
in order to avoid decontextualisation of speech, the researcher employing discursive 
analysis is reluctant to view verbal data as offering a plain and unprejudiced view of reality. 
This reluctance has led me to use discursive analysis to consider the broader perspective of 
the data under analysis - viewing them not just as language, but as conversation. This 
approach is used to study how language is used to act socially, e.g, in forming consensus 
(Potter & Edwards 1990). This means that phenomena often considered solely from a 
cognitive perspective (e.g. attribution) are approached primarily in the context of social 
action.  
This broader perspective is possible partly because discursive analysis can draw on the 
analytic techniques used by conversation analysts to study the functions of conversation 
(Seymour-Smith 2002, Wooffitt 2005). These techniques involve a focus on how utterances 
are shaped, particularly in terms of how they can be seen to follow on from previous 
utterances and serve as precursors to ensuing utterances. Although discursive analysis is 
concerned mainly with the function of conversation in a broader sense, this interest is well 
served by analysis that builds its case from the bottom-up. This is in contrast to the top-
down approach of Foucauldian approaches to the discourse analysis that take societal issues 
such as power and inequity as their starting point (Wooffitt 2005). 
3.6.6.3 Conversation Analysis 
Discursive analysis tends to draw on the principles and techniques of conversation analysis 
developed from the background of Garfinkel’s (1967) work with ethnomethodology 
(Wooffit 2005). Although conversation analysis was originally devised to study everyday 
talk, it can be applied to more formal interactive processes such as interviews (Drew & 
Heritage 1992). Given the conversational nature of the data in this study, I intend to 
conduct a discursive analysis that is explicitly informed by the principles and techniques of 
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conversation analysis. The purpose of adopting this approach is to make use of a 
conversation analytic approach to enable closer examination of the finer details of human 
interaction than discursive analysis alone would permit. 
Although relatively popular in social psychology and sociological research, conversation 
analysis has not been used a great deal to look at judgement and decision-making in nursing 
research (England 2005, Shakespeare & Clare 2005) or in health and social care research 
generally (Shaban 2005b). Conversation analysis focuses on the unfolding of the sequence 
of conversational interaction (Heritage 1984, Schegloff 1987). It shares common roots with 
discursive analysis in the work of Sacks et al (1974). 
Unlike other forms of qualitative analysis, the primary focus of conversation analysis is on 
the conversation as represented in its audio recording (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998, Wooffit 
2005). Transcripts are secondary aids to analysis, and are mainly used to illustrate the 
phenomena under analysis in detail (ten Have 1999). To this end conversation analysis has 
its own set of transcription notation devices (Jefferson 2004 - see Appendix E).  
As already noted, it is a key principle of conversation analysis to reduce - insofar as 
possible - the role of the researcher’s intuition in data analysis (Wooffit 2005). This is made 
possible by the in-depth nature of the transcription notation, which permits as valid a 
textual representation of the detailed examination of actual conversations as can be 
achieved for illustrative purposes (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998). These serve as a background 
against which to check claims made by the researcher. 
The overall focus of conversation analysis is on the sequential nature of conversation 
(Heritage 1984, Jefferson 1986, ten Have 1999). By examining phenomena such as turn-
taking, silences, interjections and paired-action sequences (e.g., I: “Hi, how are you?”  R: 
“Fine thanks.”), conversation analysis aims to uncover the function of the talk under 
analysis (Drew & Heritage 1992). This complements discursive analysis insofar as it 
reduces the potential for the researcher to mistakenly make intuitive assumptions based on 
reference solely to standard textual transcripts. Conversation analysis constantly diverts the 
researcher from forming grander ideas about themes represented in the transcripts without 
considering the actual conversations they represent and the complex minutiae of interaction 
of which they are comprised. This goes as far as any method of which I am aware to ensure 
that observations made by a researcher are grounded firmly in the conversational data as it 
was recorded.  
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3.6.6.4 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity goes some way towards addressing the challenges posed by researcher bias 
(Porter 2000). This involves the researcher acknowledging any personal stake holding, 
subjective opinions and/or values with regard to the research and its subject matter (Taylor 
2001). It also involves the researcher’s recognition of his/her personal influence on how 
data is collected and analysed (Nunkoosing 2005) particularly his/her awareness of the 
influence of affective reactions to the data, participants or other aspects of the study (Power 
2004).  
Approaches such as conversation analysis and discursive analysis facilitate reflexive 
perspectives on analysis. This enables clear insight into the scientific process of 
investigation itself as an activity of the researcher, which adds further to the validity and 
rigour of the analysis (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984, Edwards & Potter 1992b). Therefore, I see 
an important role for meta-analytic reflexivity (Horton-Salway 2001) in bolstering the 
rigour of this study’s findings.  
I believe that reflexivity is also an important component of the study with regard to my 
interpretation of the data in light of my familiarity, as a registered psychiatric nurse, with 
much of the broad interpretative repertoire of the participants. This is important as I 
exercised considerable power over the data analysis, in particular how my interaction with 
participants is represented in this thesis (Glesne & Peshkin 1992). My own approach to 
reflexivity has been influenced by that of Abma (2001, p265), who sees the need to 
acknowledge the researcher’s stance of having an “open (not empty) mind”.  
I have facilitated this process primarily by writing in the first person (Porter 2000) 
throughout this thesis. In the introductory chapter I set out my own personal interest and 
links to the research topic. Where it is apparent that my gender, profession or other personal 
factors have influenced data collection I have acknowledged this also.  
However, in doing this I realise that personal factors, including gender, can influence 
participants in such a wide variety of ways (Taylor 2001) as to make accounting for such 
influences a task that would warrant a study of this scope in its own right. Nonetheless, I 
have taken account of these factors as they are apparent and have written reflexively about 
data analysis, evidence and findings with the aim of enhancing their trustworthiness and 
credibility (Hall & Callery 2001).  
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3.6.7 Rigour 
The criteria used to evaluate the rigour of qualitative research methodologies are diverse 
and depend on the philosophical underpinning of the study (Liamputtong Rice & Ezzy 
1999). For this reason, there is no universal consensus on how best to ensure validity and 
reliability in qualitative research (Carter & Porter 2000). Some qualitative researchers argue 
that concepts such as reliability and validity do not belong nor apply to their approach to 
research (Power 2004, Tobin & Begley 2004).  
Qualitative research is often seen as lacking standardisation and being over reliant on the 
insights/abilities of the researcher (Carr 1994). However, both of these arguments make the 
mistake of confusing underpinning philosophy with method (Bryman 2002). Also, there is 
a danger that in pursuit of philosophical and methodological purism, the researcher can 
overlook opportunities to promote rigour in a philosophically and methodologically 
pluralist way (Whittlemore et al 2001). 
In a discipline-specific study such as this one, certain concepts might not be fully 
appreciated or understood due to a lack of what Baynham (2000, p18) describes as a 
“discipline-internal awareness of what counts as knowledge and what counts as an 
authoritative disciplinary position” especially, “the awareness of internal diversity and 
conflict, as realized in the politics of the discipline”. I share the same professional 
qualification and general clinical experience as the participants in my study, and throughout 
these chapters I refer reflexively to the insights that resulted from this. However, I do 
recognise the potential for blurring between bias and “discipline-internal awareness”.  
This situation is similar to that described by Carr (1994), whereby the qualitative 
researcher’s immersion in the context of the data is seen as increasing the potential for data 
analysis that is representative of the community and phenomena being studied. However, 
this immersion in context can threaten validity if it prevents the researchers from 
interpreting data in a meaningful way (Sandelowski 1986, Hilton 1987). This is where 
strategies to address bias in data interpretation and analysis can be helpful, insofar as they 
offer an approach to data analysis that clearly demonstrates the basis of the inferences 
made, and enable the study to be repeated by other researchers.  
I contend that the triangulation of methods in this study offers two strategies to minimise 
bias in this situation. In the first instance there is the clarity lent by the principle of 
conversation analysis to interpret the data from its own standpoint as opposed to relying on 
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the subjective insights of the researcher. Secondly, the main themes of interest are 
identified quantitatively using comparative keyword analysis, again depending on my 
subjective interpretation only to the degree that it would be required in the interpretation of 
any quantitative form of analysis. I believe that these strategies go as far as practicable in a 
study of this size to ensure the minimisation of bias, without at the same time unnecessarily 
limiting my own contribution from my standpoint as a registered psychiatric nurse. 
With regard to my use of the quantitative approach of comparative keyword analysis, I 
acknowledge that some commentators would regard its positivist approach to rigour as not 
being compatible with the qualitative approaches I use, insofar as its rigid application of 
criteria to establish reliability and validity could thwart the creative essence of the 
qualitative components of the study (Sandelowski 1993). The statistical generalisability 
sought by such an approach is quite different, for example, from the conceptual or 
theoretical generalisability that is sought in approaches such as discourse analysis (Mason 
1996). Notwithstanding this, I do recognise that qualitative research must be credible and 
trustworthy (DePoy & Gitlin 1998). Its reliance on the somewhat opaque issues of the 
researcher’s analytic ability and pre-understanding of the data can be seen as an obstacle to 
this (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984). It is for the sake of completeness, therefore, as well as of 
rigour that I have combined these approaches in this study. 
There are many approaches to generalisation in studies where mixed methods are used, and 
unlike quantitative studies the aim is not to generalise for the population represented by the 
sample. Descriptive research seeks to describe patterns evident in the data, from which the 
reader-practitioner then makes their own generalisations to their own context (Wolcott 
1994, Larsson 2009). This differs from other qualitative research approaches to 
generalisation, such as maximising variation and generalisation based on similarity of 
context.  
Another threat to validity and reliability in this study, and indeed any study employing 
retrospective interviewing, is that of hindsight bias (Guba & Lincoln 1981, Farnan et al 
2008). This is addressed to some degree by the fact that the retrospective interviews are 
adjuncts to in-vivo data collection, so that the study is not wholly reliant on data that is 
subject to hindsight bias for information regarding participants’ normative practices. Also, 
participants were asked to recall the most recent incident of the type being used in the study 
in order to further limit the likelihood of hindsight bias (Jones 1995).  
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However, hindsight bias will always remain a limitation to some degree where 
retrospective interviewing is concerned, and the onus is on the researcher to be aware of 
this when it comes to data collection and analysis. The critical incident technique is 
preferable to other methods of retrospective interviewing when it comes to limiting 
hindsight bias. This is because of the structured and focused way in which it takes 
participants through the recall of incidents (Kemppainen 2000), particularly with the aide of 
a tool such as the JDM PiP (MacNeela et al 2005). Nevertheless, the limitation that some 
degree of hindsight bias does remain with this technique must be accepted (Norman et al 
1992, Keatinge 2002). 
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Chapter Four   
Findings of Comparative Keyword Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter I set out the findings of the comparative keyword analysis of the study 
corpus. This method of analysis involved the identification of keywords in the study corpus 
using the WordSmith software programme. These keywords were identified as 
characterising the study corpus by measuring their frequency within it and comparing it 
with their frequency in a simlar corpus (Seale & Charteris-Black 2010).  
Preliminary discursive analysis was applied to the keywords generated by this quantitative 
analysis with the purpose of determining the functions served by these words in 
participants’ narration of their clinical judgement and decision-making. Further exploration 
of these functions was carried out through the conversation analysis-informed discursive 
analysis of the data. This is discussed in Chapter Five.   
In this study, linguistic analysis was a means to an end, and not an end in itself. This is 
reflected in the focus on linguistic features primarily for what they indicate about 
participants’ discursive representation of their judgement and decision-making. To this end 
discussion of the functions of the keywords is focused in terms of how they served 
participants’ representation of their clinical judgement and decision-making. 
The purpose of comparative keyword analysis in this study was to discover, using 
rigourous quantitative measurement, features that could be said to characterise the study 
corpus (Seale & Charteris-Black 2010). This was achieved by comparing word frequencies 
in the corpus to those in the “task oriented” or “context governed” element of the British 
National Corpus (BNC). The BNC is a vast corpus of data that is representative of everyday 
speech in English across the British Isles. The narratives in the study corpus are most 
similar to the narrative types represented in the BNC task oriented subcorpus.   
Therefore, the words that occur most frequently in the study corpus cannot be said to 
uniquely characteristic of the study data if they occur with similar frequency in the BNC 
task oriented subcorpus. Words that occur frequently across both corpora are simply 
characteristic of task oriented speech. However, those words that occur frequently in the 
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study corpus and not in the BNC task oriented subcorpus can be said to be uniquely 
characteristic of the study corpus. 
The strength of this approach is that none of the keywords that are shown to characterise 
the study corpus were chosen by me in the first instance. They were chosen solely based on 
their identification by the process of statistical comparison of the corpora. Their 
consideration here is based first and foremost on the scientific fact that they are used 
significantly more frequently in the study corpus than in a 6,153,571 word collection of 
similar corpora. 
My choice entered into the process only to filter out words such as “decision”, the more 
frequent occurrence of which was due to its use mainly by the interviewer. My interest is in 
those words whose frequency cannot be accounted for by the genre of the corpus. The 
preliminary discursive analysis described in this chapter represents my initial attempt at 
explaining their frequency. 
Rigourous application of comparative keyword analysis, or any quantitative comparison of 
two corpora, requires comparison of like-with-like and testing for statistical significance 
(Rayson et al 2004). In comparing like-with-like, rigour relies on the qualitative and 
quantitative similarity of the corpora being compared. The rigour of claims of statistical 
significance, as in all research approaches, hinges on the suitability of the tests used and 
their proper application.  
4.2 Comparing Corpora 
The most similar corpus to the study corpus is the ‘context-governed’ or ‘task oriented’ 
speech subcorpus of the BNC. The two are similar in terms of temporality and socio-
cultural background (Leech et al 2001). The task oriented subcorpus of the BNC comprises 
narratives such as interviews and medical consultations (Burnard 2007).  
Given similarity of content, the next issue to be dealt with in comparing the two corpora 
was their difference in size. The BNC context governed subcorpus stands at 6,153,571 
words (Burnard 2007) whilst the corpus produced in this study totals 515,630 words. 
Comparing smaller study corpora with larger standard corpora is common practice in 
corpus linguistics (Rayson et al 2004). The size difference is accounted for by tests of 
statistical significance applied in the comparison of word frequencies across the two 
corpora. 
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The purpose served by a large standard corpus is to act as a normative standard against 
which to compare the smaller study corpus (Rayson et al 2004). This ensures that general 
attributes of (in this case task-oriented) speech are not wrongly identified as being 
characteristic of the study corpus. As a result, keywords can validly be said to be 
characteristic of the study data.  
A statistical test is needed to test the null hypothesis that the two corpora are no different in 
terms of word frequency (Rayson et al 2004). The chi-squared statistic is used commonly to 
this end (Woods et al 1986). However, the fact that the chi-squared statistic assumes normal 
distribution is problematic given the relatively small size of the study corpus in comparison 
to the standard corpus.  
Therefore, I have used log-likelihood ratio as an alternative test (Dunning 1993). The log-
likelihood ratio test is suited to multinomial and binomial distributions, which makes it 
more suited to comparisons involving a relatively small study corpus. The differences in 
size between the corpora also led me to set the p-value for the test at p<0.0001. For this 
value, the critical value of the log likelihood (LL) test is 15.13. All of the results outlined in 
Appendix F are well within this range.  
As with all statistical tests, it is vital that results are not viewed in terms of statistical 
significance alone (Sterne & Davey-Smith 2001). Therefore, I have also interpreted the 
results in terms of practical significance. For example, given the context of the study corpus 
it is hardly surprising that the term “decision” has a high critical value.  
However, in this chapter I do not discuss the discursive function of the word “decision”. 
This is because its frequency in the study corpus was almost exclusively due to its use by 
the interviewer. Therefore, it cannot be said to characterise the data in terms of its function 
as part of participant discourse. 
Nevertheless, “decision” was the keyword that had the most obvious semantic link to 
clinical judgement and decision-making. Its critical value therefore served as a benchmark 
in that words with higher critical values than “decision” can be seen to be especially 
characteristic of the data. However, I have taken care not to uncritically dismiss words with 
lower critical values than “decision”.  
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4.3 Findings of Comparative Keyword Analysis & Preliminary 
Discursive Analysis 
Although comparative keyword analysis indicates which words and phrases characterise a 
corpus, as with any set of results from quantitative or statistical analysis, it falls to the 
researcher to interpret them. Indeed, comparative keyword analysis must take into account 
the genre of the corpus and the purpose of analysis (Seale & Charteris-Black 2010). For this 
I have relied on my knowledge of the background and context of the study corpus. 
As with the word “decision”, the keyword “hospital” was not considered in the preliminary 
discursive analysis. This was because its occurrence is due to the genre of the narratives, in 
particular their background in healthcare. Likewise the keywords “decision” and “can” are 
not considered, as they were used mainly by the interviewer and therefore cannot be said to 
characterise the narratives of study participants.  
Personal pronouns, most notably “he” and “she”, have a statistically significant higher 
frequency in the dataset than in the context governed corpus of the BNC. Given that the 
dataset is wholly comprised of talk about individuals, this is to be expected. Therefore, 
personal pronouns are discussed here in relation to their collocation with other keywords. 
In the sections that follow I consider each keyword in its own right without forcing any 
framework on the data. I discuss the use of the keywords by participants in terms of the 
discursive functions they can be seen to fulfil in talking about their judgement and decision-
making. I refrain from drawing any overall conclusions until the end of the chapter, where I 
summarise and draw together what is apparent from participant use of the keywords. 
4.3.1 Use of “looking” 
The word “looking” is versatile, and is used in the study corpus in a variety of contexts to 
denote different activities. These range from literally looking at an object to abstract 
consideration of a case. Given that the data mainly comprise descriptive case histories, the 
frequent appearance of “looking” in collocation with the personal pronouns “he” and “she” 
is to be expected.  
Whereas in the retrospective interviews “looking at” serves a wide range of purposes, in the 
think aloud data participants mainly use the phrase for self referential description of their 
in-vivo attendance the case. Sometimes the phrase “looking at” introduces a participant’s 
formulation of a case, whereas in other instances it denotes closer attention to a source of 
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information in their consideration of a think aloud case. These sources vary across the wide 
range of cues presented in the video clips and accompanying documentation.  
In the retrospective interviews, participants’ most notable use of “you’re looking” is when 
talking about cues that they commonly use in assessing a particular type of case. The use of 
“you’re” serves to generalise, denoting talk about a standard case type whereby “you” 
would generally look for “x”. Where this occurs, the generalising function of “you” can 
also be seen in other phrases apart from “you’re looking” (as demonstrated by the use of 
italics in the excerpt below). 
• “Generally when people present with clinical depression, they have signs and 
symptoms like low mood, low self-esteem, sleep disturbance maybe loss of 
appetite, you know and you’re observing all them things, you know you’re just and 
you’re looking at their whole activity of daily living, how they’re coping.”   
Participant 38, Case 3, JDM PiP 
 
The phrase “’re looking” occurs mainly as part of “you’re looking” or “we’re looking”. 
“You’re looking” appears mainly in the retrospective interview data. The phrase “we’re 
looking” is found mainly in participants’ talk around case formulation in the think aloud 
data. Use of the first person plural serves the function of building implicit consensus 
between participant and researcher regarding the meaning of phenomena (Wales 1996): 
• “And we’re looking at intervention-wise we’re looking at nurse in close 
observation area, fifteen minute checks, medicine as per chart and try and encourage 
Noel to maybe express himself and maybe kind talk a little bit more about his 
feelings and anxieties and at the same time provide some level of reassurance.” 
Participant 6, Case 2, Think Aloud 
 
The excerpts considered above demonstrate how participant use of the word “looking” is 
characterised by its incorporation into phrases alongside “we’re” and “you’re”. These show 
that the important discursive function served by “looking” relies on its combination with 
personal pronouns. This is further demonstrated in the subtle shift from “I would say” to 
“we’re looking” and on to “we’ve heard” in the excerpt below.  
This is an example of discursive building of consensus by incorporating the implicit assent 
of the researcher into the expression of a judgement by the use of the first person plural: 
• “So the key to this lady here, 36 year old single woman, suffers from paranoid 
schizophrenia, she has an enduring chronic illness so quite obviously you know 
with an enduring chronic illness there are acute phases and plus they’ve residual 
negative symptoms, which can be characterised by this type but not usually with the 
anger, so what I would say here is we’re looking at a relapse of this lady. We’ve 
heard that this behaviour is 2 days old.”  
Participant 9, Case 1, Think Aloud  
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The verb “to look” is highly versatile; its main function in the study corpus is to mark 
participant attentiveness to certain aspects of a case. Its collocation with personal pronouns 
to generalise matters gives insight into how participants deal with cases in terms of the 
typical. It is also used with subtlety by participants to seek and build consensus with the 
researcher.  
4.3.2 Use of “felt” 
The word “felt” occurs mainly in the retrospective interview data. Participants use the word 
both metacognitively and with reference to the thinking of others. In self reference this 
tends to be to express evaluative judgements: 
• IR: “And why did you think that that was a good idea, to have her on the high 
observation?” 
P36: “Because at the time I felt that she was a risk, that she had voiced suicidal 
thoughts.” 
Participant 36, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the example above, the participant uses the first person singular in direct response to a 
specific question from the interviewer about their own opinion and rationale. However, 
participants’ use of “felt” to express evaluative judgements is often in combination with the 
first person plural. As with the similar use of first person pronouns in conjunction with 
“looking”, the function here appears related to wider business of participant identification 
with the judgement of the team as their own, also evinced by the use of the word “us”: 
• “Yeah I suppose really, he just seemed to be going through a grieving process 
really, which would be also you know, to us it would have suggested sort of a, a 
reactive type depression too. You know reactive depression to the situation he was 
in, so I suppose that’s where a lot of our assessment and judgement would have 
come from. And I suppose at the end of the week, we felt that, that hadn’t 
adequately been addressed, that hadn’t adequately been dealt with and he was still 
going back out into essentially the same situation, where we had no real focus, no 
clear plan for the man.”   
Participant 17, Case 4 JDM PiP Interview  
 
Overall, where participants use “felt” to talk about judgements it is with reference to 
judgements and decisions made by themselves and the wider work group. As with 
“looking”, personal pronoun use is instrumental in the discursive function of the keyword. 
In this case the combination serves to indicate ownership of judgement, which here can be 
seen to belong at once to the participant and their work group.  
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4.3.3 Use of “know” 
In the study corpus the word “know” serves mainly as part of the discourse marker, “you 
know”. Participants also use it to mark uncertainty, mainly in the forms “don’t know” and 
“didn’t know”. Transcripts were checked for use of “dunno” - no occurrences were found.  
As well as functioning as “discourse glue” (Stede & Schmitz 2000, p129), “you know” 
serves to build consensus (mainly in the think aloud data) and check understanding (mainly 
in the retrospective data):  
• “…so maybe an option for this patient might be, you know, a day centre or some 
other thing that she could go to daily so that, you know what I mean.” 
Participant 33, Case 4, Think Aloud 
 
• “There are other things obviously that I, you know, I mightn’t get to make 
decisions in but I suppose on that side of things, you know, we just, we’d go about 
our work and organise our groups and we can make them sort of decisions, with the 
way we want to do them groups or who might benefit from them. So we have, we’re 
able to make our decisions that way.” 
Participant 5 Case 3 JDM PiP 
4.3.4 Use of “maybe” 
The word “maybe” is used self-referentially by participants, e.g., “I suppose maybe”, to 
denote uncertainty or express hesitancy. Often, “maybe” fulfils these functions in 
collocation with the discourse marker “you know” in the phrases “you know maybe” and 
“maybe you know”. Use of “maybe” with reference to others is mainly in the think aloud 
data, e.g., “maybe she’s”.  
Specifically, “maybe” is used to express uncertainty about aspects of the case at hand. 
Where the phrases “you know maybe” and “maybe you know” are used as markers of 
hesitancy, this tends to be where there is implicit criticism of others. The use of these 
phrases to ‘soften’ criticism, making it less pointed and explicit (Seale & Charteris-Black 
2010), occurs exclusively in the retrospective interview data. In these instances this 
function is shared with other markers of uncertainty such as “I think” and other phrases 
incorporating “maybe”, as italicised in the following excerpt,  
•  “Ahm, well my own opinion would have been that maybe that his family had 
enabled him, do you know maybe enabled him to, well obviously I’m presuming 
they sought help for him, but maybe Joe Bloggs didn’t want help, but in enabling 
him to live the way he was living, I think help was too late, maybe, in coming to 
Joe. Had he been allowed hit his rock bottom, you know, for instance had his, had 
his drinking been maybe, and this was his first time, I believe, to be hospitalised.” 
Particpant 35, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
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“You know maybe” and “maybe you know” are also used by participants as metacognitive 
markers of uncertainty apart from hesitancy. For the most part this occurs in the 
retrospective interview data:  
• “Also I suppose I was concerned by his fanaticism, you know born again, making 
everything right and I felt in a way that the interview with me was almost 
confessional, he was telling me all about the dog and all of this but then when he 
was laughing I was thinking, you know maybe it wasn’t true at all.” 
Participant 29, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The following excerpt demonstrates the versatility of “I suppose maybe” in marking 
uncertainty and hesitancy simultaneously: 
• IR: “Ok yeah but would he show then, I guess like physiological symptoms?” 
P5: “Of anxiety?” 
 IR: “Yeah” 
P5: “No, again it was a very different case, I suppose when I think about it, I 
haven’t seen one like that before, not particularly, but I suppose maybe in his short 
answers and in his tone of voice and the quickness of his voice, maybe that was, 
showing his anxiety through that way and his, you know, not wanting to really be 
involved in anything there.” 
 Participant 5, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Use of the first person makes a supposition more personal than does use of the more 
general “maybe you know” or “you know maybe”. As with “maybe you know” and “you 
know maybe”, “I suppose maybe” is used to mark hesitancy where participants’ talk 
involves criticism of practice: 
• “I couldn’t see it as being mistakes to be quite honest, because everybody, I 
suppose maybe, maybe it shouldn’t have been let go onto the Tuesday, I suppose 
you could say well you know why wasn’t, when she didn’t turn up Monday 
morning, how come somebody didn’t you know alert people at that stage. But I 
couldn’t see it as being, I couldn’t really say there was any mistakes made to be 
honest, I’m not just standing up for services now I’m just kind of thinking about the 
whole setup the whole scenario you know.” 
Participant 32, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview  
 
Participants use the phrase “maybe a little bit” to immediately preface terms that could be 
interpreted as negative or derogatory. This is what Heritage (1984) has noted in medical 
discourse as the language of diminution, the function of which is to soften a message that 
could have been perceived of as harsh or insensitive (Seale & Charteris-Black 2010): 
• “Maybe a little bit unrealistic”  
Participant 26, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
•  “maybe a little bit ambivalent about life”  
Participant 32, Case 3, Think Aloud 
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•  “maybe a little bit naive”  
Participant 27, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview  
 
The phrases “maybe he’s” and “maybe she’s” occur mainly in the think aloud data. They 
express uncertainty regarding an individual’s general condition or state of mind. The fact 
that “he’s” and “she’s” are in the present tense reflects the more frequent use of these 
phrases in the think aloud data, where participants were dealing with the case in-vivo: 
•  “Maybe he’s in bed to avoid all the activity on the unit such as other patients 
intruding on his space, so he maybe seeking solitude during the day and then it’s 
affecting his sleep pattern at night, but he does appear to be suffering from low 
mood, possibly a reactive type depression from his significant loss.” 
Participant 10, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
In the case of the retrospective interview data, “maybe he’s” and “maybe she’s” are used 
with reference to events that are past, but a condition that is ongoing. For example, in the 
excerpt below the participant uses the present tense “maybe he’s” to suppose that the man 
is not comfortable with other people sitting around – indicating that this is the case as much 
at the time of speaking as it was at the time of the event being recalled. The man’s 
discomfort is not represented as a one-off feeling, but the way that he typically feels in such 
circumstances: 
• “So you know this would have been a man that would have lived all alone all his 
life and you know maybe he’s not comfortable with other people sitting around 
watching him eating and because he has this awful tremor now as well, you know”  
Participant 33, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Overall, the use of “maybe” in several key phrases is to express uncertainty. This function 
is similar to that of other words such as “think” and “know”. As with other expressions of 
uncertainty in the study corpus, “maybe” is often used in retrospective interview narratives 
as a way of marking hesitancy on the part of a participant to make comments that might be 
viewed negatively.  
The evidence of the use of “maybe”, as with other words that I will discuss, clearly 
demonstrates the distinction between hesitancy and expression of subjective uncertainty in 
the study corpus. In expressing subective uncertainty, a participant communicates that they 
are not sure of a point. This differs discursively from their hesitance in saying something.  
Expression of uncertainty, e.g., not being sure of someone’s condition, has a more direct 
relation to participants’ clinical judgement and decision-making than has hesitancy. 
Nevertheless, hesitancy provides valuable insight in terms of the values and norms 
underpinning participant discourse – that is, what it is appropriate to say or not to say. It 
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also speaks somewhat to the rigour of the data, insofar as it demonstrates that participants 
do not always appear comfortable with the revelatory nature of their narratives. 
4.3.5 Use of “suppose” 
All occurrences of “suppose” in the data are as part of the phrase “I suppose”. It acts mainly 
as a marker of hesitancy or uncertainty, sometimes at the opening of a case formulation. 
Here the function of “suppose” is to limit the discursive ‘owning’ of the formulation. 
Although participants give detailed case summaries, these are often qualified with this type 
of discursive face-saving.  
The following excerpt shows how ‘supposing’ acts in a self-protective manner - working 
alongside similar words and phrases (italicised) to disown claims to authoritative truth. The 
deletion test (Stede & Schmitz 2000) used to identify discourse markers could be applied 
here. Deletion of the italicised words would still result in a narrative that makes sense, 
albeit with a more authoritative tone: 
• “I suppose non-compliance, I mean the person probably went home and didn’t take 
their medication, weren’t being supervised taking their medication whereas in the 
day hospital they can be supervised taking their medication. I mean the patient was 
paranoid about their husband, thought he was trying to poison them and yet she was 
discharged back to the situation and the scenario, the social stresses.” 
Participant 1, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The “and I suppose” construct often indicates a narrowing of focus, or development along a 
more specific path in the case formulation. In the following excerpt, the narrative about 
delusions is narrowed to imply that they are paranoid in nature. Note the italicised 
diminutive qualifers: 
• “Well yes, I suppose she, she had real delusions, she was probably depressed but 
she had real delusions. And I suppose quite paranoid and all that as well.” 
Participant 7, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the example below, the idea of physical illness is developed in terms of its implications 
for the service-user’s mental state along with a rationale for this. Here there is less 
expression of uncertainty resulting in a more confident tone, as evident in the lack of 
diminutive qualifiers: 
• “And he was physically ill as well, and I suppose when he was physically ill, that 
would have been altering his mental state as well, because it was things like lack of 
oxygen, so he was confused and stuff like that.” 
Participant 5, Case 1 JDM PiP Interview 
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In the next excerpt, the participant is talking about how the service-user presented -  
“tearful”, “seemed also quite normal”, not seeming to be “feeling the effects of loss” as 
well as giving background information in terms of his broken marriage and subsequent 
relationship with his wife and children. The “and I suppose” phrase adds the factor of the 
man’s anger to the case, which leads directly to a narrowing the overall formulation down 
to assessment of risk of self-harm. Deletable markers of uncertainty are italicised. Note also 
the single marker of certainty (underlined) – the role of this word in the study corpus is 
discussed in section 4.3.9. The presence of markers of both certainty and uncertainty are an 
example of confidence about one aspect of a case amid more general uncertainty. 
• “I’m actually kind of stuck for words now he, I suppose the tearfulness, he you 
know, it seemed also quite normal in a way but you know he did seem to be feeling 
the effects of loss really. You know ok it was a breakdown in a twenty year 
marriage or fifteen, I can’t remember but you know his wife was obviously still in 
the family home, he had moved out, he still had young children, the youngest they 
were teenagers I think. Which you know he wasn’t really having any access to and I 
suppose there was, you know a lot of anger there as well, which I suppose you 
know at the end of the day, you know it would, you’d view as increasing risk 
factors for self-harm as much as anything else really.” 
Participant 17, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
As with “I suppose”, “I suppose I” often introduces ideas about a case. However, the key 
differentiating factor between use of “I suppose I” and “I suppose” is explicit self reference. 
The function of “I suppose I” appears similar to that of “think” in terms of expressing 
hesitancy, in particular where the account of self given appears less than ideal in terms of 
self presentation (Goffman 1969). Note the markers of hesitancy in italics and underlined 
diminutive qualifier (Skelton & Hobbs 1999), all of which are deletable.  
•  “Again I suppose I, maybe too much of a slant on it at the start in the sense that 
maybe it was a little bit more me telling him rather than him agreeing but he had to 
agree to it if he wanted to move the situation on.” 
Participant 9, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the study corpus, the function of “I suppose” is highly context dependent. Generally it 
serves to limit truth claims in the introduction or conclusion of a formulation of a case in 
the retrospective interview data. Depending on context, it tends to be a part of a wider 
discursive marking of uncertainty and hesitancy. In many of these instances this is where 
the narrative becomes more focused or where a novel element has been introduced. 
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4.3.6 Use of “might” 
In the think aloud data, the phrase “might have been” is used as part of speculative 
discourse about situations characterised by uncertainty. In the retrospective interview data it 
features in participant talk about what might be called ‘less than ideal’ clinical practice, 
particularly where allusion is made to error. This is especially where participants seem 
hesitant to talk in definitive and categorical terms about actual, potential or even 
hypothetical errors or substandard practice.  
The following excerpts from the retrospective interview data show the use of “might have 
been” in the discussion of potential for error. Note the italicised markers of hesitancy and 
the diminutive qualifier in the lines where potential error is addressed. They stand in 
contrast to the more confident tone of the rest of the conversation: 
• IR: “And from the practitioner perspective, from the perspective of nurses involved 
in the case, could they have made any mistakes or?” 
P34: “I don’t think in that way really.” 
IR: “Right, well not did they make any mistakes, but could they have made 
mistakes or this, room for error?” 
 P34: “Room for error?” 
 IR: “Let’s say someone maybe just qualified first week on the ward?” 
P34: “Well maybe keeping her here might have been an error I think, you know.” 
 IR: “Right, what would have happened if she would have been kept?” 
 P34: “Family, well the family would have been just kind of distraught.” 
 Participant 34, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the excerpt above P34 seems reluctant to discuss the possibility of error. When the 
interviewer persists, error was framed as what “might have” happened if the patient had 
remained in hospital. Where allusion is made to actual error or substandard practice in the 
retrospective data, “might have been” serves a similar function, as in the following excerpt. 
Note the presence also of the diminutive qualifier:  
• “And he would, I won’t say become lost in his argument but he actually would 
become quiet and still for, it might be seconds, you know it wasn’t a long time at 
any time, it might be a few seconds. And sometimes, that was disrupted by the 
doctor actually saying you know, ‘what can you see?’ ‘what are you looking at?’, 
you know. Which might have been, might have come in a little bit too quick, 
instead of taking a little bit more time and giving him more time. 
Participant 17, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Below, P14 admits that there “might have been” prejudice” on behalf of staff. Note again 
the presence of deletable markers of hesitancy and a diminutive qualifier in broaching the 
topic, with the tone becoming more confident as the narrative develops: 
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• IR: “I’m very interested as well, these people who are ‘dodgy characters’, what was 
it about them that set alarm bells off?” 
P14: “Just the look of them really, not specifically their clothes or anything. They 
weren’t too happy talking to me or any of the nursing staff. They were just in and 
out and they seemed to help themselves to the ward, going around, they’d walk into 
this room, that room and the other and it’s be inappropriate really walking into 
patients’ activity area and things like that. I don’t know it’s just a judgement call 
really.” 
 IR: “It just wasn’t right?” 
P14: “Yeah, there was just something not right about them. I suppose there might 
have been a bit of prejudice in that we’d read his chart and we’d read that he’d 
hung around with a lot of people who abused substances as well and we knew he’d 
no brothers so we know they weren’t his brothers that they were these friends, so we 
had to keep a close eye on them.”  
Participant 14, Case 3, JDM PiP 
 
The phrase “that might have” is characterised by its function of denoting uncertainty 
regarding causal judgement. In the following example it is used in tandem with a deletable 
diminutive qualifiers: 
•  “So he wasn’t allowed to go out for the last 2 or 3 days, so I had a kind of feeling 
that might have put him into the situation to act out because when he was going 
out he was at least getting some fresh air and he liked riding the bike.” 
Participant 13, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In both the think aloud and retrospective interview data, where “might” is collocated with 
“he” and “she” it is to express uncertainty. For the most part this involves descriptions of 
people’s cognitive processes or affective states. Indeed, this is a matter about which a 
certain amount of uncertainty is predicated by the essentially opaque nature of these 
phenomena: 
• “She’s no social interaction, she doesn’t want to go to the day centre, she doesn’t 
want to be bothered with washing herself and that can happen with paranoid 
schizophrenics and she might be paranoid as well about staff.” 
Participant 34, Case 1, Think Aloud 
 
Whereas “he might be” and “she might be” refer to individuals, “they might be” alludes to 
types of people. This occurs almost exclusively in the retrospective interview data: 
• “He looked like he was craving alcohol. He was not sleeping, you know he was on 
Librium and I think when one is under the influence of alcohol, their inhibitions are 
lower and they might be more prone to suicide or to self harm.” 
Participant 3, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
As with many of the other keywords accounted for so far, “might” can be linked to the 
expression of uncertainty and hesitancy. It is also used to make reference to typical cases, 
denote hesitancy, or express general uncertainty. This also involves the use of diminutive 
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qualifiers and other markers of uncertainty. Where uncertainty is expressed it is in relation 
to elements of the case under consideration, whereas hesitancy is noticeable where delicate 
issues such as errors in practice arise. 
4.3.7 Use of “think” 
With 26 potential meanings “think” is a highly versatile and ambiguous verb (Fontanet 
2004). In general English usage it serves the function of expressing hesitancy with regard to 
expressing forthright opinion, whether to be covert or to express uncertainty (Thomson & 
Martinett 1991). In the study corpus, the phrases “do you think”, “you think of”, “you to 
think” and “think of a” occur almost exclusively in the interviewer’s speech in terms of 
their interrogative function.  
As with “maybe”, participant use of “think” is mainly to express uncertainty. This in 
narratives that feature other phrases denoting uncertainty (italicised) - e.g., “maybe”, “kind 
of”, “I don’t know”: 
• P39: “I think it would be important to maybe talk to the sister and kind of tease out 
a little bit, and maybe explain to her how much it does impinge on her mental health 
if her sister doesn’t come as planned” 
Particpant 39. Case 1, Think Aloud 
• P40: “Ok well basically this young man is 19 years of age, extremely psychotic 
came into us about, I think about two months ago, I’m thinking two months ago, 
has a history of drug abuse. I’m not saying he has a drug induced psychosis, I think 
it was always there. I think maybe there was, I think maybe dabbling in drugs may 
have brought it on but I think it was always, it could have been always there, even 
before he was dabbling.” 
Participant 40, Case 1, JDM Pip 
In other instances what appears to be subjective uncertainty about a case could be hesitance 
at disclosing what might be perceived as less than ideal practice. Again there is 
concomitant use of words and phrases linked to uncertainty – e.g., “might have”, “maybe”, 
“suppose”. However, here the function appears to be to allow the participant to hold back 
from relating potentially controversial (and disputable) situations as factual. Of particular 
interest is the intital response to the interviewer’s query in the second paragraph of text, 
where the participant sandwiches the definitive “I’ve seen it happen” in between the less 
committed, “I think it can happen”. Note here also markers of uncertainty and diminutive 
qualifier, all of which are deletable. 
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• “P21: I think sometimes when people come in, I think the day she came in it might 
have gone differently as well, she could have been medicated straight away against 
her will, brought down to a room and kind of a more aggressive management of it. 
IR: How could that happen as opposed to what did happen? 
P21: I think it can happen, I’ve seen it happen, I think it can happen when maybe 
tensions are heightened and things are, you know maybe a few less experienced 
people, more less experienced people on a ward than usual or people who don’t 
know what to do in a certain situation and people maybe aren’t confident in 
themselves and trying to kind of plamas someone into taking oral medication.” 
Particpant 21, JDM PiP, Case 2 
 
“Think” is used mainly for metacognitive expression, mainly of subjective uncertainty. 
This is evident from its combination with other markers of uncertainty and diminutive 
qualifiers. At this level of analysis there are no discernable links to any specific cognitive 
processes. As with other keywords, this is in relation to uncertainty about aspects of the 
case at hand as well as in terms of hesitancy to give discursive commitment to a narrative 
that potentially disparages nursing practice or other aspects of health service delivery. 
4.3.8 Use of “could” 
Participants use the modal verb “could” mainly in the phrases “it could be” and “could be 
a”, either in recall or in-vivo, to indicate speculation. This features in both the think aloud 
and retrospective interview data along with other markers of uncertainty (italicised): 
• “Tremor, dry mouth, palpitations, it could be just an anxiety attack, it might be an 
acute anxiety attack at present.” 
Participant 10, Case 2, Think Aloud 
 
•  “Well with him having an opportunity to go off and kill himself before he was in 
hospital I think it could have been just that he wanted to kill himself, yes, and he 
wanted his mother to come across his body as a type of revenge maybe, or some 
kind of anger thing or he just wanted to come back to the house so it could be a 
failed suicide and his mother would know about it and it’s a cry out for help.” 
Participant 14, Case 3, JDM PiP 
 
In contrast to its function in expressing speculation, as shown above, “could” is also used in 
the phrase “you could see” to point to aspects of a case as being plainly evident. The 
generalising function of “you” (used instead of “I”) in this phrase points to the typical 
nature of the judgements involved. As with use of the word “looking”, the typification 
formula - with this type of case “you” could generally see “x” – can be applied.  
Therefore, rather than being something that the participant uniquely perceives, it is 
generalised into something plainly observable. In the think aloud data this is used in 
immediate retrospective reference to cues from the video clips. In the retrospective 
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interview data it is used with reference to cues that were apparent at the time that the case 
was unfolding.  
• “We found him quite drowsy like and we had concerns and he had been, he was 
faced out toward the window but you could see from behind that he had been 
fecally incontinent.” 
Particpant 27, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
•  “He seemed quite agitated. You could see he was kind of looking behind him all 
the time the other guy was pacing around.” 
Participant 12, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
The phrases “she could have” and “he could have” are used to express speculation (usually 
in the retrospective interview data): 
• “And we think that he could have been you know the usual flushing them down the 
toilet and, so we got Largactil 250 written up for him four times a day, we had to 
increase it from I think it was 200 to 250, four times a day, that’s only barely 
touching him.” 
Participant 40, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
These phrases are also used to express speculation about what might have happened under 
another set of circumstances, almost always concerning risk of intentional self harm and/or 
suicide: 
P30: “He wouldn't have came and admitted the truth to us himself. So if we hadn’t 
got that he could have gone home that evening and easily have done something to 
himself.” 
Participant 30, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In overview, as a modal verb, “could” is used in a similar way to other keywords in 
expressing uncertainty in the context of both contingency and speculation about elements of 
the case presentation. “Could” is also used to mark hesitancy (Jaworski et al 2003) to 
commit to negative opinions about health service professionals and systems. Like other 
keywords, its use in collocation with the second person pronoun “you” serves to generalise 
and typify an aspect of a case. These features are evident across both the think aloud and 
retrospective interview data.  
4.3.9 Use of “obviously” 
The word “obviously” is used in various phrases along with third person pronouns to 
express judgement about an individual’s condition, most often their mental state. It is used 
in this way mostly in the think aloud data, although not exclusively. In most instances 
across both the think aloud and retrospective data, the reasons why the person is 
“obviously” in a certain condition are given. Whilst several other keywords involved with 
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reasoning and uncertainty have already been examined, “obviously” stands out as being 
clearly linked to the expression certainty: 
• “He’s obviously in distress: self referral, partner’s flat, sleeping rough, low mood.”  
Participant 45, Case 2, Think Aloud 
 
There are times where “obviously” is used to state a judgement, about which the participant 
then begins to deliberate in terms of rationale. Paradoxically, where a definite judgement is 
given in this way there can also be expression of uncertainty. In the example below, this 
expression of uncertainty is marked not only by consideration of different cues, but by 
explicit metacognitive reference to uncertainty (underlined), which uses the second person 
plural to incorporate the researcher: 
•  “She’s obviously not feeling well enough to get up. Obviously the suggestion by 
the student nurse here to help her is not an unreasonable one because I feel she has 
approached it in a way that she wants to assist her in some way to help her, but 
obviously Karen is very angry, she could be unwell, she could be psychotic, she 
could be, we don’t know exactly what’s going on here…” 
Participant 9, Case 1, Think Aloud 
 
In some instances judgement is expressed without reference to cues. However, on closer 
inspection, some potential influencing factors are discernable. In the next example, time 
seems to be the main factor that P27 focuses on in terms of eligibility for pass. No reason is 
given for the judgement that “John” is still grieving, but the use of the word “still” points to 
a temporal element.  
This appears more likely in that the preceding judgement that “possibly it could be a bit 
early for a pass” is by the participant’s own indication based solely on the amount of time 
that has passed. Likewise, the judgement that John is “obviously still grieving” appears to 
have been based on information derived from the notes relating to the time since his wife’s 
death. This is far from certain of course, but is an example of how close consideration of 
participants’ language in context can shed light on otherwise less tangible aspects of their 
judgement and decision-making. However, in almost all instances participants verbalised 
the rationale for their judgments by listing or describing associated cues:  
• “And possibly it could be a bit early for a pass, initially not matter what the 
presentation is, it could be, in my opinion could be a bit early for pass, the fact then 
that, flicking through the notes that his wife has passed away and he could, he’s 
obviously still grieving for her like.” 
Participant 27, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
 105 
In the example below, P26 relates their judgement that the fictional “Noel” is “not too 
happy to talk … reluctant to converse at any level”. No direct reason is given for this 
judgement, but the mention between these two expressions that “he’s obviously feeling 
low” discursively links his reluctance to talk to his low mood. 
• “He’s obviously not too happy to talk; he’s obviously feeling low and reluctant to 
converse at any level.” 
Participant 26, Case 2, Think Aloud 
 
I have already pointed out participants’ use of the words “looking”, “maybe”, “might” and 
“could” to refer to features that they represent as typical. The word “obviously” is also used 
in this way mainly, but not exclusively, in the think aloud data. In the following excerpt, 
P14 expressed the judgement that “Noel” is “obviously fairly cute to the services, he knows 
how to play them”.  
I am familiar with the ‘type’ of individual referred to here, having worked with numerous 
people who would ‘fit the bill’. However, this is not the ‘type’ of individual that I had in 
mind when I wrote Case 2. It would appear that this judgement is linked to Noel’s history 
of selling drugs, although the link is not made explicit by P14. Note also the lack of 
markers of uncertainty in these excerpts. 
• “He has a history of selling drugs. He’s obviously fairly cute to the services, he 
knows how to play them, so you’ve got to watch out for that as well.” 
Participant 14, Case 2, Think Aloud   
 
•  “He’s obviously abusing some of his medication like the Xanax. He’s selling it on 
the streets.” 
Participant 3, Case 2, Think Aloud 
 
In the second example above a similar judgement was made that Noel is “obviously 
abusing some of his medication”. Again, in writing Case 2 this is not what I had intended as 
the case with Noel, who sold his medication because he needed the money. Had he been 
“abusing” it he would have been seeking more on top of his prescription stock – which 
would be insufficient to support an ongoing benzodiazepine habit. 
However, some participants expressed inferences about the ‘type’ of person represented by 
a fictional case character that cannot be judged as certainly ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. As with the 
case above, these judgements involved assumption about ‘types’ of people based on prior 
experience. These inferences did not conflict with the intentionality behind cases as 
constructed for the purposes of the study.  
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However, neither did these assumptions reflect aspects of the fictional characters that I 
deliberately sought to convey. In the first example given below, judgement about John’s 
premorbid sociability was based on the fact that he is a taxi driver: 
•  “… he hasn’t gone out since Christmas and I mean he is a taxi driver so obviously 
he is quite sociable you know he is always meeting people and he seems to be on 
his own and just is not talking to people which is not healthy…” 
Participant 8, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
•  “Probably what’s happening is that he’s sleeping a bit during the day and 
obviously not sleeping at night which is typical of what happens.”    
Participant 20, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
In the second example, P20 makes a judgement regarding John’s sleep pattern that I did not 
intend to be conveyed by the combined cues presented in the video clips and 
documentation. However, it did not conflict with the clinical picture envisaged in the 
writing of John’s case. What is of note is participants’ addition of details based on their 
expressed perceptions of what they consider ‘typical’. In the retrospective interview data 
there are less instances of this use of “obviously”, but it is not totally absent.  
In addition to expressing certainty about judgements that are often associated with 
references to typcial features, “obviously” is used with reference to decisions about 
intervention. Whereas in the think aloud data decisions are talked about in terms of what 
“obviously” needs to be done next, in the retrospective data they are referred to as what 
“obviously” needs to happen as part of management of the case:  
• “It looks, I mean if she has been getting her medication the way its prescribed she 
obviously needs to be reviewed by the psychiatrist and all of this needs to be 
reported back because it won’t be able to go on the way it is.” 
Participant 4, Case 1, Think Aloud 
 
•  “Because of the history of bipolar and because that from time to time she became 
quite elated to the extent that she’d be very, very high really, almost kind of total 
personality change at the clinic and then obviously her medication had to be 
reviewed. Then obviously they had to provide a structured kind of programme for 
her so I had to get her out of the house and do things because I just find that she’s in 
the house a lot, so obviously she was referred to [name of day hospital omitted]” 
Participant 20, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview  
 
Where participant decisions are concerned, the expression of subjective certainty in the use 
of the word “obviously” is not always linked to a clear rationale. That this is routinely 
‘what is done’ in such a case appears to be sufficient grounds to warrant such clear 
expression of subjective certainty. The steps to be taken are “obviously” what the person 
needs. 
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The word “obviously” fulfils several discursive functions related to the theme of 
uncertainty that characterises the study corpus. In participant expression of judgement it 
expresses a degree of subjective certainty. Whether this is actual subjective certainty is not 
clear (Edwards & Potter 1992), but regardless of their internal mental state participants do 
use the word to convey such certainty.  
This is partly achieved by linking the judgements, tacitly or explicitly, to cues. With 
decisions, proposed or recalled interventions are portrayed as routine. As with several other 
keywords, the word “obviously” characterises talk about ‘typical’ cases. 
4.3.10 Use of “just” 
The phrases “you know just”, “just you know” and “just kind of” are collocations of “just” 
and the discourse markers “you know” and “kind of”. The phrases “if you just” and “that’s 
just” are highly versatile and have many uses, none of which are characteristically linked to 
judgement and decision-making in the study corpus. The same is true for “he’s just” and 
“she’s just”, which are used mainly in the think aloud data. 
The word “just” has already been seen, in conjunction with other keywords in phrases, to 
play a part in what Heritage (1984) refers to as the language of diminution. This is not to 
say that use of “just” serves only to discursively negate or minimise. Diminution is the 
study corpus also has a discursive role in communicating the quantitative, as well as 
qualitiative, limitation of phenomena.  
The examples below show how participants use “just” in summarising, so that the message 
“it was just x” can be read as “it was mainly x” or “it could be summed up as simply x”. 
This occurs mainly in the recall of cases in the retrospective interview data.  
In the example below the problem-intervention scenario set out by P5 could be summed up 
as ‘lack of motivation/encouragement’. Although the description of the man’s problem and 
the subsequent interventions are quite detailed, it is summed up by saying that it “was just a 
lack of motivation” and that what was needed most was “Just lots of encouragement”. The 
discussion of the problem and its solution hinge on and are limited by these two notions. 
• “Just lots of encouragement with him you know, trying to encourage him to you 
know, if you were on night duty, trying to encourage him to get into the, to go to 
bed early, because he’s going to find it harder to get up in the morning and then he’s 
not going to be able to stay in the bed all day, so it’s really not doing him any good 
to be staying up. Is there any reason, finding out was there any reason that he 
wanted to stay in the bed and there generally wasn’t any reason for wanting too. It 
was just lack of motivation, so then trying to give him something to be motivated 
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during the day, you know say like, ok well if you’re up, you know and you have 
your breakfast and that and stuff like that, maybe, you know. Maybe he’d be able to 
do something today, maybe go down to the therapy or maybe go out for a walk, or 
whatever like that do you know, that sort of thing.”  
Participant 5, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the next example, the man’s state is summed up by saying that he “was just angry”. This 
is expanded on in terms of his being irritable. Other potential aspects are not mentioned, 
e.g., boredom, interpersonal relationships etc. – “he was just angry”: 
• “You can almost see it, when he did become irritable, I could see it in his whole 
being that he was just angry. It’s hard to explain, just eh, you could see he was 
being irritable to people. I was doing a quiz and he said ‘ah come on Michelle stop 
molly coddling them’. And if I wasn’t moving fast enough doing certain things you 
could see it was irritating him.”  
Participant 4, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The phrase “just didn’t” serves the same function of limiting a phenomenon, but in a 
negative sense. The excerpt below demonstrates this in a case presentation that has a 
similar limiting of the problem-intervention as is seen with Participant 5 above. This can be 
seen in the use of “just didn’t” with reference to both the problem and intervention. 
• “Well if that was over looked she wouldn’t have a home help, that would be 
something there, it just wouldn’t happen, that would be, because she wouldn’t, 
regardless of what you asked her did she want she’d say no, even though she was 
crying out needing it, she just didn’t want to accept help. So you know you had to 
be aware of that, you just didn’t ask the question that way or if you did she was 
going to say no anyway you know so you had to.” 
Participant 28, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
 “Just” is a versatile word with many meanings and uses. As part of the language of 
diminution participants use it to discursively narrow down the complexity of a case. This is 
seen mainly in recall of cases in the retrospective interview data with regard to both 
problems encountered and interventions engaged in. 
4.3.11 Use of “if” 
The pairing “if you” featured commonly in both the think aloud and retrospective interview 
data. Although used frequently by the interviewer in posing questions, it is mainly used by 
participants. The phrase, like other keywords, also serves to generalise matters in 
collocation with the personal pronoun “you”: 
•  “You know if you really were in control of your emotions and you were really 
trying to deal with the situation as best you could, you’d be more inclined to hope 
that he would take himself out of the situation.” 
Participant 9, Case 3, Think Aloud 
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•  “Em and em I suppose one of the I think one of the greatest things if you have 
some kind of a confidant that you can talk about a problem but he had nobody only 
me and that was weekly sessions” 
Participant 16, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In some cases this generalising function involves generalisation not about actions, but about 
a particular type of person or case: 
• “Once you are discharged then really if you have poor social circumstances mm, 
you know things can be against you, there’s a big chance you’ll come back in.” 
Participant 12, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The “if you” pairing is also used to generalise situations involving health professionals: 
• “He seems like someone that would be, he would open up more maybe if you talk 
to him he might come out with some more information” 
Participant 39, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
In the retrospective interview data, “if you” features in participant accounts of what they 
report saying to an individual with reference to an issue of choice or contingency. This is 
characterised by the control of the professional over a regimen. In the first example the 
power of the professional is very subtly constructed, whereas in the second example it is 
more blatant. 
• “And then assuming that the husband or herself would be willing to consent to a 
visit like, outlining to her again like, ‘Look its important that you attend to 
outpatient facilities, and you know like while you done well hospital if you don’t 
comply there’s a chance you might have to come back into hospital, you might be 
there longer the next time’, that kind of thing and outlining to her all the positives, 
all the out patients services that are available like and maybe if the day hospital isn’t 
for her, that something else might be for her like you know.” 
Participant 27, Case 4, Think Aloud 
 
•  “So it was kind of like a reward system. You might say to him, he might come in at 
2 o’clock during the day, see he’s been in bed all day and he wants to ring 
somebody so you tell him that if, you know, ‘If you get dressed and go out for a 
walk and come back to me in an hour’, that type of thing, you know.” 
Participant 12, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The following excerpt is an example of a more user-oriented approach. Note that it is not an 
account of actual events, but of what “should have” happened. There is a very distinct 
function of empowerment in this account, which is not a distinguishing feature of the two 
accounts of actual practice above, or the data generally: 
• “He seemed to have grown up in Christian Brothers school I think it was and he was 
in prison for years as well and he’s been in psychiatric hospitals and maybe we 
could have given him a bit more planning as regards, put him onto social workers 
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and things like that, show him his options and things like that, you can get this 
hostel here or try for maybe rent supplements and some things like that if you’re 
going to be working and things like that. Just basics, this is how you’re going to get 
on your feet. There’s an opportunity here if you want it, go and grab it. Maybe that 
wasn’t offered to him as readily as it should have been.” 
Participant 14, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
As the corpus represents vernacular speech, the third person plural pronoun “they” is 
commonly used to refer to an individual. This is not in the same way that “he” or “she” was 
used. When used in the singular sense, “they” is used to refer to a typical individual:  
• P7: “But it would be basically the care that you would put them under, you know, 
where you would be observing them for, for you know if they were severely 
depressed.” 
Participant 7, Case 3, JDM PiP 
 
The pairing of “if” with “he”, “she” or “they” is also often involved in participant talk 
about contingency. In this case the use of “if” involves the setting out of two or more 
different ways in which matters were likely to unfold in a case and what the likely response 
might have been. For the most part participants are setting out different options or 
contingencies depending on choices or decisions made by service-users or other health 
professionals. This occurs in both the think aloud and retrospective interview data: 
• “People should try and engage with her maybe at home or you know if she isn’t 
happy with that that they would ask her to meet in a health centre.”  
Participant 29, Case 4, Think Aloud 
 
•  “So you know you can offer them a couple of follow up appointments  if they don’t 
attend but really I think the policy here is that they’re offered 3 follow up 
appointments and if they don’t attend then they’re just discharged back to the 
community people.” 
Participant 22, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The combination of “if” with “he”, “she” or “they” also occur in the retrospective interview 
data where participants were talk about an individual’s condition. This is similar to its 
contingency function, in that it sets out alternatives. However, the main emphasis is on “if” 
the person was in this or that state rather than on choice.  
In situations involving choice and contingency, “if” relates how a person might have played 
an active part in the situation. Here it referred to the action of a particular condition upon 
them, of which they were passive recipients – they were in this state or that state, but not by 
choice: 
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•  “If all of those things, if they are too psychotic to be able to do the work, if they 
are too depressed, all those things would come into the decisions about whether this 
person, whether this therapy would be the right therapy for this person.” 
Participant 29, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Participants also use “if” paired with “he” and “she” to talk about potential consequences. 
Perhaps due to the nature of the case, this is seen mainly in the think aloud data for Case 
Three, which involved an element of risk around granting weekend pass to “John”: 
• “He’s questionably still is irritable enough to do something if he got out of hospital 
so really I wouldn’t advise a weekend, a full weekend pass unaccompanied for 
him.”  
Participant 9, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
Use of “if” along with “he” and “she” to talk about risk in terms of consequences of actions 
also featured to a lesser extent in the retrospective interview data: 
• “The guy is in basically because if he’s let out on his own he would completely go; 
he’d go off and go as far as taking drugs and he’d be a huge danger to himself and 
possibly others as well.” 
Participant 14, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Participants paired “if” with “he” and “she” to express uncertainty about aspects of a case 
(Cheng 2002). This is seen almost exclusively in in-vivo consideration of cases in the think 
aloud data. This invariably involves the use of “don’t know” as the main expression of 
uncertainty, of which “if he” or “if she” is a collocate, e.g.,  
• “I don’t know if she was really fit to go if she had kind of ideas about this.”  
Participant 34, Case 4, Think Aloud 
 
In both the retrospective interview and think aloud data, “if” combined with “he” and “she” 
plays a part in setting out a chain of reasoning. This is expressed in terms of “if x, then y”. 
To illustrate this in the following excerpt, I have use italics to represent the “then y” part of 
the structure: 
• “I’d say it could be one of two things, it could be yes, it could be genuine paranoia 
based on her history, if she’s not cleaning herself she could be paranoid about the 
water but you won’t know that until there’s a proper assessment done”  
Participant 40, Case 1, Think Aloud 
 
Whereas with “if he” and “if she”, contingency is associated with individual choice and 
responsibility, the phrase “if there’s” was involved with situational contingency, e.g.,  
• “I suppose really would be to actually try and push for some sort of follow up care 
really, you’re unlikely to get a CPN, but what you may do is get you know an 
outpatients kind of appointment, you generally will have a lot more success in 
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getting those if there’s a little bit of a gap between say discharge and starting their 
next therapeutic treatment programme.”   
Participant 17, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
As it is fundamentally linked to cause and contingency, the word “if” serves functions 
related to these aspects of judgement and decision-making in participant’s talk. In particular 
it is involved with talk around uncertainty, choice and risk. Secondary issues arose, e.g., 
power where choice is talked about, or consequences where risk is mentioned.  
There is frequent pairing of “if” with personal pronouns. This is either to talk specifically 
about an individual or to generalise about types of individuals. Where generalisation is 
made, it is in the context of participants’ representation of typical cases. 
4.3.12 Use of “because” 
As well as in explaining the rationale for their own actions, participants also use “because” 
in conjunction with “he” or “she” to talk about what is represented as having motivated the 
actions of others. This occurs almost exclusively in the retrospective interview data. Here 
participants discuss the motivations of others with a remarkable degree of certainty.  
Assessing mental state is an important skill in psychiatric nursing (Barker 2004). This 
partly involves making inferences based on the observation of individuals’ behaviour. The 
following excerpt illustrates this process insofar as P37 reports that they were certain that 
the fictional “Karen” is angry because of the sound of her voice: 
• “And I think maybe avoid you know, for the moment anyway avoid the hygiene and 
avoid the room, just to find out, or to listen to her what’s going on, because she’s 
certainly very angry, she sounds very angry.” 
Participant 37, Case 1, Think Aloud 
 
In my clinical experience, the perceived ability to know the thoughts, feelings and 
motivations of others is seen as a core skill by psychiatric nurses. It is also found in certain 
models of counselling and psychotherapeutic intervention in terms of becoming familiar 
with an individual’s internal frame of reference (e.g., Nelson-Jones 2005). In my 
experience this has been taught as a psyuchiatric nursing skill both in the classroom and in 
clinical practice.  
Although guessing at the motivations of others is normative for lay people, here it is 
situated firmly in the professional nursing practice. Claiming the ability to know with no 
small degree of subjective certainty, and in a clinical context, the motivations of others may 
seem remarkable. However, the degree to which this is normative in psychiatric nursing is 
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evident in the confident and matter of fact way that the “because he” and “because she” 
phrasing is used in the examples below. 
The lack of any markers of uncertainty in the excerpt below is indicative of the degree of 
subjective certainty expressed by P39 with regard to what a person had been thinking. It 
could well be that the person had, at a stage in the relationship not discussed in the data, 
divulged these thoughts to the participant. Nevertheless, this is not revealed in the course of 
the narrative, and regardless of the mechanism of discovery on the part of the participant, 
expressing knowledge of the motiviations of others appears normative for them:  
• “When she was, compliant with medication she would do quite well but when her 
mood would start to go low, instead of recognising the need for help, she would 
stop her medication because she would think, ‘this is it, there’s no point now you 
know, it’s just going to be the same cycle again’ and, you know, so she would stop 
her medication which would automatically make everything worse.”  
Participant 39, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
There are hints to the mechanism of knowing the motivations, thoughts and feelings of 
others in the data, particularly in the think aloud data. In the following excerpt, P25 pleads 
ignorance of whether or not the fictional “John” is having “thoughts of suicide”, “because 
he’s not talking to the nurse.” The inference here is that this would be the normative 
mechanism through which they would attain such knowledge. 
• “This guy was admitted with an overdose and he’s saying he has no suicide wish 
but on admission he O/Ds, so there were thoughts of suicide. At the moment I don’t 
know because he’s not talking to the nurse.” 
Participant 25, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
In some instances in the retrospective interview data there is indirect representation of this 
process of gaining ‘knowledge’ of the thoughts of others. In the following example, P29 
talks about attaining of knowledge of a woman’s thoughts and patterns of thinking through 
a form of cognitive behavioural therapy. Although not explicitly stated, use of cognitive 
behavioural therapy is apparent from the description of P29’s structured engagement with 
her around anxiety, panic and the use of terms like “de-catastrophise”, “evidence” and 
“basic tools”. 
• “She had shown the evidence that she understood the formulation of the panic. She 
was able to make sense of that. She was able to make sense of why she panicked so 
all she had to do was to keep a track of her thoughts and de-catastrophise because 
her thoughts would be, oh I’ve got pain in my stomach it must be cancer. So she 
would then, she knew then to look at what’s the evidence, the evidence doesn’t 
support this, what might be another thing, what else could it be, oh it could be just a 
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cramp.  She knew what to do, she had the basic tools. So I based my decision on 
that, my decision to discharge her on that.” 
Participant 29, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Participants also use “because he” and “because she” to talk about probable cause. Note the  
initial use of a diminutive qualifier and metacognitive disclaimer:  
• “This time round while there’s still a little bit of anxiety there it seems to be, I mean 
low mood would be what he would have presented with originally but it seems to be 
low mood precipitated by the fact that he’s actually sitting around doing nothing all 
day, you know that its not just that he has fallen into a depression because he has 
allowed himself get into a depression because of avoiding doing anything else with 
his life.” 
Participant 22, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
As well as positively attributing causes to presenting conditions, participants also use this 
phrasing to talk about why they discounted ideas about an individual’s condition: 
• “Well my gut feeling that it wasn’t depression was because she, she was at the table 
and she was eating her breakfast and she was slouched over but she was still smiling 
up at me when she was talking.” 
Participant 4, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The word “because” commonly features in participant narratives collocated with “I think”. 
Here “because” does not serve to alter the function of “I think”, nor engage it in any novel 
function beyond those already discussed. It does, however, situate the expression of 
uncertainty by “I think” in the context of cause and effect.  
The discursive functions of interest with which “because” was associated are ascription of 
cause-and-effect and provision of rationale for decisions, particularly in relation to 
interventions. When collocated with other words, “because” was used with them to achieve 
complex discursive ends. This included combination with discourse markers as well as with 
words with discrete functions related to clinical judgement and decision-making. 
4.3.13 Use of “then” 
The most common use of “then” in the data is in the phrase “and then”, which acts as a 
chronological marker and a conjunctive. The phrase also serves the function of attributing 
consequences. This occurs invariably in the retrospective interview data, and tends to be in 
terms of psychopathology (as in the first example below) or interventions/actions (as in the 
second excerpt below).  
Essentially what is expressed in these instances is a cause-and-effect relationship similar to 
that discussed using “because”. The difference here is the specific temporal element, where 
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the cause follows on chronologically from the effect. This stems from the main function of 
“and then” as a chronological marker. 
• “Well her primary complaint would have been it would have been the alcohol, the 
alcohol yes and then the low mood would be secondary to that, that’s the 
diagnosis’s that she, you know was made.”  
Participant 32, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
•  “Very paranoid with the staff, I sat with her for a long time, did what she kind of 
said, told me to do, that kind of thing and then she began to trust me.”  
Participant 34, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The phrase “there and then” describes phenomena as instantaneous, and is used in the 
retrospective interview data in relation to actions taken. These situations vary and the 
degree of pressure and urgency are relative to the overall narrative – as can be seen in the 
differing degrees of pressure and urgency that an objective observer might attribute to the 
two examples below. However, for the participant, relative to the case at hand these were 
prompt actions taken instantaneously.  
• “So that, my first reaction there and then is to stop my assessment, because you 
really had to deal with the physical and so I got the A&E nurses back into the room 
and said well you know this patient needs to be looked at again.” 
Participant 31, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
• “I took his pulse right there and then and that was okay. So he seemed fairly 
relaxed and calm and he didn’t seem to be under any distress, he wasn’t finding it 
hard to breathe.”  
Participant 4, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the first excerpt “there and then” is followed immediately by “is”. The use of “is” rather 
than “was” denotes that rather than merely describing a past decision, this represents the 
participants’ normative course of habitual action. This made more apparent in the 
generalising function of “you” in the same sentence. 
In summary, the two distinct functions served by “then”, to express cause-and-effect and 
denote prompt intervention, have a strong temporal component. In certain instances its use 
is associated with the description of prompt, routinised action without much deliberation. In 
others it has the discursive effect of structuring an account so as to delineate cause and 
effect in a chronological manner. 
4.3.14 Use of “even” 
The word “even” is used mainly in the phrase “even though”. In the think aloud data, this 
phrase is used to present a cue or cues that would appear contrary to the participant’s 
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conclusive formulation. The cue(s) is then implicitly discounted by the fact that the 
judgement prevails despite it: 
• “Even though he’s pleasant I'm not happy about him at the moment even though 
he seems generally to be okay but I just think he’s coasting and that he will do 
something at the weekend.”  
Participant 29, Case 3, Think Aloud  
 
This is similar to its more prevalent use in the retrospective interview data to mark 
instances whereby a phenomenon is represented as atypical. In the first examples below, it 
is used to note that although an aspect of the case might have lead one to expect a certain 
situation, the opposite was true. This implies that the expected situation constitutes what is 
typical. In the first example, the typical case is that a woman living with her son would not 
be socially isolated: 
• “Well what we’ve done with her, because she was so socially isolated, even though 
she was living with her son, she was kind of out working all the time and the son’s 
girlfriend was there as well so they weren’t around that much.” 
Participant 26, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
• “She wasn’t really no, because you don’t see many, you don’t see many people with 
just pure anxiety, even though her mood was low it was kind her anxiety that was 
causing her to be low, and you don’t see many OCD* or anything like that in 
hospitals anymore, it’s mostly people that would attend the clinics, they would be 
out in the community and that kind of thing.” 
* Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
 Participant 39, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The second example above deals with the common combination of anxiety and depression 
(Gelder et al 2005). Sometimes people are given a diagnosis of anxiety depression where 
both conditions are perceived as appearing equivalent in severity (although more often one 
or the other does predominate). The typical case for P39 would appear to be that of low 
mood with a less significant anxiety component. Here the atypical case involved a strong 
anxiety component with concomitant low mood.  
In the final example below, the typical presentation seems to be that people who are 
experiencing low mood recognise this as problematic, seek help and are not averse to 
coming into hospital for treatment. The atypical case, presented here, is someone who 
refuses hospital treatment and also appears to be more preoccupied with their physical ill 
health. P22 seems also to see this aspect as atypical in people with low mood. 
• “She presented kind of passive death wish, said this kind of thing, I’d be better off 
dead, she was referred to our services here in [name of town admitted], she was 
assessed, that was all fine, refused to come in for admission, even though as we 
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would have seen it her mood would have been quite low but she just wasn’t willing 
to admit this herself and everything revolved around the physical problems that she 
was having.” 
Participant 22, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Overall, in the retrospective interview narrative the phrase “even though” is used as a 
contrastive device. This is a subtle discursive act that gives insight into what participants 
present as typical and atypical. In the think aloud data the same phrase notes cues which are 
then discounted as contrary to the participant’s final formulation.  
4.3.14 Use of “’ll” & “will” 
Participants use “’ll” and “will” at points in the case narrative where action is imperative. 
This need for action constitutes a rule that is either applied by the participant to a particular 
instance, or stated as a general principle. In the narratives, actors other than the participant 
also state or apply the rule, e.g., significant others, colleagues or service users.  
However, it is important to realise that the data represent the participant’s own account. 
Regardless of how individuals actually viewed the situation, how they represent this in the 
narrative serves primarily to make the participant’s point that the action/rule is essential at 
this point. In the retrospective interview data, actions taken in the story are framed as 
imperative using the phrase “will have to”.  
This serves to implicitly state a rule that governed the situation. Without exception, this has 
to do with justifying the curtailment of people’s liberty/choice: 
• “I said I know it’s quite troubling for people but I said we would have to actually 
legally detain him. Her answer to that was, ‘Give me the form and I will sign it’.  
She said, ‘My son is very unwell’, she said, ‘I will have to, treat him’, she said, ‘we 
have to get him well’, she said, ‘he cannot come home the way he is’, she said, ‘I’m 
frightened of him in here’, she said, ‘what would it be like at home?’” 
Participant 17, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The function of this phrasing is to explain that although it is not ideal to deprive people of 
liberty and choice; in some instances it is necessary. The phrase is used in other instances to 
relate similar rules about situations where there was a course of action that was imperative, 
for example in the think aloud data: 
• “I suppose she’s taking the oral medication but then if she doesn’t attend the day 
hospital or she doesn’t attend the clinic, we will have to do home visits on her. It 
would be important to do, because of the self harm, the increased risk of self harm.”  
Participant 3, Case 4, Think Aloud 
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There is a similarity here to narratives dealing with the deprivation of choice/liberty in that 
where intervention was being stepped up to a more intrusive level of engagement it was not 
done lightly and needed to be justified by the context – in this case risk of self harm. The 
phrase “will have to” is also used to state general principles regarding intervention, 
particularly - but not exclusively - around curtailment of liberty/choice, e.g., 
•  “Liberty pops up with each patient and we discuss liberty and things like that, 
whether they might have brought something back to the unit the night before that 
they shouldn’t have, alcohol or drugs or whatever and liberty will have to be 
stopped in that case.”  
Participant 14, Case 1, JDM PiP Interiew 
 
The word “will” and its abbreviated form “’ll” have 12 distinct functions in general 
discourse (Thomson & Martinett 1990). This is reflected in their disparate use in the study 
corpus. However, the word “will” does serve the distinct function - as part of the phrase 
“will have to” – of indicating a generally applied rule. This is either mentioned as such or is 
implied in the course of the case narratives. 
4.3.15 Use of “mean” 
The word “mean” occurs most often as part of the pair “I mean” which serves distinctive 
discursive functions in the phrases, “you know what I mean” and “but I mean”. Apart from 
these two phrases, “I mean” acts generally as a discourse marker in the same manner as 
“you know”. The phrase “I mean” is also used by participants to mark elaboration on a 
statement.  
This is evident in that it could be replaced at any point by the phrase “for example”. As 
such it marks places in participant narratives where the account became more detailed: 
• “Opinions, everybody else’s opinion can I suppose impact on your decision too and 
then we would always kind of, I mean I would never make a decision without 
running it past the doctors the you know the house officer and consultant like they 
would pass it on to the consultant and like they often, they would come back and 
say well no I don’t think it’s a good idea for such and such a reason.” 
Participant 32, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the retrospective data participants use “do you know what I mean” to check 
understanding when describing a case. The phrase tends to be used at a point in the account 
where details have the potential to confuse the listener. This involves intricacies in 
chronological order or other elements that introduce complexity into the narrative. To a 
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degree its use is attributable to an individual’s discursive style, and some participants use it 
more so than others. 
• “You see but yeah, one wonders, you see it depends, it mightn’t have gone ok and it 
certainly would have gone differently if it had happened on a Thursday when I was 
off as opposed to the Wednesday when I was on, do you know what I mean and 
that’s not to say it wouldn’t have gone well but it would have gone differently, it 
would have gone differently and maybe it is that his ability on the day was only, 
he’d only ability to connect with one, he couldn’t connect with a crowd and in fact 
it irritated him something wickedly.” 
Participant 18, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The phrase “but I mean” serves the purpose of prefacing negative, mainly critical, 
statements. This tends to involve an opinion that could be seen as derogatory and which the 
participant might be hesitant to divulge: 
• “She was meeting friends, I don’t know if they were druggy friends or whatever but 
her drug screens came back negative after her weekend leave, but I just learned that 
the relationship wasn’t a trustworthy relationship between myself and herself and, I 
shouldn’t have really believed her you know, so I, I just learned that kind of after 
six weeks like you know, it was just, we were building a relationship and I thought 
we had a good relationship established but I mean, she’s just a complete liar really 
at the end of it.”  
Participant 34, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview. 
 
The pair “I mean” is the basis of several versatile phrases that characterise the study corpus. 
Two of the phrases have notable discursive functions. The phrase “you know what I mean” 
is the most commonly used phrase containing “I mean”, and is used to check 
understanding. The phrase “but I mean” is used as a marker of hesitancy, prefacing 
comments that could be seen as negative. 
4.3.16 Discourse Markers 
I have referred at several points already in this chapter to participant use of discourse 
markers (Schiffrin 1987). Discourse markers are also referred to in the literature as 
discourse particles (Stede & Schmitz 2000). Their use characterise the study corpus to an 
extent that warrants a brief discussion at this point.  
The main role in of discourse markers in conversation is not to directly convey content-
related information, but to fulfil a pragmatic function in the ongoing interaction. When used 
as discourse markers, words carry a meaning that is different or contrary to their standard 
meaning (Stede & Schmitz 2000). The purpose of this study is not to investigate the 
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discourse of participants per se, but to analyse it with the intention of learning about the 
social and cognitive processes involved in nurses’ judgement and decision-making.  
Therefore, analysis of use of discourse markers is relevant in this study only insofar as it 
serves as a means to this end. Schiffrin (1987) has outlined the following words as the 
standard discourse markers in English. This list is not exhaustive, and other phrases 
recognised as discourse markers include“although” and “in that case” (Alonso et al 2002): 
• Well 
• And 
• But 
• Or 
• So  
• Because 
• Now 
• Then 
• I mean 
• You know 
 
Given the substantial amount of co-authored narrative (Ochs & Capps 1996, Fratilis & 
Sionis 2006) in the study corpus, and its conversational style, a higher frequency of 
discourse marker use is to be expected (Abma 2001). However, the characterisation of the 
study corpus by discourse marker use is not explained solely in terms of its genre as co-
authored narrative. Because the corpus against which it was compared was also featured 
conversational, co-authored discourse, a statistically significant difference in discourse 
marker use between the two cannot be explained by genre alone. 
In Chapter Three I pointed out that it was a principle of the analytic approach being taken 
in this study that interpretation of the data should draw on what the data itself has already 
demonstrated, and not on my own speculation independent of the evidence (Sacks et al 
1974). Therefore, in offering an explanation for this characteristion of the study corpus by 
high frequency of discourse marker use, I am cognisant of the need to consider only what I 
already know about the corpus. There are two common functions of discourse marker use 
that I have already demonstrated as characterising the study corpus.  
First, participants have been shown, through several discursive strategies, to use a style of 
narration that is subtle and implicit in description and attribution. Like the strategies already 
described, discourse markers serve the purpose of making speech less explicit and more 
implicit (Oliveira et al 2007). This can serve the purpose of positioning the speaker as non-
authoritative and less expert than their co-author.  
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The study corpus is also characterized by the use of several discursive strategies, mainly 
involving personal pronoun use, to generalise matters and closely identify both participant 
and researcher with judgements and decisions. Discourse markers also serve to identify a 
speaker with their observations, and to make these universally applicable (Oliveira 2007). 
The study corpus is characterised by this discursive strategy, and it is therefore reasonable 
to attribute the increased frequency of discourse marker use to this style of narration. 
If the aim of the study was to focus on participants’ use of language per se I would at this 
point engage in an in depth demonstration, with examples, of discourse marker use in the 
study corpus. However, as I wish to maintain my focus on what the evidence can reveal 
about participants’ clinical judgement and decision making, I will at this point move on to 
summarise the findings of this chapter.  
4.4 Summary of Findings of Comparative Keyword Analysis & 
Preliminary Discursive Analysis 
This concluding section does not constitute the sum total of the findings of this study. For 
this reason, the findings summarised here may appear inconclusive. This is because they 
are intended only to form the basis for further analysis of the data using conversation-
analysis informed discursive analysis.  
This is discussed in Chapter Five, where I will refer back to how the matters raised in this 
chapter served as the starting point for that analysis. Many of the features identified at this 
level of analysis were explored further in the next stage of analysis, as is shown in the 
following chapter.  
Preliminary discursive analysis of the functions of keywords generated by comparative 
keyword analysis shows that quantitatively measurable differences are discernable when 
participant discussion of clinical judgement and decision-making is compared to context-
governed speech, including interviews and medical consultations. More specifically, it can 
be shown that these differences are characterised by certain features that serve particular 
functions. These are summarised in Table 4.1 overleaf. 
In addition to setting out the main functions of the keywords, the table indicates whether or 
not their function is dependent on their collocation with personal pronouns. This 
dependence is semantic, not syntactic. That is, the keywords depend on pronouns not to 
make grammatical sense, but to carry out a particular function. 
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Some keywords are not dependent on personal pronouns, but do have their function 
modified by collocation with them. For all cases where this occurs a brief explanatory note 
is given as to how function is changed by collocation with personal pronouns. Functions are 
mapped to data type only where they are mainly or equally found there. 
Table 4.1 Summary of Comparative Keyword Analysis 
Keyword Characteristic 
Functions in 
Think Aloud 
Data 
Function Modified 
or Dependent on 
Collocation with 
Personal Pronouns? 
Characteristic 
Functions in 
Retrospective 
Interview Data 
Function Modified 
or Dependent on 
Collocation with 
Personal Pronouns? 
Looking 1. Indicating 
focus of 
attention 
2. Building 
consensus 
3. Indicating 
typicality 
 
1. No 
 
2. Yes 
 
3. Yes – 
generalises 
function 
1. Indicates focus 
of attention 
2. Indicating 
typicality 
 
1. Yes – 
generalises 
function 
2. Yes – 
generalises 
function 
 
Felt   1. Expressing 
evaluative 
judgment 
1.Yes – generalises 
function 
Know 1. Discourse 
marker 
2. Building 
consensus 
1. Yes 
2. Yes 
1. Discourse 
marker 
2. Checking 
understanding 
1. Yes 
2. Yes 
Maybe 1. Diminution 
2. Expressing 
uncertainty 
1. No 
2. No 
1. Diminution 
2. Expressing 
uncertainty 
3. Expressing 
hesitancy 
1. No 
2. Yes – indicates 
typicality 
3. No 
Suppose   1. Expressing 
hesitancy 
2. Discursive 
deliberation of case 
formulation 
1. Yes 
 
2. No 
Might 1. Expressing 
uncertainty 
1. No 1. Expressing 
uncertainty  
2. Expressing 
hesitancy 
1. Yes – indicates 
typicality 
2. No 
Think 1. Expressing 
uncertainty 
1. No 1. Expressing 
uncertainty 
2. Expressing 
hesitancy 
1. No 
 
2. No 
Could 1. Expressing 
uncertainty 
2. Indicating 
focus of attention 
1. No 
 
2. Yes – generalises 
and indicates 
typicality 
1. Expressing 
uncertainty, 
particularly in the 
context of 
contingency 
2. Indicating focus 
of attention 
1. No 
 
 
 
 
2. Yes – generalises 
and indicates 
typicality 
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Obviously 1. Indicating 
typicality in 
terms of both 
presentation and 
intervention 
2. Expressing 
certainty 
1. No 
 
 
 
2. No 
1. Indicating 
typicality in terms 
of both presentation 
and intervention 
1. No 
Just 1. Discourse 
marker 
1. No 1. Discourse 
marker 
2. Reduction of 
complexity by 
diminutive 
limitation  
1. No 
2. No 
If 1. Generalisation 
in terms of both 
presentation and 
intervention 
2. Setting out 
choice and/or 
contingency 
1. Yes 
 
 
 
2. Yes – indicates 
typicality 
1. Generalisation in 
terms of both 
presentation and 
intervention 
2. Setting out 
choice and/or 
contingency 
1. Yes 
 
 
 
2. Yes – indicates 
typicality 
Because   1. Thoughtful 
deliberation of case 
details 
1. No 
Then   1. Thoughtful 
deliberation of case 
details 
2. Denoting prompt 
intervention 
1. No 
2. No 
Even 1. Discursive 
deliberation of 
case formulation 
1. No 1. Indicating 
atypicality 
 
Will 1. Denoting 
imperative 
intervention, 
mainly involving 
curtailment of 
liberty/choice 
1. Yes – 
incorporates 
implicit consensus 
of researcher 
1. Denoting 
imperative 
intervention, 
mainly involving 
curtailment of 
liberty/choice 
1. No 
Mean 1. Discourse 
marker 
1. Yes 1. Discourse 
marker 
2. Marking 
elaboration 
3. Checking 
interviewer 
understanding of 
intricate 
explanations 
4. Prefacing & 
softening critical 
statements  
1. Yes 
2. Yes 
 
3. Yes 
 
 
 
4. Yes 
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These functions form the basis for conversation analysis-informed discursive analysis of 
the study corpus, discussed in Chapter Five. In conclusion here, I provide a brief overview 
of what these functions reveal about the data in terms of participant judgement and 
decision-making. This will be with reference to the evidence that has been shown to 
underpin them throughout this chapter. 
Based on the functions outlined in Table 4.1 above, the following features of the data are 
clearly discernable: 
• Participant reasoning 
• Expression of certainty & uncertainty 
• Contingency and choice 
4.4.1 Participant reasoning 
By participant reasoning I am making reference to how participants took time to consider 
various aspects of a case. This is apparent in the detail and length of the associated 
narrative. In think aloud data this is in-vivo, whereas in the retrospective interview data it 
involves a revisiting and reformulation of a judgement or decision. 
Comparative keyword analysis of the data shows that participants appear deliberative in 
their reasoning. Phrases such as “looking at” were used by participants’ to denote their 
attentiveness to and consideration of particular aspects of a case presentation. However, this 
contrasted with the relatively quick and unexpanded manner in which some judgements and 
decisions were delivered. 
Often in the think aloud data a complete judgement or decision prefaces a subsequent 
narrative giving explanatory details. These instances, evinced in particular by the use of the 
word “obviously”, give some insight regarding participant use of prior knowledge to 
interpret the information that they had attended to. Certain phrases, such as “looking at”, 
are particularly helpful in pointing towards participants’ reference to cues which they then 
linked to subsequent judgements or decisions. 
The word “obviously” was also used by participants in reference to fairly confident 
decisions made in a routinised manner. The work practices related to these decisions appear 
habitual and are carried out without much need for consideration. They are simply ‘the 
done thing’. 
As with “I felt”, the phrases “looking at” and “you’re looking / ‘re looking” are strongly 
associated with this approach, in particular in participants’ reference to case types in the 
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retrospective interview data. This, along with several other discursive features in the data, 
points towards participant reasoning as initially intuitive. Initial judgements and decisions 
were made with relative opacity, rapidity and with reference to the typical.  
Reference to typical and/or atypical cases does occur at times alongside expressions of 
uncertainty, although narratives also feature quite confident reference to typical cases, 
especially using the word “obviously”. The common thread that runs through participants’ 
use of these phrases is their pairing with pronouns, in particular the third person pronouns 
“we” and “they”. These pronouns also play a strong part in participant expression of their 
identity with their professional role (Lerner 1993), and there appears to be a link with 
participants’ description of the habitual, routine way in which they make judgements and 
decisions and their close identification with their work role. There also appears to be a link 
between the belongingness to a professional group that comes with such identification with 
role and quickness to view individuals as typically ‘other’. 
4.4.2 Expression of Certainty & Uncertainty 
Several keywords that are easily associated with certainty/uncertainty arose from the 
comparative keyword analysis of the study corpus. Some of these words and phrases are 
highly versatile and are also associated with other phenomena (e.g., language of 
diminution, discourse markers and establishing consensus with the researcher). Where 
words serve a function with regard to certainty/uncertainty, this tends to be either by way of 
marking hesitancy or expressing subjective uncertainty, or expressing subjective certainty.  
Hesitancy to engage in critique of practice is more evident in the retrospective interview 
data than hesitancy due to apparent cognitive uncertainty. However, participants make 
direct metacognitive references to uncertainty in the context of not knowing, and phrases 
containing words such as “maybe”, “think” and “know” make reference to cognitive as well 
as social phenomena. These words are used to express varying degrees of 
certainty/uncertainty.  
The word “obviously” has particular association with expressions of confidence and 
certainty. Other words associated with certainty/uncertainty include “if” and “because”, 
particularly with regard to participant expression of thoughtful deliberation regarding 
details of the case. This is apparent both from absence of expressions associated with 
uncertainty and direct, matter-of-fact expressions of inference using words such as 
“because”. 
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The subject of certainty/uncertainty is a microcosm of the wider complexity of the interplay 
between cognitive and social elements of participant judgement and decision-making. On 
analysis of what at first appeared to be mere uncertainty, it is plain that there were two 
distinct modes of expression of uncertainty evident in participants’ discourse. These are:  
1. Hesitancy - the expression of uncertainty linked to the context-based hesitancy to 
criticise others or to discuss the potential for error, and  
2. Uncertainty - the expression of subjective uncertainty, by way of metacognitive and 
other discursive markers. 
4.4.3 Contingency and choice  
Phrases which are used to talk about matters of contingency are also linked to the building 
of consensus. Contingency, consensus and choice are also related to participant discussion 
of uncertainty and reference to typical cases. As it comprises co-authored narratives (Ochs 
& Capps 1996), the study corpus features many instances of consensus building whereby 
participants seek the implicit consent of the researcher as they construct or reconstruct a 
case formulation (Fratilis & Sionis 2006).  
Think aloud data collection involved in-vivo case formulation, whereas the retrospective 
interviewing required participants to revisit their formulations of past cases. The seeking of 
consent and use of some words and phrases also associated with hesitancy and uncertainty 
(e.g., “I suppose”) demonstrate expression of tentativeness in this regard, whereas others 
are more expressive of subjective certainty (e.g., “obviously”). Participant narratives also 
provide insight into the process of building consensus with people using the mental health 
services, fellow nurses and other health professionals. Different values and perceptions 
appear to govern this process depending on the social group to which people are seen as 
belonging, with particular reference to what proposed as typical for members of these 
groups. 
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Chapter Five - Findings of  
Conversation Analysis-Informed Discursive Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the findings of analysis in terms of the main features that are seen 
to characterise the study corpus. These were derived from the preliminary discursive 
analysis of keywords generated by a comparative keyword analysis of the data, as outlined 
in Chapter Four. They are 
• Participant reasoning 
• Expression of certainty & uncertainty 
• Contingency & choice 
 
In Chapter Four the evidence that points towards these features as they characterise the 
study corpus was discussed. I now discuss each of these in turn with reference to 
conversation analysis-informed discursive analysis of the data. I use the principles of 
conversation analysis to afford a closer examination of the data than is possible using 
discursive analysis alone.  
As discussed in the methodology section, I use the Jefferson (2004) notation system to 
illustrate the salient features of the data for the main excerpts being used to illustrate points 
(see Appendix E). The purpose of this system of notation is to enable ease of reference to 
the salient points of interest in excerpts. Some ancillary excerpts are not annotated as they 
merely serve to illustrate points being made in support of the findings, and do not therefore 
require consideration of their interactional and prosodic features. For these excerpts I will 
use bold type to highlight words or phrases of interest. 
5.2 Participant Reasoning 
In Chapter Four, I described how preliminary discursive analysis based on a comparative 
keyword analysis shows certain words and phrases to be associated with participant 
reasoning. In this Chapter I detail what further analysis demonstrates regarding the same 
phenomena in terms of the overall discourse of participants’ narratives. In the section that 
follows I explain how in doing this I discovered a strong link between participants’ 
apparent use of intuition, their reference to typical cases, and also how this relates to their 
more deliberate consideration of the details of a case. 
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5.2.1 Intuition, Deliberate Consideration & Typicality 
By intuition, I refer to “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without 
much reflection” Kahneman (2003a, p697). The most obvious aspect of participant 
reasoning is the apparently intuitive way in which judgements and decisions are made. This 
was discovered on further exploration of the implict references of to certain case features 
and interventions as typical (as detailed in the previous chapter). 
The basing of intuitive judgement on what is perceived as typical is a topic which has been 
the focus of an increasing level of social psychology research over the last 15 years 
(Wegener et al 2006). Certain words and phrases that characterise the study corpus are 
indicative of participant reference to typical cases in terms of people and situations. 
Gaertner & McLaughlin (1983, p23) viewed this approach to judgement in terms of 
stereotyping.  
Gaertner & McLaughlin (1983) have cautioned researchers to avoid methodologies that 
purport to measure such intuitive strategies without accounting for participant reactivity to 
researchers’ probing. The methods of this study fulfil this criterion insofar as participant 
reference to typical cases can be seen at points in the data where neither researcher or 
participant were consciously or deliberately seeking to explore this phenomenon. The 
analysis detailed in Chapter Four demonstrated how participants’ discursive representation 
of typicality in the study corpus is linked to use of the following keywords (see Table 4.1, 
p123): 
• Looking 
• Maybe 
• Might 
• Could 
• Obviously 
• Even 
 
Participants use these keywords when talking about certain ‘types’ of individuals that they 
work with or interventions that they routinely carry out. Closer examination of the data 
using conversation analysis-informed discursive analysis reveals that these people tend to 
be discussed with reference to diagnostic categories. Where this is the case, participants 
make reference to prior knowledge regarding other individuals that they have encountered 
with a similar diagnosis.  
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Analysis also demonstrates that reference to typical cases is associated with participant 
expression of subjective certainty. This evidence builds on the link first made in the 
preliminary analysis between reference to typicality and expression of subjective certainty 
where participants use the keyword “obviously”. However, participant expression of 
subjective uncertainty was also linked with keywords which are associated with typicality.  
The expression of subjective certainty and uncertainty in the same narrative demonstrates 
the complexity of participants’ representation of their reasoning. The presence of markers 
of both certainty and uncertainty in the same narrative exemplifies participants’ expression 
of confidence about one aspect of a case amidst more general expressed uncertainty. This 
feature of the data is developed further in this chapter in the section on 
certainty/uncertainty. 
In discussing the main aspects of the evidence for participant reference to the typical, in 
particular how this can be seen to relate to use of prior knowledge, I refer to Case 4. In 
doing this I provide an in-depth illustration of how ‘types of people’ feature in participant 
talk. This is supplemented by section 5.2.1.2., which outlines in broader terms how 
participant consideration of all cases is illustrative of this way of using of prior knowledge. 
5.2.1.1 Types of people in the retrospective interview data: Case 4 as an example 
In the retrospective interview data, the phrase “they might be” is used to make general 
allusions about types of people. The important word here is “they”. In contrast to “he might 
be”, “she might be”, which are used in reference to specific individuals, “they might be” 
refers to types of individuals.  
These generalisations appear to represent a tendency, based on clinical experience, to refer 
to types of people (McCarthy 2003a, 2003b). The excerpt below demonstrates how the 
phrase “they might be” acts as a primary marker of this way of referring to people in 
participant discourse:  
1. P28 .hhh Well I supp*ose it’s, it’s just to see ah, you know (0.2) ah::, I: 
2. feel that sometimes when people are .h (0.4) aware that you’re comin’ the first  
3. time they might be puttin’ on the good front .hh (0.4) ehm (0.3) people tend to   
4. ehm .h (1) you know, they’re apprehensive, what your reasons is for calling  
5. .h (0.5) they tend to want to have the house tidy eh (0.5) .h you know and   
6.  they’re (0.5) they’re worryin’ what you’re going to ask them or (0.4) .h what  
7.  (0.1) your impression is going to be of them .h (0.4) and (.) sometimes they’re  
8. more at ease the second time and you get a truer picture of (0.4) of things rather  
9. than the first time because .h (0.5) well anybody if somebody’s comin’ to your  
10. house for the first time you’re .h (0.5) you might be a little bit apprehensive if,  
11. (.) you know you were wonderin’ why are they comin’ and .hh (0.5) what’s their  
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12.  (0.3) agenda and what are they going to tell me= 
13. IR:                      [“Right”           
14. P28 =and (0.5.)  
15. IR: [Right 
16. P28 .hh all that, so it usually the second time, y-you know the more you get to know  
17. people .hh (0.7) th-they kind of let down their guard a little bit and you kind  
18. of get to (.) to see a different side (.) o to things o.” 
19. IR:               [“Right” 
Participant 28, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Of primary interest in this excerpt is the generalisation performed by the personal pronouns 
“you” and “they”, particularly in the phrases “they might be” and “you might be”. Other 
phrases are associated with participant reference to the typicality of the case in a secondary 
manner, without using personal pronouns. However, as they are not statistically significant 
in terms of their frequency in the study corpus, their use cannot be said to be a 
characteristic of the study corpus.  
In the example above, these phrases are: 
• “sometimes when people” 
• “tend to” 
• “anybody if somebody’s” 
I discuss these before considering the role of other phrases in ascribing typicality. 
“Sometimes” is an adverb of frequency, followed here by “when”. This particular use of the 
simple present tense (adverb of frequency + when) is used in English to express “routine or 
habitual actions” (Thomson & Martinet 1986, p160). That routine, habitual actions are 
being referred to here is also obvious from the use, twice, of the word “tend”.  
Also directly indicative of discursive construction of the case as typical is the double 
occurrence of the irregular plural form of person - “people”. It is semantically equivalent to 
the third person plural pronoun, “they”. This equivalency of “people” and “they” as 
references to class or type can also be seen in the use of the phrase “they can’t”.  
This is not limited to consideration of Case 4. In the following excerpt from Case 3, for 
example, all occurrences of “they” and “people” (apart from a single italicised instance) 
referred to “people” who were “not sleeping at night”. In the first sentence P12 is talking 
about people who are “not sleeping at night”. In the second sentence, apparently to provide 
further illustration of their point, P12 narrowed their reference to a subset of this category, 
i.e., to people who “can’t sleep” and are resident in a unit with “13 or 14” other “people”: 
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•  “Well I mean like if people aren’t sleeping what happens is if they are not sleeping 
at night sometimes they are sleeping during the day. Mm, I mean in a unit, I know 
it’s different in a unit where there’s 13 or 14 people where they tend to get up every 
one else’s nose because they can’t sleep. And then they start getting irritated 
themselves during the day because they’re tired. They are tired but they can’t sleep 
so they start getting angry.” 
Participant 12, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In speech generally, “they” and “people” are representative of the typical in terms of the 
equivalency of both words in expressing regularity (Thomson & Martinet 1986, p79). This 
is seen in the semantic equation: “they say = people say, it is said”. Both “they” and 
“people” can be used in the most widely universal sense or to a very specific group of 
individuals, depending on context (Leech 1989).  
In the context of P28’s excerpt (given again below for ease of reference), both refer to 
people whom the nurse was visiting at home for “the first time”. P28 is a community-based 
registered psychiatric nurse with over 10 years of experience, working in a clinical nurse 
specialist role. 
1. P28: .hhh Well I supp*ose it’s, it’s just to see ah, you know (0.2) ah::, I: 
2.  feel that sometimes when people are .h (0.4) aware that you’re comin’ the first  
3.  time they might be puttin’ on the good front .h (0.4) ehm (0.3) people tend to   
4.  ehm .h (1) you know, they’re apprehensive, what your reasons is for calling  
5.  .h (0.5) they tend to want to have the house tidy eh (0.5) .hh you know and   
6.  they’re (0.5) they’re worryin’ what you’re going to ask them or (0.4) .h what  
7.  (0.1) your impression is going to be of them .h  
 
The pauses in P28’s delivery coupled with slight inspirations serve to delineate the distinct 
elements in the narrative. The start of the utterance (line 1) serves as an immediate response 
to the researcher’s question, perhaps allowing P28 time to gather his/her thoughts (Clark & 
Clark 1977). The inspiration and raised pitch here (line 1) are markers of initiality, 
indicating the start of P28’s turn (Bolinger 1989, Hutchby & Wooffitt 2008).  
Following the first pause (line 1), P28 makes an introductory statement (line 2) followed by 
a 0.4 second pause and slight inspiration. P28 then delivers the narrative, point by point, 
punctuating points with brief pauses and inspirations, stressing words that convey the 
salient elements of each point. The pauses here are stalls, which are thought to indicate a 
speaker’s planning of their next utterance (Clark & Clark 1977). Specifically, this is 
thought to involve processing of content to ensure it is error-free (Hieke 1981, Kahneman 
2003).  
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This seems to point towards thoughtful consideration of the case following on from an 
initial more intuitive judgement (Wegener et al 2006). The thoughtfully applied points of 
information stemming from the introductory “people are” are as follows: 
• People put “on the good front” on a first visit (lines 2 and 3) 
• People are “apprehensive” regarding the nurse’s “reasons … for calling” (line 4) 
• People “tend to want to have the house tidy” (line 5) 
• People worry about “what you’re going to ask them” (line 6) 
• People worry about what the nurse’s “impression is going to be of them” 
The “people” reference here is to individuals on the community nurse’s caseload, whom 
they were visiting at home for “the first time” and who were “aware” of the impending 
visit. Drawing on my own knowledge and experience of community mental health services, 
I can verify that this is not in reference to a special subtype of visit. This is because it is 
standard practice that community mental health nurses pre-arrange domiciliary visits. This 
is also evident in the think aloud data from other participants for the same case, e.g., 
•  “Ok, I’d pick up the phone and ring her, just find out what’s going on, does she 
need any help, does she want a home visit” 
Participant 37, Case 4, Think Aloud 
In my experience, the sole exception to this would be where contact could not be made and 
there was a concern about the individuals’ well-being, which would be unusual and not 
routine. This is also evident from the data from other participants considering Case 4, e.g., 
•  “If I don’t get him today now, see I was away all week on holidays so if I don’t get 
him today I’ll have to contact his community nurse again to go out and make a 
home visit and if he isn’t willing to engage you have to discharge.  You give him a 
long time, you give him a couple of weeks before you take that action but because 
you’ve so many waiting to come in that are actually urgent, you know if someone 
doesn’t want to engage with us, we can’t do anything really.” 
Participant 2, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
P28 reports that “people” being visited at home for the first time are typically apprehensive, 
worried and concerned about what the nurse will think of them. Expanding on this, P28 
goes on to talk about the second home visit: 
7.  (0.1) your impression is going to be of them .h (0.4) and (.) sometimes they’re  
8. more at ease the second time and you get a truer picture of (0.4) of things rather  
9.  than the first time because .h (0.5) well anybody if somebody’s comin’ to your  
10. house for the first time you’re .h (0.5) you might be a little bit apprehensive if,  
11. (.) you know you were wonderin’ why are they comin’ and .hh (0.5) what’s their  
12.  (0.3) agenda and what are they going to tell me=  
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13. IR:                        [Right          
14. =and (0.5.)  
15. IR:  [Right 
16.  .hh all that, so it usually the second time, y-you know the more you get to know 17. 
 people .hh (0.7) th-they kind of let down their guard a little bit and you kind 18.
 of get to (.) to see a different side (.) o to things o.” 
19. IR:             [Right 
Participant 28, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Here the wider population is appealed to, with emphasis on “anybody” (line 9) and the 
person’s reaction to the visit is thus normalised. The repeated referral to the visit as a first-
time (lines 2/3, 9 & 10) domiciliary visit built the picture of an awkward social situation 
that was not conducive to psychiatric assessment. The second visit (lines 8 and 16) is 
characterised by the person being more at ease (line 8) and letting their guard down a little 
bit (line 17), which enabled the nurse to see a different side to things (line 18) and get a 
truer picture (line 8).  
The drift downwards in pitch and volume seen in line 18 is associated with the ending of an 
utterance rather than having any peculiar salience regarding the content (Cooper & 
Sorenson 1981, Bolinger 1989). However, the emphasis and rising of pitch in line 17 serves 
to indicate the importance associated with people letting their guard down, albeit with some 
degree of tentativeness (Bolinger 1989). Overall in this home visitation narrative, P28 
attributes causality more so to the awkward social situation that both parties found 
themselves in than to any peculiar personal traits of the individuals being visited. This is 
underlined by the comment:  
9.  than the first time because .h (0.5) well anybody if somebody’s comin’ to your  
10. house for the first time you’re .h (0.5) you might be a little bit apprehensive if,  
11. (.) you know you were wonderin’ why are they comin’ and .h (0.5) what’s their  
12.  (0.3) agenda and what are they going to tell me  
 
With this comment P28 normalises the person’s anxieties around the home visit as being 
what might be expected from anybody in that situation (line 9). Also, P28’s use of the first 
person situates the narrative from the service-user’s perspective (line 12) and is indicative 
of some degree of empathic identification with the individuals involved in this situation. 
However, despite apparent parity between speaker and subject being evident in this 
normalisation, the narrative is firmly situated in the context of the professional-layperson 
relationship.  
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If knowledge itself is power, power here resides firmly with P28. It would appear that as an 
experienced specialist mental health professional P28 comes to this situation with the prior 
knowledge that:  
• People’s anxieties around a first home visit are not necessarily indicative of 
psychopathology and normally recede over time  
• A full assessment is not usually achievable on a first visit because of this 
• Further visits are needed for a “truer picture” to emerge 
These considerations are part of the professional business of getting to know people (line 
16) beyond first impressions and seeing a different side to them (line 18). This is a business 
in which knowledge-based power and control are firmly in the hands of the nurse as an 
experienced specialist. As such, their judgements and decisions and the power to make 
them takes precedence over those of the service-user. In saying this I make no value 
judgement, but emphasise that the parity expressed in the empathic/normalising functions 
of the narrative do not appear to affect the exercising of professional power and control as 
part of the nursing role.  
In my experience, assessment is the essential function of the home visit, and this can also 
be seen in the think aloud data for Case 4 from across participants, e.g., 
• “…make a home visit to see how she’s doing and to speak with her husband and see 
how he feels…” 
Participant 26, Case 4, Think Aloud 
• “As a community nurse I would be checking up, I would be doing a house visit, go 
out and see what’s going on out there. Sometimes from a community perspective 
you get a better idea how a person is functioning in the home setting. You can see 
what’s going on.” 
Participant 25, Case 4, Think Aloud 
P28’s narrative shows how expectations of what is typical for normative first and 
subsequent home visits aided their clinical judgement and decision-making by ensuring that 
there was not an over-reliance on first impressions. This was based on their habitual 
acceptance that assessment judgements are formed over time as a relationship develops in 
which people become more amenable to assessment. By implication, someone remaining 
guarded (line 17) after several visits would no longer be responding in a way that might be 
expected by “anybody” (line 9) and would therefore constitute an atypical presentation. 
This back-to-back relationship between typicality and atypicality has already been 
demonstrated in the preliminary analysis described in Chapter Four.  
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5.2.1.2 Use of prior knowledge in the retrospective interview data 
In the retrospective interview data, references to prior knowledge are organised within the 
context of diagnostic categories. Having used Case 4 in the previous section to consider 
participant talk concerning ‘types of people’, I will use all cases (1, 2, 3 & 4) to discuss 
participant use of prior knowledge, which is characterised by reference to diagnostic 
categories. I will also show how, across these cases, the use of diagnostic categories by 
participants differs from their use by psychiatrists in their roles as diagnosticians.  
This feature appears mainly in the retrospective interview data where participants were 
asked to discuss cases that they had recently encountered. As diagnostic labels were given 
in the case information provided to participants, I cannot make valid claims for spontaneous 
participant use of diagnostic categories in the think aloud data. In the excerpt below there 
was equivalency between “them”/“they” and “people”. 
1.   P38:  >What d’y’think with, I s’pose I s’pose the< th’easiest way t’explain it is  
2. (1) what is no:r:mal (0.7) you know it’s not normal for people (0.6) to kind 
3.  of isolatin themselves and withdrawin from (0.9) >from, from< other  
4.  IR:                  [mm 
5.   people and not havin’ any interaction with people and(0.6) and you know  
      6. IR:                  [mm 
      7.   (1.3) them (.) the-the- (0.5) >them there< people are (0.4) depressed, or  
      8.  else (0.6) if they’re sufferin with schizophrenia >or som’nl’that< 
      9.   ((something like that)) that (0.9) >it’s just that it’s that it’s the schizo-< 
      10.  schizophrenia’s that’s causing them to (0.5), you know that they can’t  
      11. IR:            [mm    
      12.  (0.5) mix with people, that they’re paranoid or suspicious you know? (0.9)  
      13. IR:              [mm 
      14.  And >it’s it’s it’s a< different kind of a (0.5) thing but >people with then  
      15. IR:              [mm 
      16.  with< depression (1) it would be too quick for them t:o (0.6) have  
      17.                          [mm  
      18. recovered >within<, you know within a few days.” 
Participant 38, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The centrality in the narrative of P38’s statement regarding normality is underlined by their 
emphasis and elongation of the word “normal” (line 2) and the bracketing of the word by 
pauses of a second and 0.7 seconds. Reference to people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
or depression is made throughout by the use of “they”/”them”. The stalls in delivery of the 
narrative after the central theme of normality/abnormality is introduced are indicative of 
thoughtful consideration (Clark & Clark 1977, Hieke 1981, Wegener et al 2006). 
Individuals with schizophrenia are represented as distinct from those who are diagnosed 
with depression, but both were organised discursively as the type of “people” (lines 2, 5 
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and 13) who isolate themselves and withdraw socially (line 3). This group mainly 
comprises people with depression (line 7), but people with schizophrenia are also found 
here albeit with differences in other areas of their presentation. The organising principle 
around which all of centres is, “what is normal”. 
In the narrative, diagnostic categories serve as an aid to explaining why people behave in a 
certain way and to aid prognosis for such behaviour in terms of recovery (lines 15 and 17). 
This inverts the medical organisation of diagnostic models in psychiatry, whereby category-
based diagnosis is served by behavioural indicators. This discursive use of diagnostic 
categories appears to be shaped by the focus of P38’s role in working with people in terms 
of their behavioural problems. 
In the excerpt below where P39 recalls a case resembling Case 1, there is the equivalent use 
of “they” and “people”: 
1. IR:  And was she your typical case? (0.6) Or this was this was a totally sep- 
2. P39:               [E:::h:::mmm  
3.  (0.6) She wa:sn’t really no, because you don’t see many, ehm (1) you don’t see  
4.  many people with (0.1) >j- eh=just< (0.3) pure anxiety, y’know what I  
5.  mean?=Even though her mood was low it was kind of her anxiety that was 
6.  causing her to be low, and you don’t see many OCD or anything like that in  
7. hospitals anymore, it’s mostly people .h that would attend the clinics, that would  
8.  be out in the the community and >that kind of thing< (0.2) .hh So she wa:sn’t  
9.  really a typical case (0.2) .hh but saying that, anxiety management and >stuff  
10.  like that< would be >something that< could benefit an awful lot of people, be they  
11.  IR:             [mm 
12. depressed or be they anxious or y’know, even someone that (0.3) that’s (.) ehmm 
13. (0.2) .hh you know, i-i- in the acute stages of mania it’s not somethin’ that’s  
14. beneficial, but (.) as as thei:r (.) their condition is improving it is certainly  
15. something that a lot of people could use.” 
* Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
 Participant 39, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The example above deals with the common combination of anxiety and depression where 
both appear to be of equivalent severity, although more often one or the other predominates 
(Gelder et al 2005). As already seen in Chapter Four, “even though” is used here as a 
contrastive device (line 5), indicating that a typical case in this instance would involve low 
mood with a less predominant anxiety component. Stress on the word “low” (line 5) serves 
to indicate its salience. The atypical aspect of the case presented here lies in the presence of 
a strong anxiety component along with low mood.  
In line 4, stress on the word “anxiety” and the hesitancy phenomena that precede its 
utterance are indications of thoughtful attribution of “pure anxiety”. The ensuing talk 
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around anxiety management is a departure from the initial case presentation, as indicated by 
the summing up (lines 8 and 9) of the description of the case. The hesitancy phenomena 
(elongation, pauses and inspiration) indicate thought about fresh content (Clark & Clark 
1977, Hieke 1981), in this case around anxiety management and its application to other 
cases.  
The use of “even though” as a contrastive device can also be seen in the excerpt below. 
Here the typical presentation seems to be that people who experience low mood recognise 
this as problematic, seek help and are not averse to coming into hospital for treatment if 
needs be. This is derived from the atypical case, presented here, of someone for whom 
anxiety symptoms predominate, who refuses hospital treatment and appears to be 
preoccupied with their physical ill health.  
1. P22: She presented (.) eh::hm (1.5) kind of passive death wish, eh::h you know, said,  
2.  >y’know this kind of thing< I’d be better off dead. (1.6) She was referred to (0.2)  
3. IR:                 [mhm  
4. P22: =our own <services> (.) e:hmm (0.7) here, in [name of town admitted]. (0.5) She  
5. was eh assessed, that was all fine. Refused (.) to come in for admission, even  
6. thou:gh, y’know=>we< as we would have seen it her mood, would ha’been  
7. quite low (0.7) but she >jus’ wasn’ willing to admit this herself like y’know<  
8. everything revolved around the physical problems that she was havin’ 
Participant 22, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
This example differs from the others considered so far in that there is an absence of the 
generalisation function performed by “they” and “people”. Instead, the contrastive function 
of “even though” (lines 5/6) and use of the general symptomological phrases “passive death 
wish” (line 1) and “mood” (line 6) along with the phrase “this kind of thing” (line 2) point 
towards presentation of a typical case. As with the other examples given so far, hesitancy 
phenomena such as stalls (lines 1, 2, 4 and 7) and filled pauses (lines 1, 4) indicate 
thoughtful consideration of the case.  
The phrase “would be very” is not alone in marking expression of typicality in the study 
corpus, and other phrases such as “they might be” and “if you” commonly operate in this 
way. The key words in these phrases are “if”, “might”, and “would” as markers of 
contingency. However, “would” appeared a great deal in the study corpus (6,047 times, 
representing 1.17% of the entire corpus) and is not always associated with reference to the 
typical. Its collocation with certain words (in this instance “very”) is the best indicator, 
therefore, of its use to talk about such cases. 
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This use of “would be very” in the study corpus to talk about typicality of cases is often in 
the sense that, “in the case of x, y would be very similar … difficult … apparent” (as in the 
example below). Diagnostic categories are almost always referred to in such instances. The 
distinguishing feature that points towards talk of typical cases here is the word “would” as 
an expression of characteristic action (Thomson & Martinet 1986) collocated with the 
adverb of degree, “very”. 
1. P9: With Karen there like, if she’s cle:arly unwell that would be ve:ry ve:ry ve:ry  
2.  apparent very quickly. She’s not able to cover it up. She’s not able to mask it.= 
3. IR:               [mm 
4. P9:  =She’s not able to keep it from me. (0.3) And there’s been plenty o’ Karens=  
5. IR:               [Yeh, yeh 
6. P9: =who I’ve walked into, situations like that, quite apparent. So therefore you= 
7. IR:      [Yeh        [.hYeh 
8. P9: =maybe skippin’ three or four parts within your normal process of tryin’ to .hh  
9. bring Karen back to (.) y’know where she was, and >wh’t< I always call baseline 
10. >functioning<. .h Baseline function is when a person is at their best (0.5) so then=   
11. IR:          [mmhm 
12. P9: =you know then (.) dependin’ (.) on what type diagnosis they have. (0.2) If it’s a  
13. mood disorder like y’know they’re gonna drop down below that in terms of their  
14. mood like. .h If it’s: eh bipolar it’s >either going to go up or down like< =which  
15. y’know. If it’s a schizophrenic >phr-< (0.2) >kiz=schizophrenic=type< illness=  
16. IR: [uhuh 
17. P9: =they can really, really .hh y’know (0.5) h:have=eh really (.) very difficult (.)  
18. impact on somebody’s ability just to function from day to day like you know. 
Participant 9, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In this excerpt, P9 recalls a case similar to Case 1 and in doing so makes reference to the 
fictional “Karen” from this case as typical insofar as she presented as: 
• Clearly unwell (line 1) 
• Easily recognisable as unwell (lines 2, 4, 6) 
• A fairly common type of presentation (line 4) 
The process of engaging with someone like “Karen”, according to P9, involves bringing 
them back to their best level of functioning. This is diagnosis-dependent, and P9’s outline 
of three different types of cases seems to point towards the typical as diagnosis-related.  
The common feature running through all of the types of cases mentioned is the ease with 
which the salient characteristics can be identified. This was the main message of P9’s 
opening statement, with stress on “cle:arly” and “ve:ry ve:ry ve:ry” (line 1) giving 
prominence to the idea of ease of recognition. To this is added the speed of recognition 
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(line 2) and more stress on the fact that she is “not” able to hide her condition. The subtext 
of this description of rapid recognition is P9’s construction of his/her own expertise.  
From the outset, P9’s construction of expertise is closely linked to their narrative on the 
ease of recognising that someone is unwell - their opening utterance concluding with the 
statement that “Karen” is not able to cover up or mask their condition (line 2) because she 
is “not able to keep it from me” (line 4). P9 goes on to mention the “plenty o’ Karens 
who I’ve walked into” (lines 4/6). Rapid recognition of a typical case and discursive 
construction of expertise also go hand in hand in P9’s description of their use of the concept 
of baseline functioning (lines 9/10).  
The “I always call” attribution of baseline functioning is followed by a definition which is 
delivered in the prosodic style of a textbook definition, “Baseline function is”. This concept 
is then linked to diagnostic categories, with diagnosis determining the cardinal features on 
which to judge baseline functioning. P9 engages in self repair (Schegloff et al 1977, Fox et 
al 1996) in line 15 after initially introducing the topic of baseline functioning as it applies to 
“a schizophrenic”.  
Even though P9 initially pronounces “a schizophrenic” perfectly, they very quickly move to 
repair their labelling with two rapid bursts of mispronunciation divided by a 0.2 second 
pause, followed immediately by the more politically correct “schizophrenic illness”. Such 
self-correcting repair in utterances that can be seen as inappropriate is a complex but 
common discursive task (Pomerantz 1992). In terms of such a task, the label 
“schizophrenic” constitutes the repairable trouble source, its mispronounced repeat the 
repair initiation, and the corrected “schizophrenic illness” the repairing segment (Rieger 
2003). Despite using diagnostic categories as the basis for making quick judgements about 
baseline functioning, using them to discureively categorise the person as opposed to their 
“illness” is obviously seen as troublesome.  
Such features of the data give considerable insight into participant’s discursive construction 
of phenomena such as expertise. However, a limitation of this study, its data and methods 
of analysis is that only the construction of such features is amenable to meaningful analysis 
(Edwards & Potter 1992a). The evidence here points clearly to participant construction of 
expertise, and cannot be demonstrated to point towards participant expertise per se. As well 
as being of relevance with regard to the relationship between participant confidence, 
subjective certainty and uncertainty (explored further in Chapter Six), it is also important 
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from a methodological perspective, in terms of what does, and does not, constitute evidence 
of expertise. 
Whereas the use of “would be very” as illustrated above demonstrates participant use of 
domain specific knowledge (Boshuizen & Schmidt 1992), the following examples show a 
similar strategy that draws on prior knowledge of an individual’s typical behaviour or 
condition. Such “pre-encounter data” has already been recognised as a key element in 
nurses’ judgement and decision-making (Crow et al 1995, O’Neill et al 2005, p71). The 
following examples from the study corpus show reference to such knowledge marked by 
“would be very”.  
In this phrase, the word “would” is the primary marker of reference to typical cases, as 
illustrated clearly in the first example below. Indirect reference to prior knowledge takes 
the form of the use of the words “normal” and “normally”. The key difference in this 
example, however, is reference to what is typical on the basis of personal social pre-
encounter knowledge rather than diagnostic categories. 
1. P20: hhhh The family were very distressed by it (.) a:nd i-now the normal  
2. family is that they would have dinner at a certain time (0.1) and >it’d=be=a< kind  
3.  of normal family to go=into. This was that they had to bring: two of the other  
4.  brothers were in the house which normally wouldn’t be, so I come in to find all  
5.  the family are there. (0.4) Ehm, they’re looking at their mother in=a chair who’s= 
6. IR:             [mhm  
7. P20: =just (.) behaving very inappropriately. (0.3) .h=Eh=f- i-ehh- It’s her mental  
8.  distress really herself (0.4) eh in a=lot=of anguish (0.3) I mean ehm, (0.5) so  
9.  therefore and not sleeping at night, disturbing the others (0.2) and (0.1) one son  
10.  who >kind=of:=i-< would be very disturbed by that (0.3) which actually would  
11.  mean he would, might: >eh=require an admission< (0.4) So: it really would mean  
12. that in order for, (0.2) that >the=mother would need=to be< definitely taken >out  
13. of the house< (0.2) so=that (0.6) things could >kind=of< (0.4) >y’know<  
14. function, >like=tha’the< others would >be=able to< kind of get on better (0.3)   
15. together. It was causing a=lot of stress and tension in the house.” 
Participant 20, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In this discussion of a case similar to Case 3 (“John”), P20 begins the utterance by noting 
how very distressed the family were. She then goes onto describe how she knew this by 
comparison to the reference points of that family both normally (lines 1 and 2) and as a 
“normal family” (line 3). There is reference here to two ways in which the family are 
typical.  
P20 initially refers to how this family normally present (lines 1 and 2) before, after a brief 
pause relating that this is a normal family (line 3). So as well as representing them as a 
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typical family, P20 represents them as being typically themselves. As a typical family, P20 
represents them as meeting expectations in terms of societal norms. Because they are 
typically themselves, the family meet these expectations based on P20’s pre-encounter 
knowledge of them.  
P20 then goes on to explain that all of the family were in the house (line 5), with particular 
reference to two of the brothers who would not normally be there (line 4). The presence of 
the family is the main feature described as having alerted P20 to the unusualness of the 
situation (line 4) and after a brief pause, she identifies their mother’s condition as the cause 
of the gathering (line 5/7). 
Line 7 sees a topic shift from the unusual nature of the family being gathered in the house 
to the mother’s condition that is the focus of their gathering. The pause following the 
conclusion of the previous utterance (line 7) and filled pause marking the start of the new 
utterance (line 7) both act as segmentation markers to signal this shift (Bestgen 1998). 
However, the new topic of the mother’s mental distress is considered firmly against the 
background of family life. Following the topic shift, P20 begins to unpack the mother’s 
mental distress (lines 8 and 9). The use of pauses and stress on words can be seen to break 
this down as follows: 
• She was in a lot of anguish 
• She was not sleeping which was disturbing the other family members 
Having got this far, P20 begins to recontextualise the mother’s mental distress in terms of 
its impact on the family (lines 9 and 10). This subtle second topic shift comes after P20 
relates how the mother was disturbing the others (line 9). After a pause, the conjunction 
“and” is used, and P20 pauses again before narrowing the focus from the others to one son 
in particular (line 9). Some hesitancy phenomena also mark this shift as the narrative 
proceeds (line 10). Once recontextualised to the original subject matter of the discourse, the 
account considers the disruption that the mother’s mental distress brought to the normal 
functioning of the family.  
The main point of this recontextualisation, and indeed the message being related in this 
excerpt, is that the mother needed to be taken out of the house (lines 12 and 13). This is 
emphasised not only by its bracketing with pauses and the speed of its delivery, but by the 
relatively slower delivery of the words “definitely taken” (line 12). This communicates 
subjective certainty on P20’s part, given the disruption of normal family life, that the right 
decision had been made.  
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The aspects of normal family life that were disrupted due to the ongoing presence of the 
mother in her mental distress, according to P20, and therefore effectively formed the basis 
for her move from the house were: 
• Familial distress (line 1) 
• Disruption of sleep (line 9) 
• Disturbing of one son to the extent that he might have become unwell himself (lines 
9, 10 and 11) 
• Family members not getting on well together (line 14) 
• Familial stress and tension (line 15) 
Although the mother’s own distress and anguish are mentioned (line 8), the main 
motivation for action here is plainly the disruption of the typical picture, derived from pre-
encounter data, of this family’s normal functioning as a normal family.  
In the example below from P31’s consideration of a case similar to Case 2 (“Noel”), they 
refer to “an alcoholic”. The work of generalisation regarding this category is initially 
performed by the pronoun “they”. It operates here as a subject pronoun (Thomson & 
Martinet 1986), its subject being that of the typical case – a person going through alcohol 
withdrawal, with concomitant problems involving physical health and living conditions.  
1. P31: Well he said that he’d been drinkin’ about you know ah about=  
2. >I=think=it=was< (0.5) ten to fourteen pints a day (0.5) and (0.4)  
3. IR:           [o m o   
4. P31: that=eh=he=w- (0.5) I think he had gotten a (0.2) >he’d=he’d< been, he’d  
5.  been doin’ really well (0.6) because he was an >al=he=he=w=rec=he< said he  
6. was an alcoholic, which was really a big thing, you know ehm and ehm it’s=  
7. IR:     [yeah      [mm   
8. P31: =always a great (1.1) I know it’s not a great thing to hear, but it’s a thing that >it< 
9. IR:           [yeah 
10.P31: it gives you mo:re (.) leeway, because they recognise they have a problem (0.4) 
11. IR:              [mhm 
12. P31: right there, so you’re not goin=ta (0.2) the person who says I don’t have a  
13.   problem, there’s nothin’ wrong with me, I just had a bad night out ‘n’ that kinda  
14. IR:            [yeah   [yeah 
15. P31: stuff (0.4) I had a bad pint (0.2) ‘tis another thing, y’know. (0.1) So uhm (1) this 
16.    (.) this=guy recognised (0.2) and he’d been doin’ really well (0.3) he’d been in  
17.    a couple o’ the ehm (0.6) the centres (0.5) a couple o’ years ago, he’d been  
18. IR:           [o m o 
19. P31: clean=n=sober for couple of years and he’d gotten into ehm (0.5) a (.)  
20.    relationship and, the relationship had, (0.4) not worked out (0.8) and he (0.4)  
21.    just, you know, (0.2) kinda, (0.3) lost the run of himself and went back  
22.    drinkin’ (.) and lost all his kind of, (0.7) the things >he w- he w- he was< he 23.
    was doin’ so well at, (0.6) which is really=n-normal for an alcoholic, it’s  
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24.    kind=of=the life cycle, (0.6) you know there’s always dips (0.5) in the road   
25. IR:        [o m o 
26. P31:  where they don’t do well and they come through, >y’know< they’re in kinduva  
27.    (.) alcoholic crisis almost. (0.4) And=so, (0.7) with him that was what  
28. IR:     [right     
29. P31:  happened (0.4) and he >so, so he, so< I asked him how many (0.2) >be=hon- 
30.    how=many< pints he was drinkin’, ehm (0.4) when his last drink was (0.4)  
31.    ehm (0.3) what he was drinkin’ (0.3) >y’know< sometimes (0.4) the spirits are a  
32. IR:              [o m o 
33. P31:  bit (.) h:arder (0.3) on the body than, than like, the beer, the beer is (0.3) ehm  
34.    (0.9) you know ehm (1) any medical problems as well because if you have an  
35.    alcoholic, (0.2) you’re dealing with (0.5) >a=lo’=of< medical problems like  
36.     ehm (0.2) >t’t< (0.3) hypertension anyway (0.6) from (.) th’alcohol over the  
37.    ye:ars, (0.3) ah you’re dealing with like a dysfunctional liver, (0.5) yeah=so  
38. IR:                   [o m o 
39. P31:  there’s medical problems around that. (0.4) You know they’ll have, sometimes  
40. IR:         [o right o 
41. P31:  they’ll have, I mean I know it’s not (0.2) with (0.2) alcohol that they’ll have  
42.   asthma, things like that , (0.2) so sometimes they’re living rough, and things  
43. IR:            [mhm     
44. P31: (0.4) >you know like< (0.3) this ehm (.) gentleman here (0.7) if you’re living  
45.    rough you tend to be more prone to kind of (0.4) flus and bronchitis=so  
46.  physically (0.8) you’re not doin’ well, (0.8) overall no ma- apart from being in  
47.  detox as well,           so. 
48. IR:   [right 
Participant 31, Case 2, JDM PiP Interview 
 
P31 initially discusses the individual in terms of his presentation. The main points are 
delivered bracketed by silent pauses (line 2) and filled pauses (lines 5 and 6). They also 
feature metacognitive disclaimers (lines 2 and 4) with regard to P31’s certainty (line 2). 
These main points were that the man: 
• Was drinking ten to fourteen pints a day 
• Had described himself as an “alcoholic” 
The pauses, filled and silent, serve to bracket out and highlight the man’s self-description 
and his level of intake as salient points of the case description. The metacognitive 
disclaimers, one delivered rapidly (line 2) and the other bracketed with pauses and marked 
out with a raise in pitch (line 4) are most likely to indicate P31’s attempts at recall of these 
points (Edwards & Potter 1992). Again, as with P28, this appears to indicate thoughtful 
consideration of the case following on from the initial rapid recognition of its base elements 
(Wegener et al 2006). 
What is being considered here, however, is the verbal and paraverbal representation of a 
complex cognitive activity and not a matter of an either/or choice between thoughtful 
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consideration versus continued intuitive handling of the case. This is evident in the self 
repair (Schegloff et al 1977, Fox et al 1996) performed by P31 following their attribution of 
the man’s description of himself as an “alcoholic” as something that’s really “great” (line 
8). What appears to be occurring here is not so much the attempted resistance of negative 
automatic thoughts (Nelson et al 1996) as a rethinking of choice of words.  
The source of the trouble in P31’s talk here is their ascription of the adjective “great” to the 
man’s self-description as “alcoholic”. That this is troublesome is apparent in the 1.1 second 
silence following the utterance of the adjective. Repair is immediately initiated with the 
statement “I know its not a great thing to hear” with emphasis on “great”.  
Unlike P9’s self repair (see p.140), P31’s self-correcting repair segment involves explicit 
and deliberate justification of their use of terminology. This involves reference to 
expectations of certain typical features from people with alcohol dependence (lines 10 to 
15) and their recognition of this as a problem. This is subsequently applied to the case at 
hand (line 16).  
Up until this point reference had been to an individual, using the personal pronoun “he” 
(lines 1 to 5), with use of the personal pronoun “I” by P31 in self reference. In line 10 there 
is a switch to the subject pronoun “they”, as well as a switch from P31’s self-referring “I” 
to “you” in reference to nurses generally. This generalisation shifts the focus from 
particular individuals to the typical, whereby P31 relates her experiences of how people 
with alcohol problems generally describe those problems (lines 12 to 15).  
The best case scenario, which justifies the “great” descriptor, is where the person 
recognises that they have a problem (line 10), thus giving the nurse more leeway with them. 
Alternatives to this, which are by inference not so great, are people saying: 
• I don’t have a problem (lines 12/13) 
• there’s nothing wrong with me (line 13) 
• I just had a bad night out (line 13) 
• I had a bad pint (line 15) 
Use of the personal pronouns “I” and “me” in lines 12 to 15 gives the effect of reported 
direct speech. There is subtle discursive construction here of experience by reference to 
utterances that had actually been heard by P31. This, added to the relative smoothness of 
delivery of the examples (only the concluding one is bracketed by pauses – line 15), serves 
to demonstrate the ease with which P31 can recall exemplars.  
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This gives the impression of a wealth and recency of experience in this regard and is an 
example of the paraverbal construction of expertise. Therefore, P31 justifies their 
attribution of “great” to the man’s self-description as an “alcoholic” by drawing on their 
apparent expertise and experience to give examples of cases that are not so “great” by merit 
of their failure to recognise that they have a problem. P31’s narrative construction of 
professional expertise permits them to view someone’s self description as “alcoholic” as a 
good thing, even though generally this is not a good thing to hear. It is precisely the context 
of expert engagement with so many people in this position who do not recognise that they 
have a problem, that a self description of “alcoholic” can actually be “great”. 
It is not my contention here that P31 deliberately purposed to use her supposed expertise as 
repair for a verbal slip. What is evident here again is participants’ discursive construction of 
expertise. Whilst not proof of actual expertise, it does have a bearing on participants’ 
perception of their own expertise, which is an important factor in the relationship between 
overconfidence, certainty and uncertainty. This is explored fully in Chapter Six. 
Next, the subject matter of the typical case is applied specifically to the case at hand - 
unlike others, “this guy” (line 16) recognised his problem and consequently did “really 
well”. More salient points of the individual case are then related, again pauses and stress on 
certain words identify the separate salient points – the man: 
• Attended some treatment centres (line 17) 
• Was clean and sober for two years (line 19) 
• Was involved in a relationship (lines 19/20) 
o that did not work out (line 20) 
• Lost the run of himself and went back drinking (lines 21/22) 
• Lost all the things he was doing so well at (lines 22/23) 
P31’s careful construction of the narrative is evident from hesitancy phenomena such as 
silent pauses throughout, filled pauses (line 19 and 22), and stress on words to lend 
prominence to certain important aspects of the case (“centres” in line 17, “relationship” in 
line 20 and “lost” in lines 21 and 22). After these details are imparted, P31 reverts to 
reference to the typical (line 23). The purpose of this is to relate that the cycle represented 
in the narrative is typical of what always happens - doing really well (lines 16 to 20), 
something not working out (line 20) and subsequent loss of doing well and return to 
drinking (lines 21 to 23), are “normal for an alcoholic” (line 23).  
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The descriptor “alcoholic crisis” (line 27) was applied to the central crisis of the cycle. The 
application of this term was tentative, as evident from the diminutive qualifiers (Skelton & 
Hobbs 1999) “kinduva” (line 26) and “almost” (line 27). Whereas P31 used the subject 
pronoun “they” to refer to the general population of alcoholics to whom this applies, the 
personal pronoun “him” was used to apply expectations of the typical to the individual (line 
27).  
P31’s recall of their assessment interview with the individual (line 29) serves as a context 
for consideration of some of the important features of alcoholism that generally need to be 
assessed: 
• How many pints are being drunk (line 30) 
• When the last drink was (line 30) 
• What is being drunk (line 31) 
o Spirits or beer (lines 31/33) 
• Medical problems (line 34) 
Although these are related in the context of the recall of an individual assessment (line 29), 
P31 subsequently recontextualises the narrative into general application when they 
generalise both nurse (referred to using “you”) and “alcoholic” (line 35). This is done at the 
point of medical problems (line 34), which serves as the point of departure into a more 
general narrative whereby P31 relates that alcoholics: 
• Have a lot of medical problems from the alcohol (line 35) such as 
o hypertension (line 36) 
o dysfunctional liver (line 37) 
• Have medical problems not related to the alcohol (line 41), but from living rough 
(line 44/45), such as  
o Asthma (line 42) 
o Flus (line 45) 
o Bronchitis (line 45) 
The brief reference to the example of this “gentleman here” (line 44) is followed by 
reference to what is typical with regard to physical ill health and living rough. What is 
addressed here is that which is typical in a wider sense however - not just for those with 
alcohol problems. This can be seen by the use of “you” as opposed to “they” (lines 44, 45 
and 46), which by inference (based on its previous use in this narrative) incorporates people 
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generally by merit of the fact that it includes in its terms of reference both P31 and the 
researcher as nurses. The second indication of its general application is seen in the use of 
the qualifier “apart from” (line 46) to distinguish its subject matter from people in alcohol 
withdrawal. So effectively, P31 conveys the fact that anyone living rough would have these 
physical problems, adding that people in alcohol withdrawal are therefore even more prone 
to them. 
5.2.1.3 Interim Summary 
Having given a detailed account of the evidence in relation to participant reasoning , I will 
at this point give an interim summary of these findings before proceding on to relate the 
evidence for participant expression of subjective certainty and uncertainty. The preliminary 
discursive analysis based on comparative keyword analysis, accounted for in Chapter Four, 
found that reference to typicality was one of the most common discursive functions of the 
keywords that characterised the study corpus. Further analysis, using conversation analysis-
informed discursive analysis, confirms this characteristic of the retrospective interview data 
in particular, and expands on this finding with more in-depth analysis. 
This analysis shows that reference to the typical in the retrospective interview data is 
mainly in terms of reference to diagnosis of mental or behavioural disorder. This is based 
on participant use of domain specific and pre-encounter knowledge, but not for the purpose 
of diagnosis. Instead, anchoring themselves with certainty on the typicality afforded by a 
diagnostic label, participants relate how they apply knowledge of the typical to make 
judgements and decisions about the case at hand. 
The application of domain specific knowledge from a medico-psychiatric perspective is not 
direct, and takes account of the social context as well as including reference to participants’ 
own pre-encounter knowledge of the individual. Participants express subjective certainty 
insofar as their narrative is anchored in reference to knowledge and expectations based on 
what was seen as typical. Analysis also shows that expressions of confidence and the 
exercise of professional power are linked to participant reliability on prior knowledge and 
what they perceive as their expertise. 
Paraverbal and verbal evidence points towards participants’ deliberate and thoughtful 
consideration of cases, at least in terms of their reformulation. This is especially true where 
a case is characterised by atypical features. The atypical has already been considered in 
Chapter Four, and is shown here again as a feature of participants’ discursive representation 
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of their judgement and decision-making that appears to be the flip side of the coin, as it 
were, of typicality. 
As this is an interim summary, I will at this point refrain from drawing any further 
conclusions from the evidence. I have already indicated where aspects of the evidence 
relating to participant reasoning are indicative of the expression of certainty and participant 
overconfidence. I will now move on to consider the findings of the conversation analysis-
informed discursive analysis of the data in relation to the expression of subjective certainty 
and uncertainty. 
5.3 Expression of Certainty & Uncertainty 
• “I suppose maybe with my experience you’re already formulating that idea of 
what’s going on even before I had this, which has been reasonably accurate so far.” 
Participant 9, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
Thompson & Dowding (2002, p15) define uncertainty in the context of clinical judgement 
and decision-making in nursing as “the inability to predict with accuracy what is going to 
happen”. As exemplified by the short excerpt above, it is in the nature of nursing practice 
that nurses tend to express certainty about much of their clinical judgement and decision-
making (Flemming & Fenton 2002). However explicitly participants express certainty, 
implicit subjective uncertainty around judgement and decision-making is a characteristic of 
the study corpus that is most readily evident in think aloud data.  
As seen in the previous section on participant reasoning, and building on the findings of 
preliminary analysis described in Chapter Four, there is further evidence that the expression 
of both subjective certainty and uncertainty in the study data is most clearly associated with 
talk that related to typical cases and diagnosis. This is seen most clearly in the think aloud 
data, complementing findings in the previous section which drew heavily on the 
retrospective interview data. Participant expression of certainty and uncertainty in the 
retrospective interview data is more implicit and less tangible.  
Conversation analysis informed discursive analysis confirms the preliminary finding that 
the main marker of expressed subjective certainty in the study corpus in this regard is the 
word “obviously”. As a sentence adverb, “obviously” modifies a sentence to indicate that 
what is being stated is the speaker’s opinion (Thomson & Martinet 1986). Such opinions 
are held with varying levels of subjective certainty. As well as marking subjective certainty 
in the study corpus the word “obviously” marks reference to the typical. This finding builds 
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on the link between typicality and the expression of certainty already described in the 
previous section on participant reasoning. 
5.3.1 The Think Aloud Data 
In the think aloud data, expression of uncertainty tends to be associated with participants’ 
seeking of information regarding the diagnosis of the fictional person in the case at hand. 
This can be seen in participant organisation of the case around the individual’s diagnosis. 
Case 2 (“Noel”) is the best example of this, where diagnosis was implied in the case 
materials, but not explicitly provided.  
The think aloud data represents participants working through unfamiliar case scenarios 
involving fictionalised characters with whom they have no prior knowledge. In the absence 
of specific pre-encounter data, participants look to the person’s diagnosis to formulate a 
quick initial assessment. As diagnosis was not made explicit in Case 2, participants turned 
alternatively to the familiarity offered by recalled knowledge of similar cases.  
In addition to the word “obviously” there are other linguistic features that also evidence 
this, as the following excerpt illustrates: 
((video playing in background, sound of fictional “Noel” coughing constantly)) 
1. Okay so (0.6) oI think o >hh< one of e:h Noel’s major problems would be ehm  
2.  (0.5) h’didn’t=seem to be coping very well (1.3) eh:m (.) eh=as regards ‘is life  
3. skills (0.7) people skills and things like that< oI=mean o (1) He’s unemployed,  
4. livin: rough >there for three< nights: eh:m (1.2) He=s-seems t’be blamin’ that  
5. on ‘is  girlfriend=that ‘is  girlfriend kicked ‘im out: (0.7) Most people if their   
6. girlfriend kicked ‘em out >they woulda< (1.3) they would have other resources  
7. y’know even to put themselves  up somewhere for a  night, but >h-he=h-he=h- 
8. he< he seems to be unemployed he >didn’t seem t’ave=any< motivation (0.9) to  
9. gain (0.3) eh employment. (1.2) Ehm, I think all that mighta led (0.3) p’rhaps,  
10. (0.6) >speculatin’ with all that i-< this lack >o’ motivation ‘n’ things mighta< led  
11. his girlfriend t-to: (0.8) split=up with=him p’rhaps, ehm. (1.7) Eh:=as regards  
12.  the rest of his condition he (0.7) ow:- o >jus=Noel=seems=to=have< a resp’r’ry  
13. tract infection (1) eh p’rhaps=due=to: (0.2) ehm (0.3) livin’ on the streets for three  
14. nights=so that needs careful monit’ring (1.1) eh throughout the night. (0.8)  
15. Ehmm (0.2) ‘e: says (.) he was gonna throw himself in the river. (1.2) Ehhm  
16. (0.4) well=that’s=fair=enough (0.6) y’know=it’s=a=good=thing=that=he came  
17. t’wards the services, but i:it gotta=be in the back o’ your mind as well that he  
18. could be playin’ (0.6) ‘e=could be playin a game with the services=as well,  
19. y’know he’s=it’s lookin he (1) to use the services for a bed, and ‘e=has a history  
20. of selling (.) drugs >jus=lookin=through =his=notes=there< so, (0.5) he’s  
21. obviously fairly cute to the services=in >‘e he< knows how to play them, (0.3) so  
22. y’gotta, y’gotta watch out for that as well. (0.8) But=I=me:an (0.4) that’s all  
23. secondary though because he >eh< by lookin’ at him he does need to be in  
24. hospital at the moment (1) but eh that, that will play on your mind eh further on  
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25. down the line, eh prior to discharge, but at the moment we just need to get him  
26.  well physically (1) ehhm (0.8) and ehh mentally and=and  get=’im motivated. 
Participant 14, Case 2, Think Aloud   
 
The word “obviously” serves as a contrastive device in this narrative. Throughout the 
narrative metacognitive disclaimers, verbal markers and paraverbal features express 
subjective uncertainty and hesitancy. In doing this they seem not so much to explicitly 
communicate objective uncertainty as to discursively express the varying degrees of 
subjective uncertainty of P14’s perception/opinion (e.g., the introductory “I think” in line 1) 
in contrast to what is certainly apparent (e.g., the reading from the case notes in line 20).  
I provide an outline below of these markers before discussing their functions in more detail: 
Metacognitive disclaimers: 
• I think (line 1, 9) (Thomson & Martinett 1986) 
• speculating (line 10) 
Verbal markers (Leech 1989): 
• seem/seems (lines 2, 4, 8, 12) 
• perhaps (lines 9, 11, 13) 
• might (line 9, 10) 
• could (line 18) 
Paraverbal features: 
• Noticeably quieter speech (lines 1, 3 & 12) (Speer 2001) 
• Hesitancy phenomena (throughout) (Clark & Clark 1977, Hieke 1981) 
• Anacrusis (lines 16, 20)  
• Stress (line 21) (Bolinger 1989) 
The degree of P14’s expressed subjective certainty is most apparent in their statements of 
inference as fact. For example, P14’s statement that the fictional “Noel” has a history of 
selling drugs is factual insofar as the information provided in the simulated case notes can 
be taken as such (line 20). Following on from this, the inference is drawn and similarly 
stated as fact, that Noel is obviously cute to the services and knows how to play them (line 
21). This is achieved through the use of factual language, which makes explicit and implicit 
claims for the veracity of its content (Potter 1996). 
The expression of certainty in the narrative was achieved through paraverbal 
communication as well as the verbal features outlined above. Hesitancy phenomena 
featured throughout both the retrospective interview and think aloud data. Whether they 
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serve functions related to conveying certainty, uncertainty or being hesitant about the 
appropriateness of the content can be difficult to gauge apart from the context supplied by 
other paraverbal features and the narrative content.  
The rapidity of the delivery of P14’s reference to the case notes (line 20) as a source of 
factual information gives prominence (Bolinger 1989) to this source. This serves to situate 
it in the narrative as underpinning the inferences that followed from it - namely that Noel is 
cute to the services and knows how to play them (line 21). This certainty stands in contrast 
to the degree of uncertainty apparent in the preceding part of the narrative.  
Prior to the reference to the case notes (line 20), which P14’s conclusions about Noel 
appear to hinge on, P14 is states that Noel could be playing a game with the services (line 
18). The repetition and silent pause here could be seen as characteristic of turn-related 
phenomena in conversation (Schegloff 2006). Whereas the retrospective interview 
narratives clearly feature the researcher as co-author, the think aloud data are more akin to 
monologues, and were deliberately constructed as such as part of the study design.  
Therefore, rather than serving an interactive function (e.g., prolonging or maintaining their 
turn in conversation), P14’s repetition following a silent pause is more likely to indicate 
thoughtful consideration of the next part of the utterance (Wegener et al 2006). There 
follows on from this the suggestion that Noel was looking to use the services for a bed (line 
19), after which follows the reference to the case notes. 
Consequently (line 22) the role of the nurse is to watch out for this kind of behaviour. The 
importance attributed to this responsibility can be seen in P14’s tone of certainty in the 
description of Noel’s playing of the services. This is particularly apparent in their repetition 
of “y’gotta” (line 22).  
Prior to P14’s reading of this information from the case notes they express consideration of 
this possibility (lines 17-19). On reading about the history of drug use, the speculation that 
Noel could be (line 18) playing the services is brought to the forefront (line 17). This 
expression of certainty colours P14’s overall formulation of the case.  
Looking at P20’s consideration of Case 1 (where a clear diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia is given in the simulation) diagnosis is mentioned early on in their 
formulation and then returned to as an organising principle. Even though the overall 
formulation is adjusted as other elements of the case presentation are considered, these 
remain “on top of”, “with”, or “as part and parcel of” what is arguably (perhaps with the 
exception of personality disorder) the most ‘loaded’ diagnosis in psychiatry: 
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1. Ehm, (0.1) okay she’s a paranoid schizophrenic (0.3) but has had no evidence  
2. of ehm (0.1) >of no active psychosis in the last four years< (0.7) ehm (0.4)  
3. hasn’t any >em< significant mood problem only >s-sometimes obviously has a  
4. low mood<  (0.6) h. (0.2) Ehm=hh (0.3) >poor social contacts< other than h- a  
5. sister, (0.2) ehm (0.9) so the biggest (.) problem >that=I see there< is a limited  
6. time >that=she=has< with her mother, (0.1) hh. >so=there< seems to be a difficult 
7. mother daughter relationship. (0.7) Ehm either (.) that was there when she was a  
8. child, (0.3) which sometimes happens, (0.7) pt (0.4) maybe a mother out at work:: 
9. (0.2) othat’so difficult sometimes this mother daughter relationship h. (0.3) but  
10. definitely seems to have ehm, got worse over the years. (0.5) h. Ehm, (0.7)  
11. >maybe the mother finds it difficult< ehm, (0.4) to deal with her daughter >who is 
12. who is< a paranoid=schizophrenic hhh. (0.6) b’cause=of wanting to be  
13. emotionally attached as a mother to=a daughter but can’t because of the illness,  
14. with >schizophrenia< sometimes people find it very hard (0.3) hh. to actually, eh 
15. relate with people, especially the people that are the=closest to them, (0.3) hh. so 
16. the mother may need a bit of hhhh (1) eh=help there. 
Participant 20, Case 1, Think Aloud 
 
This excerpt shows how information regarding a person’s diagnosis offers some degree of 
subjective certainty in terms of an organising framework which provides direction as to 
how to proceed and what to expect. This is similar to the discursive evidence already 
considered for participants basing their judgement and decision-making on regularly used 
knowledge that they draw on time and time again. Participants can be seen to make direct 
reference to their use of recent or familiar situations/cases to make sense of the case before 
them.  
5.3.2 The Retrospective Interview Data 
In the previous section I demonstrated how, in the think aloud data, participants reference 
to typical cases is linked to their expression of uncertainty. Due to the nature of the data, 
this could be associated with a lack of pre-encounter data. In the retrospective interview 
data, on the other hand, participants deal with their own familiar cases.  
As part of retrospective data collection, participants were asked to recall a case similar to 
Case 4 (“Patricia”), which is characterised by a referral with scant information and lack of 
personal pre-encounter data. This is the best example of a case type in the retrospective 
interview data where lack of information was met by participants with recourse to the 
typical. As the cases in the retrospective interview data are recalled rather than in-vivo, a 
different way of talking about the typical vis-à-vis certainty/uncertainty is seen.  
Unlike the think aloud data, which features talk around simulated cases, the retrospective 
interview data incorporate descriptive accounts of socially embedded practices in 
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judgement and decision-making. In analysing these narratives, I have drawn on my own 
previous experiences (of culturally embedded thinking and practice in psychiatric nursing) 
and domain specific knowledge (e.g., about depression) to identify application of 
knowledge of what is typical. The following is one such example from the narration of the 
case where the participant’s clinical judgement seems based more so on culturally 
embedded, routinised thinking than on analytic reasoning: 
1. P30: Well more than (0.6) his mental condition, he was very: depressed (0.7) but  
2.  had like (0.2) come over this >obviously< (0.3) after bein’ discharged=he was  
3.  at a .h (1) a medium ehm, (0.4) >t’t=eh< (0.1) w:e: (0.1) obser-we noticed=an’  
4. observed that he wasn’t (0.6) ve:ry: willin’ to take his medication (0.9) which  
5. we hadn’t (1.1) got any information about either. (0.2) It just gave us  
6. >information about what medication he was< on. (0.8) <But> (0.4) af- <on> 
7. IR:              [o mm o]  
8. P30: >givin’ him his medication he didn’t want=to=take it until we’d gone but we had 
9. like kinda told him we have to .h (0.5) stay here until you take it, >it’s only   
10. procedure an’ that=kind=o=thing< .h (0.5) So: >we kind of=observed that he 
11. didn’t want to take his< medication? .h (0.7) So obviously there was very poor  
12. insight. (1.4) Eh:m he didn’t think he needed to do anythin’ .h (0.5) he didn’t even 
13. know why the day centre was there, he was very negative about it and said well,  
14. >”w:hat’s this here for, what’s the point in comin’ here<?” ((accusative)) (1.1)  
15. IR:                    [Right]  
16.P30:“Sure=w:hat d’you do only do crosswords an’ (0.2) exercises? Sure what good is  
17. that?” (1.2) >D’you know? Very negative an’ negative< (1.9) 17. goin like for  
18. IR:          [Right] 
19.P30: all the rest o’ the clients, it was very negative for them as well, like it wasn’t  
20.  helpin’ them.  
Participant 30, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Lack of insight as described in this instance is not characteristic of depression unless it is 
severe and accompanied by psychosis (World Health Organisation 1992, Gelder et al 
2005). Indeed it is most often encountered where people are experiencing a significant 
degree of psychosis. It could feature in an unusual presentation of depression, but P30 does 
not describe the man’s depression in this narrative as atypical.  
However, in this excerpt I did recognise a common notion of typicality (with which I am 
familiar from my own practice experience) that is applied where someone is experiencing 
psychosis. This is perhaps best described as: “reluctance to comply = lack of insight”. The 
underlying assumption being that the person, as one colleague used to put it, is “so sick that 
they don’t know how sick they are”.  
However, the more commonplace experience of depression described in the case above is 
not such that lack of insight would typically be ascribed to the person. What appears to 
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have been applied in this instance is application of the principle of “reluctance to comply = 
lack of insight”. That its application is with subjective certainty is evidenced by use of 
“obviously” in line 11.  
In my own clinical experience this approach by psychiatric nurses is not uncommon, 
serving as a convenient explanation for what is in essence a complex problem that might 
otherwise require intensive engagement and intervention. However, viewing the man’s 
reluctance to comply with his treatment regimen as an aspect of his condition which is 
typical of such cases serves to nullify the need for such engagement. The need for an 
individualised approach is thus negated as a matter of routine. 
5.3.3 Interim Summary 
As with the previous section, I will now give a brief interim summary. Whereas the 
previous section on participant reasoning drew heavily on the retrospective interview data, 
this section dealt with findings based mainly on the think aloud data. Several aspects of the 
evidence set out in this section confirms findings already discussed in the previous section 
and in Chapter Four. 
Analysis again points towards the expression of subjective certainty amidst uncertainty. 
There is also evidence of clear association of references to the typical with the expression 
of certainty. This was particularly clear in those parts of the narrative where the word 
“obviously” is used, due to its discursive function in relation to both the expression of 
certainty and reference to the typical.  
The expression of uncertainty was found to be more tangible where there is a lack of pre-
encounter data and diagnosis is not given. This is because diagnosis can be seen to operate 
as an organising principle for the application of domain specific knowledge. Where 
diagnosis is available, certainty is expressed to the degree that it could be interpreted as 
overconfidence.  
Expression of subjective certainty was found to be associated with decisions regarding 
intervention as well as judgement regarding condition. This is similar to the findings in the 
preliminary analysis regarding routinised intervention as imperative action. There would 
appear to be a link to perception of role here, insofar as certain actions or interventions 
seem to be routinised, habitual responses to certain typical situations or individuals.  
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5.4 Contingency & choice 
I use the term contingency to refer to instances of judgement and decision-making whereby 
options for action are assessed with regard to context and consequence. This is, for the most 
part, a feature of narratives in the retrospective interview data. It does not occur in response 
to specific requests by the interviewer for recall of episodes characterised by contingency, 
but is freely described by participants without prompting. These narratives are replete with 
instances whereby professional power is implicitly and explicitly exercised in the offering 
of choice and marking out of contingency.  
In the retrospective interview data, participant narratives relate problematical real world 
events where there were many options and potential consequences. The think aloud data 
differ from these intricately unfolding narratives. For this reason, the retrospective 
interview data are a much richer source of instances of contingency. However, these are not 
completely absent from the think aloud data, which I will discuss in conclusion. 
5.4.1 Contingency & Control of Choice in the Retrospective Interview 
Data 
The excerpts that follow demonstrate how the construction of shared meaning by nurses 
can be a powerful means of control. These examples are all from discussion of a case 
similar to Case 1, characterised by situations involving contingency and requiring 
intervention. The narratives are clear exemplars of the extent to which control is an issue in 
contemporary Irish psychiatric nursing practice. 
In the examples drawn from community mental health services, the power of the 
professional is subtly constructed. In the examples from inpatient settings, the construction 
is cruder. The construction of shared meaning between nurse and service-user is 
represented by participants as a process over which the nurse very much has control.  
The exercise of professional power by participants has already been noted in the discussion 
of participant reasoning. In that context its bases were professional knowledge and 
expertise. These give participants an advantage in ‘managing’ individuals, in particular 
giving them license to make certain assumptions with regard to typicality and how to 
respond to it. 
Psychiatric institutions are commonly perceived of as large inpatient facilities dealt with in 
classic texts such as Goffman’s (1963) “Asylums”. Whilst such total institutions are no 
 156 
longer the mainstay of psychiatric services, psychiatric services are nonetheless social 
institutions. It is in this specific institutional context of community mental health services 
that the following narrative is grounded.  
In this narrative, P26 discusses principles that commonly guide therapeutic engagement of 
service-users on their caseload. Although this social context is at some remove from the 
total institution of the asylum, the professional control associated with that setting appears 
to have been retained to some degree. Social context and location of service delivery, it 
would appear, have a bearing on how this control is exercised – not on its presence or 
absence. This is because it is not a function of the clinical setting, but of the social role of 
the psychiatric nurse. 
1. P26:  Yeah well=you wouldn’t really put=a <ti:mefra:me> on it because (0.6)  
2. IR:                     [N:o       [Right [Yeah 
3. P26:  h. eh:m that kinda scares them=off.     
4. IR:               [Y:eah: I=was=just=thinkin’ that yeah  
5. P26:        [Y’know,    >it=can=be<  
6. IR:              [heh heh heh 
7. P26:  if=you say=to=them, okay in the next $ year you’re goin’ to be:  
8. IR:  [heh heh heh heh ha ha ha ha >ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha< 
9. P26:  $ y’know whatever, so you just kind=of=say=ehm, ‘Well, ok (0.4) eh:m  
10. IR:  [hhhhhh. <yeah, yeah> 
11. P26:   (1.3) >d’y’know< your, your biggest problem at the=moment is: (1.8) 
12. IR:                    [mmm 
13. P26:  boredom, (0.2) >whatever< lack of  (1.2) osomething to do o so:  y-you just 
14. IR:            [mmmm      [m: m: m: 
15. P26: work on that an=then when you=have that (.) resolved (0.4) h. you work  
16: IR:        [mm 
17.: P26:  on the next: (.) thing y’know you prioritise oproblems and (0.6) ehm  
18: IR:           [aw right   [mmm     [yeah    [mm 
19. P26: ehm work on >li-which=you=would< a:lways kinda say to=them, because 
20.   (0.5) you=know you’d never kinda build their hopes up too high, because 
21. IR:                 [mm 
22. P26:  (0.9) th-if they get knocked back, (0.5) >o it=can=be o< really set them back  
23. IR:           [hmmmm 
24. P26: you=know so: you=kind=of=I always say to them, y’know you (0.4)  
25. IR:        [yeah 
26. P26: <you don’t take giant leaps, y’> you learn to walk before you can run kind  
27. IR:         [mm 
28. P26: of y’know, you do this in <small little steps=n,> you=know even if ehm  
29. IR:        [m: 
30. P26:  (0.7) you do have=a: (0.2) mishap and=things >y’know=I< actually (0.6)  
31.   this particular chap he=he started a course before=and had a breakdown in 
32.  the middle of it,  
33 IR:     [oh right  
34. P26:     [you know so that was > oa major but o< (0.4) we  
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35. IR:      [oyeaho                [mmmm 
36. P26:  kinda picked up <where we> left off and y’know, we (0.9) worked on it  
37. IR:              [mmm      [yeah 
38. P26:  again so (.) 
39. IR:                [oyeaho 
40. P26:        [>like< you=know you have=to kind=of (1.5) prepare them  
41. IR:                  [yeah  
42. P26: for tha-those kind of little pitfalls y’know  
43. IR:        [oyeah, I suppose so, yeaho 
44. P26:              [oyeah you can’t be tooo 
45. IR:                [oyeaho 
Participant 26, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Here, before engaging with the individual who has been referred to them, the nurse has 
already decided not to offer them a timeframe (line 1). This curtailment of choice is 
intended to avoid scaring them off (line 3). The interviewer’s apparent display of mutual 
understanding (Hutchby & Wooffitt 2008) of the participant’s perspective (line 4), leads 
P26 to begin to expand on it. 
However, at the transition relevance place, as P26 begins their next turn, the interviewer 
initiates a 24-part laugh unit (Glenn 2003). P26 does not join in the laughter, although she 
does speak in a bemused tone of voice (lines 7/9) as the interviewer speeds up his laugh. 
The interviewer’s laughter speeds up as he orients to P26’s continuation of her turn without 
joining his laughter.  
At this point his laughter also changes in sound (from the longer “heh” to the shorter “ha”) 
before being concluded by a standard inbreath particle (Glenn 2003) and a second 
expression of mutual understanding, “<yeah, yeah>” (line 10). This repair signals the 
interviewer’s continued desire to understand and listen. For the remainder of P26’s turn, the 
interviewer continues to communicate this desire verbally (“yeah”, “oh right”) and 
paraverbally (“mmm”) and does not renew his laughter. This also constitutes repair, given 
P26’s failure to join in the laughter (Glenn 2003). 
The individual is told what their biggest problem is at that moment (line 11). The nurse, 
generally speaking, is then represented as carrying out both the prioritisation of the 
individuals’ problems and the work of resolving them. The generalisation of this approach 
as part of the nursing role is seen in the use of the second person singular pronoun “you” 
(lines 1, 7, 9, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 24 & 40). A vital aspect of this work is to set limits on the 
service-users’ hopes (line 22), with the contingency of avoiding their getting knocked back, 
with the rationale that it can really set them back (line 24).  
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The person is not just instructed, but taught general principles. Again the generalisation of 
this approach to therapeutic engagement can be seen in use of the second person singular, 
this time to build a general picture of the service-user’s role (lines 7, 24, 26, 28 & 30). This 
is structured in terms of representations of the nurse giving direct speech instruction to the 
service-user.  
The use of the first person plural pronoun, “we”, would appear to represent shared 
construction of meaning (Margutti 2007) and sharing of power (lines 34 & 36). However it 
soon becomes apparent that this is very much a process where the responsibility and power 
lie with the professional. It is they who ultimately bear the responsibility to prepare service-
users for little pitfalls (line 42). 
The second example relates to an inpatient setting, with clearer social and historical links to 
the total institution of the asylum. Here P12 openly refers to the system of contingency that 
they operate as being “like a reward system”:  
1. P12: Well=yeah=I remember a couple o’ people now. (0.7) >I=am=I'm<  
2.  thinkin’ o’ one person off hand at the moment who used to spend an awful lot  
3. IR:    [oyeaho 
4. P12: o=time in bed. (0.8) Now >this=is=the< the outcome wasn’t a success, (0.7)  
5. but=I remember (0.6) you=know, that this was discussed that he was, (0.2) a  
6. person with poor motivation, an=he was quite young, he was only in his mid  
7. twenties, (0.5) h. sittin in bed all day, very lazy, difficult to motivate. (1.6) Ehm.  
8. (1.2) Uhm. (0.4) There=was a number of things drivin=im, d’y’know,  
9. different kind=of, (0.7) attendin’ diff’rent, attendin op-occupational therapy  
10. IR:                 [mm  
11.P12: durin’ the day while he was an inpatient. (1) E:hm (1.8) we used to do stuff kinda  
12. like a reward scheme for=im, (0.7) l-you=know, like a kind=of=a system whereby 
13. if=he did somethin, (0.2) if=he went ou’ an’ did somethin’ for a day (0.3)  
14. IR:            [mhm  
15.P12: >he-ge-< he’d get somethin in return (0.5) ‘cause he was that difficult to  
16. IR:              [yeah 
17.P12: motivate, so=it was kind=of like a reward system. (0.7) You know, you might  
18. say to=im ehm, (0.6) he might come in (0.4) d-at two o’clock durin’ the  
19.  day, (.) see=he’s been in bed all day and he wants to ring somebody, (0.5)   
20. so=y’tell him >that=if< y’know, (.) if you get dressed an’ go out=for a walk, (1.5)  
21. and come back to me in an hou:r, (0.5) that type o’ thing, you=know? (0.5) <Or>   
22. IR:           [m: 
23.P12: (0.4) the usual barterin’ for cigarettes, (0.5) >oyo’know.<  (1.3) Ehm (1.3) And  
24. IR:               [$ h.yeah: 
25.P12: you'd be kinda discussin’ it with=the with=eh, with=his team as well=sometimes 
26. you’d get psychiatrist would look at=it an’ go, well maybe he’s on too much  
27. <medication.> (1) Maybe we’ll look at changin’ the meds, givin=them at  
28. different times, (0.7) you=know? (0.7) >aw-eh< y’know? (1.2) Sometimes it  
29. IR:    [yeah 
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30.P12: could be, >sometimes you find people are stayin in bed< because they’re a bit,  
31. kind of, (0.9) >sometimes< it can be ‘cause >they’d’ve< depression or they’ve  
32.  a lack=of energy, (0.6) sometimes they can be startin’ to go the other way  
33. IR:       [yeah 
34.P12: that=they’re goin, (1.7) they’re goin’ a little bit: kind=of, d’y’know, they could be  
35. schizophrenic or bipol- they could be going a >little< bit paranoid or a little bit  
36. IR:                      [omo 
37.P12: kind of pt (0.2) h. startin’ to behave stra:ngely, gettin’ notions about other people  
38. IR:           [omo 
39.P12: or somethin’ like that: (0.1) They don’t wanna leave their=ro:om, this type o’  
40. IR:            [yeah 
41.P12: thing, you=know? 
42. IR:      [mhm     
Participant 12, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The individual wanted something, in this case to make a telephone call (line 19). However, 
his being permitted this was contingent on his obeying the nurses’ suggestion that he got 
dressed and went out for a walk (line 20) in line with the nurse’s suggested time limit (line 
20). This is not an isolated practice, but is the type of thing (line 21) that might (lines 17 & 
18) happen regularly to ensure compliance with certain behaviours. The noncompliance 
that the reward system (line 17) addresses is clearly distinguished from psychopathological 
features (lines 28 to 41). 
The fact that no contention or conflict is reported in association with this system (line 12), 
along with its discussion in a narrative that also covers multi-disciplinary team review (line 
25) and medication management (line 27), would appear to indicate that in P12’s 
experience it is a process which is engaged in routinely by psychiatric nurses. It is 
interesting to note that P12 is a nurse who falls into the 0-5 year experience category. They 
would not have worked as a nurse in the more institutionalised settings common in the 20th 
century, being a graduate of 21st century third level nurse education. 
The situation described in the next excerpt, an episode of control and restraint, is by its very 
nature one where power lies with the psychiatric nurse. The choices offered are reliant on 
very limited contingencies, i.e., either lie down (lines 9 & 14), or if you refuse that (line 
17), be held down (line 23). Despite the fact that the options are quite limited here, the 
contingencies are discursively constructed in such a way to present the man with the 
illusion of choice (lines 2, 16 & 26) and the consequent burden of responsibility (lines 15 & 
16):  
1. P40: oTheo strange thing was, I >remember< (.) goin=up to=him and sayin’ 
2.  to=him, (1.1) <you got two choices.> (2.2) >And this=was when=he was,< olikeo  
3. (1.5) <hallucinatin> right, left an’ <centre.> (0.8) >He=says< what are they?  
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4. (0.4)  >An=I said< well, (2.2) we have to give you=an injection, (2.6) >oAn=I  
5. said,o< you’ve got=a choice of takin’ your tablets <or:ally.> (0.8) >oHeo=said,<  
6. what do=you mean, > oAn=I o said< you can take these tablets here=in my 
7.  hand. (1.4) Am not takin’ them fuckin’ tablets. (0.3) > oAn=I o said< that’s 
8. fine oI=said that’s fine.o (0.7) hh. I=said you got two choices now, (0.1)  
9.  >oLook=there’so< you either (1.4) lie down on your side, (1.5) and like your  
10. watchin’ your body language, <you’re watchin’ your eye contact, you’re  
11. IR:              [omo: 
12.P40: watchin’ your <tone.> (0.2) >oYouro< tone has=to=be firm but fair. (1.8) Eh:m   
13. IR:                 [omo 
14.P40: (2.2) >oI=saido< you either (0.2) lie down on your side by choice, (0.6) >oI=saido<  
15. you’ve=got complete control over the situation, (1.1) <and you take the 
16. injection (0.7) by choice.> (0.7) Your choice, (0.5) not ours. (1.5) Or  
17. >if=if=or=or:< if you refuse that, >I=said,< you leave us in no <position> (1.1)  
18. <and=I=remember> (.) pointing out: (0.6) this chap, (0.4) this chap, (0.7)  
19. ’n’ <this chap,> (0.5) colleagues (0.2) who are standin’ in the distance, (1.6)   
20. IR:                          [omo 
21.P40: ‘cause youdon’t=want him to feel threatened either, (0.1) oy-you=know.o (0.9) h.   
22. IR:              [yeah 
23.P40: (1.3) > oAn=I said, o< (0.4) we will have to hold you down. (2.1) >oHe=saido  
24. what d’you< mean? I=said, (0.3) we don’t want to do it:, (1) >oI=saido< we  
25. will have=to hold you down (1.6) <if you’re refusin’ to take> (1.7) oan injectiono  
26. by choice (1.8) >I=said< we’re goin’ to=have oto give it to=ye.o (2.8) >okay,  
27. IR:                 [mm 
28.P40: fair=enough.< (0.6) This=is in all the madness, (1.5) obviously there’s  
29.  other interventions and 
30. IR:           [So sometimes rational and sometimes not rational 
31. P40:           [oY- o              [Yeah 
32. IR: Yeah. 
 Participant 40, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
P40 acknowledges that this was neither the only approach available (lines 28 & 29), nor 
entirely desirable (lines 21 & 24). This narrative shows how shared meaning was built with 
the apparent purpose of allowing the man to save face by appearing to consent to something 
that he ultimately has no choice over. Building on the initial notion that the man had 
complete control over the situation (line 15), P40 spelt out his limited options more directly 
whilst retaining the illusion of choice (lines 24, 25 & 26). 
These three narratives cover the full range of the exercise power and control in psychiatric 
nursing – from voluntary engagement in an open partnership in a community setting to 
actual physical manhandling and injection of an individual in an inpatient setting. What is 
somewhat disconcerting is that the same type of discursive construction of choice as a 
cover for professional power and control features throughout the entire range of narratives. 
Essentially, the same social construction of illusory choice features in counselling-type 
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community engagement as in the discursive management of the physical restraint of 
individuals under lock and key. 
This points towards the covert exercise of power as a basic and integral element of the role 
of the psychiatric nurse (Walsh et al 2008). That it is embedded in narratives featuring 
contingency across the full range of settings and types of engagement underlines its 
centrality. Its implicit expression by participants, who appear oblivious to the central place 
it occupies in their narratives, is further evidence of how innate and fundamental this 
feature is in the fabric of psychiatric nursing. 
5.4.2 Contingency & Sharing of Power: Retrospective Interview Data 
The following two excerpts are exemplars of a less controlling approach that is also 
apparent in the retrospective interview data. In the first excerpt, unlike the limited offering 
of choice or construction of the illusion of choice evident in the previous section, the nurse 
does not merely offer a limited choice between alternatives, but choice itself. This takes the 
form of suggesting several options (lines 14 to 19) which convey the message that the 
scope of choice on offer is not limited to these examples of what is possible.  
P16 communicates this by representing their talk-in-practice, making a subtle shift (line 9) 
to address the service-user directly. This shift is managed in the context of P16 describing 
how they would approach the situation, specifically where they mention that they “say 
listen” – “listen” being the first word addressed hypothetically to the service-user. P16 
follows on not by imparting an imperative or condition to the woman, but by putting a 
question to her in order to address a contingency stemming from the woman’s own 
situation (lines 9 & 10).  
The shift back to addressing the interviewer (line 10) is managed using hesitancy 
phenomena and discourse markers: “(0.8) you=know that maybe, (1.1) >an=eh<”. After a 
slight pause and use of the discourse marker “you know” by way of introduction, P16 
makes the shift back to addressing the hypothetical service-user in order to represent their 
routine talk-in-practice. The suggestions that ensue (lines 14 to 19) are offered firmly 
within the contingency of the woman being unsure of what the nurse could offer as part of 
her role (line 12).  
The emphasis on “they” and “I” in “they’re not sure what I’m able to=do” (line 12) 
underscores the collaborative nature of the process being described. This sets the role of the 
nurse in the context of a relationship between two individuals, which is in contrast to the 
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alternative of discursively centring an individual’s engagement with services on the 
services themselves (for examples of this see the previous section and section 5.4.3). This is 
in the context of P16’s overall narrative description of their role, which is implicitly 
described as involving genuine facilitation of recovery as opposed to merely providing 
direction for recovery. This involves offering choices that are contingent on the woman’s 
own personal circumstances and condition, for example, finding herself in particular 
difficulty (lines 16 to 19).  
This context is also important in terms of P16’s use of a combination of diminutive 
qualifiers (Skelton & Hobbs 1999) - “just kind=of” (line 14) - and discourse markers – 
“you=know” (line 14)- in offering suggestions. The reason that these discursive features 
work in other contexts as powerful conversational tools of subtle coercion (Heritage 1984) 
is because they also function well as markers of sincere accommodation. 
These function alongisde markers of contingency to signal deference to the woman’s parity 
of control over options: asking “would=it=be okay if” (line 14); using, with emphasis 
qualifiers such as, “if you want” (line 15), “if that suits you?” (line 16); P16 offers the 
woman control over the initiation of contact, suggesting that she can ring the woman (line 
15), whilst the woman can also ring her (line 18).  
1. IR: Right 
2.P16: Eh, >that’s something that=am< actually very=aware of myself. (0.6) You=know  
3. IR:                  [ooko 
4.P16: so=I s’pose I would always, you know, put in my diary now, (0.2) y’know  
5. >will=be every< two weeks or something, (0.3) phone (0.3) whoever. (0.7) Just  
6. IR:              [ooko 
7.P16: to check in=to see how they are=if they can’t make it to me that I=would I 
8. would try and ehm, (0.5) you=know, (1.1) come up with=a plan, (0.3) and say  
9. listen, (0.1) you=know, if you can’t come down here, what: >what=other way can  
10. we work< that, (0.8) you=know that maybe, (1.1) >an=eh< suggesting maybe a  
11. IR:               [omo 
12.P16: few things, because they’re not sure what I’m able to=do. (0.6) >You=know I’m  
13. IR:                   [Right  
14.P16: just kind=of suggesting a few things that would=it=be< okay if, (0.5) you=know, 
15.  I can meet you somewhere if you want to? (0.3) Or I can ring you? (0.3)  
16. Every so often if that suits you? (0.2) Or if you are in difficulty >like=if say  
17. the person is< going through, eh, a very difficult separation > oas=wello< from her 
18. husband, (0.6) <a:nd,> it’s quite nasty, you can ring me if you’ve any problems or 
19. any difficulties.  
Participant 16, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
In the excerpt below P37’s description of collaborative engagement centres around their 
assertion that the individual is very much their own therapist (lines 10/12). P37’s role is not 
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to wield power or offer contingent rewards, but to freely and openly encourage the person 
and to affirm that they are “workin’ fine” (line 12), “doin’ oka:y” (lines 12 & 13), and 
“doin’ >really, really< well” (lines 16/18). Continued engagement was offered contingent 
only on the individual’s choice (lines 15 & 16). 
P37 uses the discursive strategy, common throughout the corpus, of deftly switching from 
addressing the interviewer to addressing a hypothetical service-user. This switch is 
achieved by means of a pause (line 3) or hesitancy phenomena (line 10). As in other 
narratives, P37 uses this strategy to represent her talk-in-practice. The importance of this 
talk for analysis is not that it can be said to actually representative of actual talk-in-practice, 
but that it represents how the participant sees that talk as constitutive of their role 
(Widdicombe 1998). 
The nurse’s therapeutic agency here is to give the individual “this notion” that they’re 
“fine”. The implication of the word “notion” is that if someone is attending mental health 
services they might not perceive their condition as “fine”. In this context, that the choice 
of “notion” here represents an attempt to instil self efficacy (Cutler 2005) rather than 
deceive the person is apparent from the tenor of the overall narrative. 
In contrast to the excerpt in section 5.4.3, where the imperative to attend and engage with 
the mental health services is paramount, P37 plays down the need for the person to engage 
on a weekly basis (line 4). Her view of the person extends beyond “the fifty minutes” in 
which they consult with her. During this time she may be their therapist, but beyond that 
they are their own “ otherapist <outside>”. 
The playing down of the need to engage with the services and the nurse as therapist is not 
done in such a way, however, to discourage the individual from attending as they see a 
need. In line 16 the hypothetical person is told that another session “isn’t a problem” if they 
feel that they need it. P37 is quite explicit that the strategy here is not to coerce people into 
being independent but to give them “empowerment to takeo control” (line 20). 
1.P37: >Y’see it’s almost like< you HHH. HHH. (0.3) you=know you (0.6) give them  
2. IR:             [yeah       [yeah 
3. this notion that (0.4) you’re fine, >you=know there’s lots of things happenin’  
4. out there, you don’t need to< come in here (0.2) >oevery week.< (0.8) It’s so  
5. IR:               [mm 
6.P37: true, becauseo everyone’s got a life (.) they’re livin’ (1.4) outside the fifty minutes  
7. IR:        [hm 
8.P37: every week. (0.5) >So=it’d be< b-really brilliant if I thought=it kept things goin’  
9. IR:         [yeah 
10.P37: for that=so it’s kind=of givin’ back that, that=you <are> (1) very much your  
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11. IR:                   [hm 
12.P37: own, (0.1)  otherapist <outside> and you’reo workin’ fine, an’ you’re doin’  
13. oka:y:  
14. IR:        [yeah 
15.P37:  [y’know=uhm (0.4) >say how=I’m=still goin to be< around if you needed 
16. another s-session, that=isn’t a problem, (1.3) obut you’re doin’ >really, really o<  
17. IR:       [mhm 
18.P37: well.  
19. IR:      [mhm  
20.P37:            [oSo it’s kind of (0.3) givin that empowerment to takeo control, and take  
21. IR:               [yeah     [omo 
22.P37: responsibility for leavin’ it for a month. 
23. IR:         [mhm 
Participant 37, Case 3, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Of course the fact that participants describe the offering of choice to individuals is not 
necessarily indicative that this is what occurs in practice. What is of interest here, however, 
is not the veracity of the narratives where choice is offered. The focus of analysis is on the 
discursive construction of choice and the offer of choice.  
Where choice and contingency are discussed in the retrospective interview data, the 
construction of shared meaning is apparent as a function of professional power. Choices 
and contingencies are offered to people in a specific social context where the nurse plays a 
specific social role. Depending on their perceived role they may construct a shared meaning 
with a service-user with the aim of subtly limiting their choices and/or gaining their 
compliance.  
Participants who describe engaging people in this way represent their actions as being in 
the best interests of those individuals, no differently than those who offered a wider range 
of choice and empowerment to people. Construction of shared meaning to limit choice 
appears not to be seen by participants as a cynical exercise of power over others, but an 
important part of the beneficent operation of their role as a psychiatric nurse. The ability to 
construct shared meaning for subtly coercive purposes is, by implication, presented as an 
important skill of the psychiatric nurse. 
5.4.3 Contingency & Control of Choice: Think Aloud Data 
The example below is from P27’s consideration of Case 4 in the think aloud data. This case 
is set in the context of community mental health services. Although not to the extent of the 
retrospective interview data, the think aloud data did feature instances where the power of 
the professional featured in the careful construction of shared meaning with the specific 
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aim of attaining compliance. Frequent exhalation is a general feature of P27’s 
conversational style. Exhalations permeate the entire narrative, and so it is difficult to 
attach any peculiar function to them with regard to the point being addressed in this 
excerpt.  
In line 3, after explaining the assumed context of the speech, P27 subtly switches to address 
the hypothetical Patricia directly. In doing this they formulate contingencies and present 
them in no uncertain terms: 
1.  <And ehm> (1.2) then assumin’ that the husband, or=herself  
2. would be willing to (0.2) h. consent to=a visit like, (0.4) h. outlinin to=her again  
3. (0.9) like look (0.2) h. it’s important that=you (.) attend to outpatient (.) <facilities  
4. and> (0.2) h. y’know like, (0.4) ye-ehm k-while you=you done well in hospital,  
5. (0.4) h. if you do:n’t comply there’s a chance you might have to come back into  
6. ho:spital, (0.1) h. you might be there lo:nger the next time, (0.4) that kinda thing,  
7. <and> outlinin’ to=her (0.5) all the positives, all the <outpatient=services  
8. that’re> are available like, (0.4) <and> (0.2) maybe if the day hospital isn’t for  
9. her, (0.3) that somethin=else might be for her like (0.3) you=know,  and  
10. discussin wit=her an’ h. (0.2) >maybe she doesn=like the day hospital< because,  
11. (0.2) one or two clients annoy=her there or, (0.6) maybe it’s too near her local  
12. area, she feels there’s h. (0.3) confidentiality issues like, h. (0.2) maybe  
13. getting’ to the bottom of why she’s not attendin’ it like, (0.3) be it over the  
14. phone or, (0.3) face=to=face when you’d meet her or the husband like, you  
15.  know? 
Participant 27, Case 4, Think Aloud 
 
The potential negative consequences for Patricia are not related in terms of her own 
experience of internal psychological processes – not even in terms of relapse or re-
occurrence of psychopathology. Instead the negative consequences are related in terms of 
social action mediated by health professionals in the form of readmission to, and a longer 
stay in, hospital (lines 5 & 6). Similarly, the positives (line 7) are not presented in terms of 
internal psychological benefits such as an enhanced sense of wellbeing, but are provided 
through the operation of the apparatus of the psychiatric services (lines 7 to 13).  
In lines 5 and 6, coercion is achieved through emphasis on the potential negative 
consequences of non-compliance: “if you do:n’t comply... you might have to come back 
into ho:spital ... you might be there lo:nger”. The use of this discursive tactic for coercion 
by psychiatric nurses has also been identified by Gilburt et al (2008, p95), whereby service-
user participants described it in terms of being “hypnotised” “brainwashed” and “playing 
the game”. 
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There is a ‘game’ element to the strategy used by P27 here in that a ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach is used. After presenting potential negative consequences, P27 places emphasis 
on “all the positives” that are available to the hypothetical Patricia should she comply. 
Attendance by Patricia at “the day hospital” (line 8), or something else that might be for her 
(line 9) is contrasted with the potential for a long spell in hospital (line 6).  
When she is seen as doing “well” (line 4), this is also expressed with emphasis on 
engagement with the services, i.e., doing “well in hospital” (line 4), as opposed to simply 
“doing well” or a more meaningful and personal form of recovery. Where internal 
psychological aspects are touched on, there is a distinct social element governing their 
exploration. Dislike of the day hospital is seen as likely to be due to the social stigma 
attached to attending (lines 11 & 12) or poor social relations with others attending there 
(line 11).  
Exploring underpinning personal issues is seen in terms of getting to the bottom of non-
attendance (line 13) and continues with the tenor of the overall narrative towards attaining 
her compliance/attendance. The focus on attendance at the day hospital is emphasised in the 
use of the phrase “why she’s not attendin’ it like”. As the impersonal pronoun object of 
the verb ‘attending’, “it” serves to make the day hospital, as opposed to Patricia, the focus 
of attendance. The alternative “why she’s not attendin’ like” would have made Patricia the 
focus of attendance. 
Overall in this example, the drive for compliance is not predicated on potential positive 
outcomes for the mental health of the individual, but by their perceived need to be engaged 
by the psychiatric services. As in the retrospective interview data, the operation of role-
determined, services-centred professional power is also evident in the think aloud data. This 
is not expressed as an unfortunate corollary to how the mental health services are structured 
or a necessary evil in the work of the psychiatric nurse. Instead it is conveyed as an 
approach which genuinely has the best interests of the individual in view. 
5.4.4 Contingency, choice and role 
In this section I discuss the findings of the conversation analysis informed discursive 
analysis in relation to contingency, choice and role. Contingencies here take the form of 
situations where choices are required. In this case, the choices I discuss are those of the 
nurse as opposed to those of individuals availing of the mental health services. 
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In its recall and portrayal of participants’ everyday work life, the retrospective interview 
data offers the clearest evidence in the study corpus regarding the role of participants as it 
relates to their clinical judgement and decision-making. The think aloud data, on the other 
hand, represents participants operating outside of their naturalistic work setting. Talk 
around choice of intervention best exemplifies participants’ expression of their roles, 
particularly with regard to those interventions that are represented as exceptional as 
opposed to routine.  
In this section I refer to participant narratives that relate to choices made in interventional 
decision-making (characterised by Case 1). Also, I have made some comments with regard 
to narratives featuring discussion of Cases similar to Case 3 and Case 4. Participants can be 
seen to talk about interventions in a general way, as something that ‘everyone’ does. This is 
seen in the use of “we” when talking about an activity, or “you” to generalise an activity.  
The first example below illustrates this and shows how careful consideration in 
participants’ talk about activities can reveal aspects of the institutional culture and roles 
from which they have arisen. In this excerpt P38 talks about choice of intervention as a 
group effort, repeatedly using the first person plural pronoun “we” alongside the second 
person singular pronoun “you”. In doing this P38 closely identifies themselves both with 
the local work group and the wider profession. Whereas the use of “we” indicates group 
decision-making by the local work group, use of “you” serves to generalise the issue further 
as representing what “you”, as a psychiatric nurse, would do in such a situation. 
1. P38: I suppose the issues >and it can=be an=and=they’re kind=of ongoin’ issues  
2. anyways,< (0.2) h.  
3. IR:            [mm 
4. P38:    [is >people’s personal hygiene,< (0.6) you=know, which can  
5. IR:          [hmm  
6. P38: impact on other people. (.) <And,> we have to make a decision, (0.9) >at some  
7. IR:       [hm 
8. P38: stage and say to=the< person, (0.3) you know, (0.4) ehm, (0.1) well this=is  very,  
9. this >is=is=a very=very< important issue. (0.5)   
10. IR:                   [hmm 
11. P38:           [<And you need (0.6) to:> (0.3)  
12.  look after your personal hygiene. (0.4)  
13. IR:      [hmm 
14. P38:          [you=know, (0.3) and we need to ensure 
15. that you do it, because the=co- the consequences (0.6) h. <for> (0.6) for both  
16. (0.4) yourself, and the=other (0.5) people, >both patients< and ourselves, (0.5)  
17. is that, (0.4) >you=know how=it,< it makes the whole environment, (0.4) and,  
18. (0.7) a:t some, at some stage, >as=well< it’d all depend really, (0.2) if the  
19. person=is a voluntary patient, (0.4) <then (0.6) y:: your> (0.6) your hands are tied  
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20. in one sense. (0.3) But still, (0.4) you=know, (0.3) you >have to say to the  
21. person, well< (0.4) y’know, (0.8) this=is what is normal and what we expect an’ 
22. what people >ex=expect< and you have=to (0.2) put as much pressure (0.2) as  
23. you can (0.7) on the person to <actually (0.4) comply with, with what would=be  
24. (0.3) seen as bein (0.4) normal kind=of eh, hygiene standards and know, y’know  
25. >and,<  (0.1) because they don’t (0.4) >they’ve really leavin’ on=people=n’ 
26. themselves at=risk. 
Particpant 38, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
Closer consideration reveals the construction here of the role of the local work group as 
well as the role of the psychiatric nurse generally. Responsibility is clearly attributed to the 
local work group in this situation. That the onus is on them, including P38 as a member, to 
act is clear from the phrasing “we have to” (line 6) and “we need to” (line 14).  
The imperative nature that such phrasing gives to this responsibility conveys the message 
that this is simply what you must do as a psychiatric nurse. The participant’s use of “we” 
here blurs the distinction between themselves and other psychiatric nurses by establishing 
common identity (Bramley 2001). This common identity serves as the basis on which the 
invocation of the collective imperative serves to occlude the participant’s individual 
responsibility.  
Rapley & Antaki (1996) the phrase “we have to” serving a similar function in their 
conversation analytic study of the acquiescence of individuals with intellectual disability in 
a residential care setting. The phrase initially appeared to imply acquiescence on the part of 
speakers, but closer consideration taking into account the wider narrative and context 
showed that the phrase was indicative of “routine rubber stamping” (Rapley & Antaki 
1996, p217). Similarly, Shepherd (2006) found that the phrases “we have to” and “we need 
to” function to vaguely attribute responsibility to a corporate body as opposed to any one 
individual. 
The preliminary discursive analysis of keywords derived from comparative keyword 
analysis (see Chapter Four) also demonstrated how talk about interventions is indicative of 
their routine and habitual manner. This contrasts with interventions being represented as 
stemming from thoughtul deliberation and analysis. In the context of the institution of 
psychiatric nursing to which participants belong, the professional responsibility assumed in 
the narrative represents the paternalistic role that has been shown to characterise that 
institution (Breeze 1998, Roberts 2004).  
Paternalism manifests here in the person being told what they need to do (lines 11 & 12). 
This is in the context of the participant adopting the discursive stance of talking directly to 
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“the person” availing of their services from line 8 through to line 17. This stance is entered 
into explicitly in line 8 where the participant, having in line 6 taken on a corporate identity 
through the use of the first person plural “we have to make a decision”, continues to 
exercise that identity by continuing on: “at some stage and say to=the< person” (line 8).  
P38 initiates their representation of this corporate speech to the person with hesitancy 
phenomena which act as a transition from the preceding narrative “(0.3) you know, (0.4) 
ehm, (0.1)” (line 8). As in line 21, the pre-placed appositional “well”, usually used to start a 
dispreferred turn - a turn the hearer is likely not to find agreeable (Pomerantz 1984). Both 
here and in line 21 there are also hesitancy phenomena (repetition in lines 8 & 9 and in line 
21, pauses and the discourse marker “(0.4) y’know, (0.8)”, characteristic of the initiation of 
a disprefered turn. Whatever claim can objectively be made about its veracity in 
representing actual talk=in=practice, it is apparent that P38 constructs this element of the 
narrative as representative of what would actually be said in such an instance. 
After the service-user is told that they need to look after their personal hygiene (lines 11 & 
12), the provision is added that the professionals need to ensure that they do it (lines 14/15). 
This is in order to avoid certain consequences (line 15). Here the team and the individual 
are portrayed as having, and communicating, an understanding of the situation that the 
person being addressed seems to lack.  
The emphasis on “need” in Line 11, followed by a brief pause, emphasises the importance 
of the individual looking after their personal hygiene. It is conveyed as a necessity as 
opposed to something that their can be any negotiation, choice or option about. The role of 
the team in this is underlined by the emphasis, using raised pitch, on “we” (Line 14) and 
“do it” in Line 15, to encapsulate the phrase, “we need to ensure that you do it”. 
Reverting from the representation of talk-in-practice directed towards a service-user to the 
interview narrative is subtly managed (Lines 17 and 18). The transition begins when the 
participant reverts to addressing the interviewer with the rapid utterance, after a brief pause, 
of “>you=know how=it,<”. The subsequent phrase “it makes the whole environment” is 
ambiguous in that it could be addressed to either the interviewer or hypothetical service-
user. In effect, as a transitional phrase, it is addressed to both. 
The end of the transition is marked by a brief pause, the conjunctive “and” and a longer 
pause before reverting to the explanatory narrative addressed to the interviewer (line 18). 
Again this is indicative of purposeful construction of this element of the narrative to 
represent actual talk-in-practice. Whatever the objective representation of the speech to 
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actual talk-in-practice, it is presented as such by the participant. Following on from this, 
addressing the interviewer, P38 presents the team as having the responsibility, having 
enlightened the person as to normalcy (line 21), to pressure them towards compliance (lines 
22/23).  
This is described as being firmly in the context of the responsibility of the psychiatric 
nurse, as indicated by use of the second person pronoun, you (lines 19, 20, 22 & 23). As a 
psychiatric nurse “you” have to tell the person “what is normal” (lines 20/21), and you have 
to put “as much pressure as you can” on the person to “actually comply” (lines 22/23). 
These subtle nuances of the exercise of professional power are made explicit in the 
statement that if the person is a voluntary patient then your hands are tied in one sense 
(lines 18/19/20).  
Here, use of the word “your” gives general application of this contingency to the 
psychiatric nursing role. The general principle here is that where a nurse’s hands are tied 
like this (line 19) then they have a responsibility to bring as much pressure as they can 
(lines 22/23) on the person to comply with what would be seen as normal (line 21). What 
would happen in the case of an involuntarily detained person is not discussed, but the 
inference is that with hands untied the nurse’s exercising of power might be less subtle.  
The slowing down of the rate of speech and the hesitancy phenomena in line 19 indicate 
trouble, as P38 seeks the best way to express the limits that a person’s voluntary status 
places on the power of the psychiatric nurse. To the eventual statement that “your hands are 
tied in one sense” contains the diminutive qualifier “in one sense” and is followed by 
further hesitancy phenomena in line 20. This ambiguity is followed in lines 20 & 21 by the 
speedily delivered, confident caveat that “you >have to say to the person, well<”. 
This generalised imperative prefaces the rationale behind the exercising of professional 
power. After more hesitancy and the discourse marker “y’know”, P38 reverts to speech 
which is ostensibly directed at the hypothetical person, as indicated by the introductory 
“you have to say to the person” (line 21). They are informed that “this=is what is normal 
and what we expect an’ what people >ex=expect<” (line 21 & 22).  
There is a subtle transition from this representation of talk-in-practice to narrative 
addressed to the interviewer in the phrase “and you have=to”. Following on from the 
previous statement the “you” addressed here may appear to be the service-user, but the 
immediately ensuing “put as much pressure as you can on the person” shows it to refer to 
the nurse generally. The role of the nurse here is explicitly to enforce normalcy.  
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This perception of role emerges in an institutional and professional context whereby many 
psychiatric nurses work in non-specialised roles with little or no autonomy. This can be 
frustrating, as the following excerpt from a participant working in an inpatient setting 
plainly shows:  
1. >Uhm< at fir- no:, not with that particular case, as the longer I was on the  
2. ward, it kind=of, I:=I >did get=a bit< frustrated with not bein’ able=to h (0.3)  
3. make a decision a=and, >yeah< yeah=it does actually get a=bit frustratin’ when  
4. you can’t just, h (0.3) make=a decision and go with that decision, if you $ 
5. understand what=I mean. (0.3) h. <Ehm,> (1.3) You=know, the other people  
6.        [ommo       [oyeaho 
7. make the decision and then, (0.3) oyouo kinda go with that. Like I understand h.  
8. (0.3) that when you=have less experience, it’s a good way of <learning,> you  
9. know, seeing how other people make their decisions, but=at the same time when  
10. (0.7) h. you kind=of have an idea=in your mind of what om-o (0.6) you=know,  
11. might be=a good idea, (0.3) it can be frustrating not to be able to (0.7) to carry  
12.                 [oyeaho 
13. on with that. 
Participant 5, Case 1, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The repetitive references to “decision” in lines 3 & 4 are not instances of next-turn 
repetition (Haeyeon 2002), as the excerpt here is in response to the question “And does that 
make you feel in anyway - were you very frustrated, or did you have any kind of feelings 
yourself?” That P5 explicitly relates being “frustrated” with “not bein’ able=to h (0.3) 
make a decision”, and the use of the word “frustrated” here could be seen as simply 
repeating the interviewer’s assertion. However, their emphasis on “not” and audible 
exhalation prior to both instances of “make a decision” (lines 3 & 4) is a combination that 
has been linked to the paraverbal expression of frustration by Trinder et al (2010). 
A slight pause and audible exhalation, followed by a the relatively slow “Ehm” and a pause 
of 1.3 seconds (line 5) marks the end of P5’s initial expression of frustration. After the 
interviewer responds “mm” and “yeah” P5 goes on to acknowledge, without significant rise 
or fall in pitch, that with less experience (lines 7 & 8) than others watching others make 
decisions can be a “good way of learning” (lines 8 & 9). After this they go onto say “but=at 
the same time when”, and after a brief pause and an audible exhalation they revert to using 
pitch for emphasis as they explain how frustrating it can be to have “what” might be a 
“good idea” and “not to be able to (0.7) to carry on with that”. 
As seen in the review of the literature in Chapter Two, the autonomous role of some staff 
seems to be predicated mainly by their work setting. In the following excerpt we see this in 
the case of a hostel-based nurse:  
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1. P13: So like, (.)in=the, sometimes in the hostels, when you have, oh patients like,  
2. (0.8) hh. they are a kind=of far from the hospital, and you don’t have proper  
3.  s:upport from=or, because on the ward you have your colleagues, h. who will 
4. help you to make a decision. (0.3) But in the hostels you=are at your own, or,  
5. either one of your colleague will be with you. And, >some< because of the  
6. night times we are just at y=our own with the care staff. (0.3) h.=And all  
7. decisions you have=to take yourself. (0.6) You have to think an=you have to  
8. IR:        [orighto 
9. P13: see the situation an’ take=a quick decision. 
Participant 13, Case 1, JDM PiP 
 
Working alone in this context is constructed as situational autonomy due to how work is 
structured rather than being chosen or attributed autonomy due to expertise. That this is less 
than ideal is evident from P13’s emphasis on lack of “proper” support (line 2) in contrast 
with the ward where “you have your colleagues” (line 3) to “help you” (line 4). The 
problem is not complete lack of support, but lack of “proper” (line 2) support. Even if you 
are with a “colleague” (line 5) or “care staff” (line 6), “all decisions you have=to take 
yourself” (lines 6 & 7).  
The essence of what is being said here is best captured in P13’s unfinished statement are 
left “at your own” (line 4). The phrase that they appear to be delivering here is “at your 
own discretion”, which is the only term used in common parlance that completes “at your 
own...” However, this is aborted with “or” and the presence of the colleague or care staff is 
referred to in order to explain that although the nurse is not completely alone, they are 
without the nursing work team.  
As a result “you have to think an=you have to see the situation an’ take=a quick 
decision” (lines 7 & 9). The repeated use of “you have to”, with emphasis on having to 
“see” and “think” and “an’ take=a quick decision” implies that this is not normative. 
Working in a team would appear to preclude the need to individually spot cues, think about 
them and make a speedy decision. By inference, P13 is more comfortable with the 
“proper” support of (line 2) peer-aided decision-making in which there is less time 
pressure and no onus on the individual to identify or process cues. 
Throughout the study corpus, rather than a being a routine part of everyday work, 
autonomous decision-making is represented as something that must be done from time to 
time due to one’s role or a situation one finds oneself in. Again it is apparent that autonomy 
is context-driven and related to role rather than based on personal expert status:  
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1. P25: I=have to bring up at the meeting to close his <case> (.) >So< again it was a 
2. IR:        [uhuh 
3. P25: (0.1) the doctor=who made=the decision, >he= said=that< ehm:, (0.3) close the  
4. case, if=he=d, if=he (0.8) does=not attend (0.2) his outpatients’ clinic  
5. appointment, then we’ll=we’ll address it further. (0.1)  
6. IR:        [okay 
7. P25:             [Because he’s (0.4)  
8. >ol- c-o< level three >which means< low risk, (1)   
9. IR:       [mhm, mhm, 
10. P25:               [Because he did not  
11. attend his appointments and because I=did all I could (0.5) do at the time, (0.4)  
12. >he said=I, it di-< it didn’t warrant any further investigation now. If he was a  
13. level two >ab- which< a patient, (1.3) that, that means a patient needs, (0.4) 
14. more interventions, >it’s kind=of, the helpin’s of a nurse.< (0.8)  
15. IR:                [okay, yeah 
16. P25:         [oThougho, it  
17. might warrant, eh, a house visit, stuff like that, (0.4) y’know, >to see if the  
18. IR:             [yes, okay 
19. P25: patient is okay,< so it depends (0.7) how they’re graded initially. 
20. IR:    [>So right,<  [oyes, theo 
Participant 25, Case 4, JDM PiP Interview 
 
The use of the phrase “have to” (line 1) has already been shown, both in Chapter Four 
(Section 4.3.14) and in this Chapter (for example, in the first excerpt of this section) to 
express that an unwritten principle governs one’s role in a given situation as opposed to 
individual initiative in decision-making. P25 raises the issue so that the doctor can decide 
whether to close the case, based on the contingency of the man’s non-attendance at the 
clinic (lines 3&4). This indicates the limited nature of the P25’s role with regard to 
decision-making. The attribution of the use of the first person plural “we’ll” (line 5) to the 
doctor, extends his decision-making and contingency planning as incorporating those 
present at the meeting (Richards 2008).  
Not only is this accepted as normative insofar as it is not remarked on as unusual or 
objectionable, but P25 further identifies with the doctor’s decision by going on to explain 
the rationale behind it (lines 7 to 12). The three main elements of this rationale are marked 
by the prefacing of each one with an emphasised “because” – because the man has been 
determined as “low risk”; because he did not attend his appointments; and because P25 did 
all they could. What P25 describes here is not their intentional feeding into the doctor’s 
decision, but of an interpretation of their intervention as being “all” that could be done 
acting as one element amongst several that inform the decision. 
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The extent to which P25’s description of decision-making is governed by organisationally-
based principles rather than autonomous reasoning can be seen in the contingency they 
construct beginning with “If” in line 12. If the man had been at level two in terms of risk 
assessment, this would determine his needing “more interventions” (line 14), including “the 
helpin’s of a nurse” which might involve a “house visit” (line 17) to see if he is “okay” 
(line 19). That the care that service-users receive is predicated on “how they’re graded 
initially” (line 19) indicates some form of system-aided (Hammond 1996a) judgement is at 
work in P25’s work setting. 
There are examples of service-user decision-making in the retrospective interview element 
of the study corpus. In these narratives it is the service-user who is represented as bearing a 
degree of responsibility as an autonomous agent for the situation in which they find 
themselves. In such situations, however, the nurse is never totally relieved of responsibility.  
Responsibility is also attributed to factors other than the service-user, for example to their 
psychopathology as something apart from them. In the excerpt below, the service-user is 
explicitly represented as an autonomous decision-maker (lines 8 & 9). However, P29’s use 
of the demonstrative adjective to describe the man’s decision as “this decision” (as opposed 
to using the indefinite article, that is, “a decision”) serves to emphasise the “decision” in an 
unfavourable light (Thomson & Martinet 1986).  
Adding to this is emphasis achieved by the stress on the central syllable of the word 
“decision”, communicating P29’s non-approval of this decision”. However, despite the 
man’s autonomous decision, responsibility for his man’s troubles is also attributed to 
“the=OCD” (obsessive compulsive disorder) (line 12). The use of the definite article to 
describe the man’s disorder (as opposed to “his OCD”) alongside the description of 
“the=OCD” coming “back with a vengance” serves to give life to the disorder in 
anthropomorphic terms.  
The significance of this in terms of autonomy is that the man is conveyed as being at the 
mercy of something apart from him. This stands in contrast with P29’s expression of their 
own responsibility for the man, reporting emphatically that they “felt ba:d” (line 4), and 
held the responsibility of performing an adequate suicide assessment (line 5). The 
appending of, and emphasis on, “myself” here amplifies the focus on P29’s own role 
(Bramley 2001): 
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1. P29: Oh, (0.3) h-he=I, he wasn’t suicidal oan’ he’do. (0.7) Yeah. No, >there=wasn’t<   
2. IR:          [Right 
3. P29: suicidal, he=was, (0.1) the reason I had explored why he’d done it, because I  
4. was quite (1) pt shock=I was kinda shocked in a way, ‘n=I felt ba:d, I (.)  
5 >wondered if I hadn’t done,< (0.3) an adequate (0.3) suicide assessment myself.  
6. (0.9) <Ehm,> (0.7) but, (0.7) I=I think that, (0.7) even if I had it wouldn’t’ve  
7. IR: [orighto 
8. P29: mattered, >because I think,< (0.4) it (0.3) was whipped up, (0.8) you=know, he  
9. made this decision to=see the hypnotherapist, an’ then, (0.4) >whatever< it 
10. <was> about that session, (0.7) you know, it just, (0.7) freaked him. (1) And  
11. IR:             [ohmo 
12.P29: then, (.) the=OCD: (1.2) came back with a vengance, >o ‘c’seo< he hadn’t had,  
13. much, (0.5) much=of that (0.2) when I’d been seein=him previously. (0.4) h. It  
14. IR:           [ohmo 
15.P29: just came=back with=a >vengeance,< he got so anxious that, (0.6) >I think  
16. it=was a< cry for help, (0.9) more than, (0.7) eh=a suicide attempt as such,  
17. IR:        [oyeaho 
18.P29: because he just, (0.1) had the rope and, (0.6) whether=he would’ve done it,  
19. o>I=dunno<o, (0.4) but, (0.4) you=know >ohe=waso< did=it at ho:me=in (0.3) full  
20. view of, >oy’knowo, people=were< arou:nd. (1.1)  
21. IR:               [yeah, yeah, 
22. P29:           [<Ehm,> (1.5) so yeah, so 
23. ehm, (0.9) >I=I< had assessed him again, an=he would be sayin’ no he would’n  
24. do=it an’ it was just in the flurry (0.9) of all the anxiety an’ worry >that he  
25. was< a pervert. 
Participant 29, Case 3, JDM PiP 
5.4.5 Interim Summary 
As with the previous sections, I give an interim summary here with regard to the evidence 
regarding contingency and choice as characteristic of the study data. Contingency and 
choice, in particular the control of choice, are two inextricably related features of the study 
corpus that evince professionally mandated control as a social function of the psychiatric 
nursing role. This control is most visible in the construction of shared meaning as a way to 
control choice. 
In community-based scenarios, the control of choice is more subtle, whereas in inpatient 
settings it is a cruder affair. The fact that controlling behaviour is represented as normative 
regardless of setting is indicative of the construction of shared meaning as a function of 
professional power as opposed to its being a function of a physically located institution. 
However, some participants do describe offering genuine choices to individuals, which 
points towards a tension in Irish psychiatric nursing practice between the controlling and 
custodial role with its services-centred approach, and the person-centred approach of what 
one would hope is the coming order (DoHC 2006, Walsh et al 2008). 
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However, as the evidence in relation to participants’ choice of interventions shows, in Irish 
psychiatric nursing it would appear that interventions are determined by the common 
perception of role within the dominant culture of the profession. The evidence strongly 
suggests that this role is one where decisions are made more on the basis of custom and 
practice than on individual consideration. These decisions are underpinned by routinised 
paternalism that appears to be enabled by mental health legislation and psychiatric nurses 
working in settings where they have little or no professional autonomy. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has given an account of the study findings in relation to the three main features 
of the study corpus identified in the preliminary analysis that was described in Chapter 
Four. Throughout the chapter I have given interim summaries for each of these sections, 
and I will not repeat those in detail here. Instead I conclude by briefly setting out the overall 
shape of the findings, which I will go on to discuss in detail in Chapter Six. 
Taking a critical and reflexive approach to data collection and analysis has enabled me to 
use a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis of verbal and paraverbal discourse 
markers to demonstrate how:  
• Atypical case presentations see participants refer more deliberately to experiential 
and domain-specific knowledge, whilst participant reasoning is more routinised and 
habitual when faced with typical scenarios. This involves a combination of 
experiential and domain-specific knowledge, most notably the contextual 
application of psychiatric knowledge governed by diagnostic categorisation. This 
serves as an anchoring point for subsequent thoughtful consideration of a case. 
Participants appear to view this ability to quickly draw with subjective certainty on 
prior knowledge as an indicator of their own expertise. 
• Participants tend to express subjective certainty amidst a background of uncertainty. 
Verbal and paraverbal expression of certainty is clearly associated with cases and 
situtations that are seen as typical, to the extent where it can at times be interpreted 
in terms of overconfidence. Where diagnosis is not present to act as an organising 
principle for the application of domain-specific knowledge and there is a lack of 
pre-encounter data, uncertainty is more likely to be expressed verbally and 
paraverbally. 
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• Participants’ judgement and decision-making shows a tension between person-
centred engagement featuring real choices for individuals and a more controlling, 
paternalistic approach. This is most apparent in situations involving choice and 
contingency. Which approach is taken appears linked to participant perception of 
the psychiatric nursing role, with professional control being apparent as a social 
function of that role. It is this perception of role, in combination with their 
perception of service-users that enables them to engage in discursive coercion of 
individuals, which is more subtle in community settings. Nurses’ own interventional 
choices are limited by the paternalistic culture in which they work, even more so in 
settings where there is decreased professional autonomy. Routinised paternalism 
appears to be the rule, with deliberate choice of interventions being an exception 
that is exercised mainly in situations where it is required by contingency. 
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Chapter Six – Discussion 
6.1 Introduction  
The aim of this study, as set out in Chapter One, is to explore the clinical judgement and 
decision-making of participants in terms of both the cognitive processes involved and their 
social context. As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the study’s combination of tried 
and tested approaches to data collection and novel application of recently developed 
methods of analysis to these data have proven capable of yielding useful insights into 
participants’ clinical judgement and decision-making. This is partly due to its mix of social 
and cognitive perspectives on participants’ judgement and decision-making.  
The previous two chapters described the evidence from two different levels of analysis of 
the data. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss these findings in light of the literature on 
judgement and decision-making and to set out what they contribute in theoretical terms. 
The implications for practice and other applications of the findings are considered in 
Chapter Seven. 
The study findings stand against the background of the vast literature on dual-process 
models of judgement and decision-making (Hammond 1988, 1996a, Kahneman 2003, 
Evans 2008). However, the real strength of the findings lies in the fact that the study 
methodology is concerned primarily with participants’ “discursive praxis” (Crawford et al 
2002, p295). I have not naïvely attempted to claim that surface level analysis of 
participants’ descriptions of their judgement and decision-making fully represents their 
actual internal mental states (Edwards & Potter 1992a).  
At the outset of this thesis I underlined the importance of reflexivity to my research efforts. 
I have applied this throughout the thesis through my discussion of the study using the first 
person. I have been vocal regarding my beliefs and personal perception of issues as 
relevant, and I believe that it is vital to continue to engage in this critical reflexive 
commentary throughout these closing chapters. This is for the sake of the transparency, 
clarity for the reader and also to attempt to reduce any metacognitive ambiguity on my part.  
I am not entirely sceptical about the usefulness of the analysis of participants’ retrospective 
narratives and think aloud protocols for revealing cognitive and social elements of their 
clinical judgement and decision-making. Instead I am cautious about what the narratives 
can be said to represent. Where I do make claims with regard to participants’ cognitive or 
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social worlds, these are based on more than an uncritical reading of their narratives at face 
value. 
For the ease of the readers’ comprehension I gave interim summaries of the findings 
throughout Chapter Five, with a final overview set out in discrete bulleted points. Therefore 
I will not repeat the findings here again, but instead will discuss them in relation to the 
literature on clinical judgement and decision-making. This discussion takes account of the 
fact that the findings are conceptually interrelated.   
The bullet-pointed list which concluded the previous chapter is the clearest and simplest 
achievable overview of the findings, and in this chapter I move on to consider the complex 
interrelationship between them. This includes discussion of the relevance of the social and 
cognitive processes with reference to how the two main data types within the study - 
retrospective interview and think aloud data - represent distinct cognitive and social 
activities. This is because whereas both data types involve co-authoring of participants’ 
narratives (Ochs & Capps 1996) by the interviewer, this is a more explicit and distinct 
feature of retrospective interview data (Fratila & Sionis 2006).  
6.2 The role of prior experiential and domain-specific knowledge 
in participant judgement & decision-making 
Participants’ narratives involve a significant degree of reference to their combination of 
domain-specific (Boshuizen & Schmidt 1992) theoretical and experiential prior knowledge 
(Benner 1984) in making clinical judgements and decisions (Rashotte & Carnevale 2004). 
Their initial reference to prior knowledge of typical features in dealing with cases appears 
intuitive and routinised. This facilitates a subsequent process of dealing with the case that is 
more deliberate.   
This is not to say that participants switch between completely rational reasoning to 
irrational intuitive strategies in their judgement and decision-making. Rather, their 
approach is indicative of a mix of intuition and analytic thinking. At times one mode is 
more noticeable than the other. 
This mix of intuition and analytic reasoning has been explained by other nursing 
researchers in terms of Hammond’s (1988, 1996a) cognitive continuum theory (Offredy et 
al 2008, Beckstead 2009). Intuitive judgement as set out in the cognitive continuum is an 
individual affair, and this is apparent in the study data. Participants’ use of intuition is 
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evident in their automatic application of domain-specific and experiential knowledge. 
When their thinking is more analytic, more reasoned, deliberate narrative accounts result. 
However, whilst the cognitive continuum views peer-aided judgement as a step away from 
intuition and towards more analytic thinking, this is not the case with participants in this 
study. Close identification with peers in the judgement and decision-making of participants 
is characterised by a reliance on pratice and custom that results in routinised paternalism. 
To understand this further, it is important to consider the social context in which this occurs 
(Hammond 1996a). 
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, the social context of the knowledge that 
participants use represents that world in which they have learned to apply that knowledge 
(Hammond 1988). From a sociological perspective it is the world into which they have 
been socialised in terms not only of application of knowledge, but also of adaptation of role 
(Berger & Luckman 1967). Although these represent two discrete ways of looking at 
participant judgement and decision-making which do not of necessity overlap fully, 
combining their perspectives offers a more rounded picture of how participants used 
knowledge. 
6.2.1 The social context of the knowledge used by participants 
Participants’ reference to diagnoses and psychiatric symptomology in their clinical 
assessments could be seen as a beneficial conceptual adherence to standardised norms in 
clinical judgement (Garb 2005). However, it might also be seen as a reductionist approach, 
narrowing the scope of clinical judgement to focus on medico-psychiatric concepts to the 
exclusion of other salient elements (Crowe 2000). However, participants in this study do 
not rigorously apply diagnostic criteria in an empirical or biodeterministic way that 
excludes other perspectives.  
Instead their narratives demonstrate an overlapping combination of lay and nursing 
knowledge to reach what they represent as a balanced assessment of the individual and the 
situation in which they found themselves. Crowe et al (2008) have described this approach 
as formulation, as opposed to a diagnosis. Crowe et al (2008) describe formulation as a way 
that psychiatric nurses involve the valuing of an individual in their assessment, which is 
more important than accurate determination of what certain signs and symptoms represent 
in terms of medico-psychiatric classification.  
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This way of applying knowledge to problem solving is an essential feature of professional 
practice (Higgs et al 2001, Thompson 2002). However, although it was possible to simulate 
aspects of everyday practice in collection of the think aloud data, participants did not have 
the benefit of knowledge drawn from a personal acquaintance with the individuals 
involved. In this context the only pre-encounter knowledge that they brought to their 
judgement and decision-making was general, domain-specific and experiential knowledge, 
exemplified in their reference to typical features of cases. 
In the retrospective data participants’ make clear reference to their specific pre-encounter 
knowledge of individuals. Across all participants and cases it is clear from the data that the 
knowledge used by participants in this study is centred on a combination of theoretical 
knowledge drawn from psychiatry and specific and/or general pre-encounter data 
(Carnevali et al 1984). Participants use this combination as the basis of a narrative 
framework within which they could explain the causes and implications of presenting 
behaviours (Klein 1989). 
Whilst the potential consequences of these behaviours are explored in participant 
narratives, this exploration is not characterised by reference to specific clinical outcomes. 
Instead, participants deal with the contingencies around these potential consequences with a 
lack of subjective certainty (Dowding & Thompson 2009a) and an element of speculation, 
which are evident in implicit discursive markers rather than in explicit reference. Whilst 
participants explicitly express confidence and certainty, their formulations are speculative, 
with reference to their experience of similar individuals and/or situations. 
This is indicative of how participants’ judgement and decision-making leans more heavily 
on experiential knowledge than on theoretical knowledge (Thompson 2002). When making 
reference to types of individual, for example, participants at times mention their experience 
of a certain type of individual without attaching a particular label to them, or grounding 
their observation in any discernable framework of ‘text-book’ or other theoretical 
knowledge. Participants do, however, make clear reference throughout the narratives to 
individuals’ diagnoses, and use these as central organising points for their discussion of 
cases.  
However, it is not a matter of participants referring to either experiential knowledge or 
theoretical knowledge. That the two work together can be seen in the peppering of 
participants’ mainly vernacular narration of their experiences with references to psychiatric 
diagnostic categories (e.g. “paranoid schizophrenia”) and associated symptomological 
 182 
phrasing (e.g., “negative symptoms”). Rather than pointing towards attempts at medical 
diagnosis of mental and behavioural disorder, this represents participant use of domain-
specific knowledge (Boshuizen & Schmidt 1992) to interpret what they had witnessed. 
Reference from both sociological and cognitive psychological perspectives is useful in 
understanding this aspect of the data. From a cognitive perspective, participant 
interpretation of cues can be understood in the context of Brunswik’s (1952) lens model. 
From a sociological perspective it can be understood in the context of Peirce’s (1895/1998) 
model of semiosis. 
From the perspective of the lens model (Brunswik 1952), participants can be understood as 
striving to make sense of multiple fallible indicators in an environment characterised by 
uncertainty (Hammond 1993). The knowledge used to interpret these indicators, or cues, 
helps participants to make sense of them. How accurate the consequent judgements are is 
something that is beyond the scope of this study. However, this study can provide 
important information regarding the types of cues used by participants to make these 
judgements. 
From the perspective of semiosis, the concern is less with quantitative measurement of 
accuracy and more with what participants’ qualitative understanding of what certain cues or 
indicators represent (Sebeok 2001). This is determined by the type of knowledge that they 
use to interpret them. This knowledge – whether experiential or theoretical – is firmly 
embedded in the social and cultural understandings into which participants have been 
socialised. 
Although the lens model is concerned solely with quantitative measurement of 
interrelationship between cues and participant accuracy, and semiosis with qualitative 
meaning derived from cues, there is a distinct overlap between the two approaches. This 
overlap lies in consideration of what sociologists refer to as the correspondence and 
stability of signs or cues (Glassman & Kang 2007), and what psychologists refer to as 
relative weighting of cues across participants (Dawes 2000). Both are concerned with the 
commonality between participants in terms of their interpretation of cues.  
Where participants draw on common sources of experiential and theoretical knowledge, the 
expectation might be that the interpretation of cues in terms of weighting would have a high 
degree of correspondence. Although measurement of such correspondence is beyond the 
scope of this study, it is plain from the findings that participants are operating from the 
same background in terms of knowledge used to interpret cues. This explains something of 
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a hive mentality characterised by routinised paternalism as opposed to a more analytic peer-
aided approach to interventional decision-making, as well as the invariable use of diagnosis 
as an organising principle for the application of domain specific-knowledge and pre-
encounter data. 
Also of relevance to this mix of experiential and domain-specific knowledge is what it 
reveals about how participants perceived individuals. This perception of others involves the 
reflexive, interpersonal and often intuitive aspects their clinical assessment of individuals 
(Allport 1968, Schneider et al 1979, Bandura 1986, Kruglanksi & Orehek 2007). The role 
played by prior knowledge of individuals and types of individuals here raises issues with 
regard to error, intuitive bias and the valuing of individuals that are dealt with throughout 
this chapter (Thompson & Dowding 2009c).  
Although differing in function from explicit medical diagnosis, participants’ assessments of 
individuals show similarities to what is known about doctors’ and clinical psychologists’ 
combination of experience and theoretical knowledge in making diagnoses (Patel et al 
1994, Garb 2005). Although they do not make diagnoses, participants in this study do use 
them as central anchors in dealing with cases in a way that combined theoretical and 
practical knowledge (Crowe et al 2008) in an approach that appeared strongly intuitive 
(Thompson & Dowding 2009c). Participants anchor with relative immediacy (Ferrario 
2003) on diagnosis as the core organising point in addressing judgement and decision tasks.  
Participants’ mix of theoretical and experiential knowledge is distinctly professional and 
applied to nursing practice. As has long been found with their medical counterparts (Byrne 
& Long 1976), participants contextualise the service-user’s world and issues from their 
own disciplinary perspective. Many of the problems they encounter are interpreted within 
the context of the body of disciplinary knowledge of psychiatry and psychiatric nursing.  
In their contextualised interpretation of information, participants’ exhibit a common feature 
of human judgement (Kruglanski & Orehek 2007), which researchers in nursing have 
explained using concepts such as pattern recognition (Ritter 2003). However, Crowe (2000) 
views the assessment of individuals in the context of diagnostic categories as an attempt to 
artificially order what is in essence a chaotic and distressing experience for the person 
seeking help. In doing this, participants can be interpreted as demonstrating a routinised 
focus on certain aspects of individual’s experiences as salient whilst excluding, on the basis 
of disciplinary and professional knowledge, experiences that the person suffering from 
mental distress may view as highly relevant.  
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Participant reliance on diagnostic categories and symptomological concepts as organising 
principles in their narratives needs to be considered in the context of socialisation into a 
subordinate nursing role. Participants work in mental health services that are for the most 
part governed by psychiatrists (DoHC 2006). However, there is no evidence that they apply 
these categories and concepts in the narrow and exclusive manner described by Crowe 
(2000).  
Where participants’ accounts of individuals’ presenting conditions uses language grounded 
in medical psychiatry, this is embedded in talk from outside the psychiatric repertoire. 
Narrative representations of case formulations feature a mix of lay and nursing terminology 
to describe family life, how individuals reportedly feel, and details of their work and leisure 
activities (Crowe et al 2008). This is to be expected in the context of the social, cultural and 
disciplinary realities of contemporary Irish psychiatric nursing practice.  
Within this context, the individual’s diagnosis and consequent attribution of the sick role 
can be seen to underpin participants’ discursive construction of the individuals’ identity in 
the study data. These two factors combine as fertile ground for the paternalistic treatment of 
individuals who are represented as inherently in need of help. This treatment stems from 
the construction of an identity that is characterised by the inability to be fully autonomous 
and responsible.   
Further evidence that participant narratives are not characteristically medico-psychiatric is 
their lack of reference to predetermined, measurable outcomes. Participant judgement and 
decision-making appears more driven by a beneficent concern for individuals’ best interests 
than clinical outcomes. The rights of individuals are represented as being respected and it is 
made clear that their best interests are paramount.  
Whilst the data are not characterised by explicit talk around the ethical and moral aspects 
involved, issues involving autonomy and beneficence are apparent from the analysis of the 
data. Again, individuals who are experiencing psychological difficulties are represented as - 
by merit of their diagnosis - inherently vulnerable, powerless and in need of direction. 
Participants actively determine the best interests of these people without expressing any 
significant subjective uncertainty or ambiguity.  
As in my own study, Deady (2005) found that this view of individuals and the subsequent 
view of the nurse as responsible for them in a paternalistic manner were not explicitly 
related, but subtly expressed in participant discourse. Both his findings and my own are 
demonstrative of the tacit, habitualised nature of paternalism and the implicit and routine 
 185 
representation of individuals as helpless. There is no evidence that participants purposively 
determine to engage with people in this way - it is simply the routine way in which they 
relate to people with a diagnosis of mental or behavioural disorder.  
From a sociological perspective, such habitualisation of identities and practices are seen to 
be representative the social order of which they are part (Berger & Luckman 1967), and the 
distinct way in which knowledge is categorised and used within that social order. From a 
social psychology perspective, this approach by participants towards categorisation and use 
of knowledge derived from social experience would be seen as evidence of their use of 
intuitive strategies (Garb 2005). Both of these perspectives align with the finding of this 
and other studies, that the paternalistic approach is an integral element of how psychiatric 
nurses in Ireland view their professional role (Deady 2005).  
6.2.2 The intuitive use of knowledge by participants 
In their recall of events in the retrospective interview data participants make both explicit 
and implicit reference to intuitive use of knowledge (Ritter 2003) However, this cannot be 
taken as necessarily indicative of its actual use by them in their everyday clinical practice 
(Edwards & Potter 1992, Hastie & Dawes 2001). More valid evidence regarding the actual 
approaches participants use comes from the in-vivo judgement and decision-making of 
participants in the think aloud data.  
As simulated cases were used for in-vivo data collection, participants lacked personal pre-
encounter knowledge of the individuals about whom they were asked to make judgements 
and decisions. Lacking this data, they resort to reference to the typical. This is evident in 
their reference to similarities between the simulated cases and familiar case types drawn 
from their own experience.  
Participants’ interpretation of these similarities as typically representative of certain 
familiar phenomena is characteristic of the automatic activation of experiential knowledge.  
This is a key component of intuitive judgement, particularly where there is uncertainty 
(Lipshitz & Strauss 1997, Marewski et al 2009). Whilst laboratory-based experimentation 
has been fundamental in uncovering and understanding such processes, it does not fully 
account for their use in everyday settings (Neisser 1976). This study has, to some degree, 
provided a basis for exploring participants’ intuitive approaches to judgement and decision-
making with reference to their everyday work practices, which the following section will 
discuss in more detail. 
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6.3 Intuition & Habitualisation 
Participants make, or discuss making, relatively quick initial judgements and decisions 
without expressing thoughts or reflection on how they arrived at them. This is indicative of 
the opacity of the cognitive processes involved in an intuitive approach (Lamond & 
Thompson 2000, Kahneman 2003a, Thompson & Dowding 2009c). There is no evidence 
that participants are wholly intuitive in their judgement and decision-making - this 
approach is characteristic of the way that they formulate their initial judgements and 
decisions about the cases used in the study. 
Participants’ rapid responses appear to represent their reduction of the complexity of the 
tasks presented to them with the speedy processing of information (Gigerenzer & Goldstein 
1996, Thompson & Dowding 2009c). This is particularly so with cases that participants 
described as familiar or typical. Participants are able to draw quick conclusions on initial 
case presentation because they had dealt with this type of case on previous occasions (Klein 
1989, Mischel & Shoda 1995).  
Accrued knowledge about similar individuals and scenarios is often compared quickly and 
automatically to the case at hand (Higgins 1996) rather than by conscious cue-by-cue 
deliberation (Klein 1998, Wittenbrink et al 1998). Individuals are assigned to a category 
and certain traits and behaviours are ascribed to them (Rothbart et al 1978). This automatic 
categorisation of information has been widely discussed in relation to the concept of the 
stereotyping (Klein 1998, Colman 2009) as a way of simplifying and speeding up 
judgements about individuals and scenarios (Higgins & Brendl 1995, Wittenbrink et al 
1998).  
This is most clearly evident in participants’ reference to diagnosis as an organising 
principle for more deliberate consideration and application of pre-encounter data and 
domain specific knowledge to cases. This enables participants to make quick predictive 
judgements based on their recollection of how this type of person had behaved in similar 
situations in the past (Wittenbrink et al 1998) and so to formulate subjectively less 
uncertain, clearer expressions of judgements and decisions (Orasanu & Connolly 1993, 
Lipshitz 1994, Higgins & Brendl 1995). This reduction of subjective uncertainty is an 
important aspect of participants’ use of intuition (Thompson & Dowding 2009c) which I 
discuss in more detail in Section 6.4, but which I need to leave aside for the moment to 
permit discussion the basic features of participants’ use of intuition in more depth.  
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The quick and routine way in which participants’ describe their initial judgements allows 
room for greater attention to detailed and demanding aspects of cases. Sociologists refer to 
this phenomenon as habitualisation, describing how activities that are engaged in on a 
frequent basis become routinised, being carried out without much conscious effort (Berger 
& Luckmann 1967). Habitualisation is characteristic of both low-skilled and highly 
specialised work and is essential to efficient work systems.  
Despite its undeniable usefulness (Marewski et al 2009), the routinised, intuitive style of 
judgement and decision-making evident in participant narratives has been found to be 
significantly prone to error (Thompson & Dowding 2009b), even in expert medical 
decision-making (Hall 2002). Nonetheless, the benefits of cognitive shortcuts to nursing 
practice are evident in how participants’ rapid, routine handling of judgement and decision 
tasks enables them to give more focused attention to more cognitively demanding tasks. 
Cognitive continuum theory (Hamm 1988, Hammond 2000a) is useful for explaining this, 
particularly in relation to task structure (Fowler 1997) and the devotion of more time and 
energy to less familiar aspects of cases (Cader et al 2005).  
Both the social constructionist concept of habitualisation and cognitive continuum theory 
explain how routinisation of tasks is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of roles in 
any social institution (Berger & Luckmann 1967, Widick 2003). In the study corpus, this is 
evident in how participants talk about activities as general – referring, for example, to a 
particular intervention as something that ‘everyone’ does. At a more discrete level of 
discursive analysis habitualisation can be seen in participants’ use of the first person plural 
in self-reference, or in the discursive function of second person pronouns to generalise 
activity.  
Interventions are represented as habitualised to the extent that participants describe them as 
being what ‘anyone’ would automatically do in a given situation. In doing this participants 
can be seen to draw on their working knowledge of the types of tasks and environments 
represented in the simulated cases (Patel et al 1994). This working knowledge, combined 
with the overarching influence of psychiatric diagnosis, theoretical knowledge and general 
pre-encounter data, facilitates rapid intuitive judgement and decision-making.  
This represents a highly-contextualised application of domain-specific knowledge, which 
has been associated with expert judgement and decision-making (Klein et al 1993, Ericsson 
& Leman 1996). As well as facilitating experienced practitioners’ quick identification of 
commonly encountered phenomena (Patel & Groen 1986) this approach enables them to 
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deal with uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss 1997, Klein 1998). I will discuss this aspect of 
participants’ judgement and decision-making in the following section. 
6.4 Certainty, Uncertainty, Overconfidence & Error 
Drawing on Hammond (1996b), Thompson & Dowding (2009a) distinguish between 
subjective uncertainty and objective uncertainty. Objective uncertainty is the actual, 
quantifiable degree of uncertainty in a given situation, whereas subjective uncertainty is the 
degree of uncertainty internally experienced by an individual. To this, my study adds the 
important interpretative distinction between participants’ expressed subjective uncertainty 
and their experienced subjective uncertainty. This distinction is made in the context of the 
wider recognition of the need to differentiate between expressed and actual mental 
processes (Edwards & Potter 1992a).  
My analysisof the use of verbal and paraverbal markers of certainty and uncertainty shows 
participants’ narratives to be characterised by the expression of subjective certainty in the 
midst of objective uncertainty. In using qualitative data analysis I have been keenly aware 
that the dominant focus in judgement and decision-making research is on research subjects 
and topics that are more amenable to quantitative measurement. Gaeth & Shanteau (2000), 
for example, used agricultural soil judges not to learn more about soil judgement per se, but 
to generate quantitative data to shed light on human judgement generally.  
However, everyday human judgement is normatively expressed in non-numerical, 
qualitative terms such as “I think that” (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, p1124). In my own 
study data, there is no evidence that participants deal with uncertainty in terms of specific 
numerical representation - such as, “Is patient X likely to die in the next 12 hours?” 
(Thompson & Dowding 2009a, p12). This characteristic feature of the data is perhaps 
unfortunate insofar as it does not lend to objective quantitative measurement of the gap 
between objective and subjective uncertainty.  
Human representation of judgements in quantitative terms such as odds or probabilities 
occurs only “occasionally” (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, p1124), and is not normative even 
in applied judgement problems (Gaeth & Shanteau 2000). Despite this, most research on 
certainty, uncertainty and overconfidence involves quantitative approaches (Juslin et al 
2000) which are seen as limited in this regard (Klayman et al 1999). Experimental research 
has been recognised as successful in identifying and understanding intuitive phenomena per 
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se, but findings can have limited application to natural settings (Chapman & Elstein 2000, 
Haskell 2009). This is particularly the case for psychiatric nursing (Wang & Mentes 2009).  
Participant narratives are characterised by the qualitative expression of certainty amidst 
objective uncertainty. This needs to be considered in terms of the propensity for error 
commonly associated with the intuitive, habitual and routinised manner in which 
participants make clinical judgements and decisions. Participants’ confident expression of 
certainty in their clinical judgement and decision-making takes place in a context 
characterised by objective uncertainty and complexity.  
This is evident in the fact that their work is such that there is often no single solution to be 
sought and found (Cioffi 1998, 2001, Thompson & Dowding 2002). Also, in this study (as 
in the normal course of their work) there is no way for participants to quickly quantify 
every available option. Especially apparent is the relative paucity of relevant information 
which participants have to hand when making clinical judgements and decisions 
(Lichenstein & Fischoff 1977, Thompson & Dowding 2009a). Indeed, the cases used for 
data collection in this study were specially formulated in view of how subjective 
uncertainty stems from an incomplete picture of the case at hand (Orasanu & Fischer 1997).  
Regardless of the level of objective uncertainty inherent in their work, participants - like all 
nurses - tend to express subjective confidence about much of their clinical judgement and 
decision-making (Flemming & Fenton 2002, Thompson & Dowding 2009c). This is 
exemplified by one participants comment that: 
“I suppose maybe with my experience you’re already formulating that idea of what’s 
going on even before I had this [reference to case notes], which has been reasonably 
accurate so far.” 
Participant 9, Case 3, Think Aloud 
 
This comment is representative of the overconfidence that characterises not only the 
judgement and decision making narratives of participants in this study, but that of humans 
generally (Dawes 2000, Thompson 2002, Sieck & Arkes 2005, Kvidera & Koutstaal 2008), 
particularly where intuition is involved (Kahneman 2003, Thompson & Dowding 2009c).  
In the think aloud data, the similarity of presenting cases to a participants’ expressed 
perception of case types (e.g., a case where someone is perceived as taking advantage of the 
psychiatric services) tends to be accompanied by the expression of subjective certainty. 
Participants readily identify those types of cases that they commonly encounter and 
therefore can quickly recognise. Interventions are rapidly chosen as a matter of course is 
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and represented as the most obvious and appropriate intervention for a certain type of 
presentation.  
As has found to be the norm in rapid decision-making (Kahneman 2003), a participant’s 
quickly chosen intervention tends to be the only choice mentioned in their narrative 
(Kahneman 2003). This is indicative of participant confidence. Whereas going through the 
different options might be seen as unconfident ‘dithering’, it does not follow that the 
confident expression of a single, definitive choice is underpinned by actual subjective 
certainty. What it more likely points toward is recognition or representativeness (Klein 
1989, Cohen & Freeman 1997, Klein 1998, Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002, Cahan & Snapiri 
2008, Cytryn et al 2009).  
This intuitive strategy also explains participants’ rapid identification of cases as diverging 
from the norm and therefore warranting more focused attention. In this way, drawing on 
knowledge framed by medical constructs such as diagnostic categories to represent types of 
cases, participants mark out cases as potentially more difficult or less difficult to deal with 
(Kaempf et al 1996). They also quickly single out of aspects of cases as representative of 
social constructs, such as the “normal family”.  
Although participants’ rapid recognition of case features as typical does not centre on 
diagnosis-related elements alone, diagnosis is the point around which other aspects tend to 
be discursively organised. Across the study data, where participants’ refer to prior 
knowledge in this way, their verbal and paraverbal markers of certainty communicate 
authority and confidence. This amounts to the implicit expression by participants of their 
faith in the robustness of their own combination of experience and domain-specific 
knowledge in making decisions and judgements.  
This is part of participants’ wider discursive construction of their expertise, which can also 
be seen in their self-reference to the ability to quickly and confidently recognise typical 
aspects of cases. This ability to quickly identify typical features has been associated with 
expertise (Brannon & Carson 2003), particularly where there is time pressure and 
uncertainty (Klein 1998). However, expertise cannot be attributed to participants solely on 
the basis of their demonstration of rapid recognition.  
Rapid recognition of a feature of a case as representative of particular phenomenon is not 
necessarily a reliable indicator that this is so (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Also, the 
reliability of experience as an indicator of expertise is highly questionable (Shanteau 1992), 
especially in nursing (Christensen & Hewitt-Taylor 2006). Rather than representing 
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expertise, participants’ apparent ‘effectiveness-with-ease’ (Strack 1992) is characteristic of 
the use of what Hammond (2000b, p60) has described as “precisely those cognitive 
activities that deceive us”.  
Although objective uncertainty can only be reduced to a certain level (Hammond 1996b), 
individuals use intuitive thinking to reduce their experience of subjective uncertainty (Klein 
1998). The use of intuition has been linked to overconfidence in judgement and decision-
making (Henrion & Fischloff 1986), and in this regard participants can certainly be seen as 
overconfident (Thompson & Dowding 2009a, 2009b, 2009d). The expression of confidence 
by participants in this study is an example of the use of intuition as a strategy by which 
uncertainty is subjectively reduced and suppressed.  
Participants’ expression of confidence is detectable by the absence of verbal and paraverbal 
markers of subjective uncertainty that they use elsewhere in their narratives. This applies 
both to participants’ in-vivo judgement and decision-making (Lichtenstein et al 1982, 
Dawes 1988, Morgan & Henrion 1990) and their reformulation of cases from memory 
(Ross 1989, Lipshitz & Strauss 1997, Thomspon & Dowding 2009d). The relationship 
between participants’ expressed confidence and their reliance on intuitive strategies is in 
line with what we know of how nurses and midwives deal with uncertainty in their 
judgement and decision-making (Cioffi & Markham 1997, Cioffi 2001, 2002).  
Participants’ use of intuition serves the purpose of reducing the cognitive load of their 
judgement and decision-making where there is uncertainty (Ciofi 2000, Hammond 2000b). 
The downside of this strategy is that it increases their reliance on illogical and potentially 
erroneous preconceived notions (Cioffi & Markham 1997). However, the effects of 
intuitive thinking on participant accuracy are not quantitatively measured in this study, as is 
the norm in the study of applied judgement problems (Gaeth & Shanteau 2000). 
This is mainly because, as with applied judgement research generally, precisely what 
constitutes error in the case of participants can be difficult to quantify in empirical terms 
(Gaeth & Shanteau 2000). Also, without recourse to the statistical testing of accuracy using 
normative Bayesian models or subjective expected utilities, measurable definitions of what 
constitutes error for the purposes of experimental testing and retesting can be difficult 
(Lipshitz 1997). However, the negative influence that reliance on intuition has on the 
rationality of participants’ judgement and decision-making is apparent.  
Participants’ expressions of confidence and subjective certainty frame their clinical 
judgement and decision-making in more optimistic terms than is warranted by the 
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approaches they use (Croskerry 2002). My novel method for detecting verbal markers of 
uncertainty, certainty and confidence is all the more important in view of the fact that the 
expression of subjective certainty and confidence in intuitive judgement and decision-
making has strong positive associations with error (Klein et al 1993). Although psychiatric 
nurses’ practice is not always as measurable in quantitative terms as that of other health 
professionals, this study’s identification of qualitative markers of explicit and implicit 
expression of uncertainty and certainty is an important contribution to the study of their 
clinical judgement and decision-making.  
The most significant contribution of my study with regard to subjective uncertainty and 
overconfidence is the novel and rigorous methods I have used to detect the use of 
approaches that are contextually error-prone. This is should be viewed as an addition to 
actuarial approaches such as clearly defined and measureable nursing outcomes (Doyle & 
Dolan 2002, Randell et al 2007). I will now consider this detection of participants’ use of 
intuition, overconfidence, and the scope for error that accompanies it, in the context of the 
nature of the complexities of their work (Orasanu & Connolly 1993, Dawes 1994).  
6.5 Complexity & the interplay of analytic & intuitive thinking  
Whatever the actual merits of an intuitive approach to clinical judgement and decision-
making, participants appear to find it useful for reducing subjective uncertainty. However, 
as it does not at the same time reduce objective certainty, this can increase the risk of error 
(Hammond 1993). My use of the term “error” here does not refer solely to the failure to 
make empirically accurate judgements and decisions, but includes ‘getting it wrong’ 
qualitatively. 
In making clinical judgements and decisions, participants can be seen to rely on their pre-
understanding of individuals and/or types of individuals. The dominance of this intuitive 
use of knowledge can increase the scope for error by precluding due consideration of the 
situation that the person is in (Gilbert & Jones 1986). It can also result in socially 
undesirable consequences (Park & Rothbart 1982, Chen et al 1996) the most obvious being 
participants’ routinised paternalism towards individuals with a psychiatric diagnosis.  
There is little or no evidence of critical deliberation on the part of participants around their 
choice of habitualised ‘interventions’ such as reward-based attempts at behavioural 
conditioning, subtle coercion and automatic limiting of choice. These interventions are 
represented as habitual, normative and integral to the role of the psychiatric nurse. Where 
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individuals do express awareness of the possibility that their judgements and decisions may 
be socially inappropriate, or of the potential for error inherent in complex cases, they tend 
to deliver more deliberative and analytic narratives (Bargh 1996, Kaempf et al 1996).  
For example, participants engage in slower, more detailed discussion where case features 
are seen not to relate to the type of person or situation that are more frequent and/or recent. 
This thoughtful discussion of cases is always pursuant to initial quick judgements and 
involves consideration of the presenting cues in the context of the activated knowledge on 
which these judgements are based. The evidence to on which these observations are based 
ranges from the level of detail with which a case is discussed (Neisser 1967) to paraverbal 
phenomena such as markers of hesitancy.  
Depending on the data type, through this focusing of effort, participants formulate (in the 
think aloud data) or reformulate (in the retrospective interview data) hypotheses. Across 
both data types, participants more readily explain their judgements and decisions regarding 
what are presented as straightforward, typical cases (Klein 1989). In general, more 
complex, atypical cases require more time and are explained in more detail, although in the 
retrospective interviews some participants’ reformulate typical, routine cases with 
thoughtful representation of the salient features of the case.  
Participants’ deliberative processing of information can be explained by participant 
resistance to automaticity. Research has shown that this can occur not only as unusual 
presentations require it (Kaempf et al 1996), but also when an individual makes a values-
based choice to do so (Wegener & Petty 1995, Stapel & Winkelman 1998, Wittenbrink 
1998, Wegener et al 2006). It is to be expected that participants’ values, as well as their 
expectancy regarding the potential outcomes of a situation, strongly influence their 
judgement (Bandura 1986, Beach 1990, Widick 2003, Wang & Mentes 2009).  
However, the fact that participants focus with effort on the contrast between presenting 
cues and activated knowledge does not in itself guarantee that assessment is empirically 
accurate (Higgins 1996) or qualitatively ‘right’. The values underpinning participants’ 
perspectives on the cases may not be congruent with those of others involved (in the case of 
retrospective interviews) (Trout 2009), or with societal and professional values (in the case 
of the think aloud data). Participants’ values are best derived from their narratives (Kaempf 
et al 1996), which draw on their clinical experience (Klein 1989).  
These are organised around diagnostic and symptomological concepts that have strong 
grounding in the medical model of psychiatry. On the basis of these, participants tell how 
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they engaged in informed anticipation of the likely course of events to select what they saw 
as the most appropriate interventions (Klein 1998). Participants’ normative expectations, 
grounded in psychiatric medicine, are the standard against which presenting cases are 
assessed.  
However, participants do not solely base their expectations on psychiatric domain-specific 
knowledge, but also on more qualitative, personal ways of knowing. As described by 
O’Neill (2005), in participants’ judgement and decision-making narratives, theoretical 
knowledge and personal knowledge can be seen working together, in a non-dichotomous 
fashion. Each informs and makes sense of the other.  
Examples of non-theoretical pre-encounter data referred to by participants in their 
explanatory narratives include knowledge of people gleaned from verbal reports from other 
nurses and from personal relationships. Participants’ use of this personal knowledge in 
tandem with domain-specific, theoretical knowledge helps them to make sense of the 
presenting cues. Participants demonstrate selective attention (Kahneman 1973) to cues in 
that after paying attention initially to cues, some are attended to further and others 
dismissed or played down in significance.  
Participants also combine lay and psychiatric knowledge to identify as absent, and seek out, 
aspects of a case presentation that they would normally make reference to in their 
judgement and decision-making. It is this context that participants identify presentations as 
unusual or atypical. In considering this process, it is important to remember that 
participants’ knowledge activation is distinct from their actual use of knowledge - activated 
knowledge is not always used in making a judgement (Wittenbrink et al 1998).  
This is because participants, like all individuals, are more likely to identify phenomena to 
which they have greater accessibility to in terms of knowledge activation (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1973, Higgins 1996, Kahneman 2003). This knowledge is more likely to 
influence participant judgement than is equally relevant data that is not so readily available 
(Thompson 2002). As psychiatric nurses operating within a medical model of healthcare 
provision, it is not surprising therefore that participants’ consistently refer to knowledge 
from the field of psychiatry.  
This knowledge is borrowed by participants from the psychiatric profession and interpreted 
and applied in lay terms in order to deal with the problems of everyday life that are faced 
by service-users. However, attempting to explain everyday problems in medico-psychiatric 
terms has its drawbacks. Participants’ perception of what is happening in cases differs from 
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what is actually occurring due to their over-reliance knowledge that is more readily 
available and familiar (Higgins & Brendl 1995). Indeed studies suggest that information 
confirming a stereotype is more readily available for recall than data that is likely to 
disconfirm it (Rothbart et al 1979, Evans 2008).  
Participants narratives indicate that they work thoughtfully through cases, drawing on, 
interpreting and applying a combination of psychiatric and lay repertoires of knowledge. 
Their thoughtful narration of events tends to be firmly grounded in the diagnostic 
categories to which the individuals involved had been allocated. Therefore, it is clear that it 
is not a question of participants using deliberate reflection and intuition each in absolute 
exclusion to the other.  
Even when participants work discursively through cases in an analytic manner, there is 
evidence that they apply knowledge in an intuitive manner. This complex interplay between 
intuitive and analytic strategies is typical of nursing judgement and decision-making (Lauri 
et al 1997, 2001), and it is difficult to tease both elements apart. I have been conscious of 
the need to avoid forcing a falsely ‘clear cut’ distinction between the two in analysis and 
discussion of the data. 
For this reason, nurse researchers tend to favour the perspective of approaches like 
cognitive continuum theory (Hammond 1996a, Lamond & Thompson 2000, Lauri & 
Salantera 2002, Offredy et al 2008) as more representative of nurses’ clinical judgement 
and decision-making than dual systems models (Evans 2008). I believe that because of their 
non-dichotomous approach, such theoretical perspectives also fit best with the evidence 
from this study. However, the design of this study does not provide the basis for confirming 
or rejecting a hypothesis that the findings fit into the conceptual box of non-dichotomous 
theories over and above others. 
6.6 Semiosis & the control of choice  
Participants’ narratives amply illustrate their control over the choices available to 
indviduals availing of their services, which is achieved by discursively controlling the 
shared construction of meaning (semiosis) with them. This process can be seen to hinge on 
participants’ perceptions of others, including individuals using the mental health services, 
their significant others, healthcare workers and other professionals (Ciofi 2000, O’Shea 
2008). This control occurs in the context of a collaborative process which offers an 
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opportunity for authentic sharing of understanding between participants and others, 
particularly in terms of role and associated expectations. 
The separation of this process into social and cognitive elements is a construct of the 
academic disciplines. As can be seen in the norms and values expressed in the narratives, 
these elements are naturally interdependent. Participants’ judgements and decisions are not 
based solely on external cues, but also on shared, internalised social values (Festinger 1950, 
Wang & Mentes 2009). Cognisance of the intricate social-cognitive interplay in clinical 
judgement and decision-making is particularly important in understanding the nature of 
shared decision-making in health care (Epstein et al 2005, Johansson et al 2005, Wirtz et al 
2006, Halpern 2007). 
Where participants describe habitually and implicitly sharing understanding with others, 
there is no cause for remark and no explicit expression of values. This sharing of 
understanding can be understood in terms of cognitive phenomena (Hardin & Higgins 
1996), in particular with regard to perception. Shared reality and construction of shared 
meaning is not confined to participants’ thoughtful sharing of the decision-making process 
with others - automaticity and intuitive thinking are involved. 
At the same time the authentic valuing of the individuality of those using the mental health 
services is explicitly expressed as normative. This is discursively linked to the empathic 
identification of a shared humanity and shared meaning in everyday events. Participants 
sometimes identify with individuals in situations where they might be expected to act more 
negatively towards them, for example, hostel residents who break the institutional rules.  
In such instances an individual’s behaviour is represented as indicative of their common 
humanity rather than as typical of a particular type of patient. There is however, a limit to 
the extent to which participants identify with service-users, seen most clearly in their 
habitualised tendency towards paternalism. There are no discernable features in terms of 
location of cases or demographics that are associated with either tendency. Paternalistic 
control of situations is visible in community as well as inpatient scenarios.  
Where participants do identify with others, this involves discursively incorporating them 
into their own social group rather than assigning them to an out-group (Brewer 1991). This 
is an example of how participants, as individual judges and decision-makers operating in 
isolation, display the influence of social norms and values (Moscovici 1985, Wang & 
Mentes 2009). In this regard, participant narratives are demonstrative of a shared reality 
between participants, and to varying degrees with other health professionals.  
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This sharing of a discipline-based reality points towards the extent to which participants 
internalise their professional role and identity, and is very much part of the social institution 
of psychiatric nursing. This came across most strongly in the analysis of the data in 
participants’ use of the first person plural pronoun “we”. This pronoun is used in self 
reference as participants give an account of their own judgements and decisions.  
Participants use personal pronouns to mark out their work as a collective effort (Lerner 
1993) - that of the psychiatric nurse. The implication of “we” as a self reference is that what 
is being described are not merely the actions of an individual, but of ‘everynurse’. In the in-
vivo judgement and decision-making of the think aloud data, “we” serves to include the 
interviewer (who was also a nurse for all but two participants) in the judgement and 
decision-making process.  
This is indicative of the natural inclination of participants to collectivise their judgement 
and decision-making. Participant pronoun use builds consensus and subtly gains the 
interviewer’s assent-by-silence to the participants’ judgement and decision-making. 
Essentially this constitutes in-vivo construction of shared understanding (Lerner 1993).  
This building of shared understanding through the construction of shared meaning relates to 
two distinct issues that have been underlined in Chapters Four and Five. First, participants 
identify with their professional role to the extent that they talk about their own judgements 
and decisions as being corporate. Corporate judgements and decisions are discussed as if 
they were the participants’ own.  
Second, in sharing the judgement and decision-making process with service-users, 
participants can be seen to disempower them (Walsh et al 2008). This is not an end in itself 
– analysis of the data demonstrates participants’ representation of these individuals as 
inherently disempowered by merit of their diagnosis in the first instance. Instead they 
follow that well-documented habitual, routinised paternalism that has been shown to be 
characteristic of those helping the mentally and behaviourally disordered since the days 
when doctors first took on permanent roles in the asylums of the 19th century (Foucault 
1965). 
At the same time participants’ close identification with social role can be understood as a 
function of healthy team-working. This is true insofar as lack of homogeneity in a social 
group hinders the smooth operation of the team (Vallaster 2005), as is evident where 
participants’ perception of the task at hand is not shared with others. Here, critique of 
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another’s perceptions and subsequent actions are couched in disclaiming and diminutive 
language (Heritage 1984).  
This is indicative of the high value placed on the preservation of social homogeneity in the 
face of difference. Also evident here is the value placed on communication between 
participants and others for the development and preservation of the shared understanding 
(White 2002) that underpins this social homogeneity. Other studies have also found this to 
be the case particularly in pressured healthcare work environments (Slade et al 2008).  
Non-acceptance of diversity can result in antagonism (Vielhaber Hermon 1996, Vallaster 
2005), and in situations that feature ambiguity due to lack of social homogeneity (e.g., the 
multidisciplinary team) participants’ talk about seeking input not only from fellow nurses 
but from other healthcare professionals (McCaughan 2002). The positive aspect of such 
close identification with and reliance on others is that rather than working in isolation, 
participants draw on a collective and multidisciplinary body of experiential knowledge 
(McCaughan 2002). This sharing of experiential knowledge points towards a certain degree 
of shared meaning between participants and their colleagues (Steinberg 2004).  
This shared meaning is conjunctural, arising from conjoined social practices and 
circumstances that involve those using the services as well as health professionals. It is also 
contingent, with specific events resulting in the construction of specific contextual 
meanings. This is best illustrated with reference to one participant’s narration of an instance 
whereby they and their colleagues restrained and secluded an individual.  
For the participant, the accepted meaning and limitations of ‘choice’ are quite different 
from the wider societal understanding of ‘choice’. In this instance, shared meaning of the 
word “choice” is hampered by the fact that “choice”, as well as other words and phrases, 
represent different phenomena and contingencies for those involved (Hamm 1991). This is 
to be expected due to the general lack of human awareness about the nature of linguistic 
ambiguity.  
This is perhaps why the participant attributes their failure to reach consensus with the 
individual to factors other than differences in basic interpretation of words (Fischhoff 
2000). Even in narrating the event they appear oblivious to the fact that the “choice” 
offered to the person was really no choice at all.This and other examples from the study 
corpus detailed in Chapters Four & Five, show that human communication is characterised 
by ambiguity even in the most straightforward situations (Fischhoff 2000).  
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The sharing of a certain perception of reality with others is a vital element of participants’ 
judgement and decision-making (Chen et al 1996). However, where the sharing of 
understanding is limited to participants’ colleagues, it results in a diminished level of 
identification with service-users (Allen 1998). So whilst shared understanding is desirable 
in psychiatric nursing practice (Volpe et al 1996), its usefulness is contingent on its being 
shared with all involved in an episode of care. 
There is a distinct link here between identification with professional role and the 
disempowering of others. The disempowering of others is achieved by participants through 
the inauthentic building of shared meaning using dynamic social processes (Steinberg 
2004). This is plainly discernable in participants’ descriptions of how they exercise power 
in their specific institutional context. 
This exercising of power is represented by participants as vicarious as opposed to 
controlling. Power is not exercised as an aggressive act of overt domination. Service-users 
are not represented as controlled or vanquished, but as inherently powerless and vulnerable.  
These powerless individuals are represented as needing someone with the knowledge and 
power to act in their best interests. Their need of professional help is discursively 
represented as evidence of innate, fundamental powerlessness. This, rather than their 
identity as a “difficult patient” (Breeze & Repper 1998, p1301), underpins participants’ 
paternalistic coercion of individuals.  
In this context, as suggested by Barnard & Sandelowski (2001), participants represent their 
exercise of power as genuinely beneficent and not at all self-serving. Subtle coercion of 
individuals is discursively constructed as a fundamental function of their psychiatric 
nursing role. As with the family supervisors studied by van Nijnatten et al (2001), this is on 
the basis of the discriminating power that participants’ professional role bestows upon 
them. Exercise of this power is underpinned by the perception that powerlessness is an 
innate element of the personhood of the service-user.  
Participants represent themselves as powerful professionals “separate” from those using the 
mental health services (Shattell et al 2008). This is problematic insofar as the two are 
supposedly working in partnership. As in the study by van Nijnatten et al (2001), what is 
lacking in this partnership is the authentic sharing of meaning. 
Instead, shared meaning operates as a function of professional power. This is seen most 
clearly where choice and contingency were discussed in the retrospective interview data 
element of the study corpus. There the operation of power and control as a function of the 
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social role of the psychiatric nurse can be seen, in certain social contexts, to underpin offers 
of choice and the discursive management of contingency.  
Where participants’ perception of their role and that of the service-user enables it, there is 
nurse-led construction of shared meaning. In this, participants represent their role in terms 
of what is expected from themselves and others (Sarbin & Allen 1968). Their role is shown 
to endow them with certain rights and privileges, as well as placing them under certain 
obligations towards others.  
This taking-on of role, both by participants and others, forms the basis for the interactive 
processes narrated in the study corpus (Krauss & Fussel 1996). These processes essentially 
involve participants ‘being nurses’, for which they need others to be ‘service-users’. This 
process is governed by participants’ subtly-masked perception of duty to limit service-
user’s choices in their best interests, e.g., in order to gain their compliance.  
In the retrospective interview data this occurs under the guise of a process of shared 
decision-making whereby participants represent themselves as working collaboratively with 
service-users. They offer open-ended options and present themselves as open to new 
information and diverse outcomes. However discursive analysis reveals this ‘collaboration’ 
to be governed by ulterior motives, for example, the covert attaining of compliance.  
Participants who engage individuals in this way represent their actions as being in the best 
interests of the other person. This is underpinned by expressions of beneficence which 
cannot be differentiated from those of participants who offer people a more authentic form 
of choice and empowerment. Participants do not seem to view their control of the 
construction of shared meaning to limit the choices of others in negative terms.  
Participants represent their ability to construct shared meaning for subtly coercive purposes 
as a fundamental psychiatric nursing skill. The perceived need to engage in subtle coercion 
seems to hinge on participants’ understanding of their role vis-à-vis the type of person they 
are working with. This is inextricably linked to participants’ intuitive judgements of 
individuals as representing a certain type of individual who is to be routinely engaged with 
in a particular way.  
There is a link here between the use of intuition as explained by concepts such as 
stereotyping, pattern recognition and representative/recognition heuristics, and the concept 
of social position (Stryker & Statham 1985, Chen et al 1996). Covert coercion appears to be 
seen as a valid form of engagement with certain types of individual, for example hostel 
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residents - but not others, for example nurses. Participants represent this approach as a 
normative element of their role as psychiatric nurses (Brewer & Brown 1998).  
This way of relating to people appears internalised to the extent that rather than being 
represented as an intentional acting out of professional role, it is habitual (Stryker & 
Statham 1985). In this way, participants’ identity as psychiatric nurses confers on them the 
right to deal with people in a manner that they might, in other contexts, construe as socially 
undesirable and even unethical. Indeed other studies have linked this strong sense of social 
identity to stereotypical perception of others (Tajfel 1981, Brewer & Brown 1998).  
In both the sociological and psychological literature, this is discussed in terms of an 
individual’s perceptions of social group membership – for themselves and others. Social 
groupings are a vital underpinning of the automatic cognitive mechanism of stereotyping 
others (Stryker & Stratham 1985). Whereas traditionally the study of stereotyping explored 
its social motivation, from the cognitive perspective it can just as fully be accounted for as 
a relatively value-free process of cognitive shortcutting (Fiske & Taylor 1984). 
Participants’ perception of themselves as ‘nurse’ and the other as ‘patient’ or ‘client’ is at 
the core of the exercise of covertly coercive power and control. As an inherent part of their 
social role, coercion by participants is in line with the expected performance of role by the 
other. As such, it has become normative, routine and habitual in the participants’ practice. 
6.7 Conclusion 
From analysis of the study data, participants can be seen to make quick intuitive 
judgements as well as taking time and effort to explore matters further to decide what to do 
next (Trope 1986). Participants use a more deliberative approach especially when faced 
with atypical presentations (Kahneman 2003, Evans 2008). Overall their initial judgements 
are characteristically quick and routine, followed by more deliberate, thoughtful reasoning. 
This is evident in both the think aloud and retrospective interview data. The deliberate, 
thoughtful approach of participants could be interpreted as their performance in response to 
being interviewed or asked to think aloud. However, these approaches have been used for 
decades as valid means of gaining insight into human judgement and decision-making, and 
participants did engage freely in rich narrative representation of their judgement and 
decision-making without much difficulty or prompting. 
The quick and routine way in which participants approach cases can be explained in 
cognitive terms with reference to the vast literature on intuition. From a sociological 
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perspective the same process can be accounted for with reference to habitualisation and 
social role. In this chapter I have explained how such concepts can be seen to relate to 
features of participants’ judgement and decision-making, such as confidence and 
uncertainty. 
Although the ability to quickly apply a combination of experience and domain-specific 
knowledge is seen as an indicator of expertise, the cognitive strategies used to do this are 
potentially irrational and erroneous intuitive (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Nisbett & Ross 
1980, Thompson & Dowding 2009d). Participants’ expression of effectiveness-with-ease 
and certainty, where there is objective and subjective uncertainty, is an important finding of 
this study. More important is the novel combination and application of recently developed 
methods of analysis. These enable the detection of the consistent use of verbal markers of 
subjective uncertainty in narratives in which participants express confidence (Cheng 2002, 
Jaworski et al 2003).  
Participants’ combination of a thoughtful approach with intuition is no guarantee that they 
can avoid the errors or biases inherent in intuitive judgement (Kahneman 2003). Although 
this study did not set out to empirically measure error or bias, it is noteworthy that 
participants’ reflection on their initial judgements does not cause them to deviate from their 
focus on an individual’s diagnosis as a central point of reference. Depending on one’s 
philosophical approach to psychiatry and mental health care generally, this could be viewed 
positively (Garb 2005) or negatively (Crowe 2000). 
Participants’ routinised approach to judgement and decision-making is based on an 
adaptation of psychiatric diagnostics that combines domain-specific knowledge with skilled 
know-how. This illustrates how the medical model of psychiatry underpins the culture of 
the institution of psychiatric nursing. As well as determining the aspects of a case to which 
participants attend, this medico-psychiatric underpinning determines participants’ 
representation of their role. 
The nurses’ immersion in their role and their perception of the service-user as ‘other’ 
determines for them what is seen as cognitively achievable and socially acceptable. Subtle 
coercion, beneficent manipulation and even dismissiveness all feature in the way that 
participants make clinical judgements and decisions only because their way of valuing 
individuals permits it. In light of this, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the psychiatric 
nurses’ view of what exactly constitutes a service-user’s best interests can be at a remove 
from the individual’s own perception.  
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This tension appears to be upheld in the view of the psychiatric nurse by the degree to 
which they see the service-user as an inherently damaged and powerless ‘other’. This view 
is in itself upheld by the medical/psychiatric lens through which participants intuitively 
assess the ‘other’. The medical and psychiatric nature of the role of the psychiatric nurse 
acts doubly, therefore, in the coercion and subtle disempowerment of those seeking help. 
Other studies have found similar non-therapeutic use of professional power to be 
characteristic of the psychiatric nursing (Walsh et al 2008) and other ‘caring’ roles (van 
Nijnatten et al 2001). 
How participants understand their role and duty of care determines how they perceive 
others and the degree to which they engage in authentically mutual collaboration with them. 
Mutual collaboration is not always authentic, that is; participants do not always engage on 
equal terms with service-users. However, as also found by Breeze & Reppert (1998) and 
van Nijnatten et al (2001), subtle manipulation and coercion of people and situations by 
participants is underpinned by a participant representation of their role and duty as one of 
helping those who are powerless to help themselves. Participants do not deliberately seek to 
disempower others as an end in itself.  
In this chapter I have drawn on the nursing and wider literature from across several 
decades, paying particular attention to seminal pieces of work that have informed my 
discussion, alongside more recent publications. Having described what analysis has 
revealed about participant judgement and decision-making, it remains to discuss the 
implications of this in relation to contemporary psychiatric nursing practice, both in Ireland 
and in general. I will do this in Chapter Seven, making reference specifically to 
methodological and other research considerations, implications for those using the services, 
and implications for psychiatric nursing practice and education. I will refer to health and 
social policy throughout as it pertains to each topic. 
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Chapter Seven  
Implications, Recommendations & Limitations 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One of this study I noted that international psychiatric nursing research does not 
always find direct application to the clinical context of Irish psychiatric nursing and mental 
health service provision. In this chapter I disuss the implications of my findings with 
particular reference to national policy (DoHC 2006) and relevant research, in order to 
critically locate the study findings in Irish psychiatric nursing and psychiatric nursing 
generally. I do this across several areas for which the study findings have implications and 
make recommendations on these.  
In doing this, it is necessary to revisit the study’s aims and objectives as refined and 
restated at the end of Chapter Two: 
Aims 
1. To explore the judgement and decision-making of RPNs working in the Irish 
Republic, in terms of both the cognitive processes involved and their social context.  
2. To consider and apply the findings to psychiatric nursing practice and education, as 
well as to policy issues and future research in this area. This applies primarily to the 
Irish context from which the data were generated and, where valid, to psychiatric 
nursing generally. 
Objectives 
1. To give a comprehensive account of clinical judgement and decision-making in 
nursing, in particular as it applies to psychiatric nursing 
2. To understand, through a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, how and why RPNs make their clinical judgements and decisions  
3. To gain as much insight as possible on the cognitive processes and social context 
of the clinical judgement and decision-making of RPNs, in particular analysing the 
interplay between the external social and internal cognitive elements involved. 
4. Having fulfilled the aims and objectives above, to make applications to 
psychiatric nursing in the Irish republic, with particular reference to its future 
development. 
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In discussing the study’s implications, recommendations and limitations, I address the three 
main aspects of the study’s aims and objectives: 
• The cognitive processes involved in nurses’ judgement and decision-making  
• The social context of nurses’ judgement and decision-making 
• The interplay between these cognitive and social elements  
This is done in terms of their applications to, and implications for the current state of, and 
future developments in: 
• Research 
• Practice 
• Policy 
• Education 
In particular, I make reference to the role of the psychiatric nurse. This is because of the 
focus of government policy on this role (DoHC 2006) and also because of the centrality of 
participants’ role in understanding and applying the study findings.   
7.2 Implications & Recommendations for Further Research 
One of the main purposes of an exploratory descriptive study such as this one is to provide 
direction for further research (Gleeson & Higgins 2009). In this chapter and in Chapter Six 
I have mentioned several areas in which further research could build on the findings of this 
study. I will discuss these here, in addition to considering further application of the 
methods used in the study to the study of judgement and decision-making. 
As with human judgement and decision-making generally (Funder 1987, Hammond 
1996b), error in nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making is an important focus of 
research (Thompson 2002, Thompson & Dowding 2009b). This usually involves 
generating quantitative evidence in relation to practice-based errors in cognitive processing. 
The nature of my study’s design means that it differs from this approach.  
Evidence of participant error in this study is in terms of qualitative mismatch between 
nurses’ perceptions and what other studies have reported as the values of those seeking 
psychiatric nursing care (Noble et al 2001, Mental Health Commission 2005, Department 
of Health 2006, Dunne 2006). In addition to this, there is evidence of mismatch between the 
values that participants expressed and those that are evident in their accounts of practice. 
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Although expressed qualitatively in this study, future studies could consider ways of 
reducing this type of mismatch to some form of quantitative measurement.  
Researchers whose main interest is in human judgement and decision-making per se tend 
towards quantitative methodologies that focus on the specific cognitive aspects of 
judgement and decision-making. Within their disciplines and among the scientific 
community generally, these approaches are valued above those that are qualitative or use 
mixed methods (Cahan & Snapiri 2008). These methods could prove useful in further 
research that explores accuracy and error in psychiatric nursing by providing a means for 
looking at nurses’ performance in tasks such as the completion of depression rating scales, 
or predictive judgements of likelihood of significant events such as suicide (Garb 2005). 
Throughout this thesis I have outlined the usefulness of approaches grounded in social 
judgement theory for understanding nurses’ clinical judgement and decision-making. 
Although not applied directly in this exploratory descriptive study, cognitive continuum 
theory and the lens model are particularly useful for investigating the accuracy of clinical 
judgement and decision-making. However, applying these approaches to some aspects of 
psychiatric nursing can be problematic due to issues such as the lack of clarity surrounding 
the links between interventions and outcomes and the difficulties with reducing the work of 
psychiatric nurses to discrete quantifiable and measurable phenomena. 
Regardless of the use of a qualitative or quantitative approach, the mismatch between 
nurses’ expressed values and those evident in their practice is an area that warrants further 
investigation, as does the mismatch between the values expressed by nurses and service-
users (Wang & Mentes 2009). However, many of the elements of psychiatric nursing 
practice and associated phenomena discussed in this study are not as amenable to 
investigation in this way. This is particularly the case for nurses’ use of intuitive judgement 
and decision-making strategies, which although not impervious to investigation, does pose 
methodological challenges (Thompson & Dowding 2002).  
My study has shown how challenges like this can be addressed by an eclectic approach to 
study design. Using a pluralist approach to research in order to shed light on the salient 
issues regarding the judgement and decision-making of psychiatric nurses is not novel 
(Tees et al 2007). To this end, researchers need to look beyond the dichotomy of qualitative 
versus quantitative, and romantic versus empiricist (Garb 2005) schools, stepping outside 
the conceptual arena to which they may have become accustomed to seek more authentic 
ways in which to ask and answer research questions.  
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One approach which this study introduces for overcoming limits imposed by dichotomous 
thinking is the overlapping of aspects of sociological theory and cognitive psychology in 
order to better understand how cues are understood and interpreted (Dawes 2000, Glassman 
& Kang 2007). Although not without its tensions, such innovative combination of different 
theoretical perspectives can provide the basis for overcoming some of the difficulties in 
applying quantitative measurement to the judgement and decision-making of psychiatric 
nurses. My study’s combination of cognitive and social perspectives to explore 
participants’ judgement and decision-making essentially involves viewing participants’ 
cognitive processes as socially situated.  
This meant viewing participant use of language as a form of social action (Potter 1996, 
2001). My attentiveness to the meta-narrative of the data was vital to this. Such an 
approach is not novel, and has been a key principle in methods of analysing verbal data, 
e.g., conversation analysis (Atkinson & Heritage 1984, Heritage 1984) and data analysis in 
discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter 1992a).  
Its usefulness in my own study was most discernable in its ability to detect participant 
expression of hesitancy and subjective uncertainty. This was achieved through novel 
application of methods of analysis not usually applied to this type of data in this field of 
research. Repeated application of the methodology with a more clearly defined population, 
e.g., Clinical Nurse Specialists in psychiatric nursing, might be of use in answering more 
specific research questions around particular areas such as expertise.  
Expertise is one of several topics about which this study yielded evidence that, whilst 
relevant, stopped short of giving a fully conclusive picture. Participants could be seen to 
discursively construct their expertise, but comparing this to their actual expertise was 
beyond the scope of the study. Research that compares nurses’ actual performance in terms 
of expertise to their discursive claims of expertise would be of interest particularly in the 
context of other issues that arose in this study, such as overconfidence, development of 
expertise and certainty/uncertainty in judgement and decision-making.  
Participant expression of subjective certainty amidst uncertainty was another key feature of 
the data in this study that points towards opportunities for further research. The approach 
used to yield the verbal and paraverbal evidence for this element of the findings could find 
application in studies with a more specific cognitive focus. This would require a departure, 
however, from the usual approach of such research.  
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In order to yield discursive evidence regarding cognitive processes, it is necessary to start 
from an initial focus on participants’ language as data representative of social as well as 
cognitive processes (Potter 1996, 2001). This is because speech has the obvious function of 
communicating information (its “referential denotative function”) and the less obvious 
function of social action (its “performative-pragmatic function”) (Oliveira et al 2007, 
p121). Therefore, awareness of social context is not mere familiarity with how, when and 
by whom language is produced, but attention to how the unfolding of the conversation itself 
creates, maintains or disrupts a particular social order (Taylor 2001).  
In this way, as this study has demonstrated, valid evidence regarding cognitive processes 
can be generated by taking an indirect, more socially and qualitatively situated perspective 
than is usually the case with studies on cognition. This constitutes a humanistic view of 
positivistic knowledge, as proposed by commentators such as Gould (1996) and Bunge 
(1983). This view should not be limited to research methods and philosophies, but also 
involve a broader consideration of who is involved in research.  
It has been recognised for some time now that the inclusion of people availing of mental 
health services needs to move beyond the planning and delivery of care and provision of 
education and training, into the area of research and evaluation of practice (Campbell & 
Lindow 1997, Noble et al 2001). Studies of how psychiatric nurses make clinical 
judgements and decisions would benefit from the participation of researchers who have 
experience of using mental health services. This would enhance the validity and rigour of 
any study, in particular those with a predominantly qualitative approach.  
For example, analysis of real-world interactions between nurses and the people for whom 
they provide care could only benefit in terms of validity and rigour if the analysis itself was 
shared between representatives of both constituencies (Perakyla & Vehvilainen 2003). This 
is of particular relevance given the findings of this study with regard to how psychiatric 
nurses can approach people with mental health problems. It stands in contradistinction to 
the paternalism represented in the study data that has dominated psychiatric nursing for 
most of the 20th century. If psychiatric nursing researchers expect practitioners to engage in 
authentic construction of shared meaning with individuals availing of mental health 
services, they need to lead the way by doing the same in their research (McGowan et al 
2009).  
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7.3 Implications for Psychiatric Nursing Practice and Those Using 
Mental Health Services 
This study was designed to elicit information about nurses’ normative practice as opposed 
to information about individuals using mental health services. However, the role of the 
psychiatric nurse is fundamentally vis-à-vis those availing of mental health services. For 
this reason it is vital to discuss the implications of the study findings for these individuals 
as well as for psychiatric nursing practice. 
I had initially envisaged setting out these implications two separate sections. However, on 
reflection and in particular in light of the findings, I became aware that separating one from 
the other would represent an unhelpful dichotomous compartmentalisation of the study’s 
implications. The practice of psychiatric nurses cannot be considered in isolation, because 
although individuals using mental health services may or may not (to varying degrees) need 
the input of psychiatric nurses, without individuals who need their assistance psychiatric 
nurses are without a raison d’etre (Jackson & Stevenson 2000). 
A desire to improve the clinical competency of nurses and promote evidence-based care has 
driven recent research on clinical judgement and decision-making in nursing, and it is my 
intention in conducting this study to make a meaningful contribution to that body of work. 
There has been increased attention in recent research studies on the accuracy of nurses’ 
judgements and decisions in the context of the need for practice that is more evidence-
based (Talbert & Talbert 2007, Kelechi & Bonham 2008, Thomson et al 2008, Miller et al 
2008, Erci & Sureyya 2008, Thompson & Dowding 2009b). This focus on evidence-based 
practice also extends to psychiatric nursing (McKenna 2003). 
The broad perspective (Burns & Grove 2005) taken by this exploratory descriptive study 
(Gleeson & Higgins 2009) has seen it focus on the social situatedness, process and 
rationality of participants’ clinical judgement and decision-making as opposed to the 
specific measurement of accuracy. The purpose and design of this study has not required 
the same focus on accuracy, clinical competency and evidence-based practice that has been 
sought in quantitative investigations of specific aspects of nursing practice. However, this 
study has considered participants’ clinical judgement and decision-making in terms of 
rationality and internal consistency. 
In doing this, I have been aware that neither internal consistency nor subjective rationality 
is an indication of the accuracy or correctness of judgement and decision-making (Tversky 
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& Kahneman 1974). I have also been aware that judgements and decisions are highly 
personal in nature, and depend not only on the cognitive functioning of the individual, but 
also on the values that they hold (Festinger 1950, Bandura 1986, Wang & Mentes 2009). 
Clinical competency is strongly related both to nurses’ proficiency in clinical judgement 
and decision-making and their values (Cioffi & Markham 1997, Wang & Mentes 2009).  
This study’s discursive analysis of participants’ expression of values that underpin their 
practice demonstrated their identification with the immediate social group to which they 
belong, as well as with wider society. These values determine what participants implicate 
as being ‘good’ or ‘sound’ judgements and decisions, as well as ‘good’ or ‘sound’ ways of 
arriving at judgements and decisions. Here, the observations of Dowding & Thompson 
(2003, 2009) regarding the difficulty of ascertaining precisely what the ‘right’ interventions 
or outcomes are in nursing can be seen to be applicable to psychiatric nursing in particular.  
Indeed, this difficulty is not unique to participants in this study, or nurses generally, but 
applies to all human judgement and decision-making (Lerner & Tetlock 1999). This is 
because humans tend to express uncertainty about the likely outcomes of the decisions they 
make (Tversky & Fox 1995) – with experts being no exception (Larkin et al 1980). This 
general shortcoming in how we make judgements and decisions has focused researchers on 
better understanding and reducing instances of error in human judgement and decision-
making – where it is clear what constitutes error.  
Being sure of the ‘right’ intervention or outcome in psychiatric nursing is compounded by 
the fact that what were once regarded as basic tenets of mental heath service provision are 
increasingly subject to constant and robust questioning by mental health professionals, 
academics and service-users (Jackson & Stevenson 2000, Clarke 2003). The 
appropriateness of subjecting individuals to the medical model of psychiatric care has come 
under particular scrutiny (Department of Health 2006, Tee et al 2007, Barker et al 2008, 
Crowe et al 2008, Cutcliffe & Links 2008, Buchanan-Barker & Barker 2009). What 
constitutes the ‘right’ judgement or decision in an individual nurse’s practice will be 
determined by their overall approach to mental health care. A nurse operating from the 
perspective of recovery and person-centred care will view this quite differently from a 
nurse who view matters from a biodeterministic perspective.  
Participants, whose narratives express their groundedness in the medical model, 
discursively constructed this as an empowering and even emancipatory approach that 
hinges on shared decision-making. However, discursive analysis of these narratives 
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demonstrates that whilst this shared decision-making did involve acting in someone’s ‘best 
interests’, this tended to entail subtle coercion of individuals in a process of linguistic 
entrapment (Crawford et al 1995, van Nijnatten et al 2001). Far from cynically exercising 
power, participants appear so habitualised into a mode of practice that I describe as 
routinised paternalism, that they appear to be as unaware of its socially coercive nature as 
they are their intuitive cognitive processes. 
Dunne (2006) has found that the nature of mental heath service provision necessitates the 
involvement of psychiatric nurses in limiting individuals’ choices, e.g., in their care of 
legally detained patients. The concept of the service-user as central to the caring process 
can be seen as contrary to this controlling function of the nurses’ role. This conflict is not 
novel, and has its origins in medicine (Balint 1964, Byrne & Long 1976). For example, 
central to Balint’s (1964) critique of medical practice was physicians’ discursive control of 
consultations.  
However, individuals who engage with psychiatric nurses expect a “positive and nurturing” 
experience (Moyle 2003). The Mental Health Commission (2005), for example, has 
reported that carers and families of service-users see their relationship with the community 
mental health nurse as an important source of support. People reported that the readiness of 
nurses to listen to their concerns and nurses’ expressions of a sincere interest in 
understanding their needs were particularly helpful.  
Although identified as characteristic of psychiatric nursing by Dunne (2006), this “caring 
mentality” was not experienced by everyone who participated in her study. Indeed, the 
subtle coercion and routinised paternalism evident in my own study data are difficult to 
align with “the caring mentality” (Mental Health Commission 2005, p92) valued by 
individuals seeking therapeutic engagement with nurses (Dunne 2006). The evidence 
generated by this study suggests that the problem stems from a lack of shared 
understanding between nurses and service-users as to what constitutes a therapeutic 
relationship.  
Dunne (2006) has cited the structuring of the work of psychiatric nurses as posing a 
particular obstacle in this regard (Dunne 2006). Rather than being the fault of nurses or 
evidence of their unwillingness or inability to care, the lack of authentic therapeutic 
engagement is indicative of the nature of the institutional order of the mental health 
services in which participants work (Berger & Luckmann 1967). Indeed, the contemporary 
view of the role of the nurse as a therapeutic agent has yet to be fully realised in the Irish 
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context, where psychiatric nurses are still emerging from their traditional paternalistic role 
as custodians.  
The fact that in this study, participants’ coercive strategies go hand-in-hand with their 
expression of a desire to act in the best interests of others is indicative of this. Paternalism 
is well documented in the literature as a pervasive feature of the cultures of psychiatric 
nursing (Breeze 1998) and nursing generally (Zomorodi & Foley 2009), and this study adds 
to that body of evidence. Although the appropriateness of paternalism in mental health care 
generally is a matter of debate (Cutcliffe & Links 2008), the associated tendency for 
coercive interventions is ranked amongst its less desirable elements (Sjostrand & Helgesson 
2008, Buchanan-Barker & Barker 2009).  
In this study, paternalistic coercion is evident where participants describe shared decision-
making with people availing of the mental health services. Shared values are central to 
shared decision-making (Woodbridge & Fulford 2004). The evidence in this study suggests 
that there is a mismatch between the values that underpin participants’ descriptions of their 
practice and what other studies have reported as the values of those seeking psychiatric 
nursing care (Noble et al 2001, Mental Health Commission 2005, Department of Health 
2006, Dunne 2006). 
This results in engagement with individuals in which the role of the nurse is to administer 
and oversee routinised interventions, and that of the service-user is to adhere to these 
prescribed regimens. This ongoing dominance of paternalism in Irish psychiatric nursing 
was also detected by Deady (2005), who also identifed the structuring of the work of nurses 
as partly responsible. Dunne (2006) recommends a reconsideration of the therapeutic role 
of psychiatric nurses by looking constructively at how psychiatric nurses’ work is 
structured – particularly with regard to their administrative role.  
The current structuring of psychiatric nurses’ role and work is such that it tends not to 
recognise and value their therapeutic input in terms of interpersonal work that they do. 
Therefore, it appears that the valuing of authentic therapeutic engagement is lacking not 
only in nursing pracitce, but also from a managerial and organisational perspective. It is my 
hope that in publishing findings from this study that I can help to raise awareness among 
nurses and others involved in mental health service delivery of:  
• the need for a more authentic expression of “the caring mentality”  
• the need for recognition, and devaluing, of routinised paternalism as a valid 
underpinning of psychiatric nursing practice; 
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• how the the non person-centred structuring of both the psychiatric nursing role and 
nurses’ everday work is actively hindering therapeutic engagement; 
• the responsibilites of nurses and mental health service providers to recognise and 
work to change non-person centred practices and structures in their work. 
By demonstrating both how subtle coercion works as a discursive strategy at conversational 
level, and how it acts as an indicator of the degree to which paternalism permeates the 
delivery of mental health service, I intend to make both nurses and those working with 
them more aware of its presence. My hope is that this provides the opportunity for both 
those effecting and being affecting by covert paternalistic coercion to limit its influence. To 
this end I aim to make these findings accessible to those who avail of mental health services 
as well as to those who provide them.  
Although participants’ exercise of power is not completely beyond their control, and cannot 
be explained solely as a structural feature of their work organisation and culture (Breeze & 
Reppert 1998, Shattell et al 2008), it is important that individual nurses, or even the 
profession as a whole are not castigated for this approach. Reflecting on my own 
professional practice as a psychiatric nurse, and sharing understanding of that role with my 
peers, I would venture to suggest that psychiatric nurses are, alongside service-users, 
victims of the system of care delivery. From the evidence provided by this study, I concur 
with Breeze & Reppert (1998) that the way in which the work of psychiatric nurses is 
structured impacts negatively on their ability to provide person-centred care.  
This is especially true given the duty of care and paternalistic beneficence that is expected 
of nurses, both by their employers and society at large. This study has demonstrated how 
organisational and societal expectations place nurses in a situation where subtle coercion 
becomes an intrinsic part of being a nurse. However, the issue of covert coercion and use of 
power in psychiatric nursing needs to be discussed not merely with reference to nurses’ 
therapeutic role, nor only as a problem for the psychiatric nursing profession, but as an 
indicator of how society would have certain individuals dealt with.  
The general public, politicians and media commentators may bemoan how psychiatric 
nurses engage with individuals, but in this role they are but the proxies of wider society. 
Subtle coercion and beneficent control are not unique to psychiatric nursing and their 
acceptance as a normative feature of society also needs to be addressed (Chomsky 1989). 
However, this is not to dismiss the need for psychiatric nurses to consider these issues in 
terms of the functions the profession generally and in the context of individual practice. 
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Questionable regard for the personhood of the ‘other’ is intrinsic to the controlling function 
and aptitude of psychiatric nurses (Breeze & Reppert 1998). This study demonstrates how 
control of others can be portrayed as necessary due to their status as damaged and 
inherently disempowered individuals - and by implication somewhat different or even 
lesser as persons. This appears to underpin the routine way in which participants exercised 
covert coercion and control. 
7.4 Implications for Government Policy & Psychiatric Nursing 
Government policy for the future of psychiatric nursing in Ireland is set out in the policy 
document “Vision for Change” (Department of Health & Children 2006). This strategy 
considers the changes needed to provide a more person-centred mode of mental health 
service provision in the Irish Republic along with the necessary changes envisioned in the 
role played by psychiatric nurses. For the most part this involves the psychiatric nursing 
role becoming more specialised with regard to therapeutic engagement. Writing from a 
social constructionist perspective, Berger & Luckmann (1967) have described how work 
roles represent the institutional order of which they are a part.  
In this context, this study has shown that participants work in mental health services where 
the requirements of broader systems of service provision often over-ride individual 
expertise and needs. This was especially evident in the degree to which participants’ roles 
can be seen to be largely routine and habitual in nature. Participants’ close identification 
with these roles could also be seen in how their use of personal pronouns represents nursing 
practice as a corporate affair. 
Whilst the Department of Health & Children (2006) has identified the need to move beyond 
this situation, participant identification with this type of role is such that concrete 
approaches that challenge the current social order and dramatically restructure the work of 
psychiatric nurses are required if this is to be achieved. Such approaches need to be 
informed by a comprehensive understanding of the current roles in which psychiatric nurses 
find themselves and the thinking that underpins those roles. Many nurses currently occupy 
roles that involve routinised domestic and administrative work that limits the potential for 
more autonomous, therapeutic work (DoHC 2006).  
Given this situation it is easy to see how nurses operate from a services-centred as opposed 
to person-centred perspective. This could be seen in the study data in the generalising 
functions participants’ use of phrases such as “will have to”, “we can’t” and “if you”. The 
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example of “if you” in particular pointed towards the association between generalised or 
habitualised aspects of role and the representation of individuals as ‘typical’.  
In “A Vision for Change” (DoHC 2006) the tension between nurses’ roles under the 
traditional, albeit changing, institutional order and that which the policy document sees as 
the coming order is apparent. In the ideal community psychiatric service, nurses are not 
envisioned as having domestic and administrative roles, but working as members of the 
Community Mental Health Team alongside fellow health and social care workers (Mental 
Health Commission 2005, DoHC 2006). To maximise the effectiveness and ability of 
nurses to engage in person-centred therapeutic practice, it is proposed that each nurse 
would have a maximum caseload of 12 service-users.  
Caseload management is seen as constituting a “core skill” (DoHC 2006, p79), competency 
for which may vary depending on nurses’ education and training. Moving beyond the 
routinised and habitual approaches to practice evident in this study is a prerequisite for the 
development of this core skill. However, despite the recommendations (DoHC 2006) for 
more specialised nurses with smaller caseloads currently there is one advanced nurse 
practitioner and fewer than 500 clinical nurse specialists working in the Irish psychiatric 
services (DoHC 2006, National Council for the Development of Nursing & Midwifery 
2008).  
Even when government finances were relatively healthy, there were not enough psychiatric 
nurses to meet the manpower demands of the Vision for Change policy (O’Shea 2008). 
Given that the current global and national economic situation is not likely to improve in the 
short to mid-term (Bergsten 2009), government policy on the psychiatric nursing role needs 
to be more creative and innovative than it has been. Unless the development of mental 
health service provision (and of psychiatric nursing practice in particular) is to stagnate, the 
only option currently available is a dramatic restructuring of how the psychiatric nursing 
workforce is deployed. 
This is against a background where Sir Robert Naylor, who manages the leading hospital in 
the UK and is most likely to be the next head of its National Health Service (NHS), has 
outlined that such restructuring needs to take place across all areas of statutory healthcare 
provision in light of the current economic outlook (Bowcott 2010). He foresees that this 
will involve significant retraining and redeployment of clinical staff. Although not 
employees of the NHS, I believe that it is clear how the professional role participants in my 
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study (and the quality of care available to the public) would be greatly enhanced by the 
application of such a strategy in the Irish context. 
Coming not from an economic, but a therapeutic perspective, Dunne (2006) has pointed out 
that the therapeutic aspect of the nursing role in the Irish Republic needs to be reconsidered 
in the context of how nursing work is structured. Indeed, performance in clinical judgement 
and decision-making needs to be considered in terms of the structural features or the work 
of which it is part (Orasanu & Conolly 1993, Klein 1998). It is perhaps to be expected that 
psychiatric nurses’ delivery of care might fall short of what is expected by the public given 
that the current structuring of their work is rooted in the medical model of psychiatric 
service provision as developed through the custodial asylum system.  
These roots differ significantly from the direction now envisaged for the profession (Mental 
Health Commission 2005, DoHC 2006). The only feasible way forward in this regard is to 
relieve psychiatric nurses of administrative and domestic duties, replacing them with 
workers who are just as capable, but less expensive to remunerate. This not only represents 
better value for money, but would free up psychiatric nurses for retraining and 
redeployment to provide person-centred, therapeutic services of significant value to those 
who use the mental health services – services that are either not currently available or of 
limited availability.  
Given the slow pace of change in Irish mental health services (Sheridan 2008), I realise that 
whilst this is the direction that needs to be taken, progress cannot be expected in the short 
term. In the meantime, the collective action of individual managers, educators and 
practitioners in psychiatric nursing is the only real means by which steps can be taken 
towards a profession that is genuinely more person-centred. The establishment of new 
professional bodies such as the Irish Institute of Mental Health Nursing is indicative of the 
direction that needs to be taken.  
This body is new and has yet to organise its first conference, but is already engaged in 
petitioning and campaigning against what it sees as the paternalistic and coercive nature of 
Irish mental health law and service provision. However, as in other professions, caution 
needs to be exercised lest in the drive towards specialisation for person-centred puposes 
evolves into the pursuit of technical skills and abilities to deliver certain outcomes. 
Considering similar developments in the teaching profession, Dunne (1993) reminds us of 
the ancient Greek concepts of the ‘good’ practitioner as a phronimos, with a sound outlook 
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and a spoudimos, having practical wisdom. Any development of nurses as individual 
practitioners, or the profession as a whole, needs to take this wider view into account. 
In terms of the findings of this study, this means that educational preparation for more 
specialised, person-centred and therapeutic psychiatric nursing practice should not focus 
solely on the attainment of technical proficiency. The evidence provided in this study is 
indicative of some of the values-based issues that psychiatric nurses need to face in 
preparation for a more person-centred role. These show that the preparation of any 
psychiatric nurse for more specialised practice should involves a rethinking and refocusing 
with regard to the philosophy and values that underpin their pratice, particularly as these 
relate to the perception and valuing of individuals using mental health services. 
7.5 Implications for Psychiatric Nursing Education & Continuing 
Professional Development 
The more aware health professionals become of their clinical judgement and decision-
making strategies, the more able they are to develop them (Cioffi & Markham 1997). 
Analysis of the study corpus revealed participant judgement and decision-making to be 
routinised and intuitive. This is to be expected insofar as the context in which registered 
psychiatric nurses’ judgement and decision-making skills are honed is one of a demanding, 
high pressured work environment with significant time limitations.  
The complexity and uncertainty of such an environment are conducive to the use of 
intuitive judgement and decision-making strategies (Cioffi & Markham 1997). An intuitive 
approach may increase the scope for error, although this study has shown how the work of 
Irish psychiatric nurses is such that ‘getting it wrong’ is as much a matter of values as of 
inaccuracy (Woodbridge & Fulford 2004, Tees et al 2007). Critiquing this aspect of 
participants practice from an educational perspective requires education that looks not only 
at concepts such as heuristics, stereotyping, prototypes and exemplars, but consider the 
wider social context of psychiatric nursing practice.  
In considering this study’s implications for education of psychiatric nurses, their use of 
intuition needs to be considered alongside issues such as the extent to which they share 
meaning with service-users, as well as how they use professional power. Also important is 
nurses’ perception of those who avail of mental health services. Participants’ in this study 
described others as typically similar to each other (e.g., “schizophrenics”), yet different 
from the in-group to which they themselves belonged.  
 218 
This creates a distance not just in terms of shared values and understanding, but in terms of 
shared humanity. The research literature would explain participants’ viewing of individuals 
in this way as having been assimilated through a process of experiential and theoretical 
learning (Gilhooly 1990). This is also the case in the medical profession.  
Participants’ intuitive judgements and decisions have their basis in their medical 
categorisation of mental health problems. However, there is no evidence in the data that 
participants use diagnostic labelling to explicitly borrow and wield power from medical 
psychiatry (Hamilton & Manias 2006). These labels simply serve as convenient discursive 
strategies for organising information in the narrative formulation of clinical judgements and 
decisions. Power and coercion do feature in this process, but there is no discernable link of 
a linear causal nature to the use of diagnostic categories in this regard.  
Is the solution to this problem then to make the educational preparation of psychiatric 
nurses less ‘medical’? Perhaps limiting the influence of medical psychiatry in professional 
education and training might help mitigate the tendency for psychiatric nurses to act as the 
‘sorceror’s apprentice’? The situation does not appear to be this straightforward. 
Participant use of diagnostic labels appears to be a routinised part of their practice. This 
seems to be a value-neutral socio-cognitive response of participants to the clinical situations 
in which they find themselves in day-to-day practice. Where power and coercion function 
as part of this response, the evidence points towards its being an inherent feature of the 
socio-cultural context of Irish psychiatric nursing and mental health service provision 
within which this style of judgement and decision-making is learned.  
I have been working to address these issues in nurse education, and clinically-based 
learning at undergraduate and postgraduate levels with my research supervisors. This has 
resulted primarily in our development and delivery of a core module (NS5001) on clinical 
judgement and decision-making at postgraduate level in DCU (See Appendix G). Elements 
of this module have fed into the refining of learning outcomes and teaching content in an 
established undergraduate module on assessment in psychiatric nursing (NS241).  
These modules have been revised to make use of problem-based, case-based learning 
approaches that have proved successful in medical education (Patel et al 1993). In addition 
to this, I have begun to receive unofficial referrals through the Irish Nursing Board (An 
Bord Altranais) to assist Nurse Practice Development Co-ordinators who have been 
appointed the task of follow-up with individual practitioners subsequent to fitness to 
practice inquiries. The delicate nature of these referrals precludes their discussion here, 
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except to note that work with these individuals has also taken the shape of a problem-based, 
case-based learning tailored to suit each situation. 
My experience of this approach has been that using case work raises pracitioners’ 
awareness of the processes involved in their clinical judgement and decision-making 
(Shakespeare 2006). In addition to this they are led to consider the role that values play in 
how they currently approach judgement and decision-making. This is made possible by 
reflection on real life cases in which they have been involved (Robinson & Shakespeare 
1995).  
This is a commonly used approach to help narrow the gap between clinical experience and 
formal education in nurse education (Ivarsson & Nilsson 2009). Essential to this process of 
reflection is that students not only reflect on their practice, but think about their thinking 
(Kuiper & Pesut 2004). This is facilitated by classroom based discussion of cases as well as 
written reflection, which involves not only metacognitive elements, but also consideration 
of social issues such as the otherwise unacknowledged values that permeate students’ work 
culture.  
The mismatch between the values inherent in the culture of psychiatric nursing and what is 
valued by people seeking mental health care points towards a need for their involvement in 
the professional education, undergraduate and continuing, of psychiatric nurses. The need 
for and benefits of this approach been identified in the research and policy literature (Khoo 
et al 2004, Tew et al 2004, Department of Health 2006, Davies & Lunn 2009). I am 
fortunate in this regard, as several members of staff of my school with whom I work in 
developing and delivering our undergraduate and postgraduate programmes have had 
substantial experience of using mental health services.  
This has enabled students to challenge their views on what constitutes ‘good’ judgement 
and decision-making, not just in psychiatric nursing, but in other areas of nursing (Gambra 
& Leon 2002). As well as learning about the need for accuracy and reducing the scope for 
error by understanding the application of evidence-based practice (Garb 2005), students 
learn about the importance of valuing the uniqueness of individuals they work with and the 
situations they find themselves in. This constitutes part of a broader humanistic perspective 
(Petit dit Dariel 2009) on nurse education represented in the undergraduate and 
postgraduate frameworks of which the modules are part.  
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7.6 Study Limitations 
As already mentioned at several points throughtout this thesis, the exploratory descriptive 
nature of this study limits its consideration of psychiatric nurses’ judgement and decision-
making to broad issues (Gleeson & Higgins 2009). The predominantly qualitative nature of 
the approach involved is such that findings cannot be generalised or said to be predictive of 
behaviour in the same way that they might be from a large scale quantitative study (Wilks 
2004). A further limitation of the study design is that it does not allow for incisive insight 
into any one area of participant judgement and decision-making, e.g., assessment of risk of 
self harm.  
The nature of the data is such that the conclusions that can be drawn from their analysis are 
also limited in comparison to those that could be made using data generated by an 
observational study. This is because participant narratives represent participant 
reconstruction of events in order to give a presentation of themselves (Goffman 1969, 
Silverstein 1995, Nunkoosing 2005) and their role (Berger & Luckmann 1967, Gilbert 
1980) in a particular light. Furthermore, as well as narrative reconstruction of events, the 
retrospective data involved participant recall. The subjective uncertainty involved in this 
process is particularly apparent from the use of qualifiers such as “I think”, “maybe” and 
“suppose” in constructing the narratives, as well as metacognitive disclaimers (e.g., 
participants saying that they are “stuck for words”) (Edwards & Potter 1992a).  
It must be recognised, therefore, that the nature of data collection has resulted in accounts 
that are somewhat removed from actuality (Gilbert & Mulkay 1984, Edwards & Potter 
1992a, Kvale 1996). These data cannot be said to validly represent what actually happened, 
nor even what the participant perceives as having happened (Schegloff 1989). What they do 
represent is how the participant chose to describe to the researcher, based on recall, what 
they perceived as having happened (Edwards & Potter 1992a).  
If this study had set out to study precisely ‘what happened’, or to measure accuracy in 
participant judgement and decision-making, it would be left at some remove from its aims 
and objectives. However, the study did not set out to answer particular hypothetical 
questions or offer solutions to specific problems (Nunkoosing 2005, Tachibana 2005). 
Instead, both the retrospective narratives and in-vivo data are intended to shed light on what 
is normative in the clinical judgement and decision making of participants. 
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However, the primary aim of this study is to explore the clinical judgement and decision-
making of participants (Taylor 2001). Whilst viewing participants’ narratives as a resource 
to look at how they make judgements and decisions, I also recognise that robust analysis 
requires me to be wary of claims to be able to see past the language itself into the cognitive 
processes of participants. To this end, my analysis has considered issues ranging from how 
meanings are constituted in participant narrative to less contextual phenomena such as 
participant expression of opinion.  
In order to make this analysis as robust as possible, I have used methods of analysis that 
rely on indirect and paraverbal expression as much as they depend on my interpretation of 
participants’ direct expression. The validity of this approach can be seen in the fact that 
participants’ expression of, for example, hesitancy and uncertainty, tends to be implicit 
rather than explicit. Indeed, key findings hinge on this approach as much as they do on 
participants’ explicit reconstruction of events and selves in retrospective data and 
presentation of themselves and their normative practice in in-vivo data. 
Whilst I do share the same professional background as participants, I remain cognisant of 
the fact that I have engaged with them as an outsider (Taylor 2001). In particular, I am 
aware of the potential for perceived inequalities in power, status and expertise due to my 
role as an academic and researcher. This may account to some degree for the hesitancy of 
participants to discuss some aspects of their practice – a phenomenon that has been 
discussed in detail in the preceding chapters. 
7.7 Conclusion & Summary of Recommendations 
In conclusion, this study reveals that amid the complexities of the social and cognitive 
interplay of forces that shape the judgement and decision-making of registered psychiatric 
nurses, areas can be discerned that are key to the development of their roles and 
capabilities. The study participants’ expressions of confidence indicate a considerable 
degree of trust in their own initial causal inferences (Hastie & Pennington 2000). These 
inferences are based on domain specific information that strongly features prior knowledge 
derived from pre-encounter data (Crow et al 1995, O’Neill et al 2005, p71) and from 
theoretical knowledge.  
Numerous studies have shown this complex cognitive activity to be characterised by 
uncertainty and complicated by factors such as the limitations of memory (Carnevali & 
Thomas 1993, Kaempf et al 1996, Klein 1998, Thompson & Dowding 2002, Garb 2005). 
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Given the routinised and habitual nature of participants’ practice, their expressions of 
confidence can be seen as widening the scope for error. Although error in this context is not 
necessarily always a matter of inaccuracy or lack of empirical precision, it warrants 
attention. 
Whilst further research focusing on the nature of error as encountered in the psychiatric 
nursing role in the Irish context would be required for more specific comment with regard 
to the profession, individual practitioners can be enabled examine their own roles with a 
view towards improvement. This would serve, in particular, to lessen the scope for value-
based error, as well as exploring nurses’ awareness of what this might mean. Some 
participants in the study, for example, describe the covert curtailing of choice and exercise 
of coercion as part of the beneficent function of their role. 
A blame-free forum is required in which to address these issues in individual practice. In 
the previous section I have discussed how educational preparation that enables individual 
practitioners to examine their routinised, intuitive approaches to clinical judgement and 
decision-making is also required. To complement this, approaches such as informal peer-
level clinical supervision could enable practitioners to continue to engage with this process 
after they complete their undergraduate or postgraduate studies (Shanley & Stevenson 
2006). This could facilitate the ongoing examination of how individual practitioners’ 
habitualisation and routinisation of judgement and decision tasks could serve as a 
springboard for specialisation rather than a self-perpetuating treadmill of non-developing 
practice. 
In summary I list the following recommendations, some of which I hope to help address in 
the context of my own future work. It is also my intention to promote these 
recommendations through my dissemination of the findings of this research study. In line 
with Flanagan’s (1954) recommendations for researchers using critical incident technique, 
this dissemination will target both the academic community and the community of 
practitioners (with mindfulness regarding confidentiality) from which the data were 
collected. The recommendations from this study are as follows: 
• Research should be undertaken that investigates and further defines the nature of 
error in psychiatric nursing. The findings of this study about the value-based nature 
of approaches to practice that are less than ideal could be a starting point for 
research to measure the degree, extent and potential consequences of this type of 
error. 
 223 
• The usefuless of verbal and paraverbal markers of subjective certainty, uncertainty 
and hesitancy in this study points towards the need to explore their usefulness in 
other areas of judgement and decision-making research. 
• Further research, following on from this exploratory study, should look at 
psychiatric nurses’ judgement and decision-making with the inclusion of service-
users at all levels. 
• By directly considering the impact of values on clinical judgement and decision-
making, psychiatric nurse education should tackle the issue of how individuals 
using mental health services can be valued as persons as opposed to being 
discursively constructed as powerless and controllable ‘others’. 
• Any attempts to reform psychiatric nursing practice should:  
o Question the wider societal function that psychiatric nurses are asked to 
perform vis-à-vis their proxy role in mental health services. 
o Consider not merely the role and work of psychiatric nurses, but the systems 
and structures of mental health service provision which shape them. 
o Avoid technicist approaches to specialisation which might further distance 
the nurse from those who seek their assistance in recovery. 
• The potential benefits of clinical supervision for psychiatric nurses should be 
explored, not merely at a higher policy level, but in a tangible and practicable 
manner at the lowest local levels of service provision (Stevenson 2005). 
• Education in clinical judgement and decision-making in undergraduate and 
postgraduate nurse education should be used as an opportunity for nurses to 
examine and challenge the values that underpin their practice as well as serving to 
increase their proficiency as accurate and rational practitioners. 
Of course these points for action would require adequate professional and policy drivers 
(Covell & Ritchie 2009). Although it is beyond the scope of this conclusion to suggest 
precise mechanisms, I believe that it is not overly optimistic to view any necessary 
reconfiguration of mental health service provision as an opportunity to challenge the status 
quo in this regard. A time of global change where new ways forward are being sought in all 
avenues of society may offer exactly the type of opportunities needed for Irish psychiatric 
nurses to seriously re-evaluate their roles. 
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Appendix A 
JDM PiP Interview Schedule 
(MacNeela et al 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
JDM PiP 
Case Study Version 
Dr Pádraig Mac Neela 
 
Choice of Case 
1. Time: Should be within past month, and reflect the dominant patient 
characteristics in the associated simulation case (e.g., acute crisis, functional 
impairment) 
2. Challenge: Aim for clinical complexity and high demand on capacity 
3. Representativeness: Full set of interviews should reflect clinical dimensions of 
the case type, and also individual / group decision making, organisational 
angle, better / poorer outcome than expected 
 
Elicit narrative of the incident (beginning-middle-end, 5 minutes) 
Classify: Case type, patient type 
 
1. Was this a typical incident? In what ways was it difficult? 
• Probe for the problems posed in this incident, priorities and goals 
 
2. How would you describe this patient’s condition? What terms come to 
mind when you think of this patient? 
Prompts (Take notes for choosing Example): 
• Change in state during the episode 
• General state (most general depiction of the patient’s condition, combining 
clinical states together into an overall description / formulation, an overall 
conclusion) 
• Clinical and personal states (mid-level judgements concerning clinical condition 
and the person) 
• Domains: Physiological (e.g., functioning of body systems), psychological (e.g., 
optimism, sad), family (e.g., family carer, lack of support), social (e.g., friends and 
neighbours) 
• Risk / inferential judgements 
• Signs and symptoms (the cues / information available to you) 
 
Take an Example of a empirically-based mid-level clinical judgement (e.g., general 
state: at risk of self harm, clinical state: depressed / poor family support / ok 
with independent living) 
I’d like to take one example of a judgement, ‘depressed’, can you tell me what 
kinds of signs and symptoms would be associated with that judgement? 
Take note of the more specific labels used to describe the general label, probe 
for which are the most telling signs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
3. At the time, what did you feel had caused this condition to occur? 
Prompts: 
• Change in explanations – during the course of the episode, with hindsight 
• Working hypothesis to explain the patient’s state, and any alternative 
hypotheses 
 
4. I’d like to ask about the strategies you used in this case, strategies based more 
on thinking and reasoning, and strategies based more on intuitive, quick routes 
to judge situations and make decisions 
• Probe for heuristic type strategies (for example, familiarity heuristic, e.g., 
patient script, patient type; rule based decision making) and reasoning type 
strategies (use of analysis) 
 
5. Describe the situation in which this event was taking place 
Prompts: 
• Any influences to do with task conditions and task environment (e.g., time 
pressure or stress, assistance from colleagues, standard work practices, 
working arrangements, inter-professional collaboration, management views 
• Any influences to do with factors besides the clinical condition (e.g., previous 
history, age, gender, etc., lifestyle, personality) 
 
6. What decisions were you involved in with this case? 
Prompts (Take notes for choosing Example): 
• Autonomous decision making / group decision making 
• Clinical / coordination 
• Micro- and macro-decisions (minor decision / choosing between interventions) 
• Why did the person that this decision would work? 
 
Take an Example of an empirically-based macro decision (e.g., choosing between 
different approaches to care or interventions) 
I’d like to take one example of a decision, ‘choosing to do X’, can you tell me about 
making that decision 
Probe for what the decision was intended to achieve, decision heuristics, what 
was attractive / unattractive, whether other options were identified and ruled 
out, autonomous / group decision making 
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Appendix B 
Case Outlines & Video Scripts 
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PILOT CASE: Damien   Setting: DAY CENTRE 
NB – For all case outlines the language of the original nursing notes from which they 
have been derived has been retained insofar (1) it preserves anonymity and (2) is 
understandable 
 
Presentation 
• Understands that he needs to take his medication and get his Lithium levels checked 
every few months 
• Communicates very well with others.  
• Appears to have problem ++ with constipation 
• Understands that he occasionally needs to go for respite care to Hostel 
• Is very aware of maintaining a safe environment both in unit and in everyday living. 
• Sleep pattern fluctuates 
 
History 
• Has a mood disorder and several admissions to psychiatric hospital. Last admission 
in 1993. 
• Periodic respite care 
• Suffering from manic-depressive illness 
 
Family 
• His family appears to give him good support and have a reasonable understanding 
of his psychiatric illness 
 
Lifestyle 
• All seven children are married; five living abroad and two around town 
• Lives at home with his wife 
• Wife fully understands his illness.  
• Enjoys the crack with fellow workers in unit. 
• Smokes 20 cigarettes a day. 
• Eats well, enjoys his food and does not consume alcohol 
 
Other 
• Weight: 8 stone
 3 
 
 
CASE 1: Karen  SETTING: High Support Hostel 
Presentation 
• Level of communication would be considered fair, she does not mix very well 
socially. 
• Tends to lie in bed especially at weekends if she does not go home 
• Personal hygiene and dress is not great. Maintenance of her bedroom is very poor. 
• Lacks motivation and has to be encouraged to work. She does not mix very well 
outside the hostel environment because she lacks confidence. 
History 
• Living in hostel since 1997. Ten admissions to acute inpatient care due to relapse 
since 1995. 
Family 
• Single 
• Mother is a retired social worker 
• Goes home some weekends, but does not see much of mother on those occasions  
• Gets on well with sister, who looks after her at weekends 
Lifestyle 
• Lives on Disabled Persons’ Maintenance Allowance 
• Sometimes works in kitchen of hostel with domestic staff 
Other 
• Smokes
 4 
 
 
CASE 2: Noel  SETTING: Acute Admission Unit 
Presentation 
• Self-referral  
• Requesting admission  
• “I can’t cope. I can’t sleep” 
• Crying, poor eye contact, very reluctant to talk. Anxious. 
• Low mood last two weeks 
• Expressing death wish 
• Poor appetite 
History 
• Re-admission after recent discharge 
• Seen at clinic 
Family 
• He was back with his partner but she was unable to cope with him and threw him 
out. 
• Parents and partner are aware that Noel is an inpatient. 
• Has 1 child, 2 years old. 
Lifestyle 
• Shared flat with partner but thrown out of same.  
• Smokes 
• Unemployed – no past-times. 
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CASE 3: John  SETTING: Admission Unit 
 
Presentation 
• Self-referral 
• Poor sleep pattern. 
• Feels hopeless and powerless to his situation at present.  
• Feels thoughts racing, needs time to sort his thought out before he can deal with 
same. 
• Has been drinking heavy up to admission, up to 10 pints and 6 shorts a day  
• Admitted to low mood, suicide attempt and suicidal thoughts. He has OD on 
paracetamol 2 days ago and was disappointed that same did not work, “next time I 
take 60, not 26”.  Expressed wish to die, but no suicidal thoughts at present. 
• Has good insight 
• Abnormal grief 
• Feeling depressed since December. 
• Poor appetite. 
Family 
• Widowed. Grieving for his wife who died some months ago (December 2005) of 
cancer 
• Daughter lives abroad 
• Family are aware of admission 
Lifestyle 
• smokes 60+ per day 
• Became unemployed before Christmas as he lost his licence, worked as a truck 
driver.  
• Needs time to sort things out before he can tackle his financial problems. 
• Has been unable to meet mortgage repayments since September 
• No social outlet since wife died, 3.5 months ago, finding life hard to bear since her 
death. 
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CASE 4: Patricia          
 SETTING: Out-Patient Clinic 
 
Presentation 
• Sleeps on and off from roughly 8.30pm to 5.30am daily 
• Not currently psychotic 
 
History 
• Cyclical pattern over last 15 years of not attending clinic post-discharge and of 
voluntary and involuntary admissions to inpatient services. 
• History of intentional self-poisoning. Last incident a few months back. Now 
glad she did not die as a result. 
• History of disturbed sleep. 
• Involved with Psych Services since she was 24 
 
Family 
• Patricia’s father died when she was 11 and her mother when she was 47 (9 years 
ago). 
• Patricia’s mother lived with her up until her death. They were very close. 
• Has 3 brothers 
• She helped one of her brothers rear his children 
• Gave up job after marrying, remains dependant on husband for income 
 
Lifestyle 
• Lives in bungalow with husband who is very supportive.  
• Does not drink alcohol 
• Enjoys playing music 
 7 
Video Script for “Damien” (Pilot Case) 
 
Cues in bold 
 
Characters: 
Damien – main case subject, 60yo man  
Brenda – Damien’s daughter, in 40s 
Brid – Damien’s daughter, in 40s 
Receptionist  
 
 
Scene 1 
Car park outside health centre viewed though a window. Car pulls up and two women, 
Brenda (driver) and Brid (passenger) get out and assist back seat passenger (Damien) 
from car. Damien is stooped over and appears stiffened in gait. Both women assist 
Damien to walk slowly towards day centre entrance (off camera to right). Whilst doing 
this the women address him affectionately as “Dad” and offer him reassurance. He 
remains silent except for quietly expressing assent. 
 
Scene 2 – is heard through an adjacent open door on which the camera is trained 
throughout. 
Trio enter reception area. The women help Damien to sit down. When seated he 
exclaims “Awww! Thank God!”. Brenda approaches receptionist and has the 
following conversation: 
B: Could I see the nurse please.  
R: Ok, are they expecting you? 
B: I don’t know, we were sent here from the Admission Unit. I have a referral 
letter. 
R: Ok, I’ll check and see. 
 
Scene 3 
Camera goes through door and out to reception area. Nurse (camera) is addressed by 
Brid: “Hello, we’ve just brought my father here from the Admission Unit. They’ve 
discharged him and said to bring him here, that you’d look after him here as a day 
patient until his test results come back from the General Hospital. I gave the referral 
letter to the receptionist” 
Damien interrupts loudly: “I want to go to the toilet!” 
Brid: “We’ll bring you in now in a minute Dad” 
Damien: “I have to go now! I need to go!” 
Brid (to camera): “We’d better take him in, I’ll be back to you” 
 
END 
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Script for Clip 1 
Characters: 
Karen – c.34yo woman with Schizophrenia - CAROLINE HAROLD 
Carol – 1st Year Student Nurse NAOMI LINIHAN 
Nurse #1 – DCU staff 
 
Scene 1 – Karen’s Room 
Karen is lying on bed in her room. Appears sullen and tearful. Carol has been asked to 
see if she can get Karen to clean her room with her. 
Carol: “Hi Karen, how are you?” 
Karen does not respond. 
Carol: “Would you like me to help you with cleaning your room” 
Karen does not respond 
Carol: “Karen?” 
Karen sits up in bed and shouts at Carol: “Will yis ever f&$k off and leave me 
alone!!!” before turning over on her side facing wall. 
Carol withdraws from room. 
 
Scene 2 – Hotel kitchen 
Carol addresses Nurse #1, who listens 
“I went up to see if Karen wanted to clean her room, but she just swore at me to go 
away. She was like this yesterday as well when Marian was trying to get her into the 
shower. I thought she was going to hit someone, and Marian said we’d best leave her 
alone for the time being. There’s an awful smell of rotten fruit or something out of her 
room.” 
Nurse #1 “Right, well…” film fades out 
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Video Script for “Noel” Case  
 
Characters:   
Noel – main case subject, c.25yo man dressed in night clothes, dishevelled and unwell – 
pale, coughing constantly 
Briege – RPN 
Joan – RPN  
 
Briege (to Joan): “So everything’s okay really, Noel Cleary has been the only new 
admission. He came in himself late this am, he’s not long gone from here, but he says 
he couldn’t cope; girlfriend threw him out of the flat. She knows he’s here and so do the 
parents, so we’ll see now if she comes in to see him. He’s much the same as last time, 
crying, anxious, not eating, suicidal ideas but no plans. He has an awful cough as well; I 
think he was sleeping rough a couple of nights. The admitting Doctor started him on 
antibiotics for his cough and other than that he’s just on Xanax. He was fairly anxious 
when he came in, but I think the Xanax settled him because he’s a lot quieter now and 
even seems a bit drowsy, probably with the Xanax.” 
Joan & Briege go over to Noel, who is lying curled up on his side in his bed.  He is 
noticeably clammy, and drowsy. He moans now and again between chesty coughs and 
his breathing is rapid and shallow. He is rosy-cheeked with underlying pallor.  
Joan: “Are you alright Noel?” 
Noel continues coughing, moans and shakes his head.  
Briege: “Well you’re only started on the antibiotics since lunchtime today, so it’s going 
to take a while for them to take effect.” 
Noel nods and throws his bed covering back before coughing again. Briege and Joan 
return to office. 
 
Camera lingers on Noel. He is lying on bed as before, coughing constantly. 
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Video Script for “John” Case  
 
Characters: 
Nurse 
John – main case subject, 46 y.o. man  
Mick – fellow inpatient, in his mid 40s 
Gary – fellow inpatient, in his late 50s 
Fred – fellow inpatient, in his mid 30s 
 
It’s Thursday morning, around 11am. The nurse is in engaged in unobtrusive participant 
observation a day room where patients are watching TV, reading, socialising etc. The 
nurse’s eye view is that of the camera. 
 
Scene 1 
John – seated adjacent from the nurse watching TV at a distance of about 15 feet his leg 
is tapping constantly 
Mick – seated next to John, also watching TV 
Gary – seated facing nurse, beyond John and Mick, reading book 
Fred – pacing behind Mick and Gary to and fro nurses position counting on his fingers 
 
Mick (turning to Fred): “Will you ever stop that pacin up and down, you’re getting on 
my nerves!” 
Fred departs off camera hurriedly & muttering 
Mick “I dunno, I couldn’t sleep last night with that fella pacin up and down in and out 
of the toilets” 
John “Ah, you slept alright, from about 2 o’clock anyway” 
Mick “Did I? Doesn’t feel like it!” 
John “Ah yeah. I don’t sleep anyway. You were asleep at about quarter past two, and 
your man settled down at about 3.” 
Gary “I do sleep alright, although I stay up reading as much as I can, it tires me out a 
bit. You should try that John” 
John <a bit tetchily> “I don’t have the concentration for reading.” 
Mick “Well I wouldn’t sleep without me Librium and me sleeper” 
John <laughs lightly> “I could do with twice the amount I get” sighs deeply, gets up and 
leaves room 
 
Scene 2 – just after lunch 
Mick – seated next to John, also watching TV 
Gary – seated facing nurse, beyond John and Mick, reading book 
Fred – back pacing again, as before 
 
John returns to seat, continues to move leg constantly 
Mick “Goin home the weekend Gary?” 
Gary “Ah yeah, myself and the wife are heading down to the daughter for the weekend” 
Mick “Where is she?” 
Gary “Below in Donegal, has a lovely place down there. If it goes well I’ll probably be 
out next weekend then for good” 
John turns quickly to Fred and shouts “Will you ever stop that f*$king pacing!!” 
Fred scurries off muttering 
Nurse calmly “Are you alright John?” 
John “No, I’m not f&*king alright” storms off out of room 
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Scene 3 – around 7pm 
John lying on bed staring despondently at ceiling with nurse sitting at bedside talking 
with him 
Nurse “Is there anything you’d like to talk about John?” 
John <after a few seconds and in a strained manner> “I’d like to get out tomorrow for 
the weekend. I think it would do me good” 
Nurse “What would you do?” 
John <pause> “I’d visit Anne’s [wife] grave.” <pauses, obviously withholding tears> 
I’d stop with Sean [son] <pauses, obviously withholding tears, looks directly at camera 
and says in a stilted, deliberate tone> It would do me good” 
Nurse “Well your review meeting is in the morning, so we can talk to Dr Byrne and see 
what he thinks” 
John remains silent, staring at ceiling 
Nurse “I’ll let you relax for a while. Give me a shout if you want anything” 
John: “Ok” and turns over onto his side, covering his face with his hand 
Camera moves away from bed 
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Video Script for Patricia Case 
 
Setting: Multidisciplinary team review meeting 
Speaking Roles: 
Consultant 
Registrar 
Community Psychiatric Nurse 
Ward Nurse 
 
Consultant: So moving on now to Patricia Wright. I think she’s ready to go today, isn’t 
she? 
Registrar: Yes. She has shown improvement on Stelazine 5mg daily and no longer presents 
as having any persecutory ideas. I spoke with her husband at the clinic and he is happy to 
have her home again. 
Consultant (to Ward Nurse): Do you think is she happy to go? 
Ward Nurse: “She’s keen to go, yes.” 
Community Nurse: “Em, will she be going to the day hospital” 
Registrar: “I spoke with her and she has agreed to attend the clinic next week, but is not 
willing to attend the day hospital” 
Community Nurse: “I doubt she’ll attend the clinic either” 
Consultant: “Well, we’ll see how it goes” (to Registrar) “perhaps you might have another 
chat with her and underline the importance of attending the clinic next week.” 
Registrar: “Okay” 
Consultant: “And continue her on the Stelazine, we’ll review it at the clinic next week. 
Right then, who’s next?” 
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Appendix C 
Details of Sample  
 2 
Sample Details 
 
Participant No Setting * Years Registered. 
1 Community 10 + 
2 Community 0-5 
3 Community 6-9 
4 Community Missing data 
5 Community 0-5 
6 Community 10 + 
7 Community Missing data 
8 Community 6-9 
9 Community 0-5 
10 In-patient 10 + 
11 In-patient 10 + 
12 In-patient 0-5 
13 In-patient 6-9 
14 In-patient 0-5 
15 In-patient 6-9 
16 Community 0-5 
17 In-patient Missing data 
18 Community 10 + 
19 Community 10 + 
20 Community 10 + 
21 In-patient 0-5 
22 In-patient 0-5 
23 In-patient 10 + 
24 In-patient 6-9 
25 In-patient 0-5 
26 Community Missing data 
27 In-patient 0-5 
28 Community Missing data 
29 Community 10 + 
30 In-patient 0-5 
31 In-patient 10 + 
32 In-patient 10 + 
33 In-patient 10 + 
34 In-patient 0-5 
35 In-patient 0-5 
36 Community 0-5 
37 Community 10 + 
38 Community 10 + 
39 In-patient 6-9 
40 In-patient 6-9 
* - Denotes setting at time of data collection.  
Most participants are rotated between settings. 
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Appendix D 
Information Sheet and Consent Form 
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Consent Form 
 
Research Title:  
Nursing Decision Making: Clinical Judgement and Decision Making 
Study 
 
DCU School of Nursing Research Team 
Professor P.A. Scott (Principal Investigator), Dr Padraig MacNeela (NUI Galway), Mr 
Gerard Clinton, Ms Daniela Lehwaldt 
 
 
 
 
I hereby confirm that having read the accompanying plain language statement I,  
____________________ give my consent to be included in the study mentioned above. I 
understand clearly the information provided to me on this study and I am satisfied with the degree 
to which I have discussed my participation with the research team. 
 
I understand that the purpose of this study is to investigate the process of judgement and decision-
making among nurses working in mental health services in Ireland and that no evaluation or 
assessment will be made of my skills in making judgements or decisions, as the study’s purpose is 
to describe what knowledge and thinking strategies I use. I understand that my participation is on a 
voluntary basis and that I may withdraw from the study at any time without being required to give 
an explanation. I understand that as part of my participation in this study my voice will be recorded 
and that if I choose to withdraw from the study that any such recording or other data concerning me 
will be destroyed. 
 
I understand that the study may be published but that my name will not appear in any part of the 
study, nor will any information that could be used to identify me personally or the institution in 
which I work. 
 
Name of participant in block capitals….………………… 
 
Signature of the participant …………….………………… 
 
Signature of the researcher ……………………………….. 
 
Signature of witness……... ……………………………….. 
 
Date: __________________  
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INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Introduction  
This study: “Nursing Decision Making: Clinical Judgement and Decision Making Study” is part of 
a Health Research Board funded research project. We aim to investigate the judgement and 
decision-making of mental health nurses working in Ireland. Nurses are continually required to 
make judgements and decisions in their practice.  
 
What is required? 
To help us better understand how nurses make judgements and decisions, we would like you to:  
• Work through four clinical cases that we have prepared: This will help us understand more 
about how nurses approach judgement and decision-making.  
• We are NOT concerned with labelling these judgements and decisions as “good” or “bad”. 
• We will NOT be making value judgements about your judgement and decision-making. 
• Participation is voluntary - you may withdraw from the study at any time without having to 
give an explanation. 
• Each case will be presented to you using video clips and clinical documentation.  
• In order that we might observe how you make judgements and decisions, we would like you 
to “think aloud” as you work through the case. We will also ask you to complete some 
ratings, and take part in a debriefing interview.  
• It is anticipated that two hours will be required from you for this, which will be part of your 
normal working day.  
 
Confidentiality & Anonymity 
During this time we will record you using a voice recorder. This recording will be used solely for 
data analysis and will be heard by no-one other than members of the research team involved in 
analysis. After this analysis is complete the recording will be destroyed. This is to preserve 
confidentiality and protect your anonymity. 
 
Potential Risks/Benefits 
No evaluation is made of your skills in making judgements or decisions, as our purpose is to 
describe what knowledge and strategies nurses use. This is the first programme of nursing research 
funded in Ireland, so we would appreciate your involvement in increasing our understanding of the 
role that nurses have in delivering quality care in Irish mental health services. 
 
Contact details: 
Professor P. Anne Scott, Principal Investigator – 01 7008271 
Dr. Padraig MacNeela, Grant Holder – 091 512699 
Mr. Gerard Clinton, Researcher – 01 7008523 
Ms. Daniela Lehwaldt, Researcher – 01 7008534 
 
If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent 
person, please contact:  
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-President 
for Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9. Tel: 01-7008000 
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Appendix E 
Jefferson Notation System 
 
 
 
 2 
Symbol Indicates… 
[text Starting point of overlapping speech. 
text] Cut-off point of overlapping speech 
= 
Break and subsequent continuation of a 
single utterance. 
(3) Time in seconds of pause in speech. 
(.) A pause of less than .1 seconds. 
 Falling pitch or intonation. 
 Rising pitch or intonation. 
> text < Enclosed speech delivered more rapidly than usual for the speaker. 
< text > Enclosed speech delivered more slowly than usual for the speaker. 
o
 Whispering or quiet speech. 
CAPS Increased volume in speech. 
text Emphasis or stress on underlined parts. 
:: Prolongation of sound of preceding letter. 
Hhh Audible exhalation. 
.hhh Audible inhalation. 
(text) Unclear speech. 
 (italic text) Description of non-verbal activity. 
$ text $ Words between dollar signs ($) are in a 
“smile voice” 
 
Adapted from Jefferson G. (2004) Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction. 
In (Lerner G.H. Ed) Conversation Analysis: Studies from the first generation. John 
Benjamins, Amsterdam. 13-31. 
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Appendix F 
Results of Comparative Keyword Analysis 
 2 
Keywords in Order of Significance According to Log Likelihood 
 
Keyword observed 
frequency 
in Corpus 1 
(dataset) 
% of  
Corpus 1 
represented 
by word use 
observed 
frequency 
in Corpus 2 
(BNC) 
% of  
Corpus 2 
represented 
by word use 
Log 
Likelihood  
 
“SHE” 8295 1.61 1485 .02 +34376.79 
“HE” 9534 1.85 4412 .07 +32114.24 
“HER” 5456 1.06 366 .01 +25258.39 
“YOU” 12253 2.38 21796 .35 +21748.68 
“KNOW” 5608 1.09 345 .07 +15996.51 
“I” 9844 1.91 22356 .36 +14350.03 
“HIM” 2918 .57 826 .01 +11120.96 
“HIS” 2909     .56   1181     .02 +10166.93     
“MAYBE” 1751 .34 345 .01 +7145.43 
“JUST” 2869 .56 3273 .05 +6727.22 
“SUPPOSE” 1432 .28 203 >.01 +6137.45 
“IF” 2454 .48 4835 .08 +4029.47 
“HOSPITAL” 906 .18 123 >.01 +3905.06 
“MIGHT” 1265 .25 777 .01 +3888.45 
“THEY” 3149 .61 8581 .14 +3855.91 
“BECAUSE” 1846 .36 2601 .04 +3833.57 
“THEN” 1842 .36 2997 .05 +3482.95 
“THINK” 2078 .40 4145 .07 +3378.75 
“DECISION”* 763 .15        152     >.01 +3107.90     
“WE” 3287 .64 12212 .20 +2777.32 
“COULD” 1265 .25 1967 .03 +2466.21 
“OBVIOUSLY” 697 .14 389 .01 +2214.10 
“EVEN” 647 .13 453 .01 +1894.84 
“LOOKING” 563 .11 461 .01 +1547.21 
“FELT” 395 .08 118 >.01 +1487.96 
“CAN” 1390 .27 4332 .07 +1468.76 
“WILL”/“’LL” 1111 .22 4376 .07 +863.36 
“MEAN” 701 .14 1960 .03 +835.60 
 
 
* - used mainly by researcher 
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Appendix G 
NS5001 Module Descriptor
 2 
Module Title Engagement Assessment & Decision Making  
Module Code NS5001  
School Nursing  
Module Co-ordinator Mr Gerard Clinton Office Number H272 
Level 5  Credit Rating 10  
Pre-requisite None  
Co-requisite None  
 
Module Aims  
To enable students to critically explore the nature of clinical and managerial judgement and 
decision-making within the context of engagement and assessment in collaborative and 
autonomous practice.  
Learning Outcomes  
On completion of this module students will be able to:  
• Critically reflect on the influence of individual, professional and organisational 
value systems, processes and approaches on how they engage with people’s 
experiences of health, illness and health care provision when making judgements 
and decisions.  
• Demonstrate and critically appraise assessment processes and their underpinning 
ideologies, philosophies and intended purposes in terms of their contribution to 
decision-making and outcomes in their defined area of practice.  
• Critically discuss how theories of engagement, assessment (judgement) and 
decision-making inform and influence organisational activity, e.g. interaction with 
service-user’s carrying a particular diagnosis.  
• Critically analyse the processes of judgement and decision-making within clinical 
and organisational practice in terms of the notion of collaborative intra- and inter-
professional teamwork.  
• Critically explore ways of engaging with the values, goals and motivations of others 
in order to develop collaborative competence in judgement and decision-making.  
• Utilise their understanding of judgement and decision-making to critically direct 
their approach to reflective and evidence-based practice.  
Indicative Time Allowances  
 Hours  
Lectures 26  
Tutorials 4  
Independent Learning Time 120  
Total 150  
 
 
 
 
NOTE  
Assume that a 10 credit module load represents approximately 150 hours' work, which 
 3 
includes all teaching, in-course assignments, laboratory work or other specialised training 
and an estimated private learning time associated with the module. 
Indicative Syllabus  
• Models and methods of judgement and decision-making.  
• Language, perception and communication in relation to predominant discourse and 
knowledge around engagement, assessment and decision-making, e.g. the influence 
of medical hegemony  
• Organisational and environmental influences on engagement, judgement and 
decision-making.  
• The role of classification of personal and clinical phenomena in engagement, 
assessment and decision-making.  
• Use of information in the clinical setting to inform judgement and decision-making.  
• Theories and practical application of reflection-in-practice and reflection-on-
practice to issues around engagement, assessment and decision-making.  
• Defining and making sense of evidence-based practice as it relates to engagement, 
assessment and decision-making.  
• The intuitive-analytic spectrum/dichotomy in judgement & decision-making in 
healthcare  
• Research approaches to judgement & decision-making in healthcare  
• Experience, expertise and engagement, assessment and decision-making.  
• Using a case study approach to understand engagement, assessment and decision-
making  
• Comparing the contribution of cognitive psychology, philosophy and sociological 
perspectives on engagement, assessment and decision-making.  
• Judgement and decision-making in groups and by individuals  
Assessment 
Continuous Assessment 100% Examination Weight 0% 
 
 
Programme or List of Programmes  
GDCAHP Grad Dip Child & Adol. Health Care Prac 
GDCANP Grad. Dip. Child & Adol. Nurs. Practice 
GDGHP Grad Dip in General Health Care Practice 
GDGNP Grad Dip in General Nursing Practice 
GDIDHP Grad Dip Intell. Dis. Health Care Prac. 
GDIDNP Grad Dip in Int. Dis. Nurs. Practice 
GDMHNP Grad Dip in Mental Health Nurs. Prac. 
GDMHP Grad Dip in Mental Healthe Care Prac. 
 
